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Part I - The Community economy 
1. Introduction : the central issue 
The present Annual Economic Report for 1983-84 is 
submitted to the Community institutions in accordance with 
established procedures. ' 
The present short-term forecasts indicate only a hesitant and 
patchy recovery. The recession of three years, 1980 to 1982, 
was exceptionally long and damaging to the employment 
situation. These developments follow a whole decade of 
failure to achieve any substantial growth in employment 
alongside the rapid growth of population of working age. 
This report is therefore addressed to the central issue of 
economic policy now facing the Community: how to devise 
policies that will foster a stronger and durable recovery in the 
The Commission's proposed Annual Economic Report is submitted to the 
Community institutions in accordance with the Council's l 974 Decision 
for attainment of a high degree of convergence of economic policies of 
Member States (Article 4 of Decision 74/120/EEC of 18 February 1974, 
amended by Decision 75(787/EEC of 18 December 1975). The Council is 
required in the fourth quarter of each year-on proposal of the 
Commission and after consulting Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Committee-to adopt an annual report on the economic situation 
in the Community and to set economic policy guidelines to be followed by 
each Member State. 
As in previous years the Commission is preparing, as a separate 
background document, an Annual Economic Review which contains a 
more detailed factual analysis of economic trends and the outlook for the 
year ahead. This second document is for the information of the Council, 
Parliament and Economic and Social Committee. 
Table 1 
The European Community economy, main economic aggregates 1961-84 
growth of production and employment m the European 
economy. 
These questions have been highlighted by requests made in 
the conclusions of the European Council at Stuttgart on 
17-19 June 1983. The European Council requested the 
Commission: 
(i) 'to prepare a detailed analysis of the nature and extent of 
the recovery and what the authorities are already doing 
to support, consolidate and accelerate it'; 
(ii) 'to make full use of Community financial instruments in 
a coordinated manner to sustain and consolidate the 
economic recovery'; 
(iii) 'on this basis, to indicate what new factors the Member 
States and the Community can bring forward to 
underpin the recovery, as and when necessary'. 
The European Parliament for its part decided at the end of 
1982 to engage work on the conditions for recovery of the 
European economy. It has subsequently decided to conduct 
a debate on this early in 1984, preceded by a phase of 
consultations. 
These various initiatives in effect concern the same central 
complex of economic problems. In responding to the 
mandate of the European Council, the present report sets out 
the conclusions that the Commission draws regarding the 
lines of action that seem appropriate for the period ahead. 
GDP GDP GDP Consumer Compensation Current General Money Unemploy-
nominal volume price price per account of 
increase growth increase increase employee balance of 
payments 
%4 %4 %4 0/ 4 "; 4 0 ;GDP /o 
1961-70 9,1 4,7 4,3 3,8 8,9 0,4 
1971-80 13,0 2,9 9,8 9,7 13,3 -0,1 
1981 8,7 -0,4 9,1 10,1 12,1 -0,6 
1982 9,5 0,4 9,1 8;7 9,6 -0,6 
1983 Last report I (7,5) 1,1 (7,0) (6,6) (7,4) -0,4 
1983 This report 2 6,9 0,5 6,3 6,3 7,2 -0,2 
1984 3 6,6 1,5 4,9 5,6 6,0 0,0 
Of October 1982. Figures in brackets from the last annual report are revised as a result of change in statistical weighting methods. 
Estimates of the Commission services, October 1983. 
Forecast of the Commission services, October 1983, on the basis of present or anticipated policies. 
EC averages calculated with current GDP weights at purchasing power parities. 
End of period (annual growth rates). 
government supply ment 
net lending growth rate 
or borrowing 
%GDP ~<, 4, 5 0/ /o 
-0,4 10,4 2,1 
-2,8 13,8 4,2 
-5,2 10,8 7,8 
-5,2 10,7 9,5 
-4,9 10,0 10,3 
-5,4 10,1 10,4 
-4,7 7,8 10,9 
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2. The nature and extent of the recovery in 
progress 
The following sections set out an assessment of the extent of 
the recovery now taking place, and the risks surrounding the 
outlook; on the extent to which the problems of unemploy-
ment, inflation and the balance of payments are being 
corrected; and finally, on the extent to which the underlying 
performance of the European economy seems to be 
changing. 
2.1 A hesitant European recovery in a turbulent international 
setting 
The recession, for the Community as a whole, probably 
ended around the end of 1982. The recovery which is taking 
shape (Graph I) offers the possibility of a progressive 
improvement in the economic situation. However, interpre-
tation of the movement in progress, which in any case differs 
among the Member States, should not be exaggeratedly 
optimistic. It remains slow, and fragile in all respects, 
particularly because of a series of risks relating, as described 
in the report, to the international environment. In the EC the 
total volume of output (GDP) remained stable in the second 
quarter of 1983 after rising at an annual rate of around 2~;,; in 
the previous two quarters, but the level of industrial 
production in the second quarter of 1983 was still lower than 
in the third quarter of 1982; in the United States, by contrast, 
Table 2 
Forecast evolution of gross domestic product in 1983 and 1984 
1983 1983 
Nominal GDP Nominal GDP 
(previous GDP outut 
report) volume 
B 7,9 6,2 -0,9 
DK 8,6 9,8 2,2 
D 4,7 3,8 0,7 
GR 23,0 19,5 -0,2 
F 10,8 9,5 -0,3 
IRL 15,5 11,2 0,5 
I 16,9 14,1 -0,8 
L 8,8 5,6 -2,4 
NL 3,3 1,9 0,3 
UK 8,2 7,9 2,8 
EC (7.5) 6,9 0,5 
Source: Commission services. 
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industrial production has grown strongly (Graph 2). At all 
events, it is a characteristic of the present economic cycle that 
neither the recession nor the recovery phase has been 
particularly pronounced in Europe. 
Gross domestic product 
EC 
us 
Industrial production 
EC 
us 
(':'.~ increase at seasonally adjusted annual rates ) 
1982 
whole 
year 
0,4 
-2,2 
-1,4 
-8,5 
1982 
Q. 4 
2,3 
-1,3 
-6,6 
-9,3 
1983 
Q. l Q. 2 
2,1 -0,21 
2,6 9,2 
2,8 2,8 
12,1 20,2 
Figures for individual quarters are often erratic, and the early results are subject to 
revision. In the second quarter of 1983 there was a strong rise of output in Germany, 
offset by drops in Italy and the UK. However in the UK case alternative official 
estimates indicate stability in this quarter. 
In its composition, the recent growth in Europe has been 
essentially due to a pick-up in private consumption, 
stockbuilding and house-building. This has been helped by 
the decline in inflation directly, as well as indirectly through 
lower nominal interest rates. It will be recalled that around 
the beginning of 1982 there were also signs of a modest 
recovery. But these were sharply reversed by a collapse in 
world export demand, whose proximate cause lay in 
international debt and monetary problems. 
('.i; change) 
1984 
GDP Nominal GDP GDP 
price GDP output rEricc 
deflator volume de ator 
7,1 7,0 0,6 6,3 
7,4 6,5 1,2 5,2 
3,1 5,1 2,1 3,0 
19,7 19,7 1,5 17,9 
9,8 7,7 0,4 7,3 
10,6 10,1 1,8 8,2 
15,1 12,0 1,5 10,4 
8,2 6,3 -1,0 7,4 
1,6 2,4 0,0 2,4 
4,9 7,2 2,2 4,8 
6,3 6,6 1,5 5,1 
The experience of previous cycles suggests that in a second 
phase investment and exports should become the engines of 
the recovery process. For this to happen it is important that 
there should be a decline in interest rates-which would help 
not only the growth of private investment within Europe but 
also a steady recovery in world trade through an easing of 
debt service burdens. 
The distribution of the European recovery by country is 
quite uneven. The main growth is forecast in the UK and 
Germany. In some countries the recovery will be retarded for 
reasons of necessary policy adjustment. 
Looking ahead, there is a range of indicators which supports 
the forecast of gradual recovery (Graph 9). Surveys of 
opinion among consumers, industrialists, and construction 
enterprises all show widespread improvements. The share 
price index has in most countries showed striking gains, and 
this is usually a leading indicator of business prospects. 
Revised forecasts by the Commission now suggest that the 
year-on-year GDP growth rates for the EC as a whole will be 
0,5% for 1983 and 1,5% for 1984. Among demand 
components, in 1984 exports are expected to grow by 3,4%, 
investment by 2,0%, private consumption by 0,5% and public 
consumption by - 0, 1 %, whereas stock building is expected 
to contribute a little to growth. While aggregate growth will 
be modest, its structural composition should thus be broadly 
in line with policy objectives. 
This slow European recovery contrasts with that of the US. 
However, while not denying that a major stabilization effort 
has been made in the US and that its economy possesses 
genuine advantages of size and flexibility, it should be 
stressed that the US recovery springs to a considerable extent 
from a disequilibrium between a budgetary policy with 
expansionary effects and a monetary policy whose overrid-
ing aim, even though it has recently been more accommodat-
ing, is to reinforce the slowdown of inflation. The 
consequences of such a policy in terms of interest rates, the 
exchange rate and the trade deficit can, in the short term-
and so long as their international impact is not taken into 
account-be more easily borne by a powerful, homogeneous 
economy benefiting from the advantages conferred by the 
status of its currency. In the Community, the economic 
policies of the Member States are subject to narrow margins 
of manoeuvre which reflect more burdensome constraints, 
notably constraints emanating from abroad. This situation 
has two consequences. First, an economic policy analogous 
to that in the US cannot be adopted in the Community. 
Second, the effectiveness of European policies is very largely 
determined by their degree of coordination. 
As to the effects of the US recovery on Europe, there are 
simultaneous and partly offsetting influences through 
several channels: the stronger direct US demand for imports, 
The Community economy 
but also a more complex set of interest rate, exchange rate 
and business confidence effects. To give a simple first 
perspective, total European exports of goods and services to 
the US amounted in 1982 to around USO 50 OOO million or 
2% of the EC's GDP. Every 5% increase in these exports 
would amount to a direct demand impulse of 0, 1 % of GDP. 
Taking into account further possible European export gains 
in third country markets as well as the US, in part as a result 
of the appreciation of the dollar's exchange rate, the total 
boost for European exports could-ceteris paribus-be twice 
or three times as great. However there are important factors 
reducing this expansionary impact. The Japanese yen has 
remained relatively weak, which means that European 
competitivity gains overall have been much more limited 
than the dollar-ECU comparison might suggest. In addition, 
high world interest rates dampen the capacity of the indebted 
Third World countries to import, inter alia from Europe 
among others. Finally, financial conditions within Europe 
are less favourable than they might otherwise have been, as a 
result of US interest rate conditions and of a larger dollar 
appreciation vis-ii-vis the EC. Overall it is hard to say where 
these offsetting influences net out; it should not be easily 
presumed that the balance for Europe is positive. 
The world trade environment has evidently been depressed 
over the past three years (with nil or negative growth in 1981 
to 1983) as a direct or indirect result of the second oil shock to 
begin with, and then the large and unpredictable swings in 
world interest rates and exchange rate conditions. An 
acceleration of world trade is expected for 1984 (growth 
could be 3,5%, according to Commission forecasts). The EC 
may be expected to make some small gains in market share. 
2.2 Stabilization of the unemployment rate? 
While a complete analysis cannot yet be made, and caution is 
therefore called for, it seems that the recovery in activity was 
accompanied at the beginning of 1983 by a slowdown in the 
growth of unemployment and even a degree of stabilization. 
It should not be forgotten in interpreting this development 
that the forecasts for 1984 show a further slight increase in 
unemployment. In any case the level of unemployment 
remains excessive: total unemployment at the end of August 
stood at 11,7 millions, compared with 10,6 millions at the 
same time last year. 
From March to June 1983, the seasonally-adjusted average 
rate of unemployment in the EC remained stable at the peak 
level of 10,7%, and the observation for July showed a slight 
fall to 10,6%, making it the first month to record a fall since 
July 1979. This level remained unchanged in August. The 
pattern of a stabilization or slight fall in unemployment since 
the spring of this year was common to all of the four large 
Member States, although continuing rises are still evident in 
most of the other countries and unemployment growth rates 
over the last 12 months are still positive for all Community 
11 
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GRAPHS I to 4 : Comparative evolution of the EC, US and Japanese economies, 1979-83 
I. Gross domestic product, s.a. 2. Industrial production 
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GRAPHS 5 to 8: Comparative evolution of the EC, US and Japanese economies, 1979-83 
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GRAPH 9: Indicators of output and economic sentiment - EC 
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Table 3 
Indicators of macroeconomic disequilibria and constraints in 1983 
Unemploy- Private Balance of Real rate Public finance Public debt 
mcnt consumhtion payments of % of GDP 
rate de ator current interest. I Budget Budget 1982 2 
~o change account long-tenn balance balance less 
% of GDP % of GDP interest 
payments 
B 14,4 7,8 -2,4 3,6 -12,2 -2,9 (97,8) 
DK 10,7 6,6 -2,2 7,8 -8,8 -3,9 25,8 
D 8,6 3,0 0,9 5,5 -3,3 -0,7 38,3 
GR 7,8 20,5 -5,0 -0,6 -6,3 
F 8,9 9,0 -1,8 4,1 -3,1 -1,4 (16,8) 
IRL 14,6 11,0 -2,6 3,5 -13,4 -3,3 102,5 
I 9,0 15,0 -0,4 2,3 -11,9 -3,5 70,3 
L 1,8 8,4 -2,9 -4,8 
NL 15,6 2,8 3,3 6,5 -6,7 -3,4 (54,0) 
UK 11,7 5,7 0,2 6,7 -2,2 +0,9 54,7 
EC 10,4 6,3 -0,2 3,6 - 5,4 -1,6 (43,4) 
Government bond yield in July 1983 adjusted by consumer price inflation over the preceeding 12 months. 
Central government debt for DK, GR, F, IRL, L, NL: general government debt for D, 'settore statalc' for I, public sector for Band UK. 
countries except France. By comparison, in the United States 
the rapid cyclical recovery has already reduced the rate of 
unemployment quite substantially from a peak of 10,7% at 
the end of 1982 to 9,5% in July of this year. 
Coming after three years of continuous sharp rises in 
unemployment, the significance of. these recent develop-
ments needs careful assessment. 
The statistical definition of unemployment has been revised 
in several countries (raising the total in the Netherlands but 
reducing it in Belgium and the United Kingdom), but the 
time-series have been corrected and so this does not affect 
materially the recent trend. 
The principal questions are whether the very recent 
stabilization of unemployment is to be attributed to a 
strengthening of labour demand or a reduction in labour 
supply, and whether this will now be sustained. 
Although a definite assessment of the recent development of 
labour supply and demand cannot yet be made, there is some 
evidence that labour demand has strengthened a little: the 
number of vacancies registered showed increases in the 
second quarter of this year in the FR of Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands, but not in France, 
where they fell. The modest output growth recorded in the 
last three quarters may at least have arrested what was 
previously a slightly declining trend in total employment. 
The intensification of special labour market measures 
concerning, especially, young people and early retirement for 
older people (see further below) has had an effect on both 
labour demand and supply. One result is probably that the 
labour force is now nearly static in size, whereas the 
population of working age (15-64) is growing by over I~,;; in 
1983. Some direct employment-creation measures have also 
been taken in a number of countries (again see below). 
Overall, it seems probable that changes on both the labour 
demand and supply sides lie behind the recent developments 
in unemployment. 
Forecasts indicate that the growth in unemployment will 
resume and that there will be a slightly higher yearly-average 
rate in 1984 compared with 1983. Some types of labour 
market measures may be reaching the limits of their 
expansion, and therefore output growth would have to 
strengthen if a renewed rise in the unemployment trend were 
to be avoided. However, the evolution of participation rates 
and productivity trends and the possible reaction of the 
labour market to real wage adjustments is also a matter of 
considerable uncertainty. In addition, the process of 
reducing and reorganizing working time is probably 
accelerating, and given certain prerequisites (also referred to 
further below) this could help ease the unemployment rate. 
Not all of the unknowns are therefore on the pessimistic side 
of the central forecast. 
Not all of the unknowns are therefore on the pessimistic side 
of the central forecast. 
15 
Annual Economic Report 1983-84 
2.3 A gradual convergence on slower inflation 
Considerable, but far from complete, progress has been 
made in reducing inflation in the period since the second oil-
price shock in 1979-80. In 1980 the EC average consumer 
price rise was similar to that of the US, being in the region of 
14%. By August 1983 the 12-month rate of increase had 
declined to 8,2% in the EC but to 2,6% in the US. In recent 
months there have been signs that in both the US and the EC 
the deceleration in inflation may have progressively been 
tending to ease off. 
Consumer price increases, % 
1980 1981 1982 12 months to 
August 1983 
B 6,6 7,6 8,7 7,9 
DK 12,3 11 ,7 10,1 6,1 
D 5,5 5,9 5,3 3,0 
GR 24,9 24,5 21 ,0 20,0 
F 13,6 13,4 12,0 9,6 
IRL 18,2 20,4 17,2 10, 
I 21,2 19,5 16,4 13,6 
L 6,3 8,1 9,4 8,3 
NL 7,0 6,8 6,0 2,7 
UK 18,0 11 ,9 8,6 4,5 
EC (10) 14,3 12,8 10,9 8.2 
us 13,5 10.3 6,2 2,6 
Decomposing the total 7 percentage points deceleration of 
inflation (measured by the total expenditure deflator) within 
the EC from 1980 to 1983, slower import price rises 
accounted for 2,5 points, unit labour costs 4 points and 
indirect taxes 0,5 points. While slower unit labour cost 
increases thus helped on average to reduce the inflation rate 
substantially, there were notable differences as between 
countries in the extent of the real wage adjustment in 
response to the second oil shock. Taking 1981 and 1982 
together some real wage cuts occurred in several countries: 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands. However, in France, Italy, Greece and the 
United Kingdom real wages continued to grow. 
As regards the problem of divergent inflation rates, the 
figures above for the four larger countries show some 
progress in that the deceleration has (in percentage points) 
been greater in the countries which had double-digit rates of 
inflation in 1980. By mid-1983 the reduction in inflation had 
been 3 points in Germany, 4 points in France, 6 points in 
Italy, and 14 points in the United Kingdom. Indeed, by mid-
1983 no EC countries except Italy and Greece any longer had 
16 
double-digit inflation. In 1982 Denmark, France and Ireland 
were in double digits and in 1981 this was also true of the 
United Kingdom. 
With the cycles of world inflation at times strongly 
influenced by world commodity prices, it is to be noted that 
the low-point in the weakening of commodity prices in 1981 
and 1982 has now passed. For non-oil commodities there was 
a clear break in trend around the end of 1982 as world prices 
for agricultural and mineral commodities turned sharply up 
(18% in dollar terms, 34% in ECU terms in the first nine 
months of 1983). However this upward movement has been 
halted in recent weeks. The impact on costs and prices within 
the EC is reduced for agricultural commodities covered by 
the CAP, but is immediately felt for such commodities as 
rubber or aluminium. For the time being the positive aspects 
of these price adjustments must be recognized : they improve 
the terms of trade of many heavily indebted developing 
countries and are a condition for expansion of capacity in a 
number of cases. 
GRAPH I O: Commodity prices 
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The average price for oil imported into the EC did decline in 
dollars from USO 33, 7 per barrel in the fourth quarter of 
1982 to USO 29,4 in the second quarter of 1983, following 
the cut in OPEC's marker price to USO 29 on 14 March 
1983. Spare production capacity in OPEC countries should 
ensure a period of approximate dollar price stability through 
to 1984. However the price of oil in ECU has hardly declined 
at all from its mid-1981 peak level, and with the further recent 
appreciation of the dollar the ECU price probably rose again 
in the third quarter of 1983. 
As noted in the table above, the deceleration of inflation has 
on average in Europe been considerably slower than in the 
United States. A large part of this difference may be 
identified in the 40% appreciation of the dollar against the 
ECU in the three years from mid-1981 to mid-1983. To the 
extent that at least the more recent rises of the dollar are 
deemed to be 'overshooting', then world inflation has been 
temporarily redistributed to the disadvantage of Europe and 
other countries with depreciating currencies. It is hazardous 
to quantify by how much there would have been a relatively 
better European price stabilization performance with less 
exchange rate movement. However, if for example the ECU 
had depreciated by 15% less against the dollar, certain 
estimates suggest that the difference between the deceleration 
in inflation noted above from 1980 to mid-1983 as between 
the EC and US might have been more than halved. At some 
stage in the future when the dollar/ECU exchange rate 
reverses somewhat, it is likely that the current European 
stabilization effort will be more amply rewarded, if it 
continues to be pursued with determination. 
2.4 Rapid balance of payments adjustments within Europe, 
but problems internationally 
Within the European Community the pattern of balance of 
payments evolutions in the recent past has been a mix of 
several processes: the general adjustment to the second oil 
shock, correction in some cases of large, twin deficits in the 
budget as well as the balance of payments current account 
(e.g. Denmark, Ireland, and Belgium), and correction in 
some cases of problems due to the marked desynchronization 
of business cycles (e.g. in France). 
Overall, this complex adjustment process is proceeding 
reasonably well, both as regards the situation of the EC in the 
world, which is in moderate and declining deficit on current 
account, and as regards the situation of individual Member 
States. Several EC countries which have been in serious 
current account deficit have in recent months been reporting 
much better trading results. In January of this year Denmark 
and Belgium reported their first month of visible trading 
surplus for many years. For Ireland and France, also, a much 
improved foreign trade performance is emerging,. whereas 
the results for Germany and the United Kingdom have 
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recently weakened. In the deficit countries the trade accounts 
have responded quite promptly to corrective measures 
including restraints on internal demand. Visible trade 
balances of course give only an incomplete picture, and rising 
debt service burdens in deficit countries require an improving 
trade account before the current begins to improve. 
However, current account deficits are also being reduced, 
and Commission forecasts for 1984 suggest that in Belgium, 
Denmark and France their size as a share of GDP will be cut 
by two-thirds or more compared to 1982. For Ireland and 
Italy the reduction is even more marked, but for Greece an 
improving trend is not yet evident. 
Major changes in the distribution of current account 
balances at the world level are taking place: 
Balance of payments current accounts 
(USD 'OOO million) I 
1980 1982 1983 
EC -37 -14 -4 
us 0 -II -30 
Japan -II +7 + 18 
OPEC + Ill -4 -22 
Other developing countries -76 -65 -47 
The world balance, in theory equal to zero, differs from zero because of statistical 
discrepancies (non-recording of certain credits). 
Compared to the extreme 1980 situation, by 1982 the 
industrialized and oil-exporting countries had, on the whole, 
completed the adjustment to the second oil-price shock. 
However the developing countries had delayed their 
adjustment, and were also caught heavily exposed to the rise 
in world interest rates. By 1982 their current account position 
was still as unfavourable as in 1980. A rapid adjustment is 
now taking place; for example, Mexico reduced its imports 
by 60~~ over the last 12 months. 
Among the industrialized countries there remain the 
problems of the worsening current account deficit of the 
United States and surplus of Japan. 
For the Community a particular concern is that the US-
Japanese disequilibria are not yet being met by plausible 
exchange rate movements (a weaker dollar and stronger 
yen), Such movements would reduce protectionist pressures 
world-wide, and greatly ease problems of macroeconomic 
policy in Europe. The EC's average competitiveness index 
improved by about a fifth from 1980 to 1982, whereas that of 
the United States deteriorated more than a quarter; however 
that of Japan changed much less. 
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Trade-weighted competitiveness index 
EC 
us 
Japan 
1980 
124 
80 
92 
(1970-75 average = JOO) 
1982 1983 
100 
104 
89 
(estimated) 
100 
104 
97 
It is to be noted that these figures are significant for their 
evolution over time, rather than the relative levels of the 
index in a particular year, and the yen in particular is 
generally considered to be undervalued. 
2.5 Insufficient signs of structural improvement 
With cyclical trends gradually turning in more favourable 
directions, there remains the important question of whether 
the European economy is now on a course of more 
fundamental structural improvement. This notably concerns 
the problems of increasing the medium-run propensity to 
invest and employ, as well as performance in certain crucial 
branches of the economy such as energy and advanced 
technology industries, and services. 
As long as both employment and investment are stagnant, as 
they are on average in the EC, the assessment must at best be 
cautious. Surveys of industrial investment intentions for the 
present year support this view. Between 1975 and 1982, the 
low-points of the two major recent recessions, industrial 
output grew only by 1 % per year in the EC as a whole. Yet 
capacity utilization was reported by industrialists to be at the 
same level in both these years (76%), which illustrates how 
little net addition there has been to the usable capital stock in 
industry and even hints at a possible reduction when capital 
productivity increases are taken into account. 
Total investment has continued to slide down as a share of 
GDP, probably reaching 18,6% in 1983, compared to 21,1% 
in 1980 and also in the 1975 recession year. Investment has 
become increasingly concentrated in market service sectors, 
but employment growth in this branch, while positive, has 
still been much slower than in the United States (1,5% per 
year in the EC, compared to 3 % in the US in the years 1973 to 
1981 ). 
In the energy sector there has been considerable progress. 
Energy deinand has fallen sharply, and this is estimated to 
reflect a sharp responsiveness to price (with an average 
negative long-term eleasticity in the EC of0,45) and a lower 
positive elasticity with respect to output growth than 
previously thought (0,65 rather than around unity). 1 
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For a detailed analysis see 'Energy and the economy: a study of the main 
economic relationships in the countries of the European Community', 
European Economy, No 16, July 1983. 
These economic adjustments can be illustrated by the 
reductions in final consumption of oil per unit of GDP over the 
period 1973 to 1981 as follows: 
(percentages) 
B/L DK D F NL UK EC 10 
-34 -~ -m -m -M -~ -~ -29 
This shows a strong adjustment in all countries. However the 
cost of imported energy, at first in dollars, and then through 
the dollar's appreciation, has continued to rise, or only just 
stabilized for European countries. This may be seen in the net 
import bill of Member States in energy products: 
('000 million £CU) (% of GDP) 
1978 
1980 
1982 
B/L DK D F 
3 
5 
8 
3 12 11 8 
3 25 22 16 
3 31 28 24 
NL UK EC 10 
I 4 
2 I 
2 -7 
40 
76 
91 
ECIO 
2,5 
3,8 
3,8 
As regards the major industrial technologies the evidence 
continues to show a lagging performance in Europe. Recent 
studies by the Commission show the Community's tradition-
ally very strong position in the equipment goods sector to 
have been deteriorating. The EC's export/import ratio in this 
sector declined from 3,4 in 1963 to 2,5 in 1973 and to below 2 
in 1981. While Japan gained strongly (its ratio rose from 2,2 
in 1963 to 9,7 in 1981), the United States appears to have 
arrested its declining performance (the US ratio fell from 3,9 
in 1963 to 1,3 in 1973, but was still at that level in 1981 ). 
Germany, the EC's principal producer, has been worst 
affected. 2 
There have been some examples of striking increases in 
average labour productivity performance, notably in the 
United Kingdom, Belgium and Denmark. However this has 
so far more reflected cuts in employment levels in sectors or 
enterprises which used to be overmanned, rather than 
growth in high productivity enterprises. Elsewhere produc-
tivity growth has slowed down substantially: 
Annual average growth of manufacturing productivity 
per employee 
1960-80 
1980-82 
B DK D F 
5,3 
3,8 
4,5 4,2 4, 7 4,6 
4,4 1,0 1,5 0,6 
NL UK 
5,3 2,4 
2,7 4,7 
EC 
4,0 
2,2 
As regards the adaptability of real labour costs and labour 
income shares and their impact on investment and employ-
For a detailed analysis see 'Community foreign trade; the equipment 
goods industry under threat', European Economy, No 16, July 1983. 
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ment growth in the enterprise sector, there are difficulties of 
measurement and interpretation. However it seems, as 
reported below, that there has been some relative improve-
ment in Europe in the period following the second oil shock 
compared with the first one : real wages seem to have been 
less rigid and there has been some recovery in profits, 
although not in all countries, and overall the change would 
not yet seem to be decisive in relation to the more positive 
environment for enterprise in the United States and Japan. 
In summary, the European economy has set in train a series 
of important economic adjustments and is progressively 
managing to face up to serious external constraints. Thus one 
should not underestimate the results which have already been 
achieved, notably on inflation. These results demonstrate 
both a collective recognition of the changes to be made and a 
capacity to implement the necessary policies. Similarily, the 
energy crisis has shown that the Community is capable of 
adapting to sudden upheavals in prices and supplies. But a 
return to lasting growth requires the continued pursuit of the 
adjustment effort already undertaken. It is on this effort that 
will ultimately depend the Community's capacity to achieve 
a lasting solution to the problem of unemployment. The 
results already achieved and the conditions which must still 
be fulfilled show that it is both indispensable and possible for 
the Community economy to follow through its structural 
adjustment effort and to assure a progressive increase in its 
70 75 80 81 82 83 84 
trend rate of growth . It would, at all events, be a mistake to 
underestimate either the size of the task to be performed or 
the capacity which the Community has recently shown for 
committing itself to such action and for reacting to the 
developments bearing on it. Moreover, the timescale for the 
realization of this task underlines the need to continue to 
_pursue an active employment policy for the more immediate 
alleviation of unemployment, which at its present high levels 
imposes major economic and budgetary costs as well as 
social ones. 
3. Policy to strengthen the recovery: recent 
initiatives and the scope for further action 
The stabi lization policies followed in 1982-83 in the 
Community are now giving rise, as has been shown above, to 
a n·umber of encouraging results: inflation is slowing down ; 
external imbalances are being rectified ; the stabilization of 
public finances is, at least in several Member States, 
proceeding favourably . The beginning of a recovery is 
becoming apparent and an acceleration in growth in 1984 
can reasonably be expected. The situation and prospects with 
regard to unemployment, however, remain a major source of 
anxiety. Moreover, the positive results on the stabilization 
front, and similarly the economic outlook for 1984, are 
highly fragile : this fragility stems both from factors external 
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to the Community and from the need, in terms of domestic 
considerations, to consolidate the results already achieved. 
The often-difficult policies pursued up to now are necessary 
conditions for economic stabilization in the Community; but 
it would be a mistake to think that, because of a start-up of 
activity which is so far purely cyclical, the efforts which have 
been made amount to sufficient conditions for a lasting 
recovery in the Community. The section which follows has 
precisely the aim of drawing out the economic policy actions 
(in the macroeconomic and financial fields; structural 
measures, notably in tht: art:a of unt:mployment) and 
developments (notably wage developments) required to 
bring together the conditions sufficient for a progressive but 
durable recovery in the Community. This analysis hinges on 
four main questions: 
(i) key problems of macroeconomic and financial strategy, 
and more particularly of monetary expansion, interest 
rates and budget deficits; 
(ii) questions linked to the implementation of a whole series 
of structural, sectoral or microeconomically-oriented 
measures which determine the real performance of 
economies, as opposed to their price performance, and 
have a very direct influence on employment; 
(iii) measures aimed directly against unemployment; 
(iv) the specific role of the European Community at the level 
of its share of responsibilities in an important number of 
economic policy fields. 
3.1 The macroeconomic and financial policy assessment 
The principal characteristic of the macroeconomic and 
financial policies pursued in the Community in the recent 
past has been one of increased convergence. Certainly, this 
has not yet been sufficiently evident in all the key economic 
indicators-even though very substantial progress has 
already been achieved on inflation. But going beyond the 
realized outturn, there is now a broadly common approach 
both to very short-term questions and to the more 
fundamental adjustments to be made. In this respect it is 
particularly indicative that the present balance of monetary 
and budgetary policies-indeed narrowly determined by the 
international monetary environment-is the object of a 
rather widespread identity of view about the main medium-
term objectives. Thus the Community's Member States are in 
general seeking to redirect the economy towards stronger 
growth of the private sector and a more satisfactory 
investment performance as well as a lasting consolidation of 
the reduction in inflation. 
It has recently been very difficult to reconcile short-term 
monetary developments with the pursuit of medium-term 
objectives. World interest rates have remained high. This has 
retarded the recovery of productive activity in the Com-
munity-for which the widespread reduction or containment 
of budget deficits has been intended to make room. 
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Disequilibria-often very marked-in public sector deficits 
or public debts, as well as a concern to brook no further delay 
in the stabilization of public finances, have led the Member 
States of the Community to make an effort to limit or reduce 
budget deficits before or, at the latest, at the onset of the 
recovery. 
Thus, for the Community as a whole budget deficits have 
been held broadly constant as a share of GDP during the 
prolonged recession (5,2% in 1981 and 1982, 5,4% in 1983). 
This has entailed restrictive public expenditure and taxation 
measures because of the rising interest rate burden ( + 0,8% 
of GDP from 1981 to 1983 in the EC as a whole, and over 
twice this amount for Belgium, Denmark, IrelaI)d and Italy). 
In addition the recession has automatically raised certain 
expenditures and reduced tax receipts, perhaps by about 
1,5% of GDP over the two years, compared with what a 
modest trend rate of growth would have given. This has also 
been offset by restrictive policy measures. Overall, therefore, 
budgetary policy has been severe. For 1984 it is estimated 
that the total EC deficit will decline to 4,7% of GDP. This 
forecast reflects a growing con&ensus that there should be no 
further delay in correcting the trend of budget deficits. One 
index of the size of the budgetary adjustment at present 
under way is seen in comparing the evolution of the EC's 
average budget deficit as a share of GDP before and after 
deducting interest payments: 
Before deducting interest 
After deducting interest 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
- 5,2 - 5,2 - 5,4 - 4, 7 
- 2,2 - 1,9 - 1,6 - 0,6 
Thus, merely to offset the rising interest rate burden and keep 
the total budget deficit roughly stable, it was necessary to 
make significant tax increases or cuts in other public 
expenditures. 
In the EC as a whole, money supply is expanding at present at 
an annual rate of 10%, whereas nominal GDP is probably 
expanding at a rate of 7%. Monetary policy is thus on 
average allowing for economic expansion in spite of 
international interest rate constraints. 
Some substantial reductions in nominal interest rates in the 
EC have been made. From the beginning of 1982 to 
September 1983 average short-term interest rates in the EC 
fell from 14,3% to 10,5%, and in Germany they fell from 
10,3% to 5,9~~- Over the same period bond rates fell by about 
2,5 percentage points in the EC on average, and by 1,5% in 
Gern1any. There have been some important successes 
registered in some other EC countries, such as Denmark, 
Ireland and Belgium, where stricter public finance and 
incomes policies appear to have changed expectations to the 
point of permitting large interest rate reductions. The most 
striking case has been Denmark. where government long-
term bond yields fell by 7 percentage points over the last 12 
months. 
Short-term interest rates 
Jan. 1982 
Sept. 1982 
Sept. 1983 
B DK D F IRL NL UK EC US 
16,0 15,3 10,3 15,0 18.5 20,5 10,2 14,5 14,3 13,4 
13,0 16,3 8,1 14,0 15,2 18,6 7,9 10,6 12,0 7,6 
9,3 11,9 5,9 12,6 12,8 17,5 6,3 9.8 10,5 9,1 
In general EC Member States have managed a progressive 
reduction of interest rates, compared with the more volatile 
US movements. 
However the real rate of interest remains high. The real 
government bond yield stands at present at 5,5% in Germany 
and 6,5'.;~ in the UK. I During the months of July and August, 
when United States rates were hardening again, distinct 
efforts were made in Europe to minimize the impact on 
European rates. Nonetheless the bond yield in Germany, 
which is little susceptible to short-run policy management, 
rose a full percentage point compared to the lowest level 
experienced this year. 
Several countries (notably Germany, France and Italy) have 
maintained and expanded selective interest rate subsidies in 
favour of productive investments and specific sectors and 
regions, in part so as to give further protection against 
international interest rate conditions. 
A result of the broad European preference for a budget-
monetary policy mix different from that of the United States 
has been the tendency for the ECU's exchange rate to decline 
against the dollar. In the past year, European monetary 
authorities have at times intervened in exchange markets to 
moderate these exchange rate movements, and in August 
1983 there was some concerted intervention involving the 
US, Japanese and some European central banks. While the 
Community would have preferred to see a greater conver-
gence of financial policies internationally, the ECU's 
depreciation against the dollar has in the circumstances 
provided some extra opportunities for European enterprises 
in the US and world markets. However, as already pointed 
out, this is mitigated by other factors, including a low 
exchange rate for the yen. 
Considering how monetary and budget deficit policies 
should best be adapted to the priority of consolidating the 
recovery in 1984, the broad assessment may be as follows: 
(i) Monetary policy remains constrained by the inter-
national monetary environment as well as domestic 
The deflator used is the rise in the consumer price index over the last 12 
months. 
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factors in many countries. Some decoupling from US 
interest rates can be managed but there are limits to this 
at present. If changes in the market environment permits, 
more progress should be made in reducing European 
rates. This depends in part on confidence earned in 
domestic economic policies in Europe. There is hardly 
scope for faster monetary expansion where inflation has 
not been brought under control. In countries which have 
achieved a good record of price stability, some tem-
porary upward deviations of money supply above the 
target range may be justified while real interest rates are 
high and inflation and activity levels are low. Money 
supply targeting has also to be alert to the emergence of 
unexpected changes in the velocity of circulation. 
However in such cases it has to remain clear that policy 
will steer the growth of the monetary aggregates back 
into the targeted path promptly enough to avoid the 
recrudescence of inflationary expectations. 
(ii) The reduction of budget deficits is, in many countries, an 
indispensable step along the path of a durable recovery. 
Further progress in this area is still necessary, all the 
more because it would contribute directly to a reduction 
in interest rates. The implementation of this guideline 
must, nonetheless, take into account the global economic 
context and especially the effects it might have on supply 
and demand. Thus countries which have already 
achieved major progress in their adjustment (slowdown 
of inflation, bringing the external account back into 
balance) and record modest budget deficits should avoid 
too precipitate a reduction of those deficits. At all events, 
if activity showed further signs of weakness, it would be 
appropriate to allow the automatic stabilizers to operate. 
Just as it is indispensable for the policy of reducing public 
deficits to be presented in a convincing way, it should 
also be possible to follow this policy without adhering 
too rigidly to pre-established targets but rather taking 
account of its possible destabilizing effects on short-term 
developments. Progress achieved in reducing deficits 
should, in any event, increasingly leave room for a 
reduction in tax pressure. 
3.2 Policies to strengthen productive potential and improve 
resource allocation in the public and private sectors 
Three broad domains of action will be discussed: 
(i) The restructuring of public expenditure and taxation, 
with priority for improving productive potential; 
(ii) The role of the social partners in improving competi-
tivity and stimulating the recovery process; 
(iii) Re-examination of regulatory functions of government 
with a view to stimulating the economy. 
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3.2.1 Restructuring public expenditure and taxation 1 
Efforts to achieve better control of total public expenditure 
have been widespread. However, given both the continued 
weakness of the labour market, and hence a rising cost of 
unemployment compensation and programmes to create 
jobs and to reduce the labour supply, and a continuing 
increase in the nominal cost of debt-service, these efforts 
were still not able to prevent its share of GDP from rising. 
The share rose from 49% in 1981 to an estimated 51 % in 1983 
for the EC as a whole. Over the two year period only 
Germany succeeded in stabilizing this ratio; in the UK the 
increase was quite small. In other countries the increases 
ranged from 2% to 4,5% of GDP. 
On the whole public consumption's share of GDP has been 
stabilized at about 19,5% of GDP in the EC as a whole. The 
compression of entitlements or benefits levels for current 
transfer payments was often significant, but in many 
countries it did not prevent further increases in their share of 
GDP, notably from 22,5% of GDP in 1981 to 23,5~~ in 1983. 
Measures to limit current transfers often included, for 
example, reductions in some social and family benefits, a 
tightening of eligibility criteria for unemployments benefits 
(and in some cases reductions in the levels of such benefits), 
and various techniques for increasing user charges for health 
services. Announcements recently made in Member States 
for 1984 budgets indicate further efforts, often of exceptional 
severity, to bring the trend of current transfer payments 
under control (Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, Nether-
lands, Denmark). 
As regards public investment, some countries. notably 
France and Greece, have made very large absolute increases 
in the level of their public investment expenditures. Several 
other countries have been introducing a positive discrimi-
nation in favour of investment expenditure in roughly 
maintaining their level in real terms alongside a severe 
curtailment of many programmes of current public expendi-
ture (Germany, Italy). This policy thrust comes after a 
number of years in which public investment appears to have 
been more squeezed than current expenditures. 
For the promotion of private investment, a number of fiscal 
initiatives are being implemented. 2 Indeed this category of 
action is receiving probably a stronger priority than public 
investment, notably in the UK. Here two broad types of 
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See also the Commission's communication to the Council on 'Fiscal policy 
in the Member States in 1984' (COM(83) 423). I July 1983, and a related 
report on 'Budget discipline and economic convergence' and 'Restructur-
ing public expenditure in favour of productive potential' (SEC(83) 1147). 
6 July 1983. 
Sec 'Business investment and the tax and financial environment', 
E11ropean Economy, No 16. July 1983. Also the Commission's communi-
cation to the Council on 'Tax and fiscal measures in favour of investment' 
(COM(83)218) of 18 April 1983 (also reprinted in E11ropean Economy, No 
16. July 1983. 
action may be recognized: fiscal prov1s10ns to induce 
physical investment by enterprises, and fiscal provisions to 
strengthen the flow of savings into risk capital. 
In the former category, depreciation allowances have been 
notably improved in France, and this is envisaged in 
Germany in 1984. The UK has introduced a large number of 
fiscal provisions to help the enterprise sector, some targeted 
on selected sectors such as oil exploration and new small 
firms, some easing corporate taxes more generally. Italy has 
improved the VAT treatment of investment, while the 
Netherlands has eased taxation on the self-financing of 
enterprises out of profits. 
To aid the risk capital market France and Belgium have 
extended or introduced fiscal advantages for personal 
investment in shares as has the UK for investment in smaller 
companies; in Italy a law has been passed to permit and 
encourage the establishment of investment funds; Germany 
and the United Kingdom have improved the fiscal provision 
for employees to take up shares in their enterprises. 3 
Germany and other countries are examining how to improve 
the supply of venture capital. 
A general policy objective has been to reduce subsidies to 
uneconomic sectors and the financing of the operating losses 
of State enterprises. A particular aim has been to couple this 
with the reduction of excess capacity and with restructuring 
measures in the sectors and regions concerned. Remaining 
subsidies need to be subject to better control of their 
economic justification, that they lead towards the com-
petitiveness of recipient enterprises and are in any case 
compatible with EEC competition law. In terms of aggregate 
expenditures, although the statistics are often incomplete or 
difficult to interpret, it is certainly not yet evident that the 
trend of these expenditures has on the whole been mastered. 
There remains a strong concentration of subsidies in 
contracting industries (steel, ships, textiles, coal, railways) 
compared to the financial effort in favour of innovation and 
advanced technology industry. In the UK there are major 
examples of reduced subsidies or losses of State enterprises 
(automobiles, railways, air transport) and individual 
examples in other countries. In Italy, the losses of the State 
enterprise sector remain of considerable macroeconomic 
proportions. In Germany the recent Subventionsbericht 
reported still slightly increasing federal subsidies, with a DM 
29 OOO million total expected for 1984. Other countries would 
do well to publish equally systematic information on their 
subsidies. 
A reduction of the tax burden, or at least putting a stop to its 
rise, is recognized as a major aspect of improving the 
European economy's performance and competitivity. The 
combination of cyclical influences and the priority given to 
containing deficits resulted in fact in further increases in the 
GDP share of tax and social security contributions taken 
Through increasing the amounts of share capital participations subject to 
tax advantages and, in the German case. benefiting from subsidies. 
together (46,6% in 1983, after 44,7% in 1981 and 38% 10 
years earlier for the EC as a whole). Germany held the 
aggregate unchanged from 1981 to 1983. In the UK it 
broadly stabilized between 1981-82 and 1982-83 but in all 
other countries the tax burden grew, in some cases very 
substantially (France, Italy, Greece, Luxembourg). 
Broad changes in tax structure have been pursued in 
Germany, as in the UK in recent years, aimed at improving 
incentives and private investment. As regards France, major 
changes in 1981 and 1982 in the tax structure have been 
guided by the objectives of fiscal equity, with the result of 
moving the income-equalizing effect of the tax system closer 
to the European average. 
Social security costs are conspicously high as an addition to 
labour costs in Europe compared with other industrialized 
countries. All countries have been attempting to limit these 
costs. However, no country was able to reduce the average 
rates of social security contributions in the past year, 
although in the UK the additional labour cost imposed in the 
form of a surcharge on firms has been reduced. Several 
countries were faced with rising social security expenditure 
(especially unemployment benefits) and deficits, and were 
obliged to raise total contributions (France, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands). Such action to reduce deficits is helpful vis-a-
vis interest rates, but from the point of view of the future of 
the enterprise sector and employment, and even if part of the 
problem is linked with the level of activity, the correction 
should be made less by increasing contributions than by 
curtailing expenditure. Heavier contributions still appear to 
be the predominant remedy. 
As regards further action on the restructuring of public 
expenditure and taxation: 
(i) While recent policy initiatives have often been import-
ant, the effort will have to be sustained or even in some 
cases intensified if past trends in the structural growth of 
public expenditure and taxation are to be adequately 
corrected; 
(ii) There is still a tendency in several countries to curb 
budget deficits more by further increases in the tax 
burden than by economizing on expenditure, and this 
needs to be halted or reversed; 
(iii) Improvements in the tax and financial environment of 
firms should be made in order to induce a greater flow of 
resources into investment and a larger supply of risk 
capital. In its communication of April 1983, 1 the 
Commission concluded that there was a need to avoid 
increasing, and even to reduce, the tax burden on firms; 
'Tax and fiscal measures in favour of investment', 18 April 1983, 
(COM(83) 218 final). 
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to strengthen and adapt investment incentives; to 
encourage risk taking by adjusting certain tax arrange-
ments; to improve the channelling of savings, especially 
the savings of wage- and salary-earners, into risk capital. 
A number of measures along these lines has recently been 
adopted or is proposed in the Member States. It is 
important for this effort to be maintained and adapted, 
along the lines proposed by the Commission and as a 
function of the specific situation in each member 
country. In this way, firms should be enabled to respond 
better to the requirements of modernizing productive 
structures. 
3.2.2 The development of wages 
In many EC countries there have been strong efforts to 
reduce wage cost increases in order to improve international 
competitiveness and reduce inflation. The form of this action 
has been quite varied according to institutional and other 
aspects of national situations. Examples include action 
focused on indexation practices (Belgium, Italy, Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg), on the important role of 
public sector contracts (Germany, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom), or on broader incomes policy concepts (France). 
Overall, considerably stricter nominal and real wage-cost 
disciplines are being observed in EC countries. In nominal 
terms the average increase in compensation of employees per 
head in the EC is estimated to have declined to 7 ,2% in 1983, 
compared with a peak of 13% in 1980. 
Cyclical recession usually causes an adverse development in 
lahour productivity, but on this occasion the effort to 
improve productivity performance has outweighed the 
cyclical influence. Thus unit labour cost increases in the EC 
have on average declined to an estimated 5,5% "in 1983, 
compared with the peak of 11,5% in 1980. However this is 
still above the 3% increases estimated for 1983 for both the 
United States and Japan. The real product wage (unit labour 
costs deflated by the GDP deflator) fell by about 1% in 1982 
and is expected to do so too in 1983. This indicates some 
redistribution of income in favour of enterprise profits, a 
pattern common to almost all EC countries. 
For the period ahead there is still much to be done to adapt 
costs and income shares in a manner that will support a long-
run economic recovery. 
(i) the development of nominal pay must continue, in 
certain EC countries in particular, to contribute to the 
slowdown in inflation, thus also creating increasing 
room for real economic growth. The 'real' degree of 
restrictiveness of financial policy, which is fixed in 
nominal terms, depends in large measure on the 
behaviour of trade unions and enterprises with regard to 
pay. 
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(ii) While it is difficult to prescribe normative evolutions for 
real pay for a wide range of country situations, a 
plausible yardstick is that there should be little or no 
expectation of real pay increases, at the level of the 
macroeconomic aggregate, until the economic recovery 
has well advanced into a phase of strong investment and 
employment creation. In some cases negative real wage 
adjustments are still necessary. Income growth needs to 
be channelled as a priority into capital accumulation and 
capacity expansion for a period of some years. The 
relatively low profitability of the European enterprise 
sector remains a fundamental problem inhibiting the 
recovery process. 
(iii) As regards the negotiation· of pay at the enterprise level, 
two objectives are of widespread relevance. First, 
increased flexibility in pay differentials as between skills 
or branches is often needed to create more employment 
opportunities and better clear the labour market, even in 
countries where aggregate pay has evolved reasonably. 
Secondly, pay negotiations should be adapted far more 
directly to helping the individual enterprise invest and 
expand. Europe would probably benefit from a higher 
share of renumeration being related to enterprise profits 
and performance, a practice which is far more developed 
in Japan. Schemes for participation of employees in the 
capital wealth of the enterprise are on a modest scale. 
Imaginative schemes are called for to adapt pay to the 
overwhelming need in the years ahead for high invest-
ment financed by risk capital. While the main initiative 
must lie with the social partners, governments can, as 
already indicated, encourage the process with regulatory 
and fiscal provisions. 
3.2.3 Re-examination of regulatory functions of government 
It is increasingly recognized that many regulatory activities 
and mechanisms do not properly achieve their desired goals, 
or do so at very high costs-both in terms of administration 
and disincentives to innovation and to the legally-imposed 
efficiency of resource allocation; thus they may have in effect 
a depressing impact on the potential rate of growth. Recent 
actions to reduce the economic costs of (broadly defined) 
regulation are extremely disparate in nature, and no doubt 
leave large further scope for reform. Such examples include: 
the easing of rent regulations in Germany, of the conditions 
oflabour recruitment in Italy, of working time regulations in 
Belgium; the introduction of lightly regulated enterprise 
zones in Belgium and the United Kingdom; and the 
privatization of some State enterprises, and in the Nether-
lands a wide-ranging programme of action to streamline 
regulations that impede economic activity. 
There is typically a very wide range of restrictive arrange-
ments affecting service branches and the professions as well 
as industry and labour markets. Competition policy in its 
traditional sense is usually quite limited in scope by 
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comparison with what needs to be done. Many service 
branches, which are sometimes self-regulated or locally 
regulated, are good candidates for review-for example 
restrictions on opening hours of shops. Many financial 
services and professional activities are needlessly com-
partmentalized and sheltered from competition, imposing 
higher costs on the economy-or, directly, a higher cost of 
living. Monopolistic arrangements in various branches of 
industry may have lost their raison d'etre, for example for 
reasons of technological change. While not calling into 
question basic standards or some recent well-founded 
regulatory legislation, there are nevertheless labour laws, 
often introduced at times of full employment and of a smaller 
income-redistributive role of the State, which need to be re-
examined for conformity with present economic and social 
priorities. 
In conclusion, for the period ahead: 
There is much more to be done in Member States to remove 
unnecessary market rigidities. The objective must be to 
devise a continuing stream of regulatory reforms pushing in 
the direction of higher productivity and less inflated prices. 
3.3 Direct labour market actions to ease the unemployment 
problem 
Major training programmes have been further developed, for 
instance in Germany. France, Ireland, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom and the Commission has prepared a resolution on 
vocational training. There is an efficient large consensus on 
the usefulness of these types of measures. They constitute an 
means of combating that part of unemployment which is 
structural. Technological progress is such that training needs 
constant adaptation if mismatch on the labour market 
between skills and vacancies is to be avoided. Direct aids to 
employment creation, either through a reduction in em-
ployers' social welfare contributions, or employment 
subsidies to the public sector, have also been introduced or 
expanded (particularily in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, France and the UK). In Germany, for example, 
56 OOO people are now concerned in the programme of 
employment subsidies, while 130 OOO jobs are to be created in 
UK for the long term unemployed. In both cases the 
additional financial burden is expected to be limited, since 
planned expenditure is partly offset to the unemployment 
benefit payments saved. 
On the other hand, early retirement schemes (such as those 
which have been introduced in Belgium, the Netherlands and 
France) are representing a growing financial burden on 
social security budgets. In addition, some doubts exist as to 
how much further these measures can be expanded. 
Depending on activity rates, a progressive reduction of the 
average retirement age may lead to a reduced ratio of 
employed to retired population, especially in a few years' 
time (1986) when the demographic growth of the population 
of the age bracket 15-64 stops, whereas the older population 
will be growing fast. 
Programmes of local m1t1at1ves are rece1vmg increasing 
attention, for instance in France and United Kingdom, in 
order to encourage self-employment creation both in the 
service and in the industry sectors. Such developments need 
help, for example as regards skills and guidance over 
organizational, fiscal and regulatory matters. If such support 
can be given at the time the initiatives are established, this 
will additionally help stem the growth of the black economy. 
The Commission is preparing a communication to the 
Council on this subject. The potential employment capacity 
in very small-scale enterprises appears to be very con-
siderable-depending upon diverse legal forms: self-
employment, company with individual ownership, cooperat-
ive enterprises and non-profit making companies and 
voluntary organizations. Such initiatives may exploit local 
skills in craft and engineering sectors, local natural 
resources; they may also, for example, take over valuable 
parts of failed enterprises. 
The reduction and reorganization of working time has 
become an important element in debate and action on the 
very high rate of unemployment. 
In several Member States, negotiations have been engaged or 
concluded with a view to using shorter working hours as an 
instrument of employment policy. In France, following 
official measures decided to reduce the average working 
wt:t:k from 40 to 39 hours in 1981-82, the initiative has been 
passed on for decentralized negotiation. 
In Belgium and the Netherlands, collective agreements have, 
as proposed by the government, in many cases linked the 
reduction of annual working time to increases in employ-
ment, together with measures of pay restraint. In Italy, 
specific working hours reductions are envisaged in new 
collective agreements. In some cases an increased flexibility 
in working time in service sectors has been negotiated 
alongside a lengthening of opening hours and increase in 
employment (e.g. in the Belgian bank sector). 
For such measures to have a durable positive impact on total 
employment, strict conditions have to be assured to prevent 
increases in the costs of enteprises. Experience is in fact. 
showing both favourable and unfavourable examples. 
Among the positive examples, the combination of more 
flexible and shorter individual working hours with longer 
opening hours for service branches, more shift-work in 
industry, and more part-time jobs can all contribute 
positively to the economic recovery and to the reduction of 
unemployment. Many more detailed and often decentralized 
initiatives are emerging, such as the job splitting schemes in 
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the United Kingdom. The French Ninth Plan, too, is 
intended to encourage the development of ·new formulae' for 
part-time jobs. They will be integrated into the negotiation 
on reduction of working time. 
In response to the Commission's memorandum I of 1982 on 
the reduction and reorganization of working time the 
European Parliament adopted a Resolution on 28 April 1983 
recommending in the short run a significant reduction in 
working time, taking account of national circumstances and 
the circumstances of individual sectors and firms, and 
implemented in a way that avoids cost increases. 
The social partners in the Economic and Social Committee 
adopted in July 1983 an opinion which concluded that the 
reduction and reorganization of working time could help to 
mitigate the unemployment problem, if conditions similar to 
those outlined in the Commission's memorandum were 
met. 2 
In September 1983 the Commission proposed a Recom-
mendation 3 to the Council on the reduction and reorganiz-
ation of working time aiming: 
(a) to bring about a reduction in individual working time, 
combined with its reorganization, sufficiently substan-
tial to support the positive development of employment, 
under conditions which safeguard competitivity as well 
as basic social rights; and 
(b) to limit systematic paid overtime more strictly and to 
increase the extent to which necessary overtime is 
compensated by time off in lieu of additional payments. 
In conclusion, for the years ahead active policies must be 
pursued which aim at reducing unemployment and its social 
and economic cost. While it takes time to change macroecon-
omic environment in the desired directions, many immediate 
initiatives have to be vigorously pursued. In particular the 
Commission is advocating that the following domains of 
labour market policy be given priority: 
(i) training and retraining schemes, especially for young 
people; 4 
(ii) job creation initiatives, also with priority for young 
people; 4 
(iii) increased emphasis on the stimulation oflocal initiatives 
for small-scale employment creation; 
COM(82) 809 final. 
ESC 663/83 and 664/83 of 6 July 1983. 
COM(83) 543 final. 
In April 1983 the Commission addressed to the Council a proposed 
'Resolution on the promotion of employment for young people', 
(COM(83) 211); this is currently under discussion. 
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(iv) initiatives to increase employment through the reduction 
and reorganization of working time, while respecting the 
~ecessity of avoiding increases in unit costs of produc-
tion. 
3.4 Actions by the European Community to strengthen the 
recovery 
The European Community's own policy responsibilities are 
substantial in its management of policies for trade, the 
internal market and competition. Moreover its rule is 
tending to develop in the macroeconomic field and in the 
field of improving competitivity, notably industrial competi-
tivity, and more generally of strengthening the economic 
structure in liaison with the development of its financial 
instruments. The present report gives an overview of recent 
developments and initiatives following, notably, the conclu-
sions of the European Council held in Stuttgart in June 1983. 
3.4.1 Macroeconomic and monetary policy 
The European Monetary System fulfills several functions in 
the present economic situation, all tending ultimately to 
ensure stable economic growth. First, it ensures exchange-
rate coordination for most of the European continent and 
protects participating countries against the pronounced 
exchange-rate instability prevalent in the industrialized 
world as a whole. It thus ensures a certain homogeneity and 
cohesion for the economic entity formed by the Community. 
It thence contributes to consolidating the advantages 
afforded by the possibility of exploiting, notably in the 
industrial field, a large, integrated market. Further, the EMS 
is a strong instrument for monetary policy coordination and, 
beyond that, serves as framework for discipline and for 
experience in the better common practice of coordinating 
economic policies. Finally, the EMS, by requiring a common 
assessment of the external monetary constraints, provides 
the Community with an organized base for its contribution 
to work on improving the international monetary system. 
In the past year there was one realignment of parities in the 
EMS, on 21 March 1983. This realignment was notable for 
two reasons. It was a realignment involving finely-judged 
changes for most of the central rates. It was accompanied by 
important domestic policy adjustments, in particular in 
France, so strengthening the future stability of the System. 
The use of the ECU in private markets also grew markedly in 
the past year, and this should contribute in time to a more 
balanced international financial system. 
T_he world economic recovery is almost certainly being 
hindered by slowly increasing protectionism. An important 
aggravating factor at present lies in misaligned exchange 
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rates and widening current account imbalances on the part of 
the United States and Japan. More stable and cooperative 
solutions to these problems are strongly desired by the EC. 
3.4.2 Structural and microeconomic policy 
The dimensions of the internal market in Europe represent an 
enormous underexploited potential for making the economic 
environment propitious to growth, efficiency and low 
inflation (taking a broad view of this domain to i~clude non-
tariff barriers and the potential for more active competition 
and industrial policy). The extension of the internal market 
which should provide enterprises with guaranteed access to~ 
market of continental size, could constitute an element of 
dynamism as powerful as that which the achievement of the 
customs union represented for the Community during the 
first 10 years of its existence. The time has come to recognize 
the fundamental interdependence between this complex of 
microeconomic topics and the macroeconomic prospects for 
the economic recovery of the European Community in the 
mediumrun. The links between EC actions, or potential 
actions, are widely and deeply connected with national 
policies. The two-national and Community-sets of 
actions have to move powerfully together in mutually 
supporting directions. Whole branches and sectors of the 
economy are at present blocked in their potential for higher 
productivity growth and for lower costs and prices by a 
combination of national restrictions and resistance to the 
efficient use of- Community powers. Almost all trade in 
manufactured goods is severely impeded by multiple non-
tariff barriers, including failure to agree on common 
technical standards, restricted public procurement and 
frontier delays and costs. Fast growing, and potentially even 
faster growing, branches of the service sector-such as civil 
aviation, road transport, insurance and financial services-
are the subject of very serious regulatory restrictions across 
the EC, and negotiations on Commission proposals have 
been extremely slow-moving in this field, and the conclusions 
of the European Council of Copenhagen should be 
implemented more rapidly. The capital markets of the 
Community are also badly fragmented: the Commission has 
proposed a new attack on these problems, with a view to 
~ssuring a fr~e flow of Europe's large capacity for savings 
mto the effective restructuring of the Community economy. 1 
As regards several of the technologically-advanced growth 
industries-such as information technology, biotechnology, 
aerospace and alternative energy sources-there is in the 
view of the Commission a vast potential for more effective 
European collaboration. There are several different types of 
organization of the European effort which have shown 
See communication of the Commission to the Council 'Financial 
integration', 20 April 1983 (COM(83J 207 final). 
themselves to be successful, of which the Community's Esprit 
programme is a new example, and should stimulate a much 
larger strategic push for a reversal of Europe's industrial-
technological weaknesses. 1 
Regarding the Community budget, the Commission has, in 
its recent communications, recommended increasing the 
share of spending devoted to action to right the economy and 
to improve the employment situation: it has therefore 
proposed a doubling in real terms, over a five-year period, of 
the resources devoted to industrial, regional and energy 
objectives and to research and development. 
The Community's borrowing and lending activities have also 
been developed and adapted to the need for an improvement 
in investment performance. Lending operations amounted to · 
5 300 million ECU in 1982 and will probably show a 
significant increase in 1983, apart from the 4 OOO million 
ECU balance of payments loan to France. The higher 
priority given to the financing of investment in the 
productive sector is illustrated by the fact that loans in this 
area have more than doubled from 1981 to 1982-particular 
attention having been paid to small and medium-sized 
enterprises. The continuing development of these activities 
has been secured in 1983 by the extension and renewal of the 
New Community Instrument (NIC), under which the 
Commission has been empowered to borrow a further 3 OOO 
million ECU, with subsequent authorization of a first 
tranche for an amount of 1 500 million ECU. In addition, the 
Commission has made in June 1983 a proposal for a 
Community financing of innovation in small and medium-
sized enterprises (COM(83)241 ). In the Commission's view, a 
determined Community action, with the main objective of 
encouraging the private financial sector in the Member 
States to become more active in favour of innovative 
investment in small and medium-sized enterprises, will open 
up a substantial growth potential and lead to the creation of 
additional future-oriented jobs. 
In conclusion, the following further action by the Com-
munity is called for the period ahead: 
(i) Reinforcement of the European Monetary System is 
feasible as an aid to economic recovery, and a most 
important next step could be extension of its membership 
to the whole Community. Strengthening of the European 
monetary mechanisms should help give economic policy 
For further detail see note of the Commission (COM(83) 547 final) on 
'L 'amelioration de la Competitivire illlernationa/e des en/reprises europeen-
nes', and many convergent ideas also presented in memoranda of the 
French Government · Une Nouvelle Et ape pour /'Europe: w1 £space 
Commun de /'Industrie et de la Recherche', and of the United Kingdom 
Government 'The Development oft he Community: other policies', and of 
the Germ~n Government 'Reconsideration of policies and the develop-
ment of new actions (excluding agriculture)', all of September 1983. 
The Community economy 
in Europe a greater margin of manoeuvre in relation to 
the international monetary environment. Development 
of the private and official uses of the ECU, and a revision 
of the capacity of its lending mechanisms, are among the 
possibilities of action. 
(ii) Better international cooperation could certainly help 
strengthen the recovery, and the Community must 
increasingly organize a collective position in order to 
influence events as effectively as possible. Concretely, the 
Community's interest is that the major industrialized 
countries should correct, or avoid creating, large 
distortions and external shock impulses in their financial 
policies. In the present situation, action in the United 
States to reduce future budget deficits is important to 
European policy management aimed at sustaining the 
recovery. The Community should also encourage work 
towards an international monetary regime that is less un-
stable in its exchange rate behaviour, and whose 
adequacy in terms of the supply of reserve assets is 
assured. The Community urges that the expansion of 
IMF financial resources is quickly ratified by the United 
States. The industrialized world must give strong 
support to efforts to strike the right balance between 
adjustment and financing in the heavily-indebted 
developing countries. 
(iii) A quantum step in progress in opening up the Com-
munity's internal market and in the stimulation of its 
advanced industrial capacity is now required as a 
contribution to medium-term economic recovery. If such 
progress is realized, the productive sector will have new 
opportunities to develop trade and industrial produc-
tion. 
(iv) The Community budget should progressively be directed 
towards giving more active support to the achievement 
of industrial, regional and energy objectives as well as 
research and development objectives. Finally, the 
exploitation of the credit of the Community, through the 
development of its borrowing and lending activities, 
should contribute directly to the priority objective of 
strengthening investment in the Community. 
4. Summary and conclusions: for consolidating 
a European recovery 
1. The European Council has requested the Commission's 
assessment of the extent of the economic recovery, and what 
further measures could be taken to strengthen it. 
2. Some cyclical recovery in Europe is apparent. But it is 
patchy and on the whole weak and potentially vulnerable to 
any new adverse shocks from the international economy. 
The increase in unemployment may have tailed off, but even 
if the level does stabilize it remains very high. Some of the 
major prerequisites for a stronger recovery-monetary and 
financial stabilization-have been largely assured in several 
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countries, and progress is being made elsewere. There is 
increasing evidence that there is now a Community-wide 
effort to bring trends in public finance and wage costs under 
control. 
3. But the transformation of the adjustment process into a 
next dynamic phase of recovery is not yet evident on a wide 
or deep scale. This may emerge automatically in some degree. 
However, in the Commission's judgement, the· risks of 
relapse into continued quasi-stagnation are too great to let 
policies stand on the status quo. 
Because of the risks, mainly of external origin, to which the 
recovery is still subject, the Community should make it its 
first priority, alongside the national or related internal 
actions described in this report, to participate in every way in 
action to stabilize the international environment. whether 
such action concerns contributions to finding a lasting and 
balanced solution to the problem of indebtedness, or the 
improvement of the international monetary system. 
Internally, a further impetus, as outlined below, is needed if 
the European economy is to be regain the desired course--
one of significant growth, of high levels of employment and 
competitivity, and low or declining inflation rates. 
4. The Commission is of the view that the further 
development of policy to strengthen the prospects for a 
durable and profound European economic recovery should 
be in the following directions: 
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(i) Use of room for manoeuvre to reduce interest rates 
further as and when international and domestic 
conditions allow; 
(ii) Reduction of structural budget deficits and then 
their stabilization at a low level to facilitate a 
renewed growth of private investment, without, 
however, excluding recourse to the automatic 
stabilizing properties of the budget, where its basic 
financial condition is sound. 
(iii) Restructuring of public expenditure and taxation, 
notably to: 
give priority to expenditure, particularly infra-
structure expenditure, that helps expand pro-
ductive potential, 
stop and even reverse the growth of the tax 
burden, 
further improve the fiscal environment for the 
enterprise sector; 
(iv) Review of regulatory activities of government with a 
view to reducing inefficiencies and rigidities that 
depress productive potential; 
(v) A sustained effort to reduce unemployment through 
direct measures such as: 
training and retraining schemes, especially for 
young people, 
job creation initiatives, especially through stimu-
lating local and small-scale employment units, 
the reduction and reorganization of working 
time respecting the need to avoid cost increases; 
(vi) Development of incomes in line with the conditions 
for economic recov,ery, in particular: 
in many countries, further nominal deceleration 
in pay, which will reduce inflation and help 
financial policies have a more expansionary real 
effect, 
real wage evolutions that allow for a major 
improvement of enterprise profitability to sup-
port an investment recovery, and growth in 
employment, 
greater flexibility in pay, through collective 
negotiations to help clear the labour market 
better, and an expansion of practices which 
relate pay to enterprise performance and boost 
employee participation in the financing of 
investment; 
(vii) Strong support at the European Community level for 
this concerted direction of national policies, notably 
through action under three headings: 
reinforcement of the Community's monetary 
mechanisms and determined action of the 
Community in pursuing improvements in the 
international monetary system and the environ-
ment for world trade, 
building up Europe's potential in new growth 
sectors of advanced technology such as inform-
ation technology, telecommunications and bio-
technology, through complementary national 
and EC action, 
large steps in fully opening up the Community's 
internal market, in which the remaining plethora 
of restrictions is barring the way to a potential 
growth dynamic. 
5. The European countries have little hope, if they act in a 
disorganised way, of transforming achievements in stabiliz-
ation into a dynamic recovery process. Only a quantum step 
forward in a concerted national and European Community 
action, which could be much helped by better wider national 
cooperation also, can achieve a strong recovery. 
6. With a number of internal and external factors now 
clearly working in favour of economic recovery, a rapid 
mobilization of all the means of action presented above could 
confirm the movement. 
7. If a sufficient critical mass of consistent policy initiatives 
is built up within countries and the EC as a whole, the 
fundamental climate of economic expectations in Europe 
could be changed in favour of growth in investment and 
Labour market policy measures in 1982-83 I 
Belgium: Early pension granted on proof of replacement 
workers taken on; temporary reduction in social security 
contributions for employees recruiting their first em-
ployee; financial aid to small and medium-sized firms 
taking on registered unemployed; raising of school-
leaving age; possibility of reduction in working hours 
associated with taking-on of additional workers. 
Denmark: Government aid to firms or local authorities taking 
on young unemployed people. 
FR of Germany: Temporary aid to firms taking on unemployed 
people; programmes of training and retraining for young 
and adult unemployed people. 
Greece: Financial aid to creating jobs for young people; 
reorganization of apprenticeship system; reduction of 
working-time to 40 hours a week. 
France: 'Job training' contracts (financial aid to employers who 
guarantee training and a certain length of employment); 
help towards the reduction of working-time if this takes 
This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. 
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employment and m favour of competitive European 
enterprise. 
8. The objective should be to make 1984 the pivotal year in 
confirming this fundamental change in the European 
economy's development. A straw-fire of unsustainable 
growth should not be the objective. What is required is the 
maximum positive growth consistent with progress in 
reducing fundamental structural problems that have been 
accumulating over a least a d~cade, if not two. 
place without loss of output and with the number of 
workers maintained or increased. 
Ireland: Training programmes for young people; setting-up of 
an investment body for direct job-creation. 
Italy: Setting-up of a investment fund for employment; 
agreement among the two sides of industry and the 
government, among others, on the wage escalator (sea/a 
mobile) and on a reduction in working-time by 40 hours a 
year by mid-1985. 
Luxembourg: Aid for employing long-term unemployed 
people; ban on overtime. 
Netherlands: Periods of job training for unemployed young 
people; subsidies to employers offering apprenticeships; 
agreement between the two sides of industry on the 
possibility of a reduction in working-time. 
United Kingdom: Job-training programme for young people 
involving 12 months training for all those leaving school 
at 16; community programme creating part-time com-
munity-service jobs; job-splitting scheme to encourage 
part-time work. 
29 

Part II - The economies of the Member States 
In Belgium, the economy made further progress towards 
restoring external balance by improving competitive ca-
pacity. However, economic activity was weak for the third 
consecutive year and this led to a further increase in 
unemployment. Gross domestic product for 1983 contracted 
by almost I% in real terms. 
It is expected that 1984 will see a slight expansion, mainly due 
to increased exports, since domestic demand will, on balance, 
probably remain stable. Private consumption is expected to 
contract somewhat as a result of the squeeze on households' 
disposable income, while business investment should 
gradually show more vigour. The balance of payments on 
current account will show a smaller deficit than in 1983; the 
deficit of 1,5~;,; of GDP will be mainly attributable to the 
levels of official transfers and interest payments on public 
debt, denominated in foreign currency since, for the first time 
since 1975, a small surplus is expected on the balance of 
trade. Unemployment is likely to be up again on the previous 
year, affecting on average 15,3% of the civilian labour force 
in 1984. The agreements concluded since the end of 1982, at 
sector or individual firm level, which provide for shorter 
working hours and extra recruitment in the context of wage 
restraint, may help to curb the growth of unemployment. 
Since the currency realignment of March 1983, the Banque 
Nationale has managed to reconstitute its foreign currency 
reserves and clear its debtor position in the European 
Monetary System, while reducing the discount rate from 
14% to 9'.;~. If monetary policy could be geared to a steady 
Table 4 
Belgium: main economic aggregates, 1961-84 
GDP GDP GDP 
value volume price 
growth growth deflator 
0/ % /o /o 
1961-70 8,5 4,8 3,5 
1971-80 10,4 3,2 7,0 
1981 4,0 -1,1 5,2 
1982 8,1 1,0 7,0 
1983 1 6,2 -0,9 7,1 
1984 1 7,0 0,6 6,3 
reduction in interest rates, this would make a major 
contribution to the recovery of investment; however, the 
distance still to cover in achieving external equilibrium and 
the sizeable borrowing requirement of the public sector, 
would appear to make the implementation of such a policy 
far from easy. 
Incomes restraint must be maintained to safeguard the 
competitiveness of the economy and the development of 
productive investment in 1984, but the reduction of the 
budget deficit is now the keystone for economic improve-
ment and for a return to conditions conducive to sustained 
growth. Against a background of weak growth, with adverse 
effects on tax revenue, the reduction of the central 
government deficit to 7% of gross domestic product-the 
target for 1985 set in the 1982 government agreements-will 
certainly not be easy, in spite of major savings in expenditure 
in the past two years. Even the slight reduction in net 
borrowing in relation to 1983 planned in the draft budget for 
1984, which actually implies somewhat slower progress 
towards the 1985 objective, will be difficult to achieve in view 
of the weakness of activity in 1984. However, the cost of 
servicing the public debt and the burden of taxation have 
reached a stage where even tighter management of expendi-
ture is absolutely essential. Also, the limit imposed on the 
central government deficit (11,3% of GDP in 1984, 
compared with a deficit of 12,7% of GDP in 1983) cannot in 
any circumstances be exceeded as it has been in previous 
years. If necessary, supplementary measures will have to be 
taken to keep the deficit within this limit during the budget 
year. 
Rise Compensation Current General Money Unemploy~d 
in per account government supply In 
consumer employee of balance balance growth labour 
pcices of payments M2l force 
%2 %2 %GDP '.{.GDP % % 
3,2 7,8 0,2 -1,3 8,6 2,2 
7,0 11,9 0,4 -4,6 10,3 5,8 
8,8 7,4 -4,2 -12,6 6,6 10,7 
7,4 8,0 -3,6 -11,9 5,7 12,6 
7,8 6,0 -2,4 -12,2 5,0 14,4 
6,5 7,7 -1,5 -11,1 6,7 15,3 
I Preliminary estimate of the Commission services on the basis of present or anticipated policies 
2 % change over previous period, annual rat~. J. End of year. 
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Restoring the budget to a sound footing is an essential 
condition for more satisfactory development of economic 
activity and employment, but basically, it will be determined 
in the medium term, by in-depth restructuring of the 
economy which in turn depends on a substantial increase in 
productive investment. The tax measures adopted in 1982 
will help here, but a policy of restraint for both direct and 
indirect wage costs is equally important, if not more so. The 
results obtained so far confirm, subject to the above-remarks, 
that the policies pursued are producing results and that a 
return to growth in production and employment, in the years 
to come, can be expected. 
In Denmark, economic growth slowed down from 3,4% in 
1982 to some 2,2% in 1983, and the inflation rate came down 
from about 9,8% to 6,6~{, partly as a consequence of the 
restrictive stance of fiscal and incomes policy since the end of 
1982. Following the sharp deterioration in 1982, the deficit 
on the current balance of payments improved considerably 
as a result of a favourable shift in the terms of trade. 
Although the public finance situation worsened between 
1982 and 1983, there was some improvement during 1983 as 
social transfer payments and public sector pay increased at a 
slower rate, and the cost of servicing public sector debt 
increased less rapidly. Thus the net central government 
borrowing requirement was limited to 12,4% of GDP, 
slightly below the corresponding guideline adopted by the 
Council last year. Although lower inflation helped to 
increase the room for manoeuvre with regard to economic 
policy, the employment situation did not improve. The slow 
increase in economic activity inhibited the demand for 
labour from the private sector and consequently the 
reallocation of resources envisaged as between the public and 
the private sector. 
The outlook for 1984 points to rather slow growth, 
accompanied by a moderate increase in nominal wages and 
prices. Real domestic demand is likely to level off, reflecting a 
stagnation of private consumption, a fall in public consump-
tion, and a moderate pick up in private investmenL Despite 
growing net interest payments abroad, the current balance of 
payments should improve, particularly since domestic 
substitution of imported energy becomes more and more 
important. 
The economic policy pursued during 1983 and envisaged for 
1984 aims primarily at reinforcing the competitive parts of 
the economy and at improving resource allocation, and thus 
the overall performance in the longer term, even though there 
will be some dampening effects on economic activity in the 
short run. 
The government plans to cut expenditure and to raise public 
revenue in 1984 with a view to reducing the net central 
government borrowing requirement to some 11 % of GDP. 
Apart from slowing down increases in various obligatory 
and non-obligatory expenditure, the government envisages 
higher social contributions and public service charges. The 
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planned reduction of the budget deficit is fully in accordance 
with a strategy designed to achieve better economic 
convergence within the Community. The cost of servicing the 
growing public sector debt represents a major constraint, so 
that it is unavoidable, if the central government net 
borrowing requirement is to be reduced, to cut other public 
expenditure, although this should not lead to a reduction of 
items needed to develop productive activities. A substantially 
lower government deficit will no doubt have a favourable 
effect on inflationary expectations and on interest rates and 
thus become a major incentive for enterprises to invest and 
accelerate the necessary structural change in the economy. 
The biennial wage settlements agreed in the spring of 1983 
conform to the government guideline of a 4% nominal 
increase in 1983 and 1984 and imply a rise in unit labour costs 
below the EC average. The aplication of this guideline should 
allow for sufficient flexibility in the labour market to 
promote a better allocation of resources. This should help to 
avoid bottlenecks in parts of the labour market and, together 
with the implementation of various training schemes, 
facilitate the redeployment of the labour force. 
The government's structural policy, incorporated in its 
overall strategy, is mainly embodied in the investment 
programme launched in the autumn of 1982, which aimed at 
coordinating private and public activities in such major areas 
as education and research, technological innovation, 
infrastructure and communications. As investment in energy 
will be falling in 1984, more room will be available for capital 
formation in advanced technology with the aim of reinforc-
ing the competitiveness of the economy. Under the 1984 
budget, the government proposes to change tax legislation so 
as to encourage risk capital investment. 
The Federal Republic of Germany experienced a distinct 
upturn in economic activity in the first half of 1983 but, 
because of the low level from which the recovery started, the 
year-on-year increase in GDP is expected to be only modest 
(0,75%). Whilst exports remained sluggish, reflecting both 
their country and commodity composition, domestic private 
demand expanded at a fairly strong rate. Consumers' 
expenditure, which had been falling steadily since the end of 
1980, picked up as a result of the slowdown in inflation, 
combined with a fall in the savings ratio, whilst wage 
settlements remained modest. Capital formation also 
recovered, following government measures taken in 1982 
and the beginning of a revival of business confidence. 
Inflation decelerated to about 3% and the rise in unemploy-
ment virtually ceased in the autumn. 
Prospects for 1984 point to a continuation of the recovery 
mainly led by domestic demand. Some slowdown through 
the year however cannot be excluded. The direct effects of 
government incentives to invest weaken; in addition, other 
factors determining investment such as capacity utilization 
The economies of the Member States 
Table 5 
Denmark : main economic aggregates, 1961-84 
GDP GDP GDP Rise Compensation Current General Money Unemployed 
value volume price in per account government supply ID 
growth growth deflator consumer employee of balance balance growth labour 
prices of payments M2Hl force 
% % % 0/ 2 ~'~ 2 0 ;GDP '.>,GDP ~/~ 0/ /o /o 
1961-70 11,2 4,9 6,0 5,2 10,5 -2,2 0,7 10,2 1,1 
1971-80 12,2 2,3 9,7 10,2 11,1 -2,9 0,0 11,3 3,8 
1981 10,9 0,1 10,8 11,8 10,2 -3,1 -7,0 9,6 8,3 
1982 13,6 3,4 9,9 9,8 11,0 -4,2 -9,1 11,7 9,7 
1983 I 9,8 2,2 7,4 6,6 7,5 -2,2 -8,8 12,5 10,7 
1984 I 6,5 1,2 5,2 5,4 5,5 -1,3 -7,8 7,5 11,8 
Preliminary estimate of the Commission services on the basis of present or anticipated policies. 
~,~ change over previous period. annual rate. 
End of year. Until 1979: M2. 
and interest rates are not expected to become favourable in 
comparison with earlier periods of recovery. The current 
moderate pace of wage settlements, admittedly, is helping to 
improve the depressed level of corporate profitability but is 
not providing direct short-term support to the level of 
demand in the economy. The continued modest rise in 
consumer spending expected for 1984 implies a further fall in 
the savings ratio. The balance of current account is projected 
to stay in surplus (0, 75% of GDP) and inflation to remain at 
around 3~{ Overall, GDP is expected to rise by 2% in 1984. 
With regard to budgetary policy in 1984 and beyond, the 
authorities have announced their firm intentions to reduce 
both the share of public expenditure in GDP and the 
structural deficit. This is reflected in the decision to limit with 
regard to 1984 the growth of expenditure of the federation to 
2% and the net borrowing of the federation to DM 37 340 
million, slightly below the projected outturn for 1983 (taking 
account oflower Bundesbank profits to be transferred to the 
federation). At the level of general government net 
borrowing could well fall from DM 54 OOO million (3,3% of 
GDP) in 1983 to about DM 37 OOO million in 1984 (2,1%). 
This deliberate strategy of consolidation of the general 
government account at a time of only modest growth 
prospects is designed to bring about a larger absorption of 
economic resources by the private sector. However, should 
there be clear indications that activity is weakening again, a 
temporary deviation from the projected path of consolid-
ation could be contemplated, allowing the automatic 
stabilizers to support demand. If, however, satisfactory 
progress in reducing the budget deficit can be achieved 
notably as a result of favourable economic circumstances, it 
should be possible to lighten the tax burden somewhat as well 
as to pursue a more active investment policy. In any event a 
firm grip on subsidies and transfer payments should be 
maintained. Policies with regard to subsidies should pave the 
way for a more positive supply side policy shifting resources 
towards encouraging new technologies rather than to 
supporting declining industries. An expansion of public 
sector investment could also contribute to the sustained 
growth of private investment and the process of structural 
adjustment. 
The tight stance of budgetary policy voted for 1983 may have 
helped the Bundesbank to announce its intention to steer the 
growth of the central bank money stock (CBM) within the 
upper half of the target range, set at 4-7% for the year to the 
fourth quarter of 1983. From the beginning of the year 
however CBM growth has been outside the target. As these 
developments were considered to be largely due to special 
factors (such as the effects of the transfer of Bundesbank 
profits to the federation, speculative movements related to 
the March EMS realignment and unusually high maturity 
payments from savings contracts), the Bundesbank refrained 
from taking measures which would have had adverse effects 
at an early stage of the recovery. Only in September, when it 
became very unlikely that the growth path of CBM would 
return within the target range, did the Bundesbank react by 
raising the Lombard rate in line with money market rates, 
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which had already increased in part in response to external 
developments. 
Of great importance for the behaviour of fixed capital 
formation, in addition to interest rates, are developments in 
the labour market. Some progress has recently been made 
towards a better balance of relative factor incomes but it is 
important that the relation between wage settlements (in real 
terms) and the rate of growth of productiviy is such that 
returns on capital investment can be restored to satisfactory 
levels. In this respect, it is important that more consideration 
is now being given to the role that participation by company 
employees in future profit earnings could play in the process 
of wealth creation. On the other hand, at a time when the 
external and public sectors are not contributing to overall 
demand, the evolution of real wages should help to improve 
the propensity to invest. 
While appropriate wage settlements are fundamental in re-
establishing a growth oriented economy, they cannot solve in 
the short term the large imbalances in the labour market that 
have built up over the years. Specific labour market measures 
remain therefore of great importance, in particular those 
which improve training, incentives and mobility. Reductions 
in working time are now also being widely considered in the 
Table 6 
Federal Republic of Germany: main economic aggregates, 1961-84 
GDP GDP GDP 
value volume {Lricc 
growth growth de ator 
% lo % 
1961-70 8,4 4,7 3,5 
1971-80 8,2 2,9 5,2 
1981 4,2 0,2 4,0 
1982 3,7 -1,0 4,8 
1983 1 3,8 0,7 3,1 
1984 1 5,1 2,1 3,0 
Federal Republic. There is as yet no consensus, however, of 
the effects of such measures, nor about the conditions under 
which they would be beneficial for the long run performance 
of the economy. If any generalized implementation of shorter 
working time would appear to be inappropriate, individual 
schemes could be negotiated at the level of sector or 
company, to take account of particular circumstances. such 
as the structural problems of the sector concerned. the cost 
and profit situation and the age structure of the workforce. 
In Greece where economic policy is geared to reconciling the 
requirements of external adjustment with those of a recovery 
of investment, the improvement aimed for on these two 
fronts is not yet clearly apparent. Weak private consumption 
has been offset by stronger demand from general govern-
ment, especially public investment but business investment 
has continued to be slack. Moreover, the real balance on 
goods and services has slightly deteriorated once again. 
Overall, the contradictory effects of these trends have 
resulted in a slight fall in activity in the first half of 1983, but 
some recovery is expected in the second half. As agricultural 
output fell sharply, gross domestic product for the year is 
unlikely to show any growth. The rate of consumer price rises 
has remained high at around 20% through the year. 
Rise Compensation Current General Money Unemployed 
in per account government supplh in 
consumer employee of balance balance growl labour 
prices of payments M2l force 
/~ 2 %2 %GDP %GDP % 
2,9 8,6 0,7 0,5 10,4 0,8 
5,2 8,6 0,6 -2,2 9,8 2,8 
5,6 5,3 -1,0 -3,9 5,0 4,7 
5,3 4,4 0,5 -3,5 7,1 6,8 
3,0 3,8 0,9 -3,3 7,5 8,6 
3,2 3,5 0,9 -2,1 5,5 8,7 
I Preliminary estimate of the Commission services on the basis of present or anticipated policies. 
2 % change over previous period. annual rate. 
l · End of year. 
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For some time to come, economic policy must continue to 
give priority to improving the real balance of trade and, 
consequently, to developing competitive production ca-
pacity. In spite of some improvement in the terms of trade, 
the balance of payments on current account is still heavily in 
deficit, and the burden of foreign debt is still growing rapidly. 
The recovery of business investment, on which prospects for 
restoration of external balance heavily depend, looks 
uncertain. The efforts which must be made in this regard 
imply that there will be no significant recovery in private 
consumption in 1984, and that public consumption should 
be kept in check. They should also be geared more forcefully 
to containing inflationary pressures so as to reduce as 
quickly as possible the factors making for instability, which 
distorts behaviour, and, in particular, produce a cautious 
attitude on the part of private investors. In 1984, growth 
could amount to about 1,5% and inflation to an annual 
average of about 18% while the balance of payments on 
current account could once more show a large deficit, 
amounting to over 5% of gross domestic product. 
Even such limited achievements imply a strict policy on the 
incomes side as well as in budget management. Wages policy 
in particular must be aimed at a reduction in real unit costs, 
by an appropriate limitation on the effects of indexation 
while avoiding as far as possible a further squeeze on wage 
differentials. 
This policy should restrain both incomes and transfers, and 
the ultimate aim should be appropriate limits on the growth 
of households' real disposable incomes, without any 
reinforcement of tax pressure other than that resulting from 
more energetic measures to combat evasion. While the 
provisions adopted should make for better balanced public 
finance, they will not be sufficient to reduce the public deficit 
to a level commensurate with growth and price targets: less 
than 6% of gross domestic product in 1984 for the general 
government borrowing requirement, and less than 9% and 
12% of GDP respectively for the gross financing require-
ments of the central government budget and the public 
sector. Although these figures are only about half a 
percentage point below the expected outturn for 1983, they 
will still be diffficult to achieve against a background of 
hesitant economic recovery. In particular, they imply a 
substantially slower rate of growth of real operating 
expenditure and an increase in public service charges large 
enough to lighten the real burden of subsidies to public sector 
firms. 
The main reason why the public deficit must be reduced is 
that it is financed by highly inflationary means. Although 
liquidity is showing a growing tendency to settle spon-
taneously in savings deposits, disinflation in the economy 
will be all the more certain as the rate of monetary creation 
and the liquidity ratio in the broad sense decline. A smaller 
deficit would thus enable monetary policy to achieve its 
The economies of the Member States 
objective without imposing excessively strict limits on 
lending to firms. But disinflation also requires a firmer trend 
towards the stabilization of savings, and this can hardly be 
achieved without a gradual rise in real interest rates, which 
are still negative at present, in contrast to the general run of 
rates internationally. Some increase in real rates must now be 
encouraged, although cautiously, so as to avoid compromis-
ing the recovery of business investment, which is essential. 
External monetary policy must be geared to helping the 
disinflation effort by keeping exchange rate depreciation in 
check as closely as possible. 
In France, the measures adopted following the currency 
realignment of21 March 1983 'reinforced the firm stance of 
economic policy. They reinforced the incipient decline in 
consumption followed after some delay by a halt of 
stockbuilding. Together with successive reductions in the 
exchange value of the franc, this produced an improvement 
in the trade balance, which shows a substantially lower 
deficit than in 1982. The rate of price inflation has also 
slowed down, and could average under 9% for 1983. 
However, with slightly recovering exports providing the only 
support, activity is loosing momentum and employment is 
contracting at a higher rate. 
In view of the growing debt burden, the complete restoration 
of external balance is still some distance away. The present 
stance of economic policy will have to be maintained in 1984 
therefore, pointing to only a weak recovery in activity during 
the year, and a positive but very low annual rate of growth. 
Nevertheless, substantial progress should be made towards 
establishing economic balance. The rate of increase of prices 
through the year should fall to well below the figure for 1983, 
and the trade balance should move out of deficit towards the 
end of the year. 
The extent of such progress, which implies a further 
deceleration in costs and strict limitation of consumer 
demand, depends crucially on wage restraint. It depends 
particularly on maintaining the present wages policy which is 
directed towards separating the growth of incomes from 
previous price increases and rather to relate it to future 
developments, that is to say, leaving open the possibility of 
some catching-up at the end of the period, to the price 
increase eventually foreseen for the year. If this principle is 
applied, and if with virtually zero growth, a pause takes place 
in the indexation for the minimum wage, the growth of wages 
is likely to be strongly reduced compared with 1983. 
Maintaining the restrictive stance of economic policy also 
means keeping the general government borrowing require-
ment to about 3% of gross domestic product, an aim which 
should be achieved by the draft budget for 1984 adopted by 
Followed by the granting of a Community loan of 4 OOO million ECU to 
France. 
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Table 7 
Greece: main economic aggregates, 1961-84 
GDP GDP GDP Rise Compensation Current General Money Unemployed 
value volume price in per account government supply in 
growth growth deflator consumer employee of balance balance growth labour 
prices of payments M2l foroe 
.o lo 'o %2 %2 %GDP " 0 GDP ,o 
1961-70 11,0 7,6 3,1 2,5 9,8 -3,1 17,6 
1971-80 19,1 4,7 13,8 13,6 18,3 -2,7 23,8 
1981 18,9 -0,7 19,7 24,4 27,1 -0,2 -10,1 34,3 4,1 
1982 25,4 0,0 25,4 21,1 26,2 -3,8 -6,4 29,I 6,1 
1983 I 19,5 -0,2 19,7 20,5 17,3 -5,0 -6,3 22,6 7,8 
19841 19,7 1,5 17,9 18,5 18,5 -5,5 -6,3 20,2 8,7 
Preliminary estimate of the Commission services on the basis of present or anticipated policies. 
% change over previous period, annual rate. 
End of year. 
the government on 27 September. Bearing in mind the lower 
revenue buoyancy, the continuing expansion of the burden 
of interest payments and the numerous factors contributing 
to an increase in the volume of social expenditure, this target 
implies a determined squeeze on expenditure and a further 
reinforcement of compulsory levies. Central government 
expenditure will at best remain constant in real terms-
actually declining under a number of headings-except for 
expenditure on priorities such as employment, training, 
research and support for productive investment. Public 
investment and aid will suffer from restrictions but 
constraints will be especially tight on operating expenditure, 
limiting its rate of expansion to well below the average rate of 
price increases. The growth of social security benefits will 
also be strictly limited, in particular through the continued 
pursuit of efforts to curb expansion of expenditure on health 
and by making no real improvement in cash benefits that are 
not linked to the trend of wages. Even so, the additional 
effort required to increase revenue to the desired level-
especially the revenue of social security schemes-will be. 
very great, representing over I% of GDP approximately 
equally distributed between taxation and social security 
contributions. 
This strict discipline is indispensable to ensure that the 
economy as a whole is financed in a manner consistent with 
the aims of disinflation and restored external equilibrium. It 
must be accompanied by measures to achieve monetary 
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growth commensurate with the outlook for nominal gross 
domestic product. Moreover, strict quantitative controls on 
credit and fairly high real interest rates will need to be 
maintained both to stimulate stable savings and to con-
tribute to restoring the balance of payments position. 
The present restrictive phase of economic policy should lay 
the foundations for the gradual improvement in business 
investment required for the restoration of durable external 
equilibrium and sustained growth. The positive effects of 
currency depreciation and cost reductions on firms' 
operating accounts will be the best guarantee of such 
improvement. The financial markets seem capable of 
responding satisfactorily to the need of business for a stable 
flow of capital. Finally, budgetary austerity deliberately does 
not affect such policies which, apart from general and 
sectoral tax incentives, involve large financial assistance, in 
particular capital grants for newly nationalized undertak-
ings. It is thus reasonable to expect the first signs ofa business 
investment recovery in 1984, particularly in the investment of 
industrial undertakings in the competitive sector, which have 
been lagging further and further behind over the years and 
consequently contributing to recent external trade dif-
ficulties. This recovery must be consolidated without 
compromising the emerging trend towards improved 
profitability. In particular, decisions on the financing of 
social security schemes and the adjustment of working hours 
must take this point into account. 
The emerging signs of recovery in investment and growth 
trends are not such as to provide much hope of a 
spontaneous reduction in the disequilibrium between labour 
supply and demand in the near future. There is still scope, 
however, for an eventual reduction in the longer term. In 
particular, a labour force with training and qualifications 
that corresponded better to employers' needs could more 
easily take up the potential supply of jobs. More flexibility in 
working hours could be introduced, providing that the 
adjustment neither increases costs nor adversely affects 
capital productivity. 
Overall, 1984 should be a year of transition marked by 
important progress towards restoring the overall balance in 
the economy and paving the way for sustained growth. 
Economic activity in Ireland showed almost no growth in 
1983 reflecting the unfavourable international conditions. 
There were however, definite encouraging features. The rate 
of price inflation, although still high, at around 11 %, 
moderated significantly from the figure of 17,2% recorded in 
1982. A marked improvement took place in the deficit on the 
current balance of payments which fell to less than 3% of 
GDP. The trend towards increasing budget deficits, 
particularly for current purposes, has been decisively 
arrested and Exchequer borrowing has been reduced by 
about 3% of GDP in 1983. On the debit side however, it must 
be remembered that the unemployment rate has continued to 
rise and at year-end may well approach 16%. 
The outlook for 1984 points to a modest revival in economic 
growth. Foreign demand will be more buoyant but this is 
Table 8 
France: main economic aggregates, 1961-84 
GDP GDP GDP 
value volume price 
growth growth dellator 
% % % 
1961-70 10,2 5,6 4,4 
1971-80 13,4 3,6 9,5 
1981 12,1 0,2 I i,9 
1982 14,8 1,8 12,8 
1983 1 9,5 -0,3 9,8 
19841 7,7 0,4 7,3 
The economies of the Member States 
expected to be largely offset by the effects of the domestic 
deflationary forces, as there is little alternative to pursuing 
the current policy stance firmly over the medium term with a 
consequent lower level of consumption. 
A number of factors are at the root of the present difficulties. 
Demographic changes are adding large numbers of young 
people to the labour force each year and, in the medium term, 
are putting increasing pressure on demand for basic social 
services. The long established policy of achieving growth and 
employment through the encouragement of export-based 
industry entails the need for considerable public expenditure, 
funded by borrowing, and the provision of essential 
infrastructure, both economic and social. The recession in 
international trade, and, until recently, in the UK market in 
particular, has meant that a full return could not be realized 
from the substantial investment made. Moreover, after the 
two oil shocks, fiscal policy remained expansionary, 
promoting short-term income generation to the detriment of 
the country's productive capacity. Attempts to maintain and 
increase real earnings despite adverse movements in the 
terms of trade, reduced the ability of many sectors in the 
economy to compete, and pushed the current balance into 
deficit in spite of a continued strong export performance. 
Corrective action, taken vigorously in hand, has con-
centrated largely on reducing the Exchequer Borrowing 
Requirement and the authorities have committed themselves 
to phase out deficit spending for current purposes by 1987. In 
pursuing this objective, however, it is important to maintain 
an appropriate balance between tax increasing and expendi-
ture cutting measures given their respective economic costs. 
Rise Compensation Current General Money Unemployed 
in per account government supply in 
consumer employee of balance balance growth labour 
prices of payments M2l force 
%2 %2 %GDP %GDP % % 
4,3 9,4 0,2 0,4 12,7 0,9 
9,5 13,8 -0,4 -0,1 14,8 3,8 
12,9 14,5 -1,4 -1,8 11,4 7,8 
10,9 14,5 -2,9 -2,7 10,8 8,7 
9,0 9,7 -1,8 -3,l 8,8 8,9 
7,2 8,2 -1,2 -3,3 6,5 9,7 
I Preliminary estimate of the Commission services on the basis of present or anticipated policies. 
2 % change over previous period, annual rate. 
l · End of year. 
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Recent budgets have stressed large increases in the level and 
scope of taxation, while the current low level of activity 
reduces tax buoyancy; this suggests that a new general 
increase in taxation would not be appropriate in 1984 but 
that attention should now be directed at achieving significant 
real cuts in expenditure. Pressure on scarce Exchequer 
resources is likely to continue, principally because of the 
continuing high level of interest charges on the accumulated 
national debt and increasing demand for social expenditure. 
Great efforts are therefore necessary to reduce both current 
and capital spending programmes. It would seem ap-
propriate to reduce the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement 
in 1984 by 1-1,5% of GDP by reference to the likely outturn 
for 1983 and on the basis of the current budgetary 
definitions. 
It is of first importance that the authorities continue and 
intensify their efforts to achieve wage moderation. This is 
significant not only from the point of view of containing 
public expenditure, of which wages costs form a major part, 
but also from the point of view of protecting employment. 
Monetary policy is designed to support the adjustment being 
pursued through fiscal policy, without itself imparting an 
independent and additional deflationary bias to macroecon-
omic policy. Give a favourable external environment, 
continued success in curbing domestic inflation and in 
reducing the current external deficit might facilitate some 
further lowering in interest rates. At the same time, an 
important continuing concern is to finance as large a 
proportion as possible of the Exchequer deficit from 
domestic sources. 
Table 9 
Ireland: main economic aggregates, 1961-84 
GDP GDP GDP 
value volume 
rr.nce growth growth de ator 
% % % 
1961-70 9,9 4,2 5,5 
1971-80 18,3 4,1 13,6 
1981 19,0 I, 1 17,7 
1982 18,3 1,2 16,8 
1983 1 11,2 0,5 10,6 
1984 1 10,1 1,8 8,2 
Efforts to ease the labour market problems more directly in 
1984 should concentrate on improving the flexibility of the 
labour market and encouraging the ending of overtime 
working while giving special attention to youth unemploy-
ment. 
In Italy, new tax prov1s10ns and public service charges 
introduced at the beginning of the year and the difficulty in 
reaching new national labour agreements have tended to 
keep domestic demand and activity weak, the only dynamic 
factor being the marked improvement in exports. This helped 
to restore external balance which should be more or less 
realized for the current account by the end of I 983. It has also 
slowed inflation down considerably, and the average 
monthly rate is expected to be less than 1 ~·~ in the second half 
of the year. 
From now on, the various demand components should tend 
to expand, and activity should strengthen. The expected 
recovery of consumption, which should continue into 1984, 
might have been strong enough to interrupt the current but 
as yet insufficiently marked trend towards restored balance, 
particularly while the adverse inflation differential, in 
relation to the other industrialized countries, is still eroding 
competitiveness. To control the recovery and ensure that it is 
lasting, anti-inflationary policy has therefore to be actively 
pursued by an optimum combination of the three instru-
ments available: concerted incomes and prices restraint, 
holding down the public deficit and monetary rigour. If all 
the available soope of these instruments is fully exploited, 
growth of about 1,5% can be expected in 1984, while 
payments on current account should remain more or less in 
Rise Compensation Current General Money Unemployed 
in per account government supplh in 
consumer employee of balance balance growl labour 
prices of payments M2l force 
o{ 2 %2 %GDP %GDP % % 
4,6 9,9 -2,3 -2,7 10,4 4,5 
13,8 18,0 -4,6 -8,1 18,5 7,4 
19,5 18,5 -13,1 -15,8 17,4 10,2 
17,1 14,9 -8,3 -16,2 12,9 11,7 
11,0 12,2 -2,6 -13,4 14,4 14,6 
8,8 8,9 -0,6 -11,8 14.4 16,6 
Preliminary estimate of the Commission services on the basis of present or anticipated policies. 
% change over previous period. annual rate. 
End of year. 
38 
balance and the rate of consumer price inflation in the 
12 months to December should come down to under I 0%. 
Progress will depend firstly on whether incomes and prices 
policy can succeed in slowing down the wages and prices 
spiral as far as possible, along the lines of the tripartite 
agreement of 22 January 1983 on wages and working 
conditions. This means not only that the limits set for 
increases of wage rates for 1983 and 1984 must be rigorously 
observed (as, by and large, they have been till now), but also 
that deliberate measures to slow down the effects of 
indexation mechanisms must be taken as far as is feasible; for 
example by linking remunerations to planned rather than to 
observed inflation. The recent agreements between govern-
ment and the professions to stabilize the prices of some 
essential goods and services should help to guide nominal 
trends in the desired direction. 
However, the greatest effort will be required on the public 
finance front. Because of the automatic nature of increases in 
a large proportion of expenditure-notably social security 
expenditure and interest payments-and in view of the once-
off nature of some of the tax provisions introduced to 
contain the deficit in 1983, the deficit for 1984 once again 
tended to show a large rate of increase, whereas a declining 
deficit would be necessary to foster disinflation. A further 
effort much more energetic than that made in 1983, has thus 
been agreed on to limit the deficit to an amount compatible 
with macroeconomic objectives, i.e. about 10% of gross 
domestic product for the general government borrowing 
requirement and less than 15% of GDP for net Treasury 
Table 10 
Italy: main economic aggregates, 1961-84 
GDP GDP GDP 
value volume price 
growth growth dcnator 
% % 
1961-70 10,5 5,7 4,5 
1971-80 18,3 3,1 14,7 
1981 17,4 -0,2 17,6 
1982 17,1 -0,3 I 7,5 
1983 1 14,1 -0,8 15,1 
1984 1 12,0 1,5 10,4 
The economies of the Member States 
borrowing, which also includes financing operations. The 
reduction of the deficit again should be achieved partly 
through measures affecting revenue, both permanent 
measures, and, once more, temporary measures. But to keep 
the expansion of the tax burden within certain limits, it has 
been decided that this time a fair share of the effort would be 
borne by expenditure, involving major savings on govern-
ment general services, expenditure on health and pensions. 
The restrictive stance of monetary policy must be main-
tained, in a new effort to lower the liquidity ratio, which once 
again rose in 1983. Therefore, the financing norms for the 
economy should be defined from 1984 onwards in terms not 
only of total domestic credit, as heretofore, but also of 
money supply growth. A further substantial increase of 
public issuing of government securities will be essential to 
achieve these aims. This implies that real interest rates must 
remain definitely positive, in line with the international 
trend. 
Demand management as outlined here should create 
appropriate conditions to help the economy to face its 
structural problems. The most serious of these is clearly the 
steady increase in unemployment which bears witness to an 
inadequate control of costs, the chronic weakness of 
productive investment, and the growing proportion of 
investments in labour saving capacity. It is therefore essential 
to make cost control and employment policy compatible on a 
lasting basis: this means long-term wage restraint, which can 
be achieved if the opportunities provided by the agreement of 
22 January are used to improve profitability and not simply 
Rise Compensation Current General Money Uncmploy~d 
in per account government supply m 
consumer employee of balance balance growth labour 
prices of payments M2J force 
%2 ~/~ 2 %GDP ~~GDP % % 
3,8 10,7 1,8 -2,3 13,3 5,2 
14,6 18,4 -0,2 -8,0 19,5 6,0 
19,0 22,0 -2,3 - I 1,7 16,0 8,8 
16,7 17,1 -1,6 -11,9 17,2 8,7 
15,0 15,6 -0,4 -11,9 16,0 9,0 
11,5 12,4 -0,2 -10,0 11.0 9,4 
I Preliminary estimate of the Commission services on the basis of present or anticipated policies. 
2 /~ change over previous period. annual ralf:. 
J· End of year. 
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to push ahead with disinflation. Special care will be required 
here to ensure that the benefits to be expected in the medium-
term from limiting agreed increases are not compromised by 
wage drift or shortening of work time with adverse effects on 
unit labour costs. 
In view of the need to restructure the system of production so 
as to improve competitiveness and employment trends, the 
gradual reduction of the public deficit is a priority. This 
reduction is necessary not only to avoid financial crowding 
out of private firms, but also, and especially, to impose a 
more efficient distribution of public expenditure and more 
generally to improve resource allocation. The effort should 
thus be concentrated on public expenditure by subjecting the 
management of departments of the social security system as 
well as public and semi-public enterprises to stricter 
efficiency criteria. In the medium term, measures to reduce 
the deficit should avoid as far as possible a further increase in 
the burden of taxation and contributions unless parallel steps 
are taken towards a more equitable tax system. 
In Luxembourg, economic activity in 1983 has been affected 
by the steel crisis and the slackness of domestic demand. 
Gross domestic product in real terms fell by 2,41~. Despite 
wage restraint in the steel sector and the temporary 
suspension of wage indexation, prices have continued to rise 
fairly fast, not only because of the delayed effects of the 
devaluation, but also because of the increased rates ofvalue-
added tax. 
Table 11 
Luxembourg: main economic aggregates, 1961-84 
GDP GDP GDP 
value volume price 
growth growth detlator 
.. ,. ~~ /o 
1961-70 7,6 3,6 3,9 
1971-80 9,5 3,0 6,3 
1981 6,5 -0,3 6,8 
1982 6,7 -I.I 7,9 
1983 1 5,6 -2,4 8,2 
1984 I 6,3 -1,0 7,4 
Economic activity will probably remain slack in 1984. On the 
export side, the outlook for Luxembourg's main industries is 
not very bright; moreover, although the limitation of wage 
indexation in 1984 to a single adjustment will improve 
profitability in Luxembourg firms outside the steel sector 
and contribute to restructuring within the sector, it will also 
damp down private consumption. 
The law of I July 1983 on restructuring the steel industry is 
intended to reduce production capacity in such a way as to 
avoid intolerable financial and social consequences in a 
country where steel is a major industry. The government's 
priority is to reconstitute a vigorous and internationally 
competitive economic structure. The strategy is based on 
wage restraint paralleling that in the competitor countries, 
but continued strict budget policy must also be given an 
important role. The net public sector borrowing requirement 
has again increased considerably in 1983 as a result of 
exceptional measures to aid the steel sector. The improve-
ment in the central government borrowing requirement 
expected in 1983 (a reduction from 4,9~~ of GDP in 1983 to 
about I% in 1984) due to increased revenue designed to offset 
extra expenditure on the steel sector, implies also a constant 
effort to hold expenditure down, and if necessary further 
compensatory measures should be taken. 
In the Netherlands, budgetary restrictions and wage restraint 
in the private sector contributed to a further considerable 
reduction in domestic demand in 1983. On the other hand, 
Rise Compensation Current General Money Unemployed 
in per account government supply in 
consumer employee of balance balance growth labour 
prices of payments M2l force 
<>,' 2 0/ 2 
'.;GDP %GDP % . 0 0 'o 
2,5 6,7 7,1 1,6 0,1 
6,7 10,5 18,5 2,0 0,3 
7,7 8,3 31,1 -2,3 1,0 
10,0 6,9 38,8 -2,0 1,2 
8,4 7,1 37,2 -2,9 1,8 
7,7 5,9 36,3 -1,5 2,4 
Preliminary estimate of the Commission services on the basis of present or anticipated policies. 
~~ change over previous period, annual rate. 
End of year. 
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the favourable trend of costs enabled Netherlands' exporters 
to take advantage of the slight improvement in world trade. 
Thus, after declining by a total of 2,9% in 1981 and 1982, 
economic activity remained stable in 1983. Nevertheless, 
unemployment expanded considerably, mainly because of a 
large increase in the labour force. In 1980, the unemployment 
rate at 4,7% was well below the Community average; by 
1983, however it averaged 15,6%, compared with a 
Community rate of 10,4%. Nevertheless, the inflation rate 
fell to about 2,8% on average for 1983, and the balance of 
payments surplus on current account, which was already 
large in 1982, should amount to the equivalent of 3,3% of 
gross domestic product this year. 
The world economic recovery will improve the Netherlands' 
exports in 1984, but domestic demand, especially private 
consumption, is liable to decline once more. Real gross 
domestic product will not grow in relation to 1983, and the 
rate of unemployment will rise further to about 17,6%. 
Inflation will remain fairly low. In view of the slackness of 
domestic demand, the current balance of payments surplus 
will increase once again. 
The choice of economic policy guidelines is not easy against 
this background. The growing surplus on the balance of 
payments on current account, the firmness of the guilder on 
exchange markets, the large surplus of savings in the private 
sector, the slackness of investment, the stability of prices, the 
high rate of unemployment and the low rate of capacity 
utilization, all indicate that the economy could deal fairly 
smoothly with much more vigorous domestic demand. For 
example, while wage restraint-involving virtually no 
change in per capita remuneration in 1984--is regarded as 
necessary to maintain competitive capacity and to improve 
the profitability of firms and the climate for investment, it 
may, if taken too far, exercise an excessively restrictive effect 
on final demand. On the other hand, there would no doubt be 
major objections to the use of budgetary policy in promoting 
recovery. 
The scope for action on the public finance front is 
particularly narrow because the borrowing requirement has 
ballooned over the past few years. Indeed, it has doubled in 
three years, and the expansion is likely to gain momentum if 
new suitable measures are not taken. The situation is the 
more alarming as the pressure of taxation, social security 
contributions and public service charges, the greatest in the 
Community, is increasingly eroding both real disposable 
private income and business profitability. There is no 
alternative to pursuing a policy of budgetary austerity, 
especially as tax revenue is expanding only very slowly 
because of slack economic activity and low inflation, revenue 
from natural gas is tending to stabilize, and some items of 
expenditure, notably on unemployment, are still growing 
rapidly. The draft budget for 1984 once again includes a 
programme to reduce expenditure by over HFL I O OOO 
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million, mainly on public service remuneration, social 
security and public health. The draft budget also provides for 
a reduction of HFL 2 OOO million in the burden on 
enterprises and new revenue amounting to about HFL 3,000 
million, with very little change in the total burden of 
taxation. The net borrowing requirement of central govern-
ment and local authorities, on national definitions, should be 
reduced to 12,4% of net national income in 1983 and to 
12, I% in 1984. This should make it easier to lower interest 
rates-which in real terms are still among the highest in the 
Community-and stimulate productive investment. 
In the medium term, the strategy adopted is expected to 
promote growth by improving competitiveness, thus boost-
ing exports, and by improving profitability so promoting 
investment. It will not, however, prevent a further rise in 
unemployment in 1984. Special attention is thus called for to 
explore ways of reducing working hours and increasing 
labour mobility without increasing labour costs. 
In the United Kingdom economic activity has expanded 
relatively quickly in 1983 (GDP growth 2,8%), faster than at 
any time since 1978, and at a rate significantly above the 
Community average. The principal reason for this has been 
the strength of private consumption, with consumers' 
propensity to save continuing to decline and consumer price 
inflation falling to 5-6%. In addition, the long period of 
destocking, lasting from 1980 to 1982, has come to an end. 
However, the impact of these developments on domestic 
output has been limited by substantial growth of imports, 
while there has been no increase in export volumes. The 
underlying trend of unemployment is still upward, although 
at a slower rate than in recent years. Fiscal developments 
have largely been in line with official plans, but some 
monetary aggregates have been growing at rates outside the 
target range despite high real interest rates. 
It is likely that growth will continue in 1984, but perhaps at a 
slightly slower rate than in the current year, about 2-2,5%. 
The expansion of private consumption is expected to slow 
down, and this will not be fully compensated by faster 
growth of investment and exports. Manufacturing output 
should increase somewhat faster than in 1983, but there is 
some risk of a further increase in unemployment. Wage 
settlements and price inflation are likely to remain close to 
current levels. 
In the last few years, the UK economy has gone through a 
period of considerable structural adjustment, partly as a 
result of the development of North Sea oil and partly 
through policies designed principally to bring about a rapid 
reduction in inflation. As these adjustments coincided with a 
period of international recession, their effects on domestic 
demand, output and employment were even greater than 
might otherwise have been expected. Despite the recovery 
now underway, the level of GDP has only just returned to 
41 
Annual Economic Report 1983-84 
Table 12 
The Netherlands: main economic aggregates, 1961-84 
GDP GDP GDP Rise Compensation Current General Money Unemployed 
value volume price in per account government supply ID 
growth growth deflator consumer employee of balance balance growth labour 
prices of payments M23 force 
"{, "2 "' '\GDP ""GDP 
" 
" -
1961-70 10,6 5,2 5,2 4,1 10,6 0,0 -0,9 9,1 0,9 
1971-80 10,7 2,8 7,6 7,7 10,7 1,3 -1,4 10,8 3.4 
1981 4,3 -1,2 5,6 6,2 3,3 2,2 -5,2 5,2 7,1 
1982 4,0 -1,6 5,7 5,7 5,7 2,7 -6,9 7,6 12,7 
1983 I 1,9 0,3 1,6 2,8 3,2 3,3 -6,7 5,5 15,6 
1984 I 2,4 0,0 2.4 3,6 0,1 4,4 -7,1 6,0 17,6 
Preliminary estimate of the Commission services on the basis of present or anticipated policies. 
% change over previous period, annual rate. 
End of year. 
that already achieved in 1979, and a period oflasting growth 
would be necessary to reduce significantly the level of 
unemployment. The achievement of such growth will be 
helped by improvements obtained in industrial structure and 
productivity, and by the low levels of price inflation and 
wage settlements. Nevertheless, the outlook is still uncertain, 
because of the unbalanced nature of the current recovery, at 
least during its early phase, depending predominantly on 
consumer demand. As the UK moved out of recession earlier 
than its major trading partners, and owing to the relative 
weakness of the international competitive position, there has 
been a substantial worsening of the balance of payments, the 
balance of trade in manufactured goods having moved into 
deficit. Capital goods investment has as yet shown little 
response to higher demand, a factor which may have adverse 
supply side effects at a later stage of the cycle. 
Consolidation of the improvements achieved in labour 
market conditions will be essential to the achievement of 
more balanced growth. The very large productivity gains 
during the recession helped to compensate, in terms of 
international competitiveness, for some of the exchange rate 
appreciation, but future gains are likely to be smaller. In 
order to encourage investment, a further redistribution of 
relative factor incomes is necessary, allowing higher rates of 
return on real assets. It is therefore important that there 
should be no acceleration of wage settlements, even if 
consumer price inflation increases slightly in 1984. Prospects 
for higher industrial output and employment in the longer 
42 
term appear to be dependent upon a stronger competitive 
position obtained through wage moderation and, if indicated 
by market forces, some exchange rate adjustment. 
During the last few years, monetary conditions have 
improved considerably, as inflation, nominal interest rates 
and the growth rates of the monetary aggregates fell from 
very high levels. The strength of consumer spending in the 
last 18 months, however, has been accompanied by a sharp 
increase in lending to the personal sector and some 
acceleration of monetary growth. At the same time, the level 
of real interest rates has discouraged borrowing by 
enterprises despite the expansion of demand. Even though 
monetary growth has been exceeding the target range (7-11 % 
annual rate) set for 1983-84 in the Medium Term Financial 
Strategy (MTFS) published in March 1983, the stance of 
policy as revealed by other indicators has remained cautious 
and the authorities should perhaps consider some reduction 
in interest rates in order to encourage borrowing for 
investment and stockbuilding purposes. For 1984-85, the 
March 1983 MTFS set out a target range of 6-10% for the 
growth of the monetary aggregates. This appears consistent 
with the financial outlook for that period, particularly given 
the planned level of public sector borrowing, and should 
allow for some further modest downward movement of 
interest rates. 
The trends in public finance in the current financial year are 
such that the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) 
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Table 13 
United Kingdom: main economic aggregates, 1961-84 
GDP GDP GDP Rise Compensation Current General Money Unemployed 
value volume rtJricc in per account government supply in 
growth growth de ator consumer employee of balance balance growth labour 
prices of payments M2l force 
% % % o; 2 ~{ 2 ~~GDP %GDP % % lo 
1961-70 7,2 2,8 4,2 4,0 7,1 0,0 -0,7 5,9 1,9 
1971-80 16,0 1,9 13,9 13,3 16,2 -0,7 -3,2 14,5 4,4 
1981 9,9 -2,0 12,1 I 1,0 14,7 2,4 -2,9 14,6 9,6 
1982 9,4 1,5 7,8 8,0 8,8 1,5 -2,1 9,3 11,1 
1983 I 7,9 2,8 4,9 5,7 7,9 0,2 -2,2 10,6 11,7 
1984 I 7,2 2,2 4,8 5,8 6,3 -0,2 -2,1 8,6 I 1,9 
Preliminary estimate of the Commission services on the basis of present or anticipated policies. 
% change over previous period, annual rate. 
End of year. 
should be relatively close to the target indicated in the MTFS 
(UKL 8 200 million or 2,75% of GDP). Measures were 
announced in July to help keep public expenditure in line 
with plans, but it remains possible that the outturn for both 
expenditure and revenue will be a little above planned levels. 
For 1984-85, the MTFS target for the PSBR, of UKL 
8 OOO million or 2,5% of GDP, represents a broadly 
unchanged fiscal stance, given the increase in revenue 
resulting from moderate growth of the economy. In view of 
the modest level of the targets in both the current and the 
next financial years, slightly higher levels of the PSBR could 
be tolerated. 
In the longer term, there may be scope for lowering the 
relative level of public spending and therefore also the tax 
burden. It would be desirable to improve the structure of 
expenditure in respect of its productive element. This 
depends partly on the overall level of expenditure and partly 
on the achievement of sufficient economic growth, so that the 
categories of expenditure determined by demand in the 
economy, such as unemployment and related benefits, can be 
reduced. Possibilities for cuts in other spending programmes 
appear more limited, in view of demographic factors (the 
increasing average age of the population) and the low level of 
public investment in recent years. 
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1. Economic problems and policy issues for the Community 
A recovery in economic activity in the Community is now underway but it will be modest 
and vulnerable to increases in interest rates and will hardly be fast enough to induce a 
lowering of unemployment. The medium-term outlook for output and unemployment is 
discouraging. The 1981/82 recession proved to be more prolonged than expected, to a 
large extent due to the fact that monetary policy since 1981 has, in large degree and 
virtually unavoidably, replicated the interest rate conditions prevailing in the United 
States. Since mid-1982 real money supply growth in Europe has been more 
accommodating than in 1981 /82. There are, however, narrow limits to the scope for using 
monetary policy actively to stimulate demand as long as government budget deficits are as 
high as at present and in many Member States inflation performance remains less 
favourable than that of United States and Japan. The present straitjacket on 
macroeconomic policy can only be lifted through supply policies, positive adjustment and, 
notably, new·and substantial steps forward to strengthen the internal market and increase 
the monetary cohesion of the Community. A combined micro-macro approach is needed. 
A feasible framework for economic policy is one where financial policies (budgetary and 
monetary policy) are decided upon with reference to the need for greater convergence 
within the Community while the micro-policies ( allocative and supply policies) address 
the problem of improving the split between the real component and the inflation 
component within a given rate of growth of nominal GDP. 
1. 1 Outlook and economic performance 
After the failure of economic recovery in the Community to 
materialize in 1982, short-term forecasts (Chapter 2) suggest 
an upturn in output may now be getting under way. 
However. against a background of high real interest rates, 
tightening budgetary policies in most of the Community 
countries and a weakness of world trade partly attributable 
to the debt problems of developing countries, the recovery in 
the Community is likely to be slow and hesitant, certainly by 
comparison with the growth rates expected for the US and 
Japan in I 983 and 1984. Moreover, the potential recovery in 
the Community is likely to be very fragile and could easily be 
knocked off course by an adverse movement in, for example, 
interest rates. 
Medium-term projections (section 2.3) are hardly rriore 
encouraging. The central projection, assuming an un-
changed dollar/ECU exchange rate from 1984 onwards, 
budgetary policies unchanged from present announcements 
and broad stability of US long-term interest rates, suggests 
that real output in the Community might grow at an average 
annual rate of I ,9~~ between I 982 and I 987. Such a growth 
rate would allow unemployment to decline slightly from a 
peak reached in 1984 and 1985, but the unemployment rate 
would still be as high as I 0,4% in 1987. 
A particularly disturbing feature of the current recession has 
been the marked weakness of investment, one of the principal 
factors determining production potential (section 2.4). The 
danger that the present recession might lead the Community 
into a 'low-growth trap' is one which cannot be ignored. 
The process of disinflation in the Community continues. The 
rate of increase of labour compensation per head in the 
Community, perhaps the soundest indicator of the underly-
ing inflation rate, has decelerated smoothly in each of the 
three years since 1980. The deceleration is expected to 
continue in 1984. 
The steadiness of the deceleration in labour compensation 
per head has been rather obscured by sharp movements in 
other price-determining factors: suppliers' export prices, 
exchange rates, profit margins and indirect taxes. The initial 
effect, most marked in 1981, of the sharp upward movement 
of the dollar was to increase the prices the Community had to 
pay for its imports from the rest of the world. Later, however, 
world prices in dollars fell sharply, so that in the latter half of 
1982 import prices were having a considerable dampening 
effect on inflation in the Community. The interplay of these 
various factors is considered in some detail in Chapter 3. 
Labour market developments, which have a crucial bearing 
on the interpretation of the current situation and of the 
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short-term and medium-term forecasts, are analysed in 
Chapter 4. This chapter shows that labour demand in the 
Community had been growing only slowly for a long period 
of time before the onset of the present recession (ever since 
1963, in fact), a slower growth of output between 1973 and 
1980 being matched by a slower growth of productivity. 
Labour supply, however, has been growing considerably 
more quickly since 1973 as a result of demographic factors. 
The almost uninterrupted rise in unemployment since 1973 
was sharply aggravated from 1981 onwards by falls in 
employment as the recession developed. In 1983 the 
unemployment rate in the Community is likely to reach 
I 0,4%, and is forecast to rise even further, to 10,9~1~, in 1984. 
No easing of the demographic pressure on the labour market 
can be expected before 1986, but thereafter the annual rate of 
growth of the working-age population will fall off sharply (to 
less than 0, 1 % a year between 1986 and 1990). 
The effects of the continuing recession combined with those 
of heavy interest payments are clearly to be seen in the 
difficulties encountered in the Community in containing 
budget deficits (Chapter 5). The tax burden in the Com-
munity will probably have risen quite substantially in 1983. 
However, this will have been about offset by a rise in transfer 
payments (including unemployment compensation) and 
interest payments from general government as a proportion 
of GDP, with little change elsewhere in the accounts, leaving 
the budget deficit in the Community, as a proportion of 
GDP, much the same as in 1982. For 1984 a further 
substantial rise in the tax burden seems likely. Total 
expenditure, in contrast, may rise slightly slower than 
nominal GDP, and, as a consequence, the budget deficit is 
forecast to be reduced from 5,41{ in 1983 to 4, 71~ in 1984. 
During the period from 1980 onwards, the rate of growth of 
the broadly-defined money supply in the Community has 
been significantly lower than the rate during the 1970s and a 
further deceleration is forecast by the Commission for 1983 
(Chapter 6). On the assumption that the realized deceler-
ation has been matched by a similar downward revision of 
the expected trend rate of money supply growth on the part 
of economic agents, the desired liquidity ratio of the 
economy will have risen (velocity will have fallen). A rise in 
the actual liquidity ratio in the Community has in fact 
already taken place. 
Trends in the Community's external compet1t1vencss, 
together with the process of balance of payments adjustment 
are examined in Chapter 7. The Community as a whole 
suffered a very substantial loss of competitiveness during the 
period 1977-80. Since then, however, almost all the 
competitive loss has been recouped, largely as a result of 
movements in nominal exchange rates. By contrast, US 
competitiveness, after a strong improvement in the second 
half of the 1970s. deteriorated by one-third between 1980 and 
1983. Japanese competitiveness has improved strikingly 
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since the second oil-price shock. These trends perhaps 
indicate that, while a substantial movement of the real 
exchange rate of the ECU against the yen might be justified, a 
further substantial real appreciation of the dollar against the 
ECU would be uncalled for on competitiveness grounds 
(although it might have to be accepted for other reasons-see 
below). 
While these changes in competitiveness among the indus-
trialized countries have been taking place, the industrialized 
countries as a group have been seeing their share in tot:.: 
world trade decline, to the profit of the non-oil developing 
countries (section 7.3). In the absence of a decline in the 
industrialized countries' terms of trade or of a major effort of 
structural adjustment, this trend is likely to continue. In a 
sense, the decision has already been partly made: the 
industrialized countries reacted to the two oil-price shocks by 
reducing savings and investment, while the non-oil develop-
ing countries were able to maintain an expansion of 
investment by increasing their savings substantially and by 
allowing a rise in their external deficit with resulting financial 
exposure due to the rise in the servicing of external debt. 
In general the operation of the EMS, (Chapter 6) has been 
such as to prevent the sharp swings in nominal exchange 
rates which have been so prevalent outside the system in the 
period since its inception. However, it is only fairly recently 
that there has been evidence of some convergence of 
underlying policies in the participating currencies such as 
might ensure that relative stability of nominal exchange rates 
could be combined with more convergent inflation perform-
ance. The absolute spread of inflation performance even 
among the members of the EMS remains very wide, and is 
wider still if Greece is brought into the comparison. 
1.2 The causes of the Community's weak 
economic performance 
Although an economic recovery now seems to be under way 
in the Community there is little comfort to be gained from the 
short and medium-term forecasts and there is every reason to 
explore all realistic options allowing an improvement of the 
economic performance and particularly a reduction in 
unemployment. But the remedy or the remedies-if 
available----clcarly must be selected in accordance with the 
diagnosis of whether the current economic problems arc due 
to: 
(a) the stance of macroeconomic policy; 
(b) international monetary and financial constraints; 
(c) structural adjustment problems in Europe. 
Each of these potential causes will be examined further 
below. 
(i) The stance of macroeconomic policy 
As shown in Chapter 5 the general government borrowing 
requirement as a percentage of GDP for the Community as a 
whole, despite the stagnation of economic activity, was 
stable in 1982 and rose hardly at all in 1983. This apparent 
overall stability of the budget balance, however, is the result 
of divergent movements of the main components: interest 
payments rose from 3,0% of GDP in 1981 to 3,8~{ in 1983 
while the borrowing requirement excluding interest pay-
ments was reduced from 2,2% to 1,6%. Governments have 
indeed made considerable efforts to raise taxes and compress 
other expenditure categories to keep overall borrowing 
within acceptable limits. A measure of the effort ac-
complished in this respect is given in Table 5.6 in Chapter 5, 
showing that discretionary policy measures reduced the 
budget deficit by 1% of GDP in both 1982 and 1983. 
The strict stance of budgetary policy was partly the result of 
policies to dampen the growth of public expenditure in the 
medium-term and partly a response to the very pronounced 
increase in the level of real interest rates in the last few years 
which made measures to dampen the growth of other 
expenditure even more urgent than before, notably in 
countries where the level of public debt had already reached 
sizeable proportions. This interest rate increase was 
instrumental in limiting the depreciation of the European 
currencies against the dollar in the face of high interest rates 
in the United States and the consequent increase in the flow 
of capital towards the latter country. Consequently real ex 
post long-term interest rates in the Community were by 1981 
much higher than on average for the period 1973 to 1980 and 
this increase in market rates was reflected in a substantial 
increase in the average real rate of interest paid on public 
debt. 
(ii) International monetary and financial constraints 
The interest rate increases resulting from the rise in the US 
budget deficit, however, have also hit the Community 
indirectly due to the sharp reduction in imports by many of 
the LDCs which-in some cases as a result of internation-
ally-negotiated adjustment programmes-have cut down 
severely on their imports of goods and services in order to 
make room for the rise in the burden of servicing foreign debt 
(Chapter 7). It is extremely difficult to produce exact 
quantitative estimates of the effects of this slower world trade 
growth. A Comet simulation suggests that if the growth of 
world trade is temporarily cut by about 2 points this causes a 
GDP loss of some 0,5 percentage points for the Community 
as a whole in the second year, rising towards l % if the weaker 
trend is maintained. In addition to being affected by the 
interest rate increase, some LDCs were also hit in 1982 by 
falls in commodity prices. Although this resulted in some 
improvement in the terms of trade of the Community, it 
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added to the financial difficulties of some of the most 
exposed countries in the Third World (see Chapter 2). 
(iii) Structural adjustment problems in Europe 
Apart from these international problems, it should be kept in 
mind that the trend rate of growth in the Community in the 
1973-80 period had already fallen to close to 2% despite the 
fact that the real long-term rate of interest on average for this 
period was as low as 0,2°/o, or much less than the 1,9% seen on 
average from 1960 to 1973. 1 Indeed, many of the more 
fundamental adjustment problems and other structural and 
distributional issues which have often been discussed in the 
debate on economic performance after the first oil-price 
shock do not appear to have been brought closer to a 
solution in the last few years. 
At a first glance the most serious adjustment problem of the 
1970s, the need to reduce the dependence upon imported oil, 
has been handled much more successfully than imagined 10 
years ago. The share of oil in domestic energy consumption 
in the Community was already down to some 47'.;~ in 1983, 
and the Council's objective, to reduce the degree of 
dependence to 40'.;~ by 1990, thus seems to be within reach. 
The reduction of dependence upon oil is to some extent 
attributable to the slowdown of economic growth rather 
than to a strong effort with respect to energy conservation 
and might in part be reversed if activity rose buoyantly. 
Nevertheless, for the time being energy supply seems to be 
much less of a constraint on economic growth than assumed 
some years ago, and even a somewhat higher rate of 
economic expansion in the Community could probably be 
accommodated without major tensions in the oil market. 
On the other hand, there are signs that the Community is 
lagging seriously behind the United States and Japan with 
respect to the introduction of new technology and new 
methods of production. Moreover, a multitude of laws and 
regulations keeps firms from taking full advantage of the 
scope for increasing productivity. Inefficient production 
Conventionally, real rates of interest are often measured by deflating 
current levels of nominal interest rates by the rate of increase in consumer 
prices over a recent past, the assumption behind this estimation being that 
financial markets tend to project the most recent rate of inflation into the 
future. Available data on the real rate of interest on indexed bonds, for 
example in the United Kingdom, however, show that markets generally 
take a much more rational view of the future rate of inflation and that as a 
result the underlying anticipated real rate of interest is more stable than the 
apparent ex post rate measured as indicated above. The present level of 
nominal interest rates might thus be taken rather to indicate that financial 
markets expect the rate of inflation in the medium term to be higher than 
the one currently measured in the industrialized countries on average. 
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lines are kept in operation through subsidies and other aid 
programmes and in most Member States the weight of the 
public sector in the economy has grown to such proportions 
that thrift and investment are seriously hampered by 
excessive taxation on employment and income. During the 
10 years from 1973 to 1983 public expenditure for the 
Community on average rose from 40 to 52% of GDP or by 
1,2 percentage points by year. The relative decline of the 
productive sectors has clearly led to a slowdown in the 
overall growth of productivity and output in the economy 
and may also have exerted a negative influem:e upon business 
investment. Moreover, the rise in public expenditure in 
proportion to GDP has taken place in expenditure categories 
such as social transfers which are not conducive to 
employment and economic growth. Expenditure on R & D, 
development aid, public investment, etc. has been severely 
squeezed and has even in some cases fallen in absolute terms. 
Table 1.1 
Key macroeconomic indicators for the Community 
1960-73 
Gross domestic product 
Volume 4,6 
Deflator 5,0 
Value 9,9 
GDP gap (volume) I 
Money and interest rates 
Money supply (M2/3) 2 11,4 
Short-term interest rate 5,5 
Long-term interest rate 6,9 
Short-term interest differential rate 3 0,9 
Changes in budget balance 4 
Total change 
of which due to: 
Change in activity 
Change in net interest payment 
Residual change 
Costs and income distribution 
Labour income ratio s 74,5 
Relative unit labour cost (manufacturing) 6 2,1 
However, there also seem to have been specific constraints on 
economic growth in the Community attributable to the fact 
that the Community's enterprises are not able to exploit the 
potential economies of scale of the internal market fully, 
notably in the field of new technology and in the service 
industries. 
While considerable progress towards economic integration 
took place in the first 15 years of existence of the European 
Economic Community the subsequent 10 years have seen 
very modest advances----even when account is taken of the 
creation of the European Monetary System. Public markets 
are still t0 a considerable extent reserved for national 
enterprises; firms with a European dimension are forced to 
confine their sales and service operations within national 
frontiers, leading to an uneconomic use of resources. 
Although the movement of goods between Member States is 
1973-80 1981 1982 1983 1984 
(estimate) (forecast) 
% change 
2,2 -0,4 0,4 0,5 1,4 
10,9 9,1 9,1 6,3 5,1 
13,4 8,6 9,5 6,9 6,6 
% 
-0,2 -1,1 -2,0 -2,0 
% change 
13,3 11,9 11,1 10,5 8,7 
% 
9,8 14,6 12,8 10,0 9,5 
11,1 14,7 13,5 11,8 10,8 
2,2 0,6 2,2 1,0 -0,5 
% of GDP 
-1,7 0,0 -0,2 +0,7 
-1,3 -0,7 -0,6 -0,1 
-0,5 -0,3 -0,5 -0,3 
+0,1 + 1,0 + 1,0 +1,1 
% 
76,3 77,2 76,4 76,0 75,4 
% change 
2,2 -13,7 -5,8 0,3 3,0 
Percentage difference between actual and the trend level of GDP (break in trend in 1973 and in 1980). Trend rate of growth from 1980 estimated al 1,4 %-
Annual averages. 
EC average over the New York rate. 
Sec Chapter 5 for details; - = increase in deficit; a positive residual change indicalcs discretionary policies to reduce the budget deficit. 
Sec Chapter 3. 
In common currency terms. 
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in theory free, the administrative burden involved in shipping 
commodities from one country to another within the 
Community is no different from, and in some cases even 
more complex than, the routines to be followed when 
exporting to a third country. According to recent estimates 
the annual cost of red tape at the Community's internal 
frontiers may amount to above 0,5% of the Community's 
GDP or almost as much as the total cost of the common 
agricultural policy. The total cost of trade barriers, national 
protectionist policies and aid schemes is several times the 
total budget of the Community. 
It is impossible to estimate how much of the 4,4;~ annual 
growth in productivity in the Community from 1960 to 1973 
was due to the lowering of trade barriers within the EEC and 
EFT A but there is hardly any doubt that the effect was quite 
substantial. Since 1973 little further progress has been made 
in this respect apart from the temporary effects of the entry of 
Denmark. Ireland and the United Kingdom. One cannot rule 
out the possibility that somewhere between 0,5 and 1 point of 
the 2,3 percentage points slowdown in productivity growth 
since 1973 is attributable to the failure to make further 
substantial progress with respect to lowering the various 
national barriers in the internal market. 
The past 10 years have seen a substantial decline in the 
profitability of investment and of the volume of investment 
in proportion to GDP throughout the Community. In fact, 
both the first and the second oil price shock resulted in very 
large terms of trade losses and a considerable change in the 
structure of relative prices. In sharp contrast to develop-
ments in the United States, wage and salary-earners in many 
Community Member States did not suffer substantial real 
income losses: as shown in Chapter 3 real per capita 
compensation of employees in the years 1980 and 1981 rose 
by 1,5 and IJ% respectively despite terms of trade losses of 
3,5 and 6,8% for the Community as a whole in these two 
years. The labour income ratio consequently rose steeply and 
the profitability of investment, which in most Community 
Member States had been on the rise again from the low levels 
of 1975, saw a new decline in 1980 and 1981. 
Employment and growth in the Community was also 
hampered by a considerable deterioration of the inter-
national competitiveness of the Community's enterprises: 
unit labour cost during the 1970s rose faster than on average 
in competing countries and, in addition, the nominal 
effective exchange on average for the Community ap-
preciated somewhat in the period from 1973 to 1980. These 
structural and distributive factors taken together are likely to 
have contributed importantly to the particularly disappoint-
ing employment and economic growth performance of the 
Community. They have probably exerted a considerable 
effect on developments in 1982 and 1983. 
Economic problems and policy issues for the Community 
1.3 The economic policy issues for 1984 and 
beyond 
Some of the factors referred to above as possible causes for 
the stagnation of economic activity since 1980 are still in 
operation; others have been reversed or can at least be taken 
to be inoperative for the time being. The Community's 
competitive position in particular is now much better than 
three years ago (although the yen remains substantially 
undervalued against the ECU) and the forecasts for 1984 
suggest that an improvement of the profit situation is under 
way. Considering the central medium-term forecasts there 
are, however. risks that some of the key assumptions may not 
be fulfilled. One such assumption is that the US long-term 
rate of interest will be broadly stable in 1983 and 1984 
(Chapter 2). In fact, on present prospects there would seem 
to be some doubt as to whether this assumption will be 
fulfilled: the general government borrowing requirement in 
the United States is expected to remain high despite the 
cyclical upturn in the economy in 1983 and 1984. The 
international economic and financial environment may 
therefore be less favourable for the Community than 
currently assumed. 
In the present situation, financial policy in the Community 
should be detem1ined with a view to two fundamental-but, 
as will be seen, related---criteria: 
I. The outlook concerning the potential rate of growth of 
output in the Community over the next 5 years; 
2. Policy with respect to the US dollar and reaction to 
interest rate changes in the United States. 
With respect to the potential rate of growth of output over 
the medium-term, the analysis in the preceding section 
suggests that, pending greater success in solving the 
structural adjustment problems, to allow the Community's 
business sector to take advantage of the continental 
dimension of the internal market and to shift productive 
resources into growth industries, there is only a rather 
slender prospect of substantially increasing the Com-
munity's medium-term rate of growth of output above the 
1,9% currently estimated according to the Comet projections 
for the years 1982-87 (Chapter 2). It would be unrealistic 
and, indeed, dangerous to base macroeconomic policy 
decisions on a more optimistic hypothesis with respect to 
medium-term economic growth as long as the basic questions 
concerning structural adjustment and the development of the 
common market remain unsolved. 
Within the context of a given rate of growth of potential 
GDP, and assuming that the level of the budget deficit and 
the higher level of profits in the United States over the 
foreseable future will exert an upward pressure on interest 
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rates, several hypothetical combinations of budgetary and 
monetary policy stance may be considered: 
Monetary policy aims 
Budgetary 
policy 
restrictive 
Budgetary 
policy 
stimulating 
demand 
Target for 
the ECU/dollar 
rate 
A. Both budgetary 
and monetary 
policy restrictive 
B. Budgetary policy 
expansionary but 
monetary policy 
restrictive 
Monetary policy assigned to domestic objectives. 
Floating 
of the ECU/dollar 
rate 1 
C. Budgetary policy 
restrictive hut 
monetary policy 
accommodating 
D. Budgetary policy 
expansionary and 
monetary policy 
accommodating 
Policy option A (both budgetary and monetary policy 
restrictive) represents the policy stands broadly taken by the 
Community in 1982 and part of 1983. Subsequently, 
however, the policy mix has moved towards option C with a 
somewhat more relaxed stance of monetary policy reflected 
in the preparedness of the Bundesbank to let the growth of 
central bank money move temporarily above the target range 
and to let the level of short-term interest rates remain 
relatively low even after the March realignment in the 
European Monetary System. Option B-involving a relax-
ation of the stance of budgetary policy-would imply a 
broad alignment of the Community on the policy stance in 
the United States and would thus, as far as its economic 
impact is concerned, be very similar to a scenario of 
generalized fiscal expansion. The cyclical upturn in the world 
economy would probably be even faster than is now the case 
but its composition as between consumption and investment 
would be compromised and the risk of rekindling inflation 
would be substantially higher. This risk would be even higher 
still under the-relatively unrealistic-hypothesis that a 
more relaxed stance of budgetary policy in the Community 
was accompanied by a monetary stimulus (option D). 
Considering now these four 'stylized' policy options with 
their advantages and drawbacks, a central question in the 
design of economic policy for 1984 is to what degree Member 
States individually or as a group have a free hand to pick the 
combination of macroeconomic policies they might want, 
and in particular whether a relaxation of the budgetary 
policy stance would be desirable. 
As shown in Chapter 5 the current stance of budgetary policy 
appears compatible with stability of the public debt burden 
in proportion to GDP in the medium term. However, this 
assessment is only a central estimate within a very wide range 
depending upon, in particular, the view taken with respect to 
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the scope for GDP growth over the coming years and to the 
amount of government financial transactions which ought to 
be taken into account when estimating the structural budget 
balance. The less optimistic the assumption concerning GDP 
growth over the next few years and the larger the amount of 
financial transactions to be included, the larger the structural 
budget deficit would be. 
Moreover, the budgetary policy stances of the individual 
Member States show very considerable divergence from one 
country to another with, in particular, an excessive level of 
monetary financing in several countries and a very large 
structural deficit in others. Only the FR of Germany and the 
United Kingdom are in a relatively healthy financial position 
and in both cases this reflects considerable efforts in recent 
years to dampen the growth of public expenditure. Belgium, 
Denmark and the Netherlands appear to record a very large 
structural budget deficit; Greece, Ireland and Italy manage 
to keep the public debt in check only through very heayy 
monetary financing with resulting inflation. France is in a 
middle position as between these groups of countries. 
A shift to a less cautious budgetary policy stance, even if 
implemented within the framework of a coordinated policy 
initiative within the Community, would represent a reversal 
of the policy stance now adopted in most Member States and 
might have unfortunate effects on financial markets' 
anticipations. Moreover, in the majority of Member States a 
relaxation of efforts to compress public expenditure would 
probably result in a further aggravation of the medium-term 
adjustment problem and endanger the stability of the 
European Monetary System. 
With a continuation of the current fairly cautious budgetary 
policy the upturn of activity in the Community is, however, 
likely to remain more timid than in the United States. 
However, the resulting slowdown in the rise of public debt 
and the restoration of balance in financial markets in the 
Community would be likely to allow a progressive reduction 
of interest rates. 
In fact, with the Community deliberately choosing not to 
replicate the budgetary policy stance of the United States, 
monetary policy in the Community could aim to go as far as 
possible in relaxing monetary conditions without undermin-
ing the prospects for a declining inflation rate, while the 
ECU/dollar exchange rate could be allowed to adjust itself to 
market conditions (except for efforts to smoothen erratic 
fluctuations). 
Even with a relatively rapid reduction of interest rates in 
response t....> a lowering of budget deficits in the Community, 
the resulting strengthening of private sector demand would 
probably take somewhat longer to come through. On the 
other hand, the upturn once under way would be soundly 
based in a recovery of productive investment and competitive 
employment in the private sector in the medium term. The 
speed and profile of the upturn, however, would depend not 
on the stance of budgetary and monetary policy but rather on 
the accompanying structural adjustment policies. In fact, the 
more rapidly the basic medium-term adjustment policies are 
carried out and the more successful they are, the greater the 
degree of flexibility will be for the management of macro-
economic policy. 
As suggested in last year's Annual Economic Report, the 
combined micro-macro approach in economic policy calls 
for the setting up of a framework of policy management 
where financial policy (budgetary and monetary policy 
together) is set with reference to a medium-term trajectory 
for nominal GDP. This trajectory could, for example, 
represent the central no-policy-change forecast for the 
medium-term rate of growth of real GDP and the highest 
acceptable rate of inflation. Micro-policies in the widest 
Economic problems and policy issues for the Community 
sense-including efforts to dampen the increase in wage 
costs, supply policies, elimination of trade barriers and 
support to investment, etc.-would then address the 
problem of improving the split between the real component 
and the inflation component within a given rate of growth of 
nominal GDP. 
Assuming that this approach is broadly followed over the 
next year or two-as recommended by the Commission in 
this year's Annual Economic Report-the most immediate 
policy issue for the Community would therefore be to make 
substantial progress on the micro-policy fronts and thereby 
gradually improve the conditions for non-inflationary 
growth. The key element of this policy would be measures to 
eliminate national subsidy schemes and protectionist 
systems, to open all national markets for competition from 
other Community countries and to make greater strides 
towards full exchange-rate stability within the Community. 
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The debate about nominal income norms 
Last year's Annual Economic Review included, in Chapter l, 
some discussion of monetary and budgetary policy with 
reference to norms, or reference trajectories, for the evolution of 
nominal income (or nominal GDP). In the course of the last year 
there have been a number of further contributions to economic 
policy analysis and debate on this subject. The following 
provides a general introduction to this subject in the context of a 
wider discussion of the relation between targets and instruments 
in economic policy. 
Although there is an increasing degree of consensus .that 
budgetary and monetary policy cannot in the short run or close 
medium term (the next two years) efficiently influence the split of 
a particular growth of nominal incomes as between real 
expenditure and the rise in prices, a high rate of real growth with 
the lowest possible rate of inflation must remain a fundamental 
objective of macroeconomic policy within the constraints given 
by environmental considerations, social policies, etc. 
Ideally, therefore, governments would formulate a medium-term 
economic strategy involving on one hand a target for real growth 
and on the other a target for the rate of inflation. 
Action to improve the real rate of growth might then typically 
involve a large number of measures aimed at strengthening 
business investment, increasing the propensity to save, reducing 
the weight of the public sector in the economy, improving the 
structure of public expenditure, eliminating waste and un-
productive activities, and other initiatives at the microeconomic 
level. 
Policies aimed at lowering the rate of inflation in the economy 
may also in many countries include measures to eliminate 
rigidities in the wage and price formation-notably indexation 
arrangements, wasteful price policies in the health sector and 
various forms of arrangements aimed at protecting commercial 
interest from the effects of competition. However, anti-inflation 
policies are unlikely to succeed unless supported by a credible 
medium-term financial strategy which explicitly allows for a 
gradual reduction in the rate of inflation within a realistic overall 
trajectory for nominal GDP. The chosen trajectories would 
therefore be supplemented by medium-term targets/trajectories 
for the key budgetary and monetary variables, also in nominal 
terms. A reduction in the growth of the monetary aggregates 
would be utilized actively as an instrument of anti-inflation 
policies. 
Over the period of I 8 to 24 months normally covered by short-
term economic forecasting the medium-term trajectory for 
nominal income and expenditure and budgetary and monetary 
variables would provide a framework within which the policy-
makers might decide how to react to price or supply shocks or to 
cyclical fluctuations in demand and output. Such decisions 
would always require a certain amount of value judgement, 
notably with respect to the distinction between cyclical 
fluctuations and changes in the medium-term trend which would 
have to be reflected in a revision of the medium-term financial 
strategy. However, despite the unavoidable uncertainty with 
respect to the identification of trend and cycle, an explicit 
formulation of policy assumptions in this field might afford a 
larger degree of credibility to the stabilization policies under-
taken. 
In the case of supply constraints leading to temporary 
productivity falls and increase in prices. the level of nominal 
GDP may remain approximately unchanged and discretionary 
budgetary or monetary policy measures would not be required. 
Where both prices and the volume of output fall temporarily 
short of the medium-term trajectory there would be some scope 
for letting the automatic budgetary stabilizers operate on the 
basis of a temporary increase in monetary financing. This would 
hardly allow a complete elimination of the cycles but would at 
least contribute to a smoothening of the fluctuations in the face 
of a temporary weakening of credit demand from the private 
sector. 
These policy prescriptions, however, can only work efficiently if 
monetary and budgetary policy arc geared fundamentally 
towards stabilization with, in particular, a realistic level of long-
term interest rates, a sound position of the budget balance in a 
medium-term perspective, a balanced competitive position, and 
towards a satisfactory inflation performance. 
Moreover, even in countries with comprehensive quarterly 
national accounts the level and growth of gross domestic product 
is known only with a timelag of several months. Also, the 
quarterly fluctuations of nominal GDP appear to be con-
siderably more erratic than real GDP. In fact, only monetary 
policy can be modified with sufficiently short notice to give some 
degree of flexibility in the implementation of policies; but the 
effects of monetary policy on the level of GDP would typically 
come through with a certain delay· typically 6 to 9 months. 
Attempts to fine-tune movements of nominal GDP could 
therefore easily lead to an even greater instability of economic 
activity than before. Consequently, in the very short-term 
macroeconomic policy would still have to rely on the conven-
tional instruments of monetary policy: changes in central bank 
money stock, discount rates, reserve requirements, etc. The 
nominal income framework, thus, would not reduce the 
responsibility of the central bank for day-to-day decisions on 
monetary conditions but perhaps make it easier for the monetary 
authorities to allow for changes in the velocity of circulation of 
money and structural changes in money demand without 
necessarily endangering the confidence of financial markets. 
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2. Economic outlook in the short and medium term 
The recovery in the world economy which had been looked for in the second half of 1982 
did not materialize; instead output weakened in many countries and world trade fell back 
again. In the first half of 1983 output in the USA started to rise and the trend of world 
trade appears to have levelled off Within the Community there is an increasing number of 
signs that a patchy recovery from recession is at last under way. However, of the three 
main external factors which at various stages either led to the onset of the recession or 
contributed to its unusual length-the oil price rises, high real interest rates and the 
weakness of world trade ( in part because of developing country debt problems )-only the 
first has been substantially eased. The recovery in Europe is therefore likely to be s!oll' and 
hesitant. The latestfvrecasls show rises in real gross domestic product in the Community 
of 0,5% in 1983 and 1,5% in 1984; this will not be fast enough to achieve any significant 
decline in the number of unemployed. Jn the medium term the central projection suggests 
annual average growth to 1987 in real gross domestic product of around 2,0%, only 
sufficient to reduce the unemployment rate very slightly. 
2.1 Recent developments and short-term outlook 
In 1983 indications of the beginning ofan upturn in the world 
economy have as yet not been reflected convincingly in the 
Community economy. There have been output gains in some 
of the Community countries since the end oflast year, but it is 
still uncertain whether these stirrings of growth are the 
prelude to a phase of sustained and balanced expansion. The 
danger remains, because of the continuance of a number of 
unfavourable factors, that the Community economy may 
revert to a further perioci of stagnation. 
1982 was the third year of the recession in the Community. 
Expectations that a gradual recovery in the Community 
economy would get under way during 1982, which were 
based mainly on increases in Community real gross domestic 
product in the final two quarters of 1981 and on some 
strengthening of business confidence in the early months of 
1982, were in no way fulfilled. Instead, against a background 
of continuing high real interest rates and a falling away of 
world trade, activity in the Community weakened, with 
especially sharp falls in output in the third quarter of 1982. A 
discussion of factors which led to the expected recovery in 
1982 being aborted, and some of which still threaten the 
potential recovery in 1983 and 1984, is given in the next 
section. 
In the developed economies outside the Community the 
second half of 1982 generally saw some steadying in activity, 
followed by a stronger trend in the first half of 1983. In the 
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United States real gross national product stabilized in the 
final three quarters of 1982, after the very sharp falls at the 
end of 1981 and beginning of 1982 (see Graph 2.1 ). In the first 
half of 1983 a slowing in the rate of stock liquidation, an end 
to the falls in fixed investment, with housing investment 
notably buoyant, and a revival of consumer spending have 
been the main features in the rises in output achieved (real 
gross national product rose at an underlying annualized rate 
of around 5,5% in the first three quarters of 1983). Although 
the very rapid increases of the last few months are unlikely to 
be sustained, expansion is expected to continue and to 
become more broadly based in the second half of this year 
and into 1984. Private consumption should be given a boost 
by the mid-year personal tax cuts, and capital investment is 
expected to strengthen steadily. After a fall of 1,7% in 1982, 
real gross national product in the United States is forecast to 
rise by 3,5~{, in 1983 and 4,3% in 1984. 
Japan managed to maintain moderate growth of output 
throughout 1982 and the early part of 1983, mainly due to the 
expansion of private consumpion. Fixed investment started 
to rise in the second half of 1982, but this upturn has not 
continued. The relatively slow growth of domestic demand 
during the first part of 1983 was partly compensated for by a 
rapid expansion of merchandise exports. Growth in real 
gross national product at an annual rate around 3% is 
forecast for both 1983 and 1984. In Canada there were sharp 
falls in output in both halves of 1982, and there were very 
large reductions in fixed investment. Some recovery appears 
to be under way in the early months of this year and output 
GRAPH 2.1 : Comparison of cycle in real GNP/GDP in the 
USA and the Community, 1979-84 
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growth should accelerate through 1983 into 1984. The 
smaller non-Community developed countries, mainly in 
Europe, are highly dependent on developments within the 
Community for their own conjunctural trends. Several of 
them (Switzerland, Norway and Sweden) experienced a fa ll 
in output in 1982, but most should show somewhat stronger 
positive growth in 1983 and a further improvement next year. 
In both halves of 1982 the vo lume of world trade fell sharply 
(see Table 2. 1). Imports by the developed OECO countries 
fell throughout the year, mainly as a result of cuts in North 
American imports in the first half and exacerbated by lower 
Community imports in the second half. But the main 
contribution to the weakness of world trade last year came 
from falling imports by developing countries (both oil 
producers and non-oil). Both groups were faced by sharply 
declining export revenues. The OPEC countries experienced 
a 21 % fall in export earnings, over three-quarters of which 
was due to a decline in export volumes consequent upon the 
large adj ustment in world demand for oil. The export 
revenues of the non-OPEC developing countries fell by some 
9%, mostly as a result of lower primary commodity prices, 
although many individual countries a lso experienced volume 
losses as well. In addition current acco unt debits were 
swollen by high debt-servicing costs, and many countries 
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faced extreme difficulties in financing new deficits or in 
refinancing maturing debt. The volume of imports by both 
OPEC and other developing countries fe ll at an annual rate 
of 7-8% in both halves of 1982 (for the OPEC countries the 
slight rise in volume when comparing the average of 1982 
with the average for the previous year is due to the fact that 
OPEC import volumes were expanding very rapidly 
throughout most of 1981 ). 
Preliminary estimates for the first half of 1983 suggest that 
the decline in world trade has halted and that the trend has 
become firmer. North American imports have begun to 
recover and, while OPEC import volumes have continued to 
shrink rapidly, it appears that imports by the other 
developing countries have fa llen less sharply than during last 
year. Trends in world trade are likely to lack dynamism, but 
the latest forecasts suggest a gradua l strengthening through 
to the end of 1984. Imports by the developed countries 
should rise faster as the recovery in activity proceeds, and the 
non-oil developing countries could start to increase their 
imports as the demand for their exports and the prices of 
commodities become firmer. More downward adjustments 
in OPEC imports are expected, as a further 20% cut in export 
revenues, due in a lmost equal proportions to volume and 
price falls , is likely for 1983 . If there is some recovery in the 
demand for OPEC oil towards the end of this year and in 
1984, then the decline in OPEC import volumes could tail off 
in the latter part of next year. In total the volume of world 
trade (imports of goods) is forecast to show almost no change 
in 1983 and then to rise by 3, 7% in 1984, after fa lling by 0, 7% 
in 1982. 
The world recession and the increases in the va lue of the US 
dollar against most other currencies have led to some 
substantia l changes in the prices of goods traded on 
international markets. There has been an appreciable 
reduction in world consumption of oi l since the second oil 
price shock of 1979-80, substitution out of oil because of the 
high level of prices having been compounded by reduced 
demand because of the fa ll in activity during the recession . 
Average dollar oil prices already started to weaken during 
1982, with falls in spot market prices and reduced premiums 
or wider discounts being offered by some OPEC countries. 
Faced by a continued deterioration of oil market conditions, 
a nd after an earlier unsuccessful attempt to hold prices 
through production discipline, the OPEC countries decided 
in March 1983 to reduce the official marker price from USO 
34 per barrel to USO 29, and set an overall limit on output of 
17,5 million barrels per day with production quotas 
allocated to indi vidual countries. Although the picture is 
confused by large stock movements which have occurred, 
some stability does now appear to have returned to the oil 
market, and it seems that the OPEC price agreement is · 
holding. For the purposes of the forecast it has been assumed 
that oil prices will remain at the nominal level reached after 
the agreement until at least the end of 1984. 
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The prices of other primary commodities fell back sharply in 
1982. Since the beginning of this year, however, the spot 
prices of many commodities, both foods and raw materials, 
have tended to become firmer. Agricultural products in 
particular have scored some large price gains during the 
summer months influenced by the prospects of relatively 
poor harvests. By the middle of October 'The Economist' 
index of commodity prices (in dollar terms) was 24% higher 
than one year earlier; in ECU terms the rise was one third. 
Commodity prices are expected to continue rising through-
out the remainder of 1983 and 1984 as demand picks up, but 
no runaway acceleration seems likely. Dollar prices of non-
fuel primary commodities (UN index) are forecast to rise by 
4,5% in 1983 and 11,2% in 1984 after a fall of 10,6% in 1982. 
Because the United States is leading most other countries out 
of recession and because of the strength of the US dollar, the 
deficit on the US current account is expected to widen 
appreciably in 1983 and 1984 (see Table 2.2). Most other 
developed countries are expected to show some improvement 
in their current balance. The OPEC countries were probably 
marginally in current account deficit in 1982, and this deficit 
is likely to widen substantially in 1983 before steadying in 
1984. The combined deficit of other developing countries, 
while remaining large should be smaller in 1983 and 1984 
than last year. 
Table 2.1 
World output, foreign trade and EC export markets 
1979 1980 1981 
GDP/GNP, OECD total 3,6 1,6 1,6 
Imports of goods (volume) 
World 5,9 1,3 2,0 
EC 10 I 9,3 1,0 2,8 
World (excluding EC) 4,2 1,4 4,7 
of which: 
OECD (excluding EC) 5,7 -3,2 0,8 
OPEC -11,3 10,5 27,4 
Other developing countries 10,0 6,7 5,5 
Other countries 2,8 4,0 1,6 
EC export markets 2 
Intra-EC markets 10,4 1,9 -2,7 
Extra-EC markets 4,0 4,7 5,7 
Total 7,4 3,2 1,3 
Exports of goods (volume), EC total 1 7,4 2,7 4,0 
I Including intra-EC trade. 
1982 
-0,3 
-0,7 
2,6 
-2,3 
-1,5 
1,2 
-6,5 
-2,3 
In the Community there was a deepening of the recession in 
the middle two quarters of 1982 and industrial production 
continued to decline until the end of the year (see Table 2.3). 
Among the domestic components of gross domestic product 
contributing to the decline in the second half of 1982 (see 
Table 2.4) were private consumption, which fell back 
marginally, and stockbuilding. Fixed investment continued 
to decline in total, although not as rapidly as in previous 
periods. There was a sharp fall in the volume of exports of 
goods and services. but at the same time import volumes 
declined even more. -
In the final quarter of 1982 and the first quarter of 1983 there 
were small rises in real gross domestic product in the 
Community and small increases in industrial production 
were also recorded in the first two quarters of 1983. Since the 
beginning of the year there has also been a considerable 
improvement in industrial confidence, as measured by the 
Commission's business surveys, and in the other components 
of the Commission's economic sentiment indicator. The 
revival of confidence is evident in most of the countries of the 
Community, but it has been most marked in Germany and 
the United Kingdom. Order books in both countries have 
been improving from their previous depressed levels. 
( 0 ~ change over previous period, seasonally adju'ited annual rate) 
1983 l 1984 l 1982 1983 l 1984 l 
Il Il Il 
2,1 3,1 -0,8 0,3 2,2 3,6 3,0 2,7 
0,1 3,7 -2,4 -3,6 1,1 2,6 4,2 4,2 
0,7 2,1 5.2 -4,5 3,3 1,1 2,7 2,2 
-0,2 4,6 -6,0 -3,1 0,0 3,5 5,0 5,3 
2,0 7,2 -10,4 4,6 6,0 9,0 7,0 6,0 
-8,2 -0,8 -6,7 -7,5 -8,8 -7,8 0,0 5,1 
-1,9 4,4 -8,6 -7,5 -1,4 3,0 4,7 5,1 
2,4 4,3 -3,4 -0,8 3,0 4,4 4,2 4,3 
2,4 0,3 2,0 
-1,7 -0,9 2,8 
0,3 -0,2 2,3 
0,8 0,7 3,5 -0,5 -3,8 1,3 4,0 3,4 3,5 
2 Import volumes by the various markets weighted together according 10 their shares in EC exports of goods. 
3 Forecasts. 
Source: OECD, !MF and Commission services. 
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Table 2.2 
Balance of payments on current account 
ECIO 
USA 
Canada 
Japan 
Other OECD countries 
OECD, total 
OPEC 
Other developing countries 
Other countries 
World I 
Including errors and omissions. 
Forecasts. 
Source: OECD, !MF and Commission services. 
Table 2.3 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 2 1984 2 
-10,1 -37,2 -17,9 -13,8 -4,1 0,6 
-0,5 1,5 4,4 -11,2 -29,6 -44,8 
-4,2 -0,9 -4,5 2,4 3,2 2,4 
-8,8 -10,7 4,9 6,9 17,9 18,9 
-5,6 -22,4 -20,6 -6,7 -3,4 -7,1 
- 29,2 - 68,8 - 33,8 - 22,4 - 16,0 - 30,0 
61,0 115,0 51,0 -3,7 -21,7 -5,8 
-41,0 -63,0 -75,0 -65,1 -44,9 -42,6 
-9,5 -10,8 -4,4 6,3 6,2 6,9 
-18,7 -27,6-62,2 -85,1 -76,5 -71,5 
Recent developments in GDP and industrial production in the Community 
1981 
II lll IV 
Real GDP (EC 4) I 0,6 -1,7 1,9 2,7 
Industrial production (EC 10) 0,1 -0,5 1,1 0,3 
('OOO million US dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rate) 
1982 1983 2 1984 2 
II II II 
- 15,0 - 12,7 -6,6 -1,6 -0,4 1,6 
5,0 -27,4 -28,0 -31,2 -48,2 -42,4 
-0.1 4,8 2,6 3,8 3,4 1,4 
7,0 6,8 19,0 17,0 18,0 20,0 
-5,1 -8,2 -3,4 -3,4 -6,0 -8,2 
-8,2 -36,6 -16,4 -15,4 - 33,2 - 27,6 
(% change on previous quarter, seasonally adjusted annual rate) 
1982 1983 
II III IV II 
0,3 -0,1 -2,8 2,3 2,1 -0,2 
0,8 -0,1 -6,8 -6,6 2,8 0,7 
Estimates based on quarterly national accounts data for the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
Source: Eurostat and national statistics. 
The improving outlook for the international environment, 
coupled with the rallying of economic sentiment and 
indications of a firming of the trend of output within the 
Community, suggest that this time the Community economy 
is at last starting on a gradual recovery from recession. But 
some indicators in the first halves of both 1981 and 1982 led 
then to hopes of recovery which were never fulfilled (see 
Annual Economic Reviews for 1981-82 and 1982-83). 
Additional evidence is required this time before there can be 
certainty that a recovery is under way. Furthermore, the 
potential recovery is likely to be very fragile and could easily 
be knocked off course by an adverse movement in, for 
example, interest rates. 
The latest forecasts for the Community (see Table 2.4) show 
only very small additions to output this year, and a slightly 
faster rate of growth (but low for a recovery phase by 
historical standards) in 1984. The recovery in Europe is 
expected to proceed at a slower, more hesitant pace than in 
the United States (see Graph 2.1). 
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Table 2.4 
Demand, output and external balance, EC 10 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 2 1984 2 1982 1983 2 1984 2 
II II 11 
% change at cons tall/ prices ( seasonally adjusted annual rate) 
Private consumption 3,7 1,6 0,2 
Government consumption 2,6 1,9 1,5 
Gross fixed capital formation 3,8 1,7 -4,7 
Stockbuilding (as% of GDP) 1,7 1,5 -0,2 
Domestic demand 4,3 1,2 -2,1 
Exports (goods and services) 6,2 2,0 3,8 
Imports (goods and services) 10,3 1,7 2,2 
Gross domestic product at market prices 3,3 1,3 -0,4 
Industrial production 4,9 -0,8 -2,2 
Unemployment rate I 5,4 6,0 7,9 
Trade balance (fob/fob) -0,4 -1,2 -0,2 
Current balance -0,4 -1,3 -0,7 
Unemployment as % of civilian labour force, EC 9. 
Forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
Most of the components of domestic demand should 
progressively strengthen this year and next. Real personal 
incomes should benefit from the slowing in the rate of 
inflation being experienced generally, and saving rates 
should tend to edge down because of wealth effects from the 
same influence, so that private consumption rises gradually. 
Fixed investment is expected to stabilize during this year and 
then to start to recover, becoming the most dynamic element 
of domestic demand in 1984. The rate of stockbuilding 
should increase, accompanying the rising trend in produc-
tion, but high interest rates are likely to mean that additions 
to stocks are kept more carefully under control than has been 
usual in previous periods of recovery. Only government 
consumption is forecast to rise more slowly in 1983 and 1984 
than during the recession years, as efforts are made to 
contain budget deficits. 
The volume of exports are forecast to rise, benefiting both 
from the expected recovery in world trade and from a more 
competitive position while the US dollar is strong. Import 
volumes will also rise in line with the domestic recovery and 
at a rate not much different from exports, so that the net 
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0,5 
0,8 
-1,8 
0,7 
0,9 
0,7 
2,3 
0,4 
-1,7 
9,6 
0,1 
-0,6 
0,4 0,5 1,0 0 1,1 -0,5 0,8 0,9 
0,8 -0,1 0,9 0,6 1,7 -0,8 0,3 0 
-0,3 2,0 -2.9 0,4 -1,4 1,2 2,3 2,4 
0,9 1,2 1,0 0,3 0,8 0,9 1,0 1,3 
0,5 1,0 2,7 -1,2 1,7 0 1,2 1,6 
0,6 3,4 -0,7 -3,6 1,6 2,7 3,7 3,4 
0,5 1,9 4,1 -3,6 2,0 1,6 2,0 2,0 
0,5 1,5 1.3 -1,2 1,6 0,3 1,7 2,0 
2,0 2,3 
10,4 10,9 
as% of GDP 
0,1 0,2 -0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,2 
-0,1 0 -0,6 -0,5 -0,2 -0,1 0 0,1 
contribution from the real foreign balance to the growth of 
real gross domestic product will be marginal. 
In total the year-on-year growth in real gross domestic 
product in the Community is forecast to be only 0,5% in I 983 
and 1,5% in 1984, following a fall of0,4% in 1981 and a slight 
rise of0,4% in 1982. Not all countries are expected to record 
positive year-on-year growth in 1983; falls are forecast for 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Greece and Italy (see Table 
2.5). The United Kingdom should have the highest growth 
rate this year. In I 984 all countries except Luxembourg 
should have positive growth, but only Germany and the 
United Kingdom are expected to achieve a rate of expansion 
of2%. 
The slow rate of recovery for the Community this year and 
next is likely to be below the rate of increase in labour 
productivity and so a further fall in employment is probable, 
of0,9% in 1983 and 0,3% in 1984. With the labour force still 
rising very gradually, this implies some further additions to 
the number of unemployed throughout the forecast period. 
In response to the gradually improving economic situation 
and to a variety of government schemes for youth training, 
early retirement, etc., which will have the effect of removing 
people from the unemployment registers, the rise in 
unemployment during the remainder of 1983 and in 1984 is 
expected to be relatively small compared with the massive 
Table 2.5 
Rates of growth of demand and output, 1971-84 
B DK 
Private consumption 1971-80 I 3,8 1,5 
1981 -1,4 -0,5 
1982 1,1 2,6 
1983 2 -3,1 0,9 
1984 2 -1,1 0,3 
Government consumption 1971-80 I 4,2 4,3 
1981 0,6 3,0 
1982 -1,6 3,3 
1983 2 -1,6 1,2 
1984 2 -0,8 -1,5 
Gross fixed capital 1971-80 I 2,2 -1,0 
1981 - 16,2 -15,7 
1982 -2,6 3,7 
1983 2 -1,9 1,9 
1984 2 0,4 1,0 
Change in stocks 1971-80 0,8 0,6 
(as% of GDP) 1981 0,2 -0,4 
1982 -0,3 0,0 
1983 2 0,2 -0,4 
1984 2 0,4 -0,2 
Domestic demand) 1971-80 I 3,3 1,5 
1981 -4,1 -2,1 
1982 -0,1 2,8 
1983 2 -2,5 1,1 
1984 2 -0,7 -0,1 
Exports 1971-80 I 5,4 4,8 
(goods and services) 1981 2,4 5,4 
1982 2,0 2,0 
1983 2 1,0 4,6 
1984 2 2,9 2,4 
Imports 1971-80 I 5,7 2,0 
(goods and services) 1981 -1,4 -1,5 
1982 0,2 2,2 
1983 2 -0,9 0,0 
1984 2 1,0 -0,8 
Gross domestic product 1971-80 I 3,2 2,3 
at market prices 1981 -1,8 0,1 
1982 1,0 3,4 
1983 2 -0,9 2,2 
1984 2 -0,6 1,2 
I Annual average. 
2 Forecast. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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increases which have occurred in the last three years. The 
total number of unemployed is expected to average almost 
12,5 million in 1984, representing 10,9% of the civilian 
labour force, more than double the unemployment rate in 
1979 before the recession began (EC 9 figures). 
(% change in volume) 
D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 10 
3,3 4,7 4,2 2,7 3,2 4,1 3,9 2,1 3,3 
-0,4 0,7 1,9 -0,4 0,2 1,7 -2,1 -0,1 0,2 
-2,2 0,6 3,5 -5,3 0,3 -1,6 -1,6 1,1 0,5 
0,5 0,1 0,3 -3,5 -0,8 -1,5 -1,5 3,1 0,4 
1,0 0,8 0,2 -0,8 -0,4 -2,5 -2,0 2,0 0,5 
2,8 6,1 3,1 6,1 3,0 3,7 2,7 2,5 2,9 
1,7 6,5 2,4 -0,1 1,7 2,1 1,3 0,4 1,5 
-1,1 1,0 1,7 3,3 1,8 0,3 0,7 1,2 0,8 
-0,1 3,0 -1,1 0,0 1,8 -0,3 1,7 2,4 0,8 
0,0 2,5 -1,2 -1,0 1,8 -0,7 -3,4 0,4 -0,1 
2,0 2,5 2,4 5,2 1,2 2,4 0,8 0,5 1,5 
-3,9 -10,1 -2,3 7,5 -0,2 - 13,3 - 10,8 -8,2 -4,7 
-5,4 -1,0 1,1 -8,4 -5,3 -2,2 -5,0 5,1 -1,8 
3,3 -2,2 -3,8 -10,4 -5,1 -5,8 0,7 4,7 -0,3 
4,7 2,8 -2,6 -1,2 3,7 -2,3 0,5 3,1 2,0 
0,8 5,3 1,3 1,0 2,3 -0,9 0,9 0,5 1,2 
-0,1 7,3 -0,3 -1,0 0,8 1,9 -1,1 -1,7 -0,2 
0,4 4,2 1,1 0,1 0,8 1,4 -0,1 -0,7 0,7 
0,7 3,9 0,9 0,2 0,5 1,6 -0,1 0,3 0,9 
1,0 4,0 0,9 0,1 0,8 1,8 0,1 0,7 1,2 
2,8 4,5 3,6 3,6 3,1 3,5 2,8 1,7 2,7 
-2,0 0,3 -1,1 1,2 -2,7 -1,2 -5,0 -1,7 -2,1 
-2,6 0,4 2,7 -5,0 -0,5 -1,5 -1,8 1,9 0,1 
0,9 0,2 -0,8 -4,7 -1,1 -2,4 -0,5 3,3 0,3 
1,5 1,5 -0,5 -0,9 0,6 -2,2 -1,7 1,9 0,7 
6,2 10,5 8,0 8,0 7,0 3,0 5,4 4,1 6,0 
7,7 5,4 4,6 2,0 6,0 2,0 0,8 -1,8 3,8 
3,5 -5,8 -3,7 4,0 1,2 0,3 -0,9 0,6 0,7 
-1,0 -2,8 -0,1 7,5 1,7 -3,3 2,9 0,3 0,6 
3,2 2,2 3,0 8,3 4,5 0,4 3,8 3,0 3,4 
6,3 6,3 7,7 6,3 5,9 3,6 4,1 3,3 5,4 
-0,5 9,0 -1,5 2,1 -5,4 1,8 -7,3 -0,9 -2,2 
-0,1 5,9 4,8 -4,4 2,1 -0,9 1,1 5,0 2,3 
0,5 -1,3 -2,7 -1,5 -0,8 -3,0 1,7 4,8 0,5 
3,0 1,6 -0,9 3,7 2,9 -0,8 1,1 3,3 1,5 
2,9 4,7 3,6 4,1 3,1 3,0 2,8 1,9 2,9 
0,2 -0,7 0,2 1,1 -0,2 -1,8 -1,2 -2,0 -0,4 
-1,0 0,0 1,8 1,2 -0,3 -1,1 -1,6 1,5 0,4 
0,7 -0,2 -0,3 0,5 -0,8 -2,4 0,3 2,8 0,5 
2,1 1,5 0,4 1,8 1,5 -1,0 0,0 2,2 1,5 
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2.2 External influences on recession and 
recovery in the Community 
The economies of the Member States have been experiencing 
the longest period of recession since the Community was 
founded. In 1974-75 the fall in output was sharper than 
occurred at any time during 1980-82, but the recession then 
was relatively short-lived and output bounced back upwards 
quite strongly in the course of 1975. Although a large part of 
the explanation of the latest recession must be looked for in 
the behaviour and reactions of economic agents within the 
Community, some has its origins in a series ofrelated shocks 
which have hit the Community economy from outside. 
The first of these shocks, which pushed the Community and 
world economy into recession, was the second huge rise in 
OPEC oil prices which occurred in a series of steps in quick 
succession between late 1978 and early 1981. The two-and-a-
half-fold rise in oil prices adversely affected oil-consuming 
countries by cutting incomes, raising price levels, and 
pushing external balances towards deficit. The fall in output 
which would be expected to occur in any one country in 
response to this shock was greatly amplified by the 
international transmission mechanism, whereby initial falls 
in output and imports in many countries simultaneously led 
via shrinking world trade and reduced exports to further 
declines in output. 
Some of the adjustment to higher oil prices would be bound 
to take place over a number of years, e.g. in cases where new 
investment is required to make energy savings or to 
substitute other fuels for oil, but the major part of the 
adjustment at the macroeconomic level, and more par-
ticularly to output, would normally be expected to occur 
within a period of 18 months-2 years. Thus it was that early 
in 1982 some signs of a slight upturn in output in the 
Community were interpreted as being the beginnings of the 
recovery phase. But three closely linked external factors 
played a part in aborting the potential recovery. These were 
high real interest rates in the United States, and the related 
strength of the US dollar and worsening debt situation of the 
developing countries. 
In the classic business cycle, interest rates, nominal and real, 
are expected to decline during a period of recession, and thus 
to give some encouragement to consumption and investment 
demand. During 1982 nominal interest rates in the United 
States did fall substantially from the peak levels reached 
during the previous year, but this was not sufficient to reflect 
the rapidly declining rate of inflation, and real US interest 
rates (relative to the current rate of consumer price increases) 
were higher on average in 1982 than in 1981. Real short-term 
money market rates in the United States averaged 4;~ in 1982 
and real long-term rates 5,4%. Furthermore, although there 
was some easing of nominal and real rates during the second 
half of 1982, they have tended to harden again in the first part 
66 
of 1983. The causes of these high interest rates are not fully 
explained, but important elements are: a failure of inflation 
expectations to adjust downwards with current inflation 
performance; fears about the future size of the US federal 
budget deficit and its implications for domestic financing and 
inflation; and worries about the stability of the US banking 
system because of its exposure to more-than-usual risk 
domestically during the recession and. even more seriously, 
internationally because of the debt problems of many 
sovereign borrowers. 
The effects of high US interest rates have been to keep the US 
dollar strong and so to severely constrain the opportunities 
for European interest rates to be brought down to more 
desirable levels. Although in real terms interest rates in the 
Community do not appear to be as high as in the United 
States, they are nonetheless at record levels, averaging about 
3,0% for short-term rates during 1982 and early 1983 and 
3,8% for long-term rates. This adds substantially to the real 
debt servicing costs of a large proportion of existing 
borrowing and discourages new borrowing to finance 
investment, stockbuilding and some forms of consumer 
spending. 
The strong US dollar has advantages and disadvantages for 
the European economies. On the import cost side, prices 
denominated in dollars become more expensive in domestic 
European currencies. Thus, to the initial oil price shock of 
1978-81 was added a dollar shock in 1981 and 1982 when the 
dollar appreciated by some 42% against the ECU (average 
for _1982 compa:ed with average for 1980). The weakening 
dunng 1982 m 011 and other commodity prices in dollars was 
not perceived as a price fall in terms of most European 
currencies. Thus although inflation has slowed appreciably 
in Europe, and this has been helped by an easing in the rate of 
increase of import prices, the strength of the dollar has 
prevented import costs from falling as rapidly as they might 
otherwise have done. 1 The continuing strength of the US 
dollar at the same time has made it very difficult for an active 
policy of interest rate reduction to be pursued in Europe, as 
such a policy could well imply a further depreciation of the 
European currencies against the US dollar so long as US 
interest rates remain high. 
On the other hand, the strong dollar makes European 
suppliers more competitive in world markets relative to 
dollar-based suppliers. By the second quarter of 1983 the 
Community's price competitivity (based on wholesale prices) 
against oth~r countries showed an improvement of 15% 
compared with the average for 1980, while the competitivity 
of the United States deteriorated by 28%. 
Sec Chapter 3 for further discussion on this point. 
The third influence which played a major part in halting any 
recovery in Europe in 1982, was the worsening developing 
country debt crisis which had direct repercussions on 
developing country imports, world trade, Community 
exports and output. The enormous cumulative current 
account deficit of the oil-importing developing countries 
since 1973 had been financed with increasing difficulties. The 
prolonged world recession, which reduced demand and 
prices for developing country exports, and the high level of 
interest rates meant that many countries faced very large 
debt-servicing burdens and could not easily obtain further 
financing. In addition a group of high-absorbing oil 
exporters was hard hit by the fall in demand for oil and the 
weakening of oil prices. A sharp reduction in imports 
followed and had its repercussions and was amplified 
through the developed economies. Imports by the non-oil 
developing countries (which accounted for 21 % of Com-
munity exports to extra-EC countries in 1982) fell by 6,5% in 
volume in 1982, and imports by the OPEC countries ( 19% of 
extra-EC exports by the Community) also declined steeply 
during 1982 and are expected to fall again markedly in 1983 
(see Table 2.1). 
In 1983 many of the factors mentioned have continued to 
restrain growth in Europe. It is true that oil prices have fallen 
back (although by relatively little compared with the earlier 
rises), and this should give some stimulus to output and 
trade. But the continuing strength of the dollar will limit to 
some extent the effects in Europe of a fall in dollar oil prices. 
Interest rates remain high and are showing a tendency to 
move higher; if this trend should be confirmed the recovery 
in Europe will be very seriously threatened. Community 
exporters will continue to be helped by their improved 
competitiveness, but in other areas the strong dollar places 
severe constraints on policy options. Finally, although the 
risk of major financial collapse seems for the moment to have 
been averted, serious difficulties remain for the developing 
countries which are bound to hold back the growth of world 
trade. 
2.3 Medium-term prospects 
Projections beyond the horizon of the short-term forecasts 
described in section 2.1 are made using the Commission's 
medium-term Comet model. The most recent projections 
look as far ahead as 1987. The first two years of the 
projection (1983 and 1984) are aligned with the short-term 
forecasts. The central medium-term projection for the 
Community as a whole is shown in Table 2.6. 
Over the period between 1982 and 1987 the central projection 
suggests average gowth of real gross domestic product in the 
Community of about 2,0% per year. This is slightly stronger 
than the average growth of 1,75% per year during the nine 
Economic outlook in the short and medium term 
Table 2.6 
Medium-term projection to 1987, EC 10 
( annual average growth rate in %) 
1973 
1960 
Real GDP 4,8 
Private consumption 4,8 
Government consumption 3, 7 
Fixed capital formation 5,6 
GDP prices 4,9 
Employment 0,2 
Unemployment rate (% of labour 
force) I 2,4 
Real wages per employee 5,0 
General government net lending (% of 
GDP) I -0,8 
Balance of trade in goods and services 
e~ of GDP) I 0,5 
At end of period. 
Source: Comet model. 
Central 
projection 
1982 1987 
1973 1982 
1,7 1,9 
2,0 1,5 
2,3 0,6 
-0,4 2,7 
10,7 5,7 
-0,3 -0,1 
9,6 10,4 
2,4 1,1 
-5,2 -2,7 
0,3 1,1 
years following the first oil shock in 1973, but it is well below 
the rate of expansion in the early years of the Community. 
Private consumption is projected to grow a little more slowly 
than gross domestic product, while the projected rise in 
government consumption is noticeably lower at only 0,5% 
per year. Fixed investment, which was lower in real terms in 
1982 than in 1973, grows at almost 3% per year. The growth 
rate of gross domestic product over the period as a whole is 
the same as that of labour productivity, but some very slow 
rises in employment from 1985 onwards should be possible. 
As a consequence unemployment declines little from the 
peak expected to be reached in 1984, and, on the assumption 
of unchanged policies underlying the projection, the 
unemployment rate by 1987 is still as high as I 0,4%. Inflation 
is shown as stabilizing at just under 6% per year. Over the 
period of the projection government net borrowing (as a 
percentage of GDP) is expected to fall back to below 3%. 
Any projection for the medium term is highly sensitive to the 
assumptions made about the key exogenous variables in the 
model. The main assumptions about the international 
environment outside the Community relate to the price of oil, 
the growth of world trade and long-term interest rates in the 
United States. In the central projection it has been assumed 
that the nominal OPEC export price of oil in US dollars 
starts to rise again in 1985 but at a slower rate than the dollar 
prices of OPEC imports. The real oil price (relative to the cost 
of OPEC imports) is thus assumed to fall over the period by 
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an average 2,5% per year. The volume of world imports 
(excluding the Community) is assumed to grow at an annual 
rate of 3,9%, which, while faster than the average for the last 
five years, is still slow in a longer-term historical perspective. 
The US long-term interest rate is assumed to show a gradual 
and fairly small reduction until 1987. 
A number of exogenous assumptions are also made for each 
of the member countries. These relate principally to 
government consumption and investment expenditures, 
residential construction investment, rates of direct and 
indirect taxes and of social security contributions and 
payments of subsidies. Generally in the central projection 
these variables are set to reflect no change in policies other 
than those which have already been announced. Exchange 
rates against the US dollar are also set exogenously; it is 
assumed in the central projection that from 1984 onwards 
there is a gradual small appreciation (averaging only about 
0,5% per year) in the value of the ECU against the dollar; but 
some larger movements in individual currencies are intro-
duced to reflect differential inflation rates. 
The central medium-term projection for the Community 
suggests that economic growth during the remainder of this 
decade will be much slower than achieved in the years before 
the first oil shock in 1973, but slightly faster than in the years 
since that divide. Two alternative approaches to assessing 
what has been the underlying growth in production potential 
in Community countries in recent years are given in 
Table 2.7. The comparative cyclical positions of the Member 
States can be more clearly seen where abstraction is made 
from the varying underlying growth rates in each case. 
Medium-term average growth rates differ significantly from 
one member country to the next, so that attempts to analyse 
relative cyclical positions by making comparisons of recent 
GDP growth rates can be misleading: what might appear to 
Table 2.7 
Growth trend and capacity-utilization levels 
be a good recent performance in a country with high growth 
potential may, in terms of the use of available production 
factors and technological opportunities, be less effective than 
a slower growth rate in a country with more limited 
possibilities for expansion. 
There are two well-known methods of circumventing this 
problem in the measurement of relative cyclical perform-
ance. The first requires the measurement of trend GDP 
growth rates, deviations from which indicate the cyclical 
element in economic activity; and the second uses a 
straightforward comparison of plant capacity-utilization 
levels, as an indication of the degree to which available factor 
supplies are absorbed in current production. 
The available capacity-utilization indicators refer to manu-
facturing industry only but, to the extent that the recession is 
attributable to weak aggregate demand, trends in this series 
are probably indicative of capacity use in the economy at 
large. On the basis of this criterion, it can be concluded (see 
Table 2.7) that, as of the second quarter of 1983 (the date of 
the most recent observation of capacity utilization levels), the 
effects of the recession on productive capacity use were most 
severe in the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland and Italy 
(in that order), with Belgium, France and the Netherlands 
being much closer to normal activity levels. 
However, as suggested above, normal activity levels (and the 
equivalent high rates of capacity utilization) imply substan-
tially different growth performances as between the count-
ries in question here. This follows from the fact that 
production potential (based on such factors as investment 
and technological progress) is advancing at different rates in 
the Member States. The estimates of underlying GDP 
growth and of GDP expansion between points in time of 
equal capacity utilization in consecutive cycles, presented in 
Table 2.7 are designed to indicate the growth of production 
potential in this broad sense. 
(% change) 
EC B D F IRL L NL UK 
Underlying GDP growth trend 1 1,7 1,6 2 1,8 0,7 2,6 -0,4 2 0,9 
Decline in industrial capacity-utilization levels during present 
recession (since 1979-80) - 7,4 
Recent inter-cyclical growth in GDP between periods of equal 
industrial capacity utilization 3 1,3 
Based on 5-year moving averages, adjusted for average cyclical performance. 
Based on industrial production. 
For details of methodology see European Economy, Supplement B, June 1983. 
Source: Eurostat and EC business surveys. Data not available for Denmark and Greece. 
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-4,3 -10,3 
1,2 1,6 
-4 -8,9 -7,2 -0,5 -2,7 -11,3 
1.2 2,6 1,8 0,5 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of these growth potential 
estimates is the fact that they are everwhere low, both in 
historical terms, and with reference to the economic growth 
necessary to reduce unemployment. GDP annual growth 
Table 2.8 
Share of net investment in GDP, 1974-83 
(~; o/GDP) 
1974 1980 1981 1982 1983 
B 13,2 11,6 8,4 7,5 7,2 
DK 16,0 9,4 6,4 6,6 6,4 
D 10,4 10,2 8,9 7,3 7,3 
GR 14,9 12,6 10,3 9,8 10,0 
F 13,8 9,4 8,4 7,7 6,9 
IRL 15,6 18,2 19,9 17,9 15,2 
I 13,3 10,1 9,7 8,3 7,3 
L 12,6 13,5 10,5 9,9 9,0 
NL 12,7 9,9 7,7 6,8 6,6 
UK 9,5 6,0 4,2 4,4 4,3 
EC 12,0 9,5 8,1 7,1 6,7 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
Economic outlook in the short and medium term 
potential appears in fact to have fallen to about 1,5% for the 
Community, with country estimates varying from 2,5% in 
Italy to less than 1% in the United Kingdom. 
As can be seen from Table 2.8, the share of net investment 
(gross fixed capital formation less depreciation) in GDP, one 
of the principal factors determining production potential, 
has fallen steadily in recent years. From an average of 13,2% 
in the 1960-73 period, the net investment ratio for the 
Community has declined from 12% in 1974 to 7,1% in 1982; 
the forecast net investment ratio for 1983 is again somewhat 
lower, at 6, 7%. At the individual Member State level, there is 
a marked clustering of net investment ratios around 7,0% 
( 1983 forecasts), exceptions being Ireland with relatively 
high net investment (10% of GDP), with Greece and the 
United Kingdom at the lower extreme (2,9% and 4,3% of 
GDP, respectively). 
The weakness of investment activity in the Community not 
only limits the growth of production potential through its 
effects on the expansion of the capital stock; it also slows 
down the absorption into production processes of new and 
more efficient techniques, thus rendering Community output 
less price competitive than it might otherwise be. In these 
circumstances, the importance of encouraging investment, 
promoting a more efficient industrial structure and support-
ing technological progress is clear. 
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3. Prices and costs 
The slowdown of inflation in the Community which started in 1982 proceeded further in 
1983 and is forecast to continue, albeit at a more modest pace, in 1984. Price increases 
have, however, slowed down quickly and by large amounts in the main trading partners 
since the second oil shock. The poor price performance of the Community on an 
international comparison, is largely attributable to transitory elements, notably the effect 
of exchange rate changes and an increase in profit margins in 1982. The direct 
contribution of unit labour costs to the rise in the deflator of final expenditure in 1982 was 
in fact the same in the Community as in the United States, but higher than in Japan. The 
real product wage ( unit labour costs deflated by the GDP deflator) in the Community.fell 
both in 1982 and 1983 and is expected to decline further in 1984. Within the Community, 
all Member States have recorded a substantial slowdown of inflation, but only very partial 
results were obtained in the reduction of divergences between countries. With respect to 
adjustment of the income distribution, the development has been uneven with marked 
declines in the labour income ratio in some Member States, but smaller declines or even in 
some cases, an increase in 1983 (Greece, Italy, Luxembourg). 
I 
3 .1 Inflation: trends and prospects deflator of total final expenditure decelerated even more 
strongly (from 8,5% in 1982 to 6,0% in 1983) as a 
consequence mainly of a pronounced slowdown of the price 
increase for exports of goods and services (in ECU terms). 
The GDP deflator, the broadest expression of the domestic 
cost developments, after an increase of 9,1% in 1982, is 
estimated to rise by 6,3% in 1983. Despite the depreciation of 
the ECU in trade-weighted terms, both in 1982 and in 1983, 
the terms of trade of the Community (measured on total 
The process of disinflation in the Community since the 
second oil shock in 1980 proceeded further in 1983. The 
deflator of private consumption for the Community as a 
whole, which rose by 8,7% in 1982, is estimated to have 
increased by 6,3% in 1983, representing a slowdown of 2,4 
percentage points or substantially more than the 1,4 points 
slowdown from 1981 to 1982 (Table 3.1). The rise in the 
Table 3.1 
Price developments for GDP components, EC 10 
1961-73 
Private consumption 4,6 
Government consumption 7,1 
Gross fixed asset formation 5,0 
Export of goods and services 3,0 
Total final expenditure 4,6 
Import of goods and services 2,7 
Gross domestic product 5,0 
Terms of trade (goods and services) 0,3 
I Estimates. 
2 Forecasts. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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1974-79 
10,8 
12,3 
11,6 
10,2 
11,2 
11,5 
10,9 
-1,1 
( Percentage change in implicit price index, nalional acco11nts definition) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 I 1984 2 
11,2 10,1 8,7 6,3 5,6 
13,6 11,7 9,0 6,2 4,8 
12,0 9,3 7,0 5,7 5,1 
11,4 10,8 8,4 5,3 5,2 
11,7 10,2 8,5 6,0 5,4 
15,5 14,0 6,0 4,6 6,1 
10,8 9,1 9,1 6,3 5,1 
-3,5 -2,8 2,3 0,6 -0,8 
external and internal trade in goods and services) improved 
by 2,3% in 1982 and should improve a further 0,6% in 1983. 
Although the rate of inflation in the Community in 1983 is 
estimated to have declined to within reach of the rate 
experienced on average for the years 1961-73, the divergence 
of inflation among Member States remains considerably 
Table 3.2 
Consumer prices and the GDP deflator 
1961-73 
(average) 
B 3,7 
DK 6,1 
D 3,7 
GR 3,5 
F 4,7 
IRL 5,9 
I 4,8 
L 3,0 
NL 5,2 
UK 4,9 
EC 10 4,6 
USA 3,1 
Japan 6,1 
Standard deviation EC I 0 1,7 
B 4,1 
DK 6;7 
D 4,3 
GR 4,5 
F 4,9 
IRL 7,2 
I 5,4 
L 4,1 
NL 6,0 
UK 5,1 
EC 10 5,0 
USA 3,5 
Japan 5,8 
Standard deviation EC 10 2,0 
Prices and costs 
larger than before the first oil-price shock. Thus the 
difference between the highest and the lowest rate of increase 
in the deflater of private consumption in 1983 amounted to 
17, 7 percentage points against 3, I points in the 1961-73 
period and the standard deviation of the rates of change in 
1983 amounted to 5, 1 as against 1,8 on average in the 
reference period. 
(national currencies, % increase) 
1974-79 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
(average) (estimate) (forecast) 
Consumer prices 
7,8 7,0 8,9 7,4 7,8 6,5 
10,6 11,2 11,8 9,8 6,6 . 5,4 
4,7 5,4 5,6 5,3 3,0 3,2 
15,3 22,2 24,4 21,l 20,5 18,5 
10,5 13,3 12,9 10,9 9,0 7,2 
15,2 17,6 19,5 17,1 11,0 8,8 
17,1 20,3 19,0 16,7 15,0 11,5 
7,4 7,7 7,7 10,0 8,4 7,7 
7,3 6,7 6,2 5,7 2,8 3,6 
15,6 16,4 11,0 8,0 5,7 5,8 
10,8 11,2 10,1 8,7 6,3 5,6 
7,5 10,4 8,9 5,7 4,3 5,0 
9,4 7,0 4,5 2,9 1,7 1,6 
4,6 5,8 6,0 5,1 5,1 4,2 
GDP deflator 
7,9 4,2 5,2 7,0 7,1 6,3 
10,0 8,8 10,8 9,9 7,4 5,2 
4,7 4,4 4,0 4,8 3,1 3,0 
15,5 17,9 19,7 25,4 19,7 17,9 
10,6 11,6 11,9 12,8 9,8 7,3 
14,0 13,9 17,7 16,8 10,6 8,2 
17,1 20,7 17,6 17,5 15,1 10,4 
6,8 7,8 7,9 7,9 8,2 7,4 
7,5 5,3 5,6 5,7 1,6 2,4 
16,0 19,2 12,1 7,8 4,9 4,8 
10,9 10,8 9,1 9,1 6,3 5,1 
7,6 9,4 9,3 5,9 4,6 4,7 
7,8 3,0 2,8 2,1 1,3 1,7 
5,1 5,9 5,4 6,2 5,2 4,2 
Note: Consumer prices = implicit price index of consumers· expenditure; GDP deflator = implicit price index of GDP. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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GRAPH 3.1: Consumer prices and main components, EC 9 
Change on six months (s.a.) expressed as an annual rate 
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Nonetheless since 1980 there has been some progress in 
reducing the problem of divergent infla tion rates. Among the 
four la rger countries the decelera tion has (in percentage 
points) been greater in the countries which had double-digit 
rates of inflation in 1980. By mid-1 983 the reduction in 
inflation had been 3 points in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, 4 points in France, 6 points in Italy, and 14 points 
in the U nited Kingdom. Indeed, by mid-1983 no EC 
countries except Italy and Greece any longer had double 
digit inflation . In 1982 Denmark , France and Ireland were in 
double digits and in 198 1 this was also true of the United 
Kingdom. 
With an end to the weakening of primary commodity prices 
further progress in reducing inflation is li kely to be much 
more difficult to accompli sh. The monthly index of 
consumer prices in the Community in the six months to July 
1983 rose at an annual ra te of 8, I ~~ 1 or a lmost the same rate 
as at the beginning of the year with , notably, the rise in food 
prices and services showing a tendency towards acceleration 
in 1983 while the prices o f manufactured goods and fuel and 
energy, wh ich had shown a tendency to accelerate from mid-
1982, have risen more moderately in the spring of 1983 (see 
Graph 3. 1). 
A continued fa ll in inf1at ion in the Comm unity is forecas t for 
1984, with the def1ator of private consumption easing to 
5,6%, a figure close to the levels recorded a t the beginning of 
the 1970s, but still above the average for the period 196 1-73 
(4,6%). Divergence is a lso expected to narrow with inf1ation 
rates falling rapidly in the higher inf1ation countries and 
modest rises in the trend of consumer prices in the lower 
inf1ation countri es . A mo ng these Member States, the 
increase in inf1ation will be marginal in the Federa l Republic 
o f Germany and the U nited Kingdom, but in the Nether-
lands, which recorded the lowest inf1ation rate in the 
Community in 1983, the ri se in prices wi ll accelerate to 3,6%. 
In the Federa l Republic of Germany, Denmark and the 
Netherlands, inf1ation in 1984 wi ll be below the average rates 
of the period 196 1-73, whil e in the U nited Kingdom, France 
and Ireland, this pre-oil shock level is expected to be 
exceeded by between I and 3 percentage points. In Luxem-
bourg, Italy and G reece, inf1atio n in 1984 wi ll be 5, 7 and 
15 percentage points higher than in 196 1-73 . Some slight 
wo rsening in the terms of trade of the Community wi ll result 
in the GDP deflater rising 5, 1% in 1984, the lowest rate 
recorded in the Community since 1969. 
The monthly index of consumer prices in the Commun it y is calcu lated by 
Eurostat as a fixed weight (Laspeyre) index (base year 1975) whi le the 
dcnator of private consumption is calcu lated as a current weight index. 
The d ifference between the two estimates wi ll increase with the di stance 
from the base year a nd is at present (in 1983) almost 2 percentage points. 
3.2 The Community's price performance in an 
international perspective 
The Community is not alone in having reduced its rate of 
inflation towa rds the level reco rded in the yea rs 196 1 to 1973 . 
In fact the U nited States made even fa ster progress than the 
Communi ty in thi s respect and Japan- whose infla tion ra te 
in the 1960s was substantia lly higher than tha t of the 
Comm uni ty- may have a lower ra te of infla tion in 1983 than 
even Germany and the Netherlands. • 
However. wh ile the apparent ra te of inflation (defl a tor of 
priva te consumption) in the Community in 1983 remained 2 
and 4,6 points above the ra tes recorded in the United Sta tes 
and Japan respecti vely, a more detailed analysis of the origin 
of price increases shows tha t the underlying price perfo rm-
ance of the Community may, in fac t, be rela tively more 
favo urable. One element. which in 198 1, 1982 and 1983 has 
wo rked to boost prices in the Community, is the deprecia tion 
of the Community currencies against the dolla r while, on the 
other hand. the United Sta tes has benefit ed from the 
substan tia l appreciation of the dolla r in effecti ve terms. 
Thus, as shown in Table 3.3, changes in the rea l effecti ve 
exchange ra te may, fo r the Communi ty as a whole in 198 1, 
1982 and 1983, have added 1,7, 0,6 and 0,5 percentage points 
respecti vely to the increase in the defl a tor of to ta l 
expenditure. 1 In the U nited States, on the o ther hand , rea l 
exchange ra te apprecia ti ons in 198 1, 1982 and 1983 is 
est imated to have reduced the ri se in the detl a tor of total 
expenditure by 1,2, 1,0 and 0,5 points respectively. Thus the 
real exchange ra te movements go quite a long way towa rds 
explaining the fas ter price decelera ti on in the U nited Sta tes 
than in the Community over the past two and a half years. 
However, the exchange ra te changes have been absorbed in 
part by changes in the pro fi t margins o f exporters. The 
estimates of the impact on the final expenditure defl a tor of 
changes in the export prices of suppliers, in fac t, in recent 
years have shown a tendency to vary inversely with rea l 
exchange ra te changes. For example, as seen from column 2 
in Table 3.3, changes in the export prices of suppliers in 198 1 
(in dollars) exerted a nega ti ve impact ofO, I% on the domestic 
price level in the Community while for the United Sta tes 
export prices of suppliers raised the final expenditure 
The contributio n to the rise in prices of rea l exchange rate changes, can be 
regarded as a ro ugh measure o f the inOuence on inOation of moneta ry 
policy via its ex tern a l impact. The difference betwee n fi gures fo r the 
nominal a nd rea l excha nge ra tes is the movement in excha nge rates which 
would be necessa ry to maintain competiti veness in that yea r. This gives an 
idea of the secondary impact o f domestic cost pressures on prices th ro ugh 
exchange rate movements to compensa te for cost deve lopment s which a re 
out of li ne wi th pa rtner countries. The technica l a nnex d iscusses the 
in terpreta tio n of these fi gures and reviews cert ain sta tistica l a nd 
methodologica l problems associa ted with the da ta. 
Prices and costs 
GRAPH 3.2: External impacts on the final expenditure 
deflator 
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Table 3.3 
Origin of price increases (final expenditure) 
Imports Unit Indirect Other Total 3 
labour taxes factors 
Total of which: of which: costs ~(which: 
eXJ)Ort nominal real Domestic 
pnccs effective exchange factors 4 
of exchange rate 
suppliers rate 
EC JO 
1970 0,3 0,3 0,0 -0,2 4,8 0,2 1,4 6,4 6,3 
1971 0,3 0,4 -0,1 -0,2 4,3 0,5 1,9 7,1 6,9 
1972 0,0 0,1 -0,1 -0,2 3,5 0,4 2,2 5,9 6,0 
1973 1,7 1,7 -0,2 -0,2 4,8 0,5 2,6 9,4 7,9 
1974 5,4 4,1 0,3 0,3 7,4 0,6 2,4 16,8 12,4 
1975 0,2 0,5 -0,3 -0,8 8,2 0,9 2,8 13,2 13,5 
1976 1,4 0,4 1,0 1,1 3,7 1, 1 3,3 11,0 9,5 
1977 0,9 1,0 -0,1 -0,2 4,2 0,9 2,4 9,6 8,8 
1978 -0,3 0,0 -0,3 -0,3 3,6 0,8 2,2 7,2 7,5 
1979 1,3 1,9 -0,6 -0,8 4,3 1,2 2,4 9,6 8,5 
1980 2,4 2,4 -0,3 -0,7 6,1 1,4 2,2 11,8 10,1 
1981 2,1 -0,1 2,0 1,7 5,2 1,1 2,2 10,0 8,4 
1982 0,5 -0,2 0,7 0,6 3,5 0,9 3,1 8,5 8,1 
1983 I 0,5 -0,1 0,6 0,5 2,3 0,7 2,1 6,0 5,6 
1984 2 0,9 0,7 0,2 0,2 1,9 0,5 1,8 5,4 4,3 
USA 
1970 0,3 0,3 0,1 0,1 4,2 0,8 0,2 5,4 5,0 
1971 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,3 2,0 0,6 2,4 5,2 4,8 
1972 0,4 0,0 0,4 0,5 2,6 0,0 1,5 4,3 3,8 
1973 1,0 0,4 0,5 0,7 3,3 0,4 1,6 6,3 5,2 
1974 2,8 2,5 -0,1 0,3 5,9 0,8 1,5 11,0 8,2 
1975 0,8 0,7 0,1 0,7 4,0 0,7 3,7 9,1 7,7 
1976 0,2 0,6 -0,4 -0,2 3,4 0,3 1,6 5,5 5,1 
1977 0,8 0,8 0,0 0,2 3,2 0,2 2,1 6,4 5,4 
1978 0,4 -0,4 0,8 0,7 4,4 0,1 2,3 7,2 6,9 
1979 1,5 1,1 0,3 0,1 5,3 0,3 2,4 9,5 8,3 
1980 1,9 1,7 0,0 0,0 5,6 0,9 2,1 10,3 8,6 
1981 0,1 1,4 -1,3 -1,2 4,5 1,1 2,8 8,5 8,3 
1982 -0,3 0,8 -1,1 -1,0 3,6 0,4 1,3 5,0 5,2 
1983 I -0,3 0,4 -0,7 -0,5 1,8 0,1 2,3 3,9 4,0 
1984 2 0,2 0,8 -0,5 -0,6 2,9 0,2 1,2 4,5 4,3 
Japan 
1970 0,2 0,2 0,0 0,0 4,2 0,6 1,9 6,8 6,6 
1971 -0,l 0,1 -0,I -0,5 5,3 0,2 -0,8 4,7 5,1 
1972 -0,3 0,5 -0,9 -0,9 2,8 0,2 1,8 4,4 4,8 
1973 1,4 1,8 -0,4 -0,9 6,7 0,7 3,6 12,1 11,2 
1974 5,7 3,9 0,6 -0,4 12,2 0,4 6,2 24,4 20,9 
1975 1,1 0,7 0,4 0,3 6,1 0,1 0,5 7,9 6,9 
1976 0,6 1,2 -0,5 -0,5 3,7 0,4 1,6 6,3 5,6 
1977 -0,5 0,6 -1,2 -1,0 3,0 0,6 1,4 4,5 4,9 
1978 -1,6 0,2 -2,0 -1,6 1,3 0,1 2,7 2,4 3,8 
1979 2,4 1,5 0,6 1,2 1,4 0,6 0,4 4,7 2,0 
1980 4,1 3,0 0,5 1,3 2,1 0,2 0,3 6,5 2,2 
1981 0,0 1,7 -1,7 -1,2 2,2 0,1 0,1 2,4 1,9 
1982 0,3 -0,4 0,6 1,2 1,8 0,1 -0,0 2,1 1,3 
1983 I -1,3 -0,2 -1,2 -1,0 1,1 0,0 -0,0 -0,1 1,1 
1984 2 0,3 0,4 -0,1 0,0 1,5 0,1 -0,1 1,8 1,4 
Estimate. 
Forecast. 
3 Excluding intra-Community trade. 
4 Total, excluding the effect of export prices of suppliers and real exchange rate changes. The factors were regarded as additive. 
Source: Eurostat and Comission services. For methods used and comments on the interpretation of figures, sec technical annex. 
74 
deflator by 1.4%. Although these differences may be due, to 
some extent, to divergences with respect to the structure of 
foreign trade, it would also seem likely that foreign suppliers 
have reacted to the large exchange rate changes by reducing 
their profit margins in markets where the currency has 
depreciated and by raising their sales prices (in their own 
currency) in the United States in 1981 and 1982. Symmetrical 
developments appear to have occurred in the past for the EC 
and the US but much less so for Japan (see Graph 3.2). 
When external factors are eliminated from the comparison, 
the price performance of the Community indeed compares 
more favourably with that of the United States: as seen from 
the last column in Table 3.3, the domestic factors in 1983 
contributed 5,6% to the final expenditure deflator in the 
Community and 4,0% in the United States. The similar figure 
for Japan, however, was as low as I, I% and has in fact been 
2% or below in all years since 1978. The 5,6% impact from 
domestic factors in the final expenditure deflator of the 
Community in 1983 also includes a 0,7% impact from 
increases in indirect taxes- which have been used much more 
extensively in the Community than in the United States for 
stabilization purposes. The contribution of domestic cost 
increases excluding indirect taxes in 1983 can be estimated at 
4,9% in the Community- a lot closer to the US figure of 
3,9%. In recent years, the contributions from unit labour 
costs and the residual item (including profit margin changes) 
have actually contributed similar amounts to the final 
expenditure deflator in the Community and the United 
States (see also Table 3.3). 
3.3 The cost performance of individual Member 
States 
The relative price performance of the individual Member 
States is li kewise heavily influenced by real exchange rate 
changes. Graph 3.3 reveals several instances in which real 
effective exchange rate depreciations have at times resulted in 
a considerable boost to the overall price rise: Belgium ( 1980, 
1981 and 1982), Denmark (1981), Germany (1981), Greece 
( 1980 and 1983), Ireland (1981 ), the Netherlands (1981 ), and 
the United Kingdom (1976 and 1983). On the other hand , the 
larger real appreciation of sterling in 1979 and 1980 is 
estimated to have lowered the final expenditure deflator in 
the United Kingdom by 3 and 4 percentage points 
respectively. 
The underlying price trend of the individual countries is, 
therefore, better identified in the domestic cost develop-
Prices and costs 
GRAPH 3.3: Contribution of the real exchange rate to total 
final expenditure deDator 
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ments, and notably, the contribution of unit labour costs. 
The latter operates, however, not only directly but also 
indirectly through the nominal exchange rate changes 
required just to keep the economy's competitive position 
unchanged. Thus countries whose unit labour costs rise less 
than competitors' will be in a position to lower their import 
prices through currency appreciation without any change in 
Table 3.4 
competitive position while, in contrast, countries with 
higher-than-average unit labour cost increases suffer 
additional cost increases due to the depreciation of their 
currencies required to maintain competitiveness. Although 
in the short term a country may prefer to take a real exchange 
rate change (such as has been the case in several periods) the 
underlying cost performance eventually has to compensate 
Direct and indirect l effect of unit labour cost increases on price increases 
( total final expenditure) 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
B Direct 3,1 5,5 6,0 3,5 3,0 1,7 1,7 2,1 2,4 1,8 1,6 2,1 
Indirect -0,3 0,4 1,2 0,7 0,1 -0,9 -1,1 -1,6 -0,7 -0,9 0,0 0,9 
Total 2,8 5,9 7,2 4,2 3,1 0,8 0,6 0,5 1,7 0,9 1,6 1,2 
DK Direct 4,6 7,9 5,8 3,1 3,7 3,8 3,4 4,7 3,5 3,3 2,0 1,5 
Indirect 0,4 0,9 -0,4 -0,4 0,0 0,3 -0,1 0,1 -0,3 0,1 -0,1 -0,2 
Total 5,0 8,8 5,4 2,7 3,7 4,1 3,3 4,8 3,2 3,4 1,9 1,3 
D Direct 4,0 4,5 2,8 1,0 1,8 1,6 1,6 2,8 2,0 1,5 0,4 0,4 
Indirect -0,1 -0,8 -1,6 -1,2 -1,0 -0,8 -0,8 -0,9 -1,2 -1,0 -1,0 -0,8 
Total 3,9 3,7 1,2 -0,2 0,8 0,8 0,8 1,9 0,8 0,5 -0,6 -0,4 
GR Direct 3,3 6,4 4,0 5,0 5,7 4,9 6,1 5,6 7,1 8,3 5,5 5,2 
Indirect 0,2 1,4 -0,2 1,9 1,6 1,7 2,0 0,8 2,7 3,1 2,1 2,4 
Total 3,5 7,8 3,8 6,9 7,3 6,6 8,1 6,4 9,8 11,4 7,6 7,6 
F Direct 4,1 6,7 7,5 4,9 4,7 4,4 4,4 6,1 6,0 5,2 4,0 3,1 
Indirect -0,1 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,2 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,6 0,4 
Total 4,0 6,7 7,8 5,2 5,0 4,7 4,6 6,6 6.6 5,9 4,6 3,5 
IRL Direct 6,0 5,8 9,3 6,4 3,6 4,2 6,9 6,7 5.8 4,4 3,2 2,2 
Indirect 1,8 -0,3 1,6 2,2 0,0 1,1 3,1 1,9 1.9 1,9 1,3 0,6 
Total 7,8 5,5 10,9 8,6 3,6 5,3 10,0 8,6 7,7 6,3 4,5 2,8 
I Direct 5,9 8,5 10,9 7,1 8,9 6,2 6,4 8,2 9,6 7,6 7,2 5,1 
Indirect 0,6 0,7 2,2 1,3 2,3 1,3 1,1 1,7 2,7 2,1 2,5 1,5 
Total 6,5 9,2 13,1 8,4 11,2 7,5 7,5 9,9 12,3 9,7 9,7 6,6 
L Direct 1,4 6,1 6,1 3,7 3,2 0,5 1,2 2,6 3,4 3,0 2,8 1,9 
NL Direct 3,7 4,9 5,4 2,3 2,6 2,2 2,2 2,0 1,2 1,7 0,2 -0,5 
Indirect 0,1 -0,6 -0,3 -0,7 -0,6 -0,6 -0,7 -1,6 -1,9 -0,8 -1,5 -2,0 
Total 3,8 4,3 5,1 1,6 2,0 1,6 1,5 0,4 -0,7 0,9 -1,3 -2,5 
UK Direct 3,8 9,9 14,9 5,1 4,5 4,8 7,2 9,6 5,0 2,2 1,8 1,8 
Indirect -0,2 1,0 3,8 0,4 0,3 0,6 1,6 2,2 0,4 -0,4 -0,1 -0,1 
Total 3,6 10,9 18,7 5,5 4,8 5,4 8,8 11,8 5,4 1,8 1,7 1,7 
EC 10 Direct 4,8 7,4 8,2 3,7 4,2 3,6 4,3 6,1 5,2 3,5 2,3 1,9 
Indirect 0,0 0,0 0,5 -0,1 0,1 0,0 0,2 0,5 0,3 0,0 0,1 0,0 
Total 4,8 7,4 8,7 3,6 4;3 3,6 4,5 6,6 5,5 3,5 2,4 1,9 
USA Direct 3,3 5,9 4,0 3,4 3,2 4,4 5,3 5,6 4,5 3,6 1,8 2,9 
Indirect -0,2 -0,4 -0,6 -0,2 -0,2 0,1 0,2 0,0 -0,1 -0,0 -0,2 0,1 
Total 3,1 5,5 3,4 3,2 3,0 4,3 5,1 5,6 4,4 3,6 1,6 3.0 
Japan Direct 6,7 12,2 6,1 3,7 3,0 1,3 1,4 2,1 2,2 1,8 1,1 1,5 
Indirect 0,4 1,0 0,1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,4 -0,5 . -0,8 -0,5 -0,6 -0,2 -0,2 
Total 7,1 13,2 6,2 3,6 2,9 0,9 0,9 1,3 1,7 1,2 0,9 1,3 
Effect on prices of the effective exchange rate change required to maintain constant competitiveness. Sec technical annex for method of calculation and qualifications. Factors assumed to 
be additive in totals. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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this if a serious disequilibrium is to be avoided in the balance 
of payments. 
As seen from Table 3.4 the direct effect of unit labour costs 
on the final expenditure deflator in 1983 was as low as 0,4 
points in the Federal Republic of Germany and 0,2 points in 
the Netherlands. Taking account of the indirect effects, 
labour costs in these two countries in 1983 actually exerted a 
negative influence on price (0,6 and 1,3' points respectively 
for the two countries). Belgium, Denmark and the United 
Kingdom in 1983 recorded total (direct and indirect) labour 
cost impacts below the Community average of2,4 percentage 
points while Irel_and, France, Greece and Italy form a group 
with the labour cost impact on the final expenditure deflater 
in the range of 4 to I O points. 
As could be expected, the four countries in this group were 
also those recording the highest rate of increase in per capita 
compensation of employees ranging in 1983 from 17,3% in 
Greece to 9, 7% in France-see Table 3.4. In Italy, which had 
the second highest rise of per capita compensation in the 
Community in 1983 (15,6%), prices were kept in check by the 
real effective appreciation of the lira and real per capita 
compensation, after an increase of0,4% in 1982, rose further 
in 1983. As domestic profit margins are being compressed 
without being compensated by productivity increases, the 
real product wage in Italy is estimated to actually show a 
strong increase (3,9%) in 1983-a development which can be 
considered normal in a year with a weak economic activity 
but which nevertheless is substantially out of line with 
developments elsewhere in the Community. In Ireland 
consumer prices in 1983 rise nearly as fast as per capita 
compensation but unlike in Italy the relative price and cost 
movements entail a reduction in the real product wage-
following a large fall (3,3%) in 1982. Like Italy and Ireland, 
France in 1983 recorded a rise in real per capita compens-
ation of employees but in contrast to the Italian experience, 
productivity increases and profit margins develop so as to 
entail a decline in the real product wage for the second 
consecutive year. 
The remaining Member States (Denmark, Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom) in 1983 record increases in 
per capita compensation below or (in the case of Denmark 
and the UK) only marginally above the Community average. 
Apart from Luxembourg, where adverse developments in the 
steel sector have influenced output, these countries all record 
a substantial decline in real wage costs as measured by the 
real product wage-although in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom (largely due to a favourable productivity develop-
ment) per capita compensation of employees actually rises 
faster than consumer prices and even substantially so 
(2,0 points) in the UK. 
Prices and costs 
3 .4 Income distribution and profitability of 
investments 
With the fairly sharp decline in the real product wage in 1982 
and 1983 the Community has taken a large step towards 
restoring the distributive shares prevailing before the second 
oil-price shock. The labour income ratio (labour income I as 
a percentage of gross domestic product at factor cost) in the 
Community in 1983, is estimated at 76,2, approximately the 
same level as on average for the 1970s and down 1 point from 
the recent peak level of 1981. A further decline to 75,5% or I 
point above the level recorded on average for the period 
1961-73 is forecast for 1984 (see Table 3.6). 
While on average the Member States are expected by 1984 to 
have restored this broad structure of income distribution 
prevailing before the first oil-price shock, there are 
substantial divergences in this respect among the individual 
Member States. In Belgium, in particular, the labour income 
ratio rose very steeply in the period from 1973 to 1981 and 
despite a subsequent decline, is still in 1983 as high as 77,5 or 
nearly 7 points above the average of 1961-73. In France the 
labour income ratio also peaked in 1981 and the subsequent 
decline has not been pronounced enough to compensate for 
the increase during the 1970s. In Italy, as already mentioned, 
the real product wage rose considerably in 1983 and the 
labour income ratio consequently rose from 84,7 2 in 1982 to 
88 in 1983 and is expected to remain at this level in 1984. In 
Luxembourg the persistent difficulties and low profitability 
of the steel industry has entailed a striking increase in the 
labour income ratio as compared to past levels. In the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the labour income 
ratio is below or approaching the average of the 1960s, but in 
.these two countries substantial changes have occurred in the 
structure of the economy with rises in the production of 
natural gas or oil and a strong decline of industrial activity. 
With the high level of profits in the gas and oil sectors this 
apparent stability of the overall ratio may therefore hide a 
substantial deterioration of the profit situation in certain 
sectors of the economy. Also Ireland has, following a 
decrease in the ratio from 1982 to 1983, reached the same 
overall income distribution as in the period up to the first oil 
shock but in this country the changes in the labour income 
ratio may, in fact, particularly reflect fluctuations in 
agricultural income. The same may be the case for Greece, 
and the data for these two countries consequently cannot be 
interpreted with any confidence. 
Including an imputed income for the labour of self-employed. 
The imputed income from labour by independent entrepreneurs is 
assumed to be equal to the average compensation of employees. In 
countries with a large agricultural sector with a low per capita income, this 
method of calculation may give an exaggerated estimate of 'labour 
income' as compared to more mature economies. but will not effect 
comparisons over time. 
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Table 3.5 
Compensation of employees 
(% change) 
1961-73 1974-79 1980 1981 1982 1983 I 1984 2 
(average) (average) 
Per capita compensation of employees 
B 8,9 12,0 8,8 7,3 8,0 6,0 7,7 
DK l0,6 12,0 9,9 10,2 11,1 7,5 5,5 
D 9,2 7,4 6,8 5,3 4,4 3,8 3,5 
GR 10,5 21,6 14,8 23,9 26,2 17,3 18,5 
F 9,9 14,8 14,8 14,5 14,5 9,7 8,2 
IRL 11,5 18,5 19,5 18,5 14,9 12,2 8,9 
I 11,5 19,9 22,2 22,0 17,1 15,6 12,4 
L 7,5 11,0 7,8 7,7 6,9 7,1 5,9 
NL 11,3 10,2 5,5 3,3 5,7 3,2 0,1 
UK 8,3 17,3 20,2 14,7 8,8 7,9 6,3 
EC lO 9,7 13,7 12,9 11,5 9,6 7,2 6,1 
USA 5,6 8,1 9,3 9,5 6,0 5,0 6,7 
JAP 14,1 12,4 6,4 7,1 5,1 4,7 5,1 
Real per capita compensation of employees 3 
B 5,0 3,9 1,6 -1,5 0,5 -1,7 1,1 
DK 4,3 1,3 -1,2 -1,5 1,2 0,9 0,1 
D 5,3 2,6 1,4 -0,3 -0,8 0,8 0,3 
GR 6,8 5,5 -6,1 -0,4 4,2 -2,6 0,0 
F 5,0 3,9 1,4 1,5 3,3 0,6 1,0 
IRL 5,3 2,9 1,6 -0,9 -1,9 1,1 0,1 
I 6,4 2,4 1,6 2,5 0,4 0,5 0,8 
L 4,3 3,3 0,1 0,0 -2,8 -1,2 -1,7 
NL 5,8 2,7 -1,1 -2,8 0,0 0,4 -3,4 
UK 3,2 1,5 3,2 3,3 0,7 2,0 0,5 
EC 10 4,9 2,7 1,5 1,3 0,9 0,8 0,4 
USA 2,4 0,5 -1,0 0,6 0,3 0,6 1,6 
JAP 7,5 2,8 -0,6 2,5 2,2 2,9 3,5 
Real product wage 4 
B 0,3 1,5 1,4 1,7 -1,7 -2,2 0,1 
DK 0,3 0,7 1,4 -3,1 -3,0 -2,7 -2,1 
D 0,3 -0,4 1,5 0,2 -1,3 -1,9 -1,7 
GR -2,2 2,5 -4,2 1,7 1,6 -1,2 -0,5 
F -0,3 1,0 1,7 1,1 -1,0 -1,1 -0,6 
IRL -0,2 0,1 6,5 0,3 -3,3 0,6 -1,0 
I -0,1 0,4 -1,0 4,1 -0,2 3,9 0,3 
L 0,0 3,3 0,5 2,4 1,2 -0,6 -0,9 
NL 1,0 0,2 -0,1 -2,4 -1,3 -0,9 -3,3 
UK 0,2 0,1 2,1 0,3 -1,5 -1,1 -0,5 
EC 10 0,0 0,3 1,1 1,1 -1,0 -0,3 -0,8 
USA 0,0 -0,1 1,0 -0,6 1,3 -1,9 0,3 
JAP -0,8 1,5 0,0 1,8 1,0 1,6 1,3 
I Estimates. 
2 Forecasts. 
l Per capita compensation of employees deflated by the consumer price deflator. 
4 Real compensation of employees per unit of output (deflator - GDP price deflator). 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
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Table 3.6 
Normalized labour income ratio 1 
1961-73 1974-79 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
(average) (average) (forecast) 
B 70,6 76,8 79,2 80,6 79,2 77,5 77,6 
DK 76,I 78.1 79,4 76,9 74,6 72,6 71,1 
D 72,0 73.5 72,9 73,1 72,I 70,8 69,5 
GR 91,2 83.0 85,0 86,5 87,9 86,8 86,4 
F 72,1 74.1 75,7 76,6 75,8 74,9 74,5 
IRL 87,4 86.5 90,8 91,0 88,1 87,6 86,7 
I 80,0 83.6 81,5 84,9 84,7 88,0 88,2 
L 67,7 80.1 81,1 83,1 84,1 84,6 83,9 
NL 71,0 74,4 74,1 72,3 71,3 70,7 68,4 
UK 73,6 74,8 75,7 75,9 74.7 73,9 73,6 
ECIO 74,5 76,3 76,4 77,2 76,4 76,2 75,5 
Labour income, including an imputed income from labour of sctf-cmploycd as a ~~ of gross domestic product at factor cost. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission services. 
Two countries, Denmark and the Federal Republic of 
Germany have, through wage restraint in recent years, 
brought their labour income ratio considerably below the 
average of the 1960s. Denmark, in particular, where this 
ratio by 1980 had reached 79 ,4-or more than 3 points above 
the 1961-73 average-reduced the real product wage by 3,1, 
3,0 and 2,7 points respectively the three following years, and 
is expected-after a further reduction in 1984-to record a 
labour income ratio of 71,1-5 points below the 1961-73 
average. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the develop-
ment has been very similar, albeit less pronounced. 
Nevertheless, by 1984 the German labour income ratio may 
be reduced to below 70%, the lowest level recorded there 
since 1960. 
Although for the Community as a whole, the labour income 
ratio is now approaching the level prevailing before the first 
oil-price shock, considerable real wage adjustments may well 
be required to solve the problem of unemployment and the 
low investment propensity. In fact, as indicated in the box to 
Chapter 4 (real wages and employment) an excessive real 
wage level will not necessarily show up in a change in the 
income distribution, but may be reflected in a fall in 
employment, a rise in the capital intensity, and a decline in 
the profitability of invested capital-which is in fact what 
seems to have happened in the Community over the last 
15 years. 
Admittedly, statistical data on profitability are particularly 
uncertain. There are important methodological problems 
involved in the evaluation, both of profits, and of the value of 
capital against which to measure the rate of return. Thus 
profits may be measured as the gross or net operation surplus 
(entity concept of profits) according to the national accounts 
concept which is calculated before deduction of interest 
payments and company taxes. After deduction of net interest 
payments and taxes, one obtains the so-called equity concept 
of profits which is a measure of the remuneration of the 
equity capital. 
The most commonly used macroeconomic profit ratio, 
measures the gross or net operating surplus against the stock 
of fixed capital estimated, either at historical cost or at 
replacement (current) cost.This profitability indicator is 
broadly consistent with the macroeconomic income distri-
bution indicators utilized above (real product wage or labour 
income ratio), but will rarely give an appropriate measure of 
the relative profitability of investment in risk capital as 
opposed to investment in, say, government bonds. 
The decline in profitability in the enterprise sector in 
European countries for which comparable data are available 
is shown in Table 3.7 which reproduces estimates prepared 
by the Deutsches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung. Profit-
ability, measured as the net rate of return on fixed capital 
stock at replacement cost, in the Community was, in the 
1980s, less than half the level recorded, on average, in the 
period 1960-73. The fall in profitability was particularly 
pronounced in France, Italy, Belgium and the United 
Kingdom while in the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Netherlands, profit rates declined less significantly. The 
current low estimates of rates of return may be somewhat 
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Table 3.7 
Net rate of return on fixed capital ( enterprises excluding 
construction) I 
1960-73 1974-80 1978 1979 
B 11,0 6,8 6,2 6,0 
D 11,6 8,3 9,1 9,6 
F 14,2 7,7 7,1 6,8 
I 7,5 1,9 0,8 2,9 
NL 10,1 8,4 10,1 9,0 
UK 8,0 2,8 4,5 2,5 
EC6 10,6 5,9 6,2 6,1 
1980 
3,6 
8,6 
4,8 
3,6 
7,7 
0,7 
4,9 
Net operating surplus as''.~ of the capital stock calculated at replacement cost. 
Source: Estimates of the Deutsches Institut fiir Wirtschaftsforschung. 
1981 
2,8 
7,6 
5, I 
0,7 
6,8 
0,2 
4,0 
biased in this data due to the statistical difficulties in 
measuring profits and capital in a time of rapidly-changing 
technologies and deep recession. It should, in particular, be 
noted that the national accounts estimates, on which most 
measures of profitability are based, make no allowance for 
accelerated depreciation of obsolete capital. This results in a 
substantial downward bias in the measured rate of return, 
since the capital stock actually in use or potential use is lower 
than recorded (although this is partially compensated for by 
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higher consumption offixed capital than recorded). Another 
factor depressing recorded profits in the short term (through 
redundancy payments which are deducted from profits in the 
national accounts) is the closure of uneconomic parts of 
enterprises, decisions about which are taken on the basis of 
the need to restore corporate profit in the longer run. A final 
element which should be kept in mind in analysing these 
figures is that they are pre-tax figures, while the post tax 
figures are unlikely to show such a steep downward trend. 
The level of profitability, on the basis of the figures in 
Table3.7, was lowest in the United Kingdom in 1981 
followed by Italy and Belgium, while it was highest in the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands followed 
by France. However, the factors cited above make the 
comparison of levels between countries hazardous and, in 
addition, sectoral classifications can introduce distortions in 
the comparison (e.g. inclusion of oil sector in the United 
Kingdom). 
Despite the factors mentioned above, which exert a 
downward bias on recorded figures of rates of return, a 
substantial profitability problem has undoubtedly been 
present in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the Community. 
The evidence cited earlier in this chapter on the behaviour of 
the labour/income ratio in more recent years and in the 
balance-of-payments chapter on the competitiveness of the 
Community vis-a-vis its principal trading partners, would 
suggest that some easing of the pressure on enterprises is 
under way. 
Inflation and wages in the Community 1 
The literature on the determination of wages is extensive. Much 
empirical and theoretical work has been done on the interre-
lation between unemployment and money wage inflation since 
A.W. Phillip's paper 25 years ago [I) and its extension by 
Lipsey [2) two years later using standard statistical techniques, 
This explanation gave reasonable predictions of the behaviour of 
money wages both in the short and long run-up to the late 1960s 
but thereafter its predictive power failed with rising unemploy-
ment and inflation. About this time concentration shifted to the 
natural rate of unemployment, based on the work of Fried-
man [3) and Phelps [4) and the role of price expectations in the 
wage setting process was emphasized. This led to the concept of 
the expectations augmented Phillips curve which, when later 
combined with rational expectations as in Lucas [5], implied that 
the long-run Phillips curve was vertical and even questioned the 
proposition of a short-run tradeoff, as the slope could, under 
certain circumstances, be positive. Recent experience of rising 
unemployment and falling wage inflation has tended to 
rehabilitate the Phillips curve, although now with an expec-
tations content. Analysis has generally concentrated on the 
employment effects of changes in real wages with negative 
relationships being found by Grubb, Layard and Symons [6), 
Bruno [7) and Sachs [8), while Geary and Kennan [9) find no 
link. 2 Other analysis of wage behaviour has emphasized cost 
pressures, highlighting competing wage claims by different 
groups of labour, real wage resistance and maintaining that the 
inflation of the 1970s has emerged from a struggle over the 
distribution of income. Recent econometric work by Artis and 
Ormerod [10) using the real wage approach, which as they point 
out, can also be considered in the Phillips curve tradition if the 
inclusion of a lagged real wage term is considered as an 
alternative way of measuring the excess demand for labour, 
suggests that, except for Lht: Federal Republic of Germany, there 
is no long-run tradeoff, as wage claims generally take expected 
inflation completely into account. 
In general, global econometric models for Community countries 
have tended to express labour market conditions and expected 
inflation rates as the main determining factors of changes in 
wages. The graph shows the relationship suggested by theory and 
previous studies. The results, which express real expected wages 
as a function of unemployment, are mixed. Only for France and, 
to a lesser extent Belgium, have results emerged which obviously 
support a fairly stable tradeoff between unemployment (rep-
resenting the level of demand) and expected real wage increases. 
For most countries, however, inflation expectations or lagged 
inflation rates, where indexation was applied, are an important 
element in pay increases. When a variable for lagged inflation 
rates is included in regressions for wage determination, it has 
been found that it is not usually statistically significant, but if the 
dependent variable is redefined as expected real wage increases, 
the statistical parameters of most equations are improved. 
The figures in brackets in the text refer to the following bibliography. 
On this aspect see also box on real wages and employment in 
Chapter 4. 
Prices and costs 
No significant structural shift has been found in the relationship 
covered over time but what does emerge in the French and 
Belgian case is the non-linear nature of the tradeoff :with little 
evidence that, on the basis of the figures for this period, real wage 
increases will be negative at any level of unemployment. For 
most other countries the evidence is less clear but there does 
appear to be a inverse relationship between real wage increases 
and the level of unemployment. Individual incomes policy 
episodes show up quite clearly in the data. They had moderated 
wage increases substantially in 1976/77 in the United Kingdom 
(Healey/TUC 51~) and the Netherlands in the same period (6 
months wage freeze), but subsequent ·catch up' phases have 
tended to compensate for these periods of restraint. 
The overall conclusion to be drawn from country developments 
shown above must be that current levels of deficient demand (as 
measured by unemployment) have a depressing effect on wage 
increases. However it is also clear that anticipated inflation also 
plays a significant role, with wage-earners endeavouring to 
maintain the real expected value.of their incomes. Little evidence 
exists for any significant change in the relationship over the 
period shown and, while incomes policies have had substantial 
effects on wage settlements, avoiding catch-up wage increase 
after the removal of controls, remains a problem. 
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Major developments in prices and incomes policy 
Belgium 
Government measures modifying indexation of wages and 
salaries, adopted in February 1982, remained in force in 1983. 
These measures provided for the temporary suspension of the 
system of proportional indexation which was replaced by a 
system of flat-rate indexation under which wages were increased 
by a fixed amount each time the index crossed specified 
thresholds. The overall impact of this arrangement was to limit 
indexation to the national minimum wage. Following the failure 
of negotiations on an economy-wide agreement, the government 
decided that the first two index-linked wage increases in 1983 
should again be in the form of a flat-rate increase and that 
proportional indexation should consequently be restored only if 
warranted by the trend in competitiveness. The index-linked 
increases will no longer be calculated on the basis of the monthly 
index figures, but on the basis of a four-month moving average. 
In addition, the composition of the index. itself will be changed. 
These measures apply to both the public and private sector. In 
the public sector, additional measures taken include the transfer 
of the annual bonus for civil servants from the 1983 to the 1984 
financial year and the extension of the solidarity levy until the 
end of 1984. Action was also taken to influence non-wage 
incomes with a freeze on fees for medical and associated services 
at the level of I January 1982 until 1984. 
The selective price freeze was prolonged until the end of l 983 and 
controls on rents were extended in December 1982 for another 
year, the authorized increase for 1983 being maintained at 6%. 
Denmark 
In March the social partners adopted a biennial wage agreement 
which came into effect on I March 1983 in the private sector and 
on I April in the public sector. The agreement, among other 
things, stipulates that general increases in pay will take place 
twice a year in March/April and September/October, that the 
possibilities for readjusting individual supplements are limited, 
that public sector wages may be further adjusted in October 1984 
in order to assure parallelism with private sector wage increases 
during the first year of the agreement, and that increases in the 
lowest incomes will be higher than the average increase. The 
outcome is in line with the government's decision to limit the 
annual pay increase in the public sector to 4%. It should be 
recalled that other adjustments (notably that for the cost-of-
living) have been abolished until March 1985. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Pay increases are negotiated within the framework of free wage 
bargaining between unions and employers. The trend of current 
settlements for the private sector emerged in the spring, while 
negotiations in the public sector went on to mid-year. The annual 
increases range between 2,6% and 3,2% and cover from 12 to 18 
months. The size of the increases and the length of the wage 
round indicate increasing flexibility in the labour market. For the 
second year running, the public sector is getting a lower wage 
increase than the private sector. In addition, the Federal 
Government has announced that there will be no further increase 
in pay until April 1985 in order to give a lead in lowering labour 
cost pressures. On the other hand, renewal of the general 
agreement concerning conditions of employment (Rahmentarif-
vertrag) in the private sector, becomes due next year. 
Greece 
The indexation system introduced to apply from I January 1982 
continued into 1983. The base on which indexation applies in the 
public sector remains unchanged, i.e. complete indexation for 
wages up to DR 35 OOO per month, one half for the portion 
between 35 OOO and DR 55 OOO and one quarter for that between 
55 OOO and 80 OOO. However, the payment of increases has been 
delayed. Thus only half the amount due to be paid in January, as 
a result of the rise in prices in the period September to December 
1982, was paid then, the remainder being paid at the beginning of 
May. The amount corresponding to the increase in prices 
between January and August 1983 was paid on I September. 
These arrangements which concern public servants have formed 
a headline for settlements in the private sector. 
Price controls were reinforced further with additional resources 
being put at the disposal of the price control commission and the 
institution of a new service of price inspectors. In addition, the 
system of controls (prior authorization of the Ministry of 
Commerce for each increase in prices of industry, importers, 
traders and distributors) was enlarged in April with the addition 
of further products to the list of those requiring authorization. 
France 
The government's pay freeze for the period I June to 31 October 
1982 suspended all wage increases in the public and private sector 
(except for the statutory minimum wage). The government set 
guidelines for wage settlements at l 0% in 1982 and 8% in 1983 
which corresponded to official price objectives. The statutory 
minimum wage, which was unaffected by the pay freeze, was 
increased on 1 December 1982 and 1 March 1983. 
The price freeze was lifted on 31 October, but replaced by control 
to limit the rise in prices to 8% in 1983. Contracts have been 
signed between the government and most sectors of activity to 
ensure that the price objective is attained. Rises in rents in 1983 
were fixed by decree. The maximum rate corresponds to 80% of 
the annual variation in the index of construction of rented 
property. Measures taken to back up the devaluation in March 
1983 included an average increase of 8% in most public service 
charges. 
Ireland 
The national pay agreement which terminated for the majority of 
workers in December 1981, was followed by individual 
agreements (collectively known as the 22nd round) which, in 
general, extended for 15 months (16 months in the construction 
industry) and provided average increases of 16,2% for an average 
duration of 15.2 months. 
Negotiations have been proceeding at industry level for a 
renewal of these agreements to date from April 1983. Draft 
proposals for a public service pay agreement provide for a 15-
month agreement consisting of a 6-month pay pause followed by 
a 4, 75~~ increase for 5 months, and a further 3,25% for 4 months. 
Italy 
During 1982 the majority of national three year agreements 
expired and in general were not renewed. A tripartite agreement 
was finally reached in January 1983 which provided for a 
modification in the wage indexation system (sea/a mobile) with 
the effect of reducing by 15% the quarterly cost-of-living 
adjustments. The result is that purchasing power is only 
guaranteed for about 70% of the average wage. In addition, the 
agreement set maximum increases of wages for the renewal of 
collective agreements in the period 1983-85 (LIT 25 OOO in 1983 
and 35 OOO and 40 OOO in the following years). The agreement 
also provided for measures to fight against absenteeism, 
encourage mobility and reduce working hours. The government 
agreed to introduce measures to reduce fiscal drag, increase 
family allowances from I July 1983 and maintain increases in 
public service charges and government controlled prices below 
13% in 1983. 
Luxembourg 
It was decided in 1981, under the tripartite concertation 
procedure, that, except for cost-of-living adjustments, the wages 
of manual employees in the steel industry would be frozen for 
three years and that those of non-manual employees would be 
reduced by 3% in 1981. At the same time, deferred application of 
the wage-indexing arrangements was decided on a national level. 
Wage-indexing arrangements were temporarily suspended 
following the realignment of the Luxembourg franc in February 
1982; wage increases in 1982 were limited to two index-linked 
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increases of 2,5% each, with specific measures being taken for 
those on the minimum wage. This system has been maintained in 
1983, albeit in a slightly altered form; there will be a maximum of 
three increases of 2,5%. 
In addition, existing arrangements for a solidarity contribution 
for professional incomes were renewed for 1983 with the rate 
being raised from 5% to 6,5% of net incomes, and the freeze on 
traders' profit margins was extended. 
The Netherlands 
The automatic linking of wages to prices was temporarily 
suspended in 1980 and only partially restored in 1981 and 1982 
with the top range of incomes excluded in 1982. As a result of an 
agreement between the two sides of industry on a reduction of 
working hours in return for the giving-up of indexation due on I 
January 1983, the government decided not to implement plans 
for a price and wage freeze in the early months of 1983. 
Price controls in industry and commerce were suppressed in 1983 
with the exception of 17 sectors. In the services sector controls 
have been maintained in all except seven sectors. In the areas 
where controls still remain in force the government will permit in 
addition to the incorporation of changes in prices of raw material 
and intermediate prodticts, an increase in prices of I, 15% at 
maximum for the first half of 1983 for industry, 3~~ for services 
and the maintenance of margins in effect on 31 December in the 
wholesale and retail trade. 
United Kingdom 
Wage settlements continue to be negotiated directly between 
unions and employers, within an overall financial framework 
that reflects the stance of monetary and fiscal policy. With regard 
to the pay of civil servants, the armed forces and other central 
government employees, the government's expenditure plans for 
1983-84 are based on the decision announced on I October 1982, 
to provide for average increases in wage and salary bills of 3,5%, 
from due settlement dates after taking account of planned 
manpower changes. 
85 
4. The labour market 
The labour market once more recorded increasing unemployment in 1982 and 1983, 
although signs of stabilization began to appear from April 1983. A longer-term view based 
on the results of labour force surveys highlights the complexity of the situation and implies 
that it is caused by a combination of various factors. At a time when the labour market is 
especially slack, socio-economic factors that increase participation rates and 
demographic trends resulting in an increase in the population of working age magnify the 
effects of a contraction in employment due to stagnation. The employment situation of 
women has deteriorated as well as that of men, although male and female unemployment 
show different features. With the growth of unemployment generally, the problems of 
youth unemployrnent and long-term unemployment have been accentuated. All this means 
that there cannot be a single quick solution to the problem: even a stronger recovery than 
the one at present emerging would not produce a substantial improvement in the labour 
market. Measures on several fronts to deal with the structural aspects of unemployment 
are still as necessary as ever. 
4.1 Trends and prospects on the labour market 
Against a background of slack economic activity ever since 
1980, total employment has once more contracted in the 
Community as a whole (see Table 4.1); the contraction of 
1,4% in 1982 will probably be followed by a further drop of 
0,9% in 1983. This decline in 1983 affects practically all the 
Member States, with contractions ranging from 0,4% in 
Denmark to 2, 1 % in the Netherlands; the only exception is 
Italy, where employment is likely to expand by 0,5% in 1983. 
A further contraction of0,2% for the Community as a whole 
is expected in 1984, the only Member State where a slight 
expansion is predicted being Italy. Employment trends are 
particularly disturbing in the manufacturing sector, where 
Table 4.1 
Employment and unemployment in the Community 
Total employment Rate of unemrloyment 
~/~ change as% 
1970-80 1981 1982 1983 I 1984 2 1970 1981 1982 1983 I 1984 2 
(average) 
B 0,3 -2,I -2,0 -2,0 -0,8 (2, 1) ( 11,2) ( 13, 1) 14,9 15,9 
DK 0,7 -1,9 0,1 -0,4 -0,9 1,0 8,2 8,8 9,7 10,6 
D -0,1 -0,7 -1,8 -2,0 -0,4 0,6 4,7 6,8 8,5 8,7 
GR 0,6 0,1 -1,3 -1,0 -0,2 (4,1) (6,1) (7,8) (8,7) 
F 0,4 -0,7 -0,8 -1,0 -0,7 1,3 7,8 8,8 9,0 9,8 
IRL 1,0 -1,9 -1,4 -1,8 -0,8 5,3 10,2 12,3 15,4 17,6 
I 0,5 0,5 -0,4 0,5 0,6" 4,4 8,8 10,5 10,9 11,4 
L 1,3 0,2 0,1 -1,1 -1,2 0,0 1,0 1,3 1,9 2,4 
NL 0,2 -1,3 -2,2 -2,1 -1,4 (1,3) (8,8) (11,7) 14,3 16,2 
UK 0,0 -5,3 -2,5 -0,6 0,0 2,3 9,6 11,2 11,9 12,0 
EC 0,2 -1,6 -1,4 -0.9 -0,2 (2,0) 7,8 9,4 10,4 10,9 
I Estimate. 
2 Forecast. 
3 Number of unemployed as O O of civilian labour force. Eurostat definition (for Greece: national definition and Commission services). 
Sources. Eurostat, and Commission services. 
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the employed labour force is expected to contract by 0, 7% in 
1984 after 3,3% in 1982 and 2,4% in 1983. 
This decline in employment is one of the factors in the 
expansion of the unemployment rate from 7,8% in 1981 to 
10,4% in 1983 and a predicted 10,9% in 1984. After March 
1983 there were some signs that the index was stabilizing, but 
not sufficiently strongly to imply a real improvement. The 
trend is unfavourable in all the Member States to a greater or 
lesser extent: excepting Luxembourg, where the rate is very 
low, and Greece, for which strictly comparable figures are 
not yet available, the rate of unemployment ranges from 
8,5% in the Federal Republic of Germany to 15,4% in 
Ireland. It is expected to rise in all the Member States in 1984. 
Productivity gains were fairly low in the Community in 1983, 
and are not expected to be better in 1984. Gross domestic 
product per person employed will expand by only 1,5% this 
year (compared with an annual average of2,1% from 1973 to 
1980: see Table 4.2). However, trends vary from one country 
to another. In Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, 
productivity has increased faster in recent years than it did 
from 1973 to 1980. Other countries, particularly France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands, 
have recorded very small productivity gains in the past few 
years. The latest forecasts indicate that no country except 
Italy is likely to see a genuine improvement in 1984, and the 
rate of productivity gains is even expected to slow down 
somewhat in 1984 compared to 1983 in Denmark, Ireland, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Table 4.2 
Productivity per person employed in the whole economy 
1960-73 I 1973-80 I 
B 4,2 2,4 
DK 3,5 1,2 
D 4,2 2,7 
GR 8,2 2,6 
F 4,9 2,5 
IRL 4,3 2,3 
I 5,6 2,0 
L 3,3 0,6 
NL 4,1 2,0 
UK 2,9 1,1 
EC 10 4,4 2,1 
I Annual average growth rate. 
2 Estimate. 
3 Forecast. 
Sources: Eurostat and Commission services. 
The labour market 
Productivity has fared better in manufacturing industry. 
Value added per employee at constant prices will show an 
increase of 3,5% in 1983, and probably 2,9% in 1984. The 
longer-term trend is shown in a comparison between annual 
average growth rates for 1960-73 and 1973-82 in Table 4.3. 
The figures indicate that, while annual productivity gains 
slowed down from 4,8% in the earlier period to 3,2% in the 
latter, they were still relatively high, especially when 
compared to the average of 1,3% in the USA. The reason why 
manufacturing productivity has been better than that in the 
economy as a whole is clearly apparent from Graph 4.1, 
which shows the post-1960 trend in seven Member States. 
For three countries, Belgium, Denmark and the United 
Kingdom, the rate of gain is higher from 1981. Indeed, 
although it is lower than the rate observed in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, the annual average increase in productivity 
in manufacturing industry in these three countries is tending 
upwards again and is even more stable in the United 
Kingdom. In Belgium and the United Kingdom especially, 
there has been evidence of a substantial degree of rationaliz-
ation in manpower utilization. 
More recently, the rate of growth of productivity recovered 
in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, in 
1983. Only in France and Italy was there no significant 
change, with productivity since 1980 progressing at a less 
rapid pace than previously. No significant change in trend is 
expected for 1984, except a slowdown in the United 
Kingdom. 
1980-84 I 3 1980 1981 1982 1983 2 1984 3 
1,4 3,1 0,3 2,8 l, l 1,5 
2,5 -0,6 2,0 3,3 2,6 2,1 
1,7 1,0 1,0 0,9 2,7 2,5 
0,8 -0,1 -0,8 1,3 0,8 1,8 
1,4 1,3 1,0 2,6 0,7 1,3 
2,8 1,2 3,1 2,4 3,2 2,6 
-0,3 3,1 -0,6 0,0 -1,4 0,9 
-1,l 0,6 -2,0 -1,2 -1,3 0,2 
1,2 0,4 0,1 0,9 2,5 1,5 
3,0 -0,4 3,5 3,3 3,4 2,2 
1,5 1,2 1,2 1,7 1,5 1,7 
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GRAPH 4.1: Productivity per employee in manu&cturing industry I 1%0 = 100 
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Table 4.3 
Working hours and productivity in manufacturing industry 
Working hours Productivity 
Total hours 4 Average hours 2 Per employee 5 Per hour 
1960-73 I 1973-82 I 
B -0,5 -4,7 3 
DK -1,1 -2,1 
D -0,2 -2,6 
F 0,6 -2,5 
I -0,1 -0,7 
NL -1,1 -3,2 3 
UK -1,2 -4,4 
EC -0,3 -2,7 
USA 1,6 0,0 
Japan 2,1 -0,2 
Annual average growth rate. 
Average hours worked per employee (USA: per employes person). 
1973-81. 
1960-73 I 
-1,0 
-1,4 
-0,8 
-0,5 
-1,5 
-1,1 
-0,7 
-0,8 
0,1 
-0,9 
1973-82 I 1960-73 I 1973-82 I 1960-73 I 1973-82 I 
-1,1 3 5,9 4,9 3 7,0 6,1 3 
-0,4 5,0 3,7 6,4 4,0 
-0,9 4,7 3,1 5,4 4,2 
-1,0 5,3 3,5 6,0 4,5 
-0,4 5,3 3,2 6,9 3,7 
-0,8 3 6,4 4,3 3 7,6 5,2 3 
-1,0 3,5 1,4 4,3 2,5 
-0,9 4,8 3,2 5,6 4,1 
-0,3 3,2 1,3 3,0 1,5 
0,1 9,7 6,3 10,7 6,2 
Number of employed (USA: employed persons) multiplied by average number of hours worked. 
USA: per employed person. 
Sources: Eurostat, US Bureau of Labour Statistics, and Commission services. 
4.2 Population trends and participation rates 
The present disequilibrium in the Jabour market is still due 
not only to the contraction of employment, but also to the 
fairly rapid increase in the labour force, determined both by 
demographic factors and by changes in the participation 
rate. Until 1982, the labour force expanded faster than total 
population (see Table4.4): from 1970 to 1980, the annual 
average rate of expansion of the labour force was 0,6% 
compared with 0,4% for total population. Both rates slowed 
down in the 1980s, but the gap between them only narrowed 
temporarily in 1982 and 1983. It is expected that the rate of 
expansion of the Jabour force in 1984 will be again double 
that of total population. 
Labour force trends vary from one Member State to another. 
During the 1970s the rate of expansion was 1% or more in 
Denmark,. Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands. The Jabour force expanded faster than total popu-
lation in all countries except the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Ireland. In those countries, as in the 
Netherlands and Italy, the rate of total population growth 
speeded up after 1980 (except for the negative figure in the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1983), while it declined in 
the other Member States and actually became negative in the 
United Kingdom (1981 and 1982), in France (1983) and in 
Luxembourg (1983). The trend has now been reversed in the 
United Kingdom, but the forecast is still negative for France 
and Luxembourg. No other significant change in growth 
rates is expected in 1984, except a substantial decline in 
Denmark and a further increase in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. In eight of the 10 Member States the labour force 
will still expand as fast as total population, or faster. 
This fairly sustained labour force trend is due partly to the 
development of the population of working age and partly to 
other factors. During the I 970s, the population aged 15 to 64 
increased by an average of 0,6% a year. Since then the rate 
increased slightly to stabilize at about 0,8% after peaking at 
1,1% in 1981 (see Graph 4.2). The Community figure reflects 
a higher rate of growth in Denmark, Italy, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom-indeed the 
present rate in the latter three countries is double the average 
for· 1970-80. The other countries show stable rates of 
expansion or, in the case of France, a considerable decline 
after 1982. Projections for 1984 do not imply any change in 
the situation, and longer-term projections confirm that there 
are no grounds for expecting a relaxation in the pressure 
exerted by demographic factors until the end of 1986. Recent 
and projected population trends in the Community are thus 
particularly important in that they lead to an expansion of 
age-groups in the middle of the pyramid, and thus to 
potential growth of the labour force. 
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Table 4.4 
Total population, labour force, working-age population in the Community 
("., change ) 
Total population Wo rking age popula tion 3 Civili an labo ur force 
1970-80 1981 1982 1983 I 1984 2 I 970-80 1981 1982 1983 I 1984 2 1970-80 198 1 1982 1983 I 1984 1 
(average) (average) (average) 
B 0,2 0, 1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,6 0,1 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,8 0,1 0,5 0,0 0,2 
DK 0,4 0,0 - 0,1 - 0,1 - 0,1 0,4 0,7 0,5 0,5 0,4 1,2 0,8 0,6 0,7 0,3 
D 0,1 0,2 - 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,6 1,5 1,3 1,2 0,8 0,1 0,8 0,4 - 0,1 0,2 
GR 0,9 0,9 0,6 0,8 0,8 1,0 1,5 0,8 0,7 0,8 1,3 I 0,8 I 0,8 t 0,8 0,8 
F 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,8 1,2 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,8 0,3 0,7 - 0,3 - 0,1 
IRL 1,4 1,2 1,2 1,1 1,1 1,7 1,9 1,0 2,0 1,5. 1.6 1,4 
I 0,5 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,5 1,0 1,1 1,1 0,8 0,9 1,3 0,3 1,1 1.2 
L 0,7 0,1 0,1 -0,1 0,0 1,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 - 0,1 1,3 0,4 0,3 - 0.5 - 0,6 
NL 0,8 0,7 0,5 0,4 0,4 1,4 1,3 0,5 0,5 0,4 1,2 3,0 2,7 1,1 1,0 
UK 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,6 - 0,6 - 0,9 0,1 0,2 
EC 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,6 1, 1 0,8 0,8 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,3 0,3 0,4 
Estimate. 
Forecas t. 
Population aged 15-64. 
Sources: Eurosta t and Commission services. 
The supply of labour is also affected by the participation 
rate, defined as the proportion of the population of working 
age who are part of the labour force . The rising trend of this 
rate over the past few years is a net result of the decline in the 
male participation rate and the increase in the female 
participation rate. 
GRAPH 4.2: Population and employment 
Since the participation rate is so important a factor in the 
labour supply, a detailed long-term analysis is required . The 
role of structural factors is preponderant; valuable inform-
ation on this aspect is supplied by the finding of the two-
yearly labour surveys, of which the 1981 results have just 
been made available. 1 They confirm the rising trend of 
participation rates in the central age groups (ages 25 to 54) 
already noted in 1975, 1977 and 1979 (see Table 4.5). They 
also confirm that the rising trend is due to the net effects of an 
increase in the female participation rate and a decrease in the 
male rate, except in the 25 to 29-year-old group. Among 
younger age groups (ages 14 to 24), the situation is different : 
in 1981 , their participation rate increased (after having 
declined in earlier years), mainly owing to a higher rate 
among young men. 
The decline in participation rates among adult males would 
seem to be mainly attributable to the depressed nature of the 
See the melhodological annex for a deta iled description of Ihe survey. 
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labour market (the 'discouraged worker' effect) and to the 
negative correlation between participation and real wage 
rises. The increase in female participation is due to a whole 
set of factors such as the development of the tertiary sector, a 
higher level of education, the development of back-up 
facilities such as creches and nursery schools and, sometimes, 
a reaction to the recession (the 'added worker' effect). The 
rising trend of participation rates among the young age 
groups, particularly young men, seems to be due to earlier 
entry to the labour market (see section 4.3). The net result of 
these trends is an increase in the aggregate participation rate 
that combines with unfavourable population trends, against 
a background of economic stagnation, to swell the labour 
supply at a time of weak labour demand, and to accentuate 
disequilibrium on the labour market. 
4.3 The features of Community unemployment 
The results of the labour force survey are also useful in 
analysing in more detail the structure and nature of 
Community unemployment, and in assessing more ac-
curately its component elements. Although it is difficult to 
draw definite conclusions from the data available, it would 
seem that the cyclical trends of male and female unemploy-
ment are different. 1 Male unemployment rates were fairly 
The trend of unemployment emerging from the survey data is strictly 
parallel to the trend of registered unemployment. The survey figures are 
lower than those for officially registered unemployment because some 
people may have provisionally or permanently withdrawn from the labour 
force. or be in precarious temporary jobs, on the date of the survey (thus 
appearing as non-participants or employed in replies to the question-
naire), without having signed off the register, where they appear as 
registered unemployed. 
Table 4.5 
Participation rates by age and sex, I total for EC 9 
Total 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 2 1973 
14-24 46,0 44,9 44,0 43,4 47,6 51,4 
25-29 69,8 71,8 73,4 74,1 75,0 93,4 
30-39 69,7 71,7 72,6 73,8 . 74,7 97,6 
40-49 69,6 71,2 71,8 72,3 72,9 96,3 
50-54 65,8 66,9 66,9 67,1 67,4 92,3 
55-59 53,7 59,0 59,6 57,4 55.3 84,5 
60-64 40,3 38,7 35,5 33,6 29,2 64,6 
65 + 7,6 7,5 6,6 5,2 4,1 12,9 
The labour market 
stable from 1977 to 1979, after the large increase from 1973 to 
1975, following the first oil shock. There was a further 
upsurge after 1979, due to the cyclical downturn that 
followed the increase in oil prices and the adoption of 
restrictive anti-inflationary monetary policies. Female rates, 
on the other hand, increased steadily from 1973 to 1981. 
These developments imply that male unemployment is more 
sensitive to the level of economic activity, in line with the 
view that male unemployment is mainly due to a decline in 
the demand for labour whereas female unemployment is 
mainly determined by an increase in the supply. Con-
sequently, a sustained recovery could be expected to result in 
a relatively larger expansion in male than in female 
employment, while female employment would benefit in the 
longer term by the gradual increase in the tertiary sector's 
share in the economy. 
The expansion of unemployment from 1973 to 1981 
accentuated the difficulties facing certain categories of 
workers, who were already at a disadvantage: young people 
(and especially young women: see below) and older people. 
Chances of older workers have diminished also because of 
the lack of occupational and geographical mobility; at the 
same time young workers' chances offinding stable jobs have 
not increased (see Table 4. 7). In 1981 the rate of unemploy-
ment among 14 to 24-year-olds was 14%: 2,3 times the 
aggregate rate, and over 3 times the adult rate. The updating 
of the survey at the end of March 1983 assessed the rate of 
unemployment among young people at 26,4'.%;, or 2,4 times 
the aggregate rate. The situation of workers aged 25 to 29 
also appears to be worsening; these workers were in the 
lower age group at the beginning of the period, and their 
chances of finding a job have not improwJ as they have 
grown older. Although the rate of unemployment among 
young people did not increase faster than the aggregate rate 
Male Female 
1975 1977 1979 1981 2 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 2 
49,2 47,7 47,1 51.8 40,7 40,7 40,3 39,8 43,4 
93,0 92,3 91,7 92,2 45,5 50,9 54,8 57,0 57,7 
97,3 96,9 96,6 96,5 40,9 45,4 47,8 50,6 52,5 
96,2 95,7 95,6 95,4 43,6 46,3 47,7 48,8 50,1 
92,5 91,8 91,4 90,5 43,2 43,9 43,9 43,9 44,7 
85,4 84,2 81,4 78,4 34,1 36,2 38,0 36,7 34,9 
62.1 56,8 53,6 46,9 20,6 19,2 17,8 16,8 14,6 
12.9 11,2 8,2 6,9 4.2 3.9 3,6 2,8 2,2 
Persons h~ving a main occupation and unemployed persons (labour force) as a percentage of total population of the relevant age and sex. 
Excluding Luxembourg. 
Source: Eurostat: Community labour force sample surveys 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981. 
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Table 4.6 
Unemployment rates by age and sex,' total for EC 9 
Total Male Female 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 l 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 l 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981' 
14-24 4,7 8,1 10,0 10,1 14,0 4,7 8,0 9,0 8,5 12,8 4,7 8,2 11,3 12,0 15,5 
25-29 2,3 4,2 5,0 5,2 7,1 2,0 3,7 4,3 4,4 6,4 2,9 5,1 6,1 6,6 8,3 
30-39 1,2 2,8 2,8 2,9 4,0 1,0 2,3 2,3 2,3 3,5 1,4 3,7 3,7 4,1 4,9 
40-49 1,2 2,3 2,4 2,3 3,1 1, 1 2,0 2,1 2,0 2,9 1,2 2,8 2,8 2,9 3,5 
50-59 1,7 2,3 2,6 2,5 3,9 1,1 2,0 2,4 2,3 3,7 1,4 2,7 3,0 3,0 4,4 
60-64 1,9 3,1 3,5 2,8 4,8 2,0 3,5 3,9 3,0 5,8 1,3 2,0 2,6 2,2 2,3 
65+ 0,9 2,2 1,4 0,6 0,7 1,1 2,7 1,5 0,8 0,6 1,1 1,1 (0.7) 
Total 2,0 3,7 4,2 4,2 6,1 1,8 3,3 3,5 3,4 5,3 2,3 4,4 5,3 5,6 7,4 
Unemployed as ~{ of labour force of the relevant age and sex. 
Excluding Luxembourg. 
Source: Euroslal: Community labour force surveys 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981 and Commission services. 
from 1973 to 1981, the problem has become much worse in 
absolute terms. Statistical data show that over 4 million 
young people under 25 were registered as unemployed in the 
Community in June 1983 (in gross terms); they accounted for 
371~ of total unemployment. 
Young men are as much affected as young women. In 1981, 
the rate of unemployment for young women under 25 was 
15,5%, which means that on average in the Community 
young women are three times as likely as adult women to find 
themselves unemployed. But while the situation of women 
gradually deteriorated in relation to that of men until 1979, it 
has not done so since. The unemployment rate among young 
women was about 40% higher than that among men of the 
same age in 1979; by 1981, it was only 20% higher, and is 
estimated at only 13% higher in 1983. Nevertheless, it is fairly 
clear that this is not so much an improvement as a reflection 
of increased male unemployment, since the effects of the 
recession have been more keenly felt in the manufacturing 
sector, where relatively more men are employed, than in the 
services sector. 
Although the unemployment situation of young people is 
quite serious in the Community as a whole, there are 
differences from one Member State to another. The 1983. 
updating of survey data shows that one out of three young 
people is unemployed in four Member States: the Nether-
lands (35%), Italy (34%), Denmark (34%) and Belgium 
(33%). Three other countries have youth unemployment 
rates around the Community average of one out of four 
young people: the United Kingdom (28%), France (27%) 
and Ireland (26'.;'~). The rate is much lower in Germany 
(15%). It is striking to note that in 1973, unemployment 
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affected one young person out of 20; by 1979 it was one out 
of I 0, and by 1983 one out of four. The gap between the 
young male unemployment rate (25% in 1983) and the young 
female unemployment rate (28,3%) has not increased 
substantially in recent years in the Community as a whole, 
but considerable differences occur between the Member 
States, with the young female rate ranging from 13% in the 
Federal Republic of Germany to over40% in Italy. However, 
it should be borne in mind that differences in female 
unemployment from one country to another are often due 
more to differences in eligibility for benefits, particularly for 
married _women, than to real differences in the supply of ( or 
demand for) female labour. 
The general picture, nevertheless, is one of a substantial 
deterioration in youth unemployment over the past decade. 
Obviously the low rate of economic growth is partially 
responsible for the deterioration, but other factors are also 
important. Among them are the following. 
(i) The generation born during the baby boom of the 1960s 
has reached working age just when the demand for 
labour is in a cyclical trough; this has led to permanent 
adjustment problems in the younger section of the labour 
market. 
(ii) The participation rate of young people increased 
considerably in 1981 after declining steadily from 1973 to 
1978. Although a correct interpretation of this trend is 
difficult, it may be that young people at first reacted to 
the adverse employment situation by continuing with 
full-time education and delaying-but only tem-
porarily-their entry to the labour market. 
The labour market 
Table 4.7 
Unemployment rates among adults and young people under 25 
% 
Unemployment rates among adults 
Total Male Female 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 
B 1,3 2,2 4,5 5,8 9,1 1,0 1,5 2,4 3,2 6,0 2,1 3,9 9,1 I 1,3 15,2 
DK 5,5 5,7 5,0 8,6 5,9 5,0 3,6 8,9 5,2 6,8 7,0 8,2 
D 0,4 2,4 2,4 2,2 2,5 0,3 2,3 2,0 1,6 2,0 0,7 2,6 3,1 3,3 3,4 
F 1,3 2,3 2,9 3,8 4,6 1,1 1,9 2,4 3,2 3,6 1,7 3,0 3,9 4,9 6,1 
IRL 7,5 7,3 5,8 9,3 8,2 8,1 5,5 10,2 5,6 5,4 7,1 6,1 
I 1,9 1,6 1,9 2,5 2,3 1,6 1,4 1,5 1,9 1,6 2,8 2,2 3,0 4,1 3,8 
L : : : 0,8 0,8 
NL 1,6 2,6 2,7 2,6 3,9 1,6 2,7 2,8 2,6 4,0 1,1 2,3 2,4 2,5 3,7 
UK 1,9 3,9 3,8 2,8 6,1 2,1 3,5 4,1 3,2 7,3 1,5 4,6 3,3 2,2 4,3 
EC9 1,3 2,7 3,0 3,0 4,3 1,3 2,5 2,6 2,5 3,9 1,5 3,3 3,6 3,9 4,9 
Unemployment rates among young people 
Total Male Female 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 I 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 I 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 I 
B 3,1 7,8 I 1,3 12,8 20,8 32,6 2,3 6,0 6,9 7,8 15,7 30,0 4,0 9,8 16,4 18,5 26,5 36,0 
DK 13,9 13,4 11,2 17,9 33,9 : 14,4 9,3 7,5 15,0 29,2 12,7 18,1 15,6 21,1 38,8 
D 0,9 5,3 5,3 3,8 4,7 14,9 0,8 5,6 4,8 3,1 4,1 16,6 1,0 4,9 5,9 4,6 5,4 13,1 
F 4,1 7,8 I 1,5 14,2 17,5 26,5 3,4 6,8 8,6 10,4 12,6 19,9 4,9 9,0 14,6 18,2 22,7 33,2 
IRL 15, l 14,4 11,4 14,5 25,5 16,3 16,5 11,7 16,7 28,7 12,8 11,7 11,0 11,5 21,4 
I 14,9 13,0 18,0 21,0 21,5 34,2 14,6 12,3. 16,1 18,0 18,0 28,0 15,4 13,9 20,3 24,8 26,0 41,7 
L 4,2 3,9 : 4,6 
NL 2,9 5,7 5,6 6,4 10,7 35,0 3,4 7,4 6,3 5,8 12,0 36,1 2,4 3,8 4,8 7,0 9,2 33,8 
UK 3,2 7,7 8,6 6,8 15,4 27,6 3,6 7,6 8,8 7,0 17,1 29,0 2,6 7,8 8,4 6,6 13,1 25,8 
EC9 4,7 8,1 10,0 10,I 14,0 26,4 4,7 8,0 9,0 8,5 12,8 25,0 4,7 8,2 I 1,3 12,0 15,5 28,3 
Estimate. 
Sources: Eurostat: Community labour force sample surveys 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1981 and Commission-services. 
(iii) Wage and non-wage labour costs for young workers 
have moved closer to those for adult workers as a result 
of rules governing minimum wages and apprentices' 
wages; employers are therefore sometimes unwilling to 
recruit and train young people. 
(iv) The attitude of young people to work may have changed 
in several ways: according to studies, 1 young people, 
particularly those from privileged socio-economic 
backgrounds, set more and more store by interesting, 
non-repetitive and non-monotonous jobs, which does 
not make it any easier for them to find work. It would 
also appear that less well-qualified young people, in 
OECD: Youth unemployment: The causes and consequences. Paris, 1980. 
particular, have got into an 'unemployment rut', and 
passively accept a situation seen as widespread and 
inevitable. 
From 1973 to 1979, the general expansion of unemployment 
and the aggravation of youth unemployment were ac-
companied by an increase in long-term unemployment (see 
Table4.8.). After declining from 1973 to 1975, the propor-
tion of job seekers who had been out of work for a year or 
more increased to a peak of 37,4% in 1979. The survey for 
1981 shows some improvement to 33,4%, no doubt due to 
vocational training programmes to combat structural 
unemployment, and to the withdrawal from the labour 
market of discouraged workers. 
Long-term unemployment affects both adults and young 
people. Among the adult unemployed, the percentage of 
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Table 4.8 
Unemployed by duration, total EC 9 
Total unemployed 
Total Male Female 
1973 1975 1977 1979 198 J 2 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 2 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 2 
Months: 
JI 13,6 16,1 11,6 10,5 9,2 13,0 14,4 11,5 10,5 9,1 14,4 18,3 11,9 10,4 9,5 
1-2 16,1 20,4 15,5 13,5 13,6 14,8 20,9 15,8 14,2 14,2 18,2 19,8 15,l 12,8 12,8 
3-5 18,6 21,6 17,9 16,0 18,3 18,6 22,7 18,3 16,8 19,1 18,6 20,1 17,4 15,2 17,4 
6-11 22,0 23,5 22,4 22,6 25,5 21,2 22,6 20,6 21,5 25,6 23,3 24,6 24,5 23,8 25,3 
12+ 29,7 18,4 32,6 37,4 33,4 32,4 19,3 33,8 36,9 32,0 25,5 17,2 31, l 37,9 35,0 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 JOO JOO JOO 100 100 100 
Unemployed aged 14 to 24 
Total Male Female 
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 
Months: 
I I 13,0 16,7 12,2 11,9 9,8 13,5 16,8 13, l 13,2 10,5 12,3 16,7 11,4 10,9 9,2 
1-2 16,0 20,9 16,0 13,5 13,6 16,2 22,0 16,8 15,1 14,3 15,8 19,6 15,4 12,2 12.8 
3-5 17,8 20,0 17,5 15,7 17,2 18,7 21,1 18,1 16,9 17,9 16,6 18,7 17,0 14,8 16,6 
6-11 27,2 26,3 26,1 26,8 28,3 25,9 23,8 23,5 24,8 28,3 28,9 29,2 28,5 28,3 28,3 
12+ 26,0 16,1 28,2 32,1 31,1 25,7 16,3 28,5 30,0 29,0 26,4 15,8 27,7 33,8 33, l 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Including those who have not yet started to look for a job. 
Excluding Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland. 
Source: Eurostat: Community labour force sample surveys 1973, 1975. 1977, 1979, 1981. and Commission services. 
those unemployed for more than a year was 35,21c; in 1981 
compared with 41,2 % in 1979. The relative improvement in 
the aggregate figures is almost entirely a reflection of this 
decline. The percentage of long-term unemployed among 
young job seekers did not change much from 1979 (32, I~~) to 
1981 (31, I%). It should also be noted that while long-term 
unemployment accounted for 3,2% of the young labour force 
in 1979, the percentage had risen to 4.4% in 1981. This seems 
to confirm the view that while the majority of young school-
leavers change jobs frequently at first before settling down to 
a stable career, there is a class of young unemployed workers 
who are caught in a vicious circle and suffer from a set of 
social and cultural handicaps that are difficult to overcome. 
In assessing the real dimensions of the problem of youth 
unemployment, this structural hard core must be taken into 
account; it involves young women as well as young men, 
since over 33% of young female job seekers had been 
unemployed for more than a year in 1981. 
94 
4.4 Employment policy problems and 
alternatives 
The complexity and breadth of the unemployment pheno-
menon is a challenge to Member States' policies on several 
fronts. Obviously there is no single employment policy 
answer, and no single solution to the problem: a package is 
required on both the supply side and the demand side. 
A strong recovery would no doubt eliminate a large 
proportion of present cyclical unemployment, to the extent 
that employment is correlated to activity. But the effects of 
an expansion of demand are closely limited by structural 
factors. In view of the size of the non-cyclical components of 
unemployment, further measures are required in several 
areas. The role of real wage increases in unemployment 
trends is a controversial point (see box), but there are 
grounds for expecting favourable, if modest, results from 
restraining the growth of real wages in relation to produc-
tivity. The Annual Economic Review for 1982-83 shows that 
employment and productivity trends in the Community are 
diametrically opposed to those in the USA, which implies 
that the rigidity of real wages in Europe could be one of the 
factors in the Community's poor performance on the 
employment front since 1970. It would be wrong to conclude 
that a fall in real wages would decisively solve the problem, 
however, because the fall would have to be considerable and 
adjustment would take time. Moreover, a number of experts 
agree that a real wage adjustment could not exercise the 
desired effects on unemployment against a background of 
insufficient demand. But beyond the immediate boost to 
labour demand directly attributable to wage restraint, 
favourable effects could be expected in the longer term as 
investment became more profitable and more dynamic. 
On the supply side, several Member States have already 
introduced compulsory education programmes and vo-
cational training measures (see box on employment policy). 
These measures have a twofold purpose: first, to cancel out 
the effects of unfavourable population trends, and secondly, 
to give young people the opportunity of improving their 
qualifications and to make it easier for them to find jobs. 
Almost everyone agrees that such measures are useful, 
especially so as the present pace of technological progress 
will aggravate structural mismatch on the labour market if 
appropriate training is not available. 
The problem of qualifications is not confined to young 
people, for many job-seekers are without the background 
employers require. Although mismatch is not by any means 
eliminated by boom conditions, it is much more troublesome 
in a stagnant labour market. One of its consequences then is 
to increase individual periods of unemployment, since the 
lack of qualifications that makes it difficult to find a job in 
the first place is an even more important factor as time passes 
for the job-seeker. Training programmes specially designed 
for the long-term unemployed are another useful approach. 
But it is difficult to measure the favourable effects of all these 
initiatives-although favourable effects do seem to have 
resulted-particularly in the experimental stages. 
The effects of early retirement schemes, on the other hand, 
are clearly apparent in the reduction in participation rates. 
among the over-54s. These measures, which are increasingly 
costly to implement, are intended to provide an alternative to 
laying-off older workers, who are not only those hardest hit 
by long-term unemployment, but also those least likely to 
benefit from training schemes; the measures are also 
intended to create new jobs. The schemes are apparently 
widely used at present in labour-shedding operations, but the 
job-creating effects are not clearly demonstrable. 
The labour market 
Another approach adopted by governments is to encourage 
the reduction and reorganization of working time, and part-
time working. Measures along these lines have been 
introduced by most of the Member States. It is not easy to 
assess the results to date, and even less so to estimate how an 
even greater reduction in working hours would affect the 
situation. As to part-time working, which has become much 
more common over the past few years, it is not known how 
far the trend is a response to workers' wishes and how f«r it is 
the result of the slackness on the labour market. It is also 
difficult to determine to what extent part-time jobs are new 
jobs, and to what extent they correspond to previous full-
time jobs that have been transformed without leading to new 
recruitment. 
The trend towards shorter working hours is apparent in the 
annual average reduction of about 1 % in working hours over 
a long period, in response to the demand for a better 
standard and quality of living. The issue of accelerating this 
trend so as to increase employment has assumed major 
importance in recent years. In some Member States there 
have been, or are to be, negotiations between the two sides of 
industry on this point. In September 1983 the Commission 
adopted a draft recommendation inviting the Member States 
to consider the reduction and reorganization of working time 
among employment policy instruments, and setting out 
general guidelines to be followed by national governments, 
These guidelines concern, in particular, simultaneous 
reduction and adjustment, so as to avoid an increase in unit 
production costs and ensure better use of capital, and 
restrictions on overtime, with the generalization of arrange-
ments for time off in lieu (while at the same time taking 
account of the flexibility required in certain industries). It is 
recommended in addition that the public sector should set an 
example- by adopting the recommended arrangements. 
Governments do not therefore have a wide choice of action, 
and the approaches open to them cannot always be justified 
on the grounds of verifiable and clear results. 
While an economic recovery policy should help to reduce the 
share of unemployment at present attributable to the 
slackness of demand, its implementation runs up against 
several obstacles.Firstly as there is no general consensus on 
the extent of this component of unemployment, there is no 
way of determining the extent of expansion required to 
eliminate it or the results that such expansion might achieve. 
Secondly, policies of austerity can only be relaxed where 
progress made towards mastery of inflation and budget 
aggregates permits, which is not the case in countries where 
inflationary expectations and inflation rates are still not 
controlled. 
In addition, structural adjustment policies seem to be 
required everywhere: as the structural component of 
unemployment will not respond to economic recovery, 
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government action is required to improve the quality and 
mobility oflabour and to eliminate rigidities and constraints 
that prevent firms from stepping up recruitment. 
Finally, government policies to adjust the structure of the 
labour market will operate within the context of the rapid 
changes in social and demographic structures, and in 
particular the major change that will take place in 
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demographic patterns over coming decades. This implies 
that some employment policy instruments will need to be 
handled with care. For example, the rate of growth of the 
population of working age will start to decline after 1986, 
and will become negative by the end of the 1980s. This is a 
major consideration which should influence such decisions 
as to how far to adjust working hours or retirement age over 
the next few years. 
Employment policies 
Belgium 
The Belgian Government has not changed its employment policy 
stance since the middle of 1982. Apart from wage restraint (see 
box of Chapter 3), policy has concentrated on three points: early 
retirement, job creation and measures to combat youth un-
employment. Since I January 1983, early pensions for workers 
aged 60 and over are granted only on production of proof that 
the retiring worker has been replaced. A Royal Decree of 
December 1982 encourages the recruitment of the first employee 
by temporarily reducing employers' social security contri-
butions. Another measure, also taken in December 1982, enables 
small and medium-sized firms which recruit unemployed 
workers in receipt of benefit for certain types of development 
project to avail of government grants. On the initiative of the 
Minister for Employment and Labour, negotiations have been 
launched at branch or company level to discuss the proposal for a 
5% reduction in working hours accompanied by a compulsory 
3% increase in recruitment. In March 1983, the government 
approved a bill raising the age for compulsory education to 18 
(with full-time education compulsory until the age of 16). 
Changes in regulations for unemployment benefit have been 
introduced to promote personal initiative and self-employed 
activity. 
Denmark 
Denmark's employment policy was reviewed when the new 
government took office in September 1982. The previous 
government had concentrated on a package of measures from 
the economic policy programme for 1982-85, intended to create 
50 OOO new jobs a year and to provide all young people with 
either a job or a training opportunity after 1984. The new 
government's aim is to follow its predecessor's commitments on 
training and employment (particularly employment for young 
people), while changing the form and the spirit of its 
implementation. In particular, the new government has 
announced its intention of relaxing conditions of access to all 
types of education, gradually removing age limits for admission, 
and eliminating distortions between various financial aid 
schemes, so that the students' choice will not be affected by the 
authorities' administrative rules. A law on the creation of new 
jobs has been passed enabling private firms, local authorities and 
central government bodies to apply for government aid to recruit 
job seekers aged 18 to 25 who have been unemployed for a certain 
period to undertake work of community benefit, on condition 
that the new work cannot be done in any other way and docs not 
lead to any major distortion of competition. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
During 1982, measures were taken to stimulate employment 
directly (youth training programmes) or indirectly (investment 
subsidies); the impact of these measures is expected to continue 
The labour market 
in 1983 and 1984. In early 1983, the Government stepped up its 
job-creation activity (Arbeitbeschaffungsmaj3nahmen) and chan-
ged certain social security arrangments. Job-creation measures, 
which are intended to assist about 56 OOO people, include grants 
normally for one year, with the possibility in certain circumst-
ances of an extension to three years. The cost of these 
arrangements is not expected to exceed the saving on unemploy-
ment benefits. On the vocational training side, two programmes 
have been introduced: one, involving expenditure of about OM 
3 OOO million, is organized by the Federal Labour Office and will 
provide retraining for 125 OOO unemployed workers; the other, 
costing OM 124 million, will provide training and work 
experience for 11 OOO young people. 
Greece 
The government has made funds available to the National 
Employment Office to safeguard existing jobs and create new 
ones. A special job-creation proramme was set up in this 
framework for the benefit of young people under 25, for whom 
15 OOO new jobs are planned, and aged 25 to 29, for whom 5 OOO 
new jobs are planned. In the area of vocational training, it is 
planned to reorganize apprenticeships, introducing new syl-
labuses and new teaching systems, as well as a special syllabus for 
15 to 18-year-olds. Working hours were reduced to 40 hours a 
week from I January 1983. 
France 
In line with the approach adopted in late 1981 and followed 
throughout 1982, government action has concentrated on the 
issues of long-term unemployment, vocational training and 
youth unemployment, the reduction of working hours and 
unemployment insurance schemes, Specific measures are 
planned for long-term unemployment. For training and youth, 
the government has decided to change the Avenir Jeunes plan, 
which was brought to a close in mid-1982 and to abandon 
automatic aid, giving priority to bilateral negotiations with 
individual firms. The 'job-training contract' arrangements, 
under which employers receive financial aid if they undertake 
either to train a worker or to guarantee a job for a certain period, 
have been retained. In January 1983, the government finalized 
the main features of a plan to help with the occupational and 
social integration of young people aged 16 to 25; this plan 
concentrates on prolonging the effects of school and university 
education, measures to help young people find jobs (including 
'job-training contracts' and traineeships in large firms) and 
improving career counselling for young people. New arrange-
ments for solidarity contracts were adopted, guaranteeing aid for 
three years from I January 1983 to firms that considerably 
reduce working hours, while maintaining production capacity, 
and undertake to maintain or increase staffing levels. It is also 
planned to increase the period of post-natal leave without pay, 
and to encourage fixed-term contracts by making the rules more 
flexible. 
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Ireland 
The government that took office in December 1982 retained 
some of the measures already in operation and, in particular, the 
Youth Employment Agency, whose task is to increase the 
number of young participants in training and work-experience 
programmes. It is estimated that these programmes involved 
33 700 young people in 1982, and 45 OOO in 1983. New measures 
have been announced, including setting-up a special task force of 
ministers, a National Planning Board and a National Develop-
ment Corporation. The first two bodies will work out measures 
to protect and create jobs, while the Development Corporation 
will invest directly in commercially profitable projects designed 
to substitute domestic goods for imports and to promote exports. 
Italy 
In April 1982, an investment and employment fund was set up 
with resources of LIT 5 350 OOO million. These resources arc to 
be shared between projects to help with the recovery of 
investment and with job creation, comprising: an automatically 
renewable fund for the purchase of shares issued by special credit 
establishments to finance industrial capital investment, housing 
construction and business modernization; investment in energy 
by the ENEL (national electricity company); modernization and 
construction of infrastructure in rural areas; grants to small and 
medium-sized firms, production cooperatives and wage-earners' 
cooperatives; a reduction in VAT; deductibility of interest 
payments on loans to finance the development of services in 
agriculture; an increase in the resources of the technological 
innovation fund set up in February 1982; an increase in the 
resources of the Mezzogiorno credit institution. Furthermore, an 
agreement was reached in January 1983 between the two sides of 
industry and the government on: changes in the automatic 
indexation system (sea/a mobile); the renewal of collective 
agreements; a reduction in working time by 40 hours by mid-
1985; compensatory tax and social measures to protect workers' 
purchasing power; measures to improve the efficient use of 
productive capacity by combating absenteeism and improving 
mobility. 
Luxembourg 
Special measures have been planned lo protect employment and 
economic competitiveness in general: a new system of aids for 
geographical mobility, specific aid for the recruitment of long-
term unemployed workers, the extension to other categories of 
workers of the reemployment grant for steelworkers, a tighter 
ban on overtime. stricter supervision of the laws on a 40 hour 
week in the case of workers with more than one part-time job, 
opportunities for the authorities to employ unemployed workers 
in receipt of benefits on jobs in community services. At the end of 
1982, two agreements were reached at the national tripartite 
conference: one concerns wage restraint, higher minimum wages 
and the continuation of the solidarity levy; the other concerns a 
reduction in hours and a corresponding reduction in pay in the 
steel sector. 
The Netherlands 
A package of vocational trammg measures in favour of 
unemployed young people was adopted in 1982; it involved 
setting-up courses and introducing grants for employers that 
allow under 23-year-olds to follow apprenticeship courses for the 
long-term unemployed. On taking office in November 1982, the 
new government developed a three-fold approach to unemploy-
ment: the reorganization of public finance, the reinforcement of 
private enterprise and the promotion of employment. The 
measures planned include an adjustment of working hours and a 
single plan for the employment of young people, involving 
financial aid lo further training projects and short vocational 
training courses. To improve young peoples' job opportunities, 
education and employment contact centres have been set-up with 
the purpose of matching the qualifications of newly-trained 
young people to the need of firms. The two sides of industry 
reached a nation-wide agreement in principle on a socio-
economic policy that provides for the option, al the level of a 
sector or an individual firm, of a reduction in working hours in 
lieu of wage indexation. 
United Kingdom 
The government's employment measures have continued along 
the same lines as those adopted in 1981 and 1982, concentrating 
mainly op measures to reduce unemployment among young 
people. The Youth Opportunities Programme has been replaced 
by the Youth Training Scheme, which guarantees from 
September 1983 12 months' training and work to all 16-ycar-old 
school-leavers and some 17-ycar-old job-seekers. The estimated 
cost for 1983/84 totals UK L 950 OOO million, and 460 OOO young 
people should be involved. Two other schemes arc also in 
operation: the Community Programme Scheme, introduced in 
October 1982 to provide jobs (some part-time) of community 
benefit for 130 OOO long-term unemployed persons aged over 18, 
and the Job Splitting Scheme, introduced in January 1983 to 
encourage employers to split existing full-time jobs into two part-
time jobs. This scheme is open for applications until March 1984, 
and 60 OOO subsidies are planned. It is estimated that these and 
other existing measures had covered 657 OOO people by May 
1983. 
Real wages and employment 
Over the past few years there has been much discussion of the 
role of real wage levels in determining the level of employment. A 
n\lmber of empirical studies have been carried out, to test 
equations where the explanatory variable is either real wages 
(wages deflated by a cost-of-living index), or the real wage gap 
(the gap between actual real wages and a reference wage that 
would, for example, leave factor income distribution un-
changed I).or the share of real wages in national or sectoral 
income. The real wage gap and the share of wages are 
theoretically equivalent, but may differ in practice because of the 
data used. It should be noted in addition that studies on this 
subject have applied inappropriate deflators to nominal wages 
(the detlator of GDP at factor cost being the only valid deflator) 
and that the results have sometimes been substantially different. 
Some studies have taken account only of the direct effects on 
employment of a change in real wages, while others have 
included indirect effects through changes in profits and 
investment. 
The basic specifications and results of some representative 
studies, are considered to give an idea of the range of discussions. 
Geary and Kennan ( 1982) inspect quarterly data for employment 
and real wages in manufacturing industry in 12 OECD countries. 
They test several lag assumptions, but in no case do they find a 
statistically significant correlation between the two variables. 
The validity of their findings is compromised, however, because 
they use the wholesale price index to deflate nominal wages. A 
similar criticism applies to the studies by Neftci ( 1978) and 
Sargent ( 1978). both of whom use the consumer price index and 
reach the contradictory conclusion that real wages and 
employment are positively correlated in the USA. 
Grubb, Layard and Symons (1982) also use nominal wages 
deflated by the index of wholesale prices; they find a negative 
correlation between real wages and employment. According to 
the authors, the result is due to the introduction of import prices 
as one of the explanatory variables. This explains why Geary and 
Kennan, who do not include import prices, reach different 
conclusions. The authors also consider the influence of aggregate 
demand on the determination of employment, but only in France 
do they find a positive correlation. Both studies obviously suffer 
from the same criticisms concerning the choice of deflator. 
Jeffrey Sachs ( 1983) studies the relationship between unemploy-
ment rates in the economy as a whole and either real wages 
(deflated by value-added prices) on the real wage gap (defined as 
the gap betwen the observed value of the ratio of real wages to 
This is the variable used in Chapter 3, where it is called the 'real 
product wage'. 
The labour market 
full employment productivity on the one hand, and the average 
value of this ratio for 1965-69 on the other).Testing the equations 
for six countries from 1961 to 1981. Sachs finds significant 
correlations in Canada, Germany, Japan and the United 
Kingdom. There is no positive correlation in France or the 
United States. The equations also incorporate the real money 
supply, so as to monitor the effects of monetary policy changes 
on the employment situation. Although there is a negative 
correlation in all cases between unemployment and money 
supply, the findings for real wages are not significantly modified. 
A recent report by Dornbusch, Basevi, Blanchard, Buiter and 
Layard (1983) questions whether the problem of real wages can 
be defined and measured by using the real wage gap--and thus 
whether it is possible to distinguish between 'classical' and 
'Keynesian' unemployment. The report argues that the 
measured effects of an increase in real wages relative to 
productivity gains on the share of wages in GDP depend on the 
basic assumption adopted concerning the production function. 
If a Cobb-Douglas function is used, the distribution of income 
between wages and profits remains constant, so that a decline in 
employment due to an increase in labour costs is entirely offset 
by productivity gains. As firms cannot adjust their labour force 
and capital stock without some delay, there may be a short-term 
wage gap. However, in the longer run, technology is adjusted 
towards greater capital intensity, labour productivity increases 
and the wage gap tends to narrow. If no gap is found, this does 
not mean that the real wages problem does not exist any more. 
The report attempts to assess the problem from a different angle, 
by estimating the size of the increase in real wages compatible 
with maintaining full employment. The results for manufactur-
ing industry in three European countries confirm that from 1975 
to 1980, the expansion of unemployment was partly due to an 
excessive increase in real wages; the evidence for 1981-82 
apparently implies that slack demand played a much greater role 
in the expansion of unemployment during those years. 
The conclusions of these studies are sometimes divergent, as are 
the economic policy measures they imply. From several points of 
view, such as the choice of variables, the form of the equations 
tested and the quality of the findings, the most satisfactory 
studies are those which take a midpoint position: the trend of 
real wages is not entirely responsible for mounting unemploy-
ment, but there is little doubt that real wage growth (ac-
companied by declining profits) was excessively rapid during the 
1970s, and that it was at least partly responsible for the slackness 
of productive investment and the stagnation of employment. 
There are grounds for concluding that a certain proportion of 
present unemployment cannot be eliminated unless real per 
capita wages decline, although some studies add that this would 
not have the desired effects as long as aggregate demand 
remained insufficiently strong. 
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5. Budgetary policy 
In 1983, the net borrowing of general government in the Community as a whole was 
roughly stable. Given the shortfall of receipts caused by the pers-istence of the recession , 
and the increase in the cost of debt service, this result was obtained only through a marked 
effort to control the growth of public expenditure. In certain Member States this effort 
was accompanied by an increase in the burden of indirect taxes and social secuity 
contributions. The search for economies bore as much on government consumption and 
social transfers as on gross capital formation. In many cases, productive expenditures 
have not escaped the economy effort. The share of taxes and parafiscal paymen ts in GDP 
again increased. The magnitude of budget deficits is reflected in an increase in the ratio of 
public debt to GDP on average for the Community. This movement, together with the high 
levels of interest rates over the past Jew years, has led to a sharp rise in payments of 
interest on public debt, which now constitute an important financial constraint on 
budgetary polity in a number of Member States. 
5.1 Budgetary trends and policies 
The budget deficit in the Community as a whole is likely, on 
the basis of latest Commission estimates, to be little changed 
as a proportion of GDP in 1983 : 5,4% as against 5,2% in both 
1982 and 1981 . This outturn should be viewed in the context 
of a slowdown in the growlh of nominal GDP: 6,9% this year 
as against 9,5% in 1982, while real activity grew at the very 
modest rate of 0,5% (0,4% in 1982). 
Three main elements have dominated the development of 
general government accounts in 1983: the persistence of the 
recession, which reduced the growth of receipts and swelled 
transfers to households; the effort made by the Member 
States to squeeze the growth of public expenditure; and the 
big increase, caused by the regular accumulation of deficits, 
in interest payments on public debt. In 1983, the current 
receipts of general government in the Community grew by 
9% as against 12,2% in 1982. Of these receipts, only indirect 
taxes grew at a rate close to that of the previous year (9, I% in 
1983, 10,7% in 1982), as a result of an increase in the weight 
of such taxes in a number of Member States (see Table 5.1 ). 
Rates of social security contributions were often similarly 
increased, but direct tax rates were little changed, direct tax 
receipts growing faster than nominal GDP only as a result of 
fiscal drag. In sum, overall tax pressure (including social 
security contributions) has continued to increase for the 
Community as a whole, reaching 42,8% of GDP in 1983 as 
against 41,9% in 1982. 
Efforts to control the increase in public expenditure have 
been even more determined and more general than in 1982: 
on average for the Community, current expenditure has risen 
by 8,7% in 1983, compared with 12,3% in 1982, continuing 
the slowdown already evident in the earlier year. This 
slowdown was particularly marked in the case of social 
transfers and government consumption (growth of, respect-
ively, 8,2;~ and 7,1;~ in 1983 and 13,1;~ and 9,6% in 1982). 
The reduction in the inflation rate has certainly contributed 
to this outturn, but, given the development of unemploy-
ment, a strict control of administrative and personnel 
expenditure and of transfers to households (up 8,4% in 1983, 
13,6% in 1982) has been required for it to be achieved. Net 
capital transfers have increased substantially, but expendi-
ture on gross capital formation has grown only very slightly 
faster than last year (6,9% in 1983, 5,6% in 1982). 
Debt interest payments have continued to grow much faster 
than other categories of expenditure, even if the very gentle 
decline in interest rates in Europe has moderated the 
increase, one of 18,1% in 1983 against one of20,4% in 1982. 
The sharp rise in debt interest payments as a percentage of 
GDP on average for the Community (from 4,2% in 1982 to 
5, I% in 1983), and the high level of such payments in certain 
Member States, reflects the fact that public debt has been 
growing significantly, even as a percentage of GDP, for a 
number of years. 
In its communication of I July 1982, ' Budgetary discipline 
and economic convergence' (COM(82)422 final), the 
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Table 5.1 
Income and outlay transactions of general government,' EC 10 
'OOO 
million 
ECU 
1983 2 1980 
Indirect taxes 370,7 16,5 
Direct taxes 352,8 17,5 
Social security contribution~ 412,5 14,6 
Total taxes and social security contributions I 136,0 16,1 
Other current receipts 4 100,1 17,1 
Total current receipts I 236,1 16,2 
Current transfers 620,1 13,0 
Actual interest payments 136,3 27,5 4 
Government consumption 515,0 18,0 
Total current expenditure I 271,4 16,2 
Gross saving - 35,3 
Net capital transfers 26,4 13,0 
Gross capital formation 80,8 13,1 
Net lending ( +) or borrowing ( - ) -142,5 
For information: Nominal GDP 12,2 
National accounts definition, excluding Joans. advances and pa:ticipations. 
Estimates. 
Forecasts. 
Actual interest received and miscellaneous. 
Commission underlined the importance of better control of 
the budgetary aggregates in achieving a greater convergence 
of economic developments in the Community. The Commis-
sion stressed, notably, the need for a reduction in, or, at the 
very least, a stabilization of, net borrowing, a deceleration in 
the growth of public expenditure; for a restructuring of taxes 
and social security contributions; and for a more frequent 
use of charges for public sector services. From this poirit of 
view, the general government budgetary outturn in 1983 is. 
encouraging. In the majority of Member States, the growth 
of spending in nominal terms has been less than was forecast 
a year ago. Spending has also slowed down in real terms, 
clearly pointing up the generally restrictive stance of 
budgetary management. At the same time, however. the 
growth of receipts has been not only slower than in 1982 but 
has also fallen short of initial estimates (except in Denmark 
and Italy), despite, in some cases, higher tax rates. 
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% change % of GDP 
1981 
11,7 
11,8 
12,8 
12,1 
19,2 
12,7 
18,1 
26,6 
13,6 
16,8 
-1,4 
3,8 
8.7 
1982 1983 2 1984 J 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 2 1984 J 
10,7 9,1 6,6 12,7 13,4 13,5 13,7 14,0 14,0 
13,3 9,2 9,2 11,4 17,7 12,6 13,0 13,6 13,6 
12,4 9,4 8,0 13,5 14,9 14,8 15,2 15,5 15,8 
12,1 9,2 7,9 37,5 40,3 40,9 41,9 42,8 43,4 
12,8 6,0 8,5 3,1 3,5 3,7 3,8 3,8 3,8 
12,2 9,0 8,0 40,6 43,8 44,6 45,7 46,6 47,2 
13,1 8,2 6,8 19,8 20,8 22,4 23,1 23,4 23,4 
20,4 18,1 11,5 3,04 3,5 4 4,2 4,6 5,1 5,4 
9,6 7,1 4,9 17,2 18,7 19,4 19,4 19,4 19,1 
12,3 8,7 6,5 40,0 43,0 45,9 47,1 47,9 47,9 
0,7 0,8 -1,3 -1,4 -1,3 -0,7 
12,6 32,9 2,8 1,0 1,0 0,8 0,8 1,0 1,0 
5,6 6,9 5,7 3,0 3,3 3,1 3,0 3,0 3,0 
-3,4 -3,5 -5,2 -5,2 -5,4 -4,7 
9,5 6,9 6,6 
Budgets for 1983 were in fact based on macroeconomic 
assumptions about activity in 1983 which were slightly more 
favourable than the actual outturn. It soon became apparent, 
in many cases in the first few months of the year, that receipts 
had been overestimated. In all the Member States, the fact 
that the economic outturn was weaker than had been 
assumed was not considered reason for allowing budget 
deficits to stray off target: the authorities decided to 
maintain their budgetary objectives and have taken ad-
ditional measures in order to be able to respect them. Thus 
the Belgian Government decided in March on budget 
economies of BFR 39 400 million and an increase in social 
security contributions. Following the March realignment of 
EMS parities, the French Government decided on a 
programme of measures to back up the devaluation of the 
franc. These measures included economies in central 
government, social security and public enterprises. In 
Table 5.2 
Income and outlay transactions of general govcrnmcnt,I 1982-84 
Total current Indirect taxes 
receipts 
1982 1983 2 1984 3 1982 1983 2 1984 J 
B 12,2 5,7 9,4 8,7 4;0 7,1 
DK 12,0 12,5 8,0 9,7 7,8 4,7 
D 4,9 4,0 5,3 1,8 4,6 6,2 
GR 39,5 27,4 22,1 36,4 32,0 23,0 
F 16,2 11,8 9,8 15,4 8,6 7,3 
IRL 24,7 16,5 11,4 21,9 13,1 11,0 
I 23,7 22,0 17,3 22,8 34,2 8,0 
L 11,1 8,6 7,8 15,8 8,6 11,8 
NL 5,4 6,1 0,8 2,1 4,4 5,9 
UK 12,2 6,6 6,5 11,7 4,6 7,7 
EC 12,2 9,0 8,0 10,7 9,1 6,6 
Total expenditure Current transfers 
1982 1983 2 1984 J 1982 1983 2 1984 J 
B 9,9 6,3 7,0 9,2 7,1 6,4 
DK 16,2 11,5 6,0 16,3 8,2 7,8 
D 4,0 3,6 2,9 5,4 3,4 3,0 
GR 24,4 25,9 21,7 32,9 22,4 20,2 
F 18,2 12,6 10,2 19,4 12,8 10,2 
IRL 23,8 9,8 8,1 29,2 11,7 7,2 
I 22,8 20,3 12,4 21,4 17,5 12,2 
L 10,5 10,0 5,4 11,8 9,8 7,7 
NL 8,4 5,3 1,5 10,8 5,8 1,6 
UK 10,1 6,9 6.3 12,4 6,3 9,0 
EC 11,9 9,0 6.4 13,1 8,2 6,8 
National accounts definition. excluding loans, advances and participations. 
Estimates. 
Forecasts. 
Source: Commission services. 
addition, direct taxation was raised through the creation of 
an exceptional tax of 1 % on incomes and the establishment of 
a compulsory loan equivalent to 10% of income tax 
payments. In Ireland, where VAT rates had been raised in the 
1983 budget, there was announced in July an IRL 70 million 
economy package and an increase in excise duties. In Italy, a 
number oflevies, mostly of a one-off nature, were introduced 
at the beginning of 1983. In Luxembourg, the financial 
support to the steel industry decided in April was ac-
companied from July by an increase in VAT rates and excise 
duties. Various expenditure reductions, amounting to HFL 
2 OOO million were decided in the Netherlands in April, and 
certain taxes were increased. The United Kingdom Govern-
Budgetary policy 
(% change) 
Direct taxes Social security Other current 
contributions receipts 
[982 1983 2 1984 J 1982 1983 2 1984 J 1982 1983 2 1984 J 
17,2 3, I 9,1 7,7 11,9 12,7 15,8 2,1 5,5 
12,2 13,3 9.6 32,1 42,6 12,6 11,6 10,8 8,0 
2,7 4,4 5,2 5,9 3, I 6,5 21,7 5,5 -3,7 
61,0 30,0 23.0 27,6 19,0 19,7 61,5 26,0 22,5 
18,2 14,4 9,0 17,4 13,8 12,4 7,9 7,4 6,8 
20,5 19,7 15,2 31,5 17,2 7,4 39,3 18,4 7,0 
30,1 21,4 23,6 21,1 16,1 11,2 9,8 11,0 67,8 
9,4 9,2 6,2 6,7 6,6 5,3 17,6 11,4 9,8 
2,6 -2,5 -1,6 9,5 14,1 -1,2 5,9 5,0 3,2 
12,3 8,5 6,7 13,7 10,6 6,8 11,3 2,1 1,2 
13,3 9,2 9,2 12,4 9,4 8,0 12,8 6,0 8,5 
Actual interest Government Net capital 
payments consumption transfers and gross 
capital formation 
1982 1983 2 1984 J 1982 1983 2 1984 J 1982 1983 2 1984 J 
25,9 13,1 14,5 5,6 3,4 6,1 4,9 -0,9 -3,3 
29,3 51,9 13,5 14,8 7,9 3, I 8,6 -5,1 -1,2 
23,1 17,4 10,4 2,2 2,5 2,3 -3,8 0,9 -0,7 
4,1 47,1 26,0 26,8 23,4 20,8 1,5 38,6 27,8 
13,3 39,5 30,0 16,9 9,9 7,3 17,5 7,0 8,0 
39,4 19,1 14,4 18,6 9,6 6,3 11,0 -5,5 6,8 
35,5 30,6 14,9 18,5 16,8 11,2 25,9 27,8 12,9 
17,1 13,6 24,8 7,2 7,1 6,0 11,9 15,6 -5,0 
21,8 17,6 16,1 4,0 2,4 -3,2 -1,9 0,2 -0,2 
8,7 -1,1 0,1 9,2 8,1 5,4 5,4 18,6 8,6 
20,4 18,1 11.5 9,6 7,1 4,9 7, 1 12,3 5,0 
ment took similar steps in July, in announcing a series of 
measures aimed at reducing the 1983/84 borrowing require-
ment by UKL I I 00. 
Table 5.2 shows percentage changes in the main items of 
receipts and expenditures of general government in the 
Member States. While a slowdown in the growth of current 
receipts has been evident in eight of the ten countries, there 
was a slight acceleration in Denmark and the Netherlands. In 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, 
the increase in indirect tax receipts accelerated, as did the 
increase in direct tax receipts, in Denmark and the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The increase in social security 
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contributions accelerated in Belgium, Denmark and the 
Netherlands. Elsewhere, taxes and social security contri-
butions decelerated. Table 5.3 expresses the same general 
government operations as percentages of GDP, taking 1979 
as a reference year. In four years the overall rate of taxation 
(that, is including social security contributions) for the 
Community as a whole has risen by 5,6 points of GDP. The 
increase has been particularly sharp (more than 8 points) in 
Ireland and Italy, where, however, the overall rate of 
taxation was in 1979 significantly lower than the Community 
average. The increase has heen equal to or more than 5 points 
in Greece and Luxembourg, and around 4 points in France 
and the United Kingdom. It has been more modest in the 
other Member States, and particularly in Denmark and 
Table 5.3 
Income and outlay transactions of general government,I 1979-84 
Total current Indirect taxes 
receipts 
1979 1983 2 1984 3 1979 1983 2 1984 3 
B 45,7 46,7 47,8 12,0 11,8 11,8 
DK 51,4 52,4 53,2 19,1 17,2 16,9 
D 43,5 46,1 46,2 12,9 12,7 12,9 
GR 30,6 35,7 36,4 15,2 16,3 16,8 
F 44,5 48,9 49,9 14,4 14,5 14,5 
IRL 37,6 45,7 46,3 15,8 18,2 18,4 
I 36,0 44,7 46,8 9,5 12,0 11,6 
L 52,5 58,4 59,3 13,1 14,8 15,5 
NL 53,1 56,8 56,0 11,9 11,7 12,1 
UK 38,5 43,0 42,7 15,7 16,8 16,9 
EC 40,6 46,6 47,2 12,7 14,0 14,0 
Total expenditure Current transfers 
1979 1983 2 1984 J 1979 1983 2 1984 J 
B 53,1 58,9 58,9 24,7 26,9 26,7 
DK 54,5 61,2 61,0 20,2 22,4 22,7 
D 46,6 49,4 48,3 19,2 21,7 21,3 
GR 34,1 42,0 42,7 8,9 15,8 15,9 
F 45,3 52,0 53,2 25,7 29,9 30,6 
IRL 49,1 59,1 58,1 16,2 20,4 19,9 
I 45,4 56,6 56,8 19,2 22,3 22,4 
L 52,5 61,3 60,8 28,0 32,5 33,0 
NL 55,0 63,6 63,0 29,9 34,5 34,3 
UK 41,7 45,1 44,8 14,2 15,8 16,I 
EC 44,0 52,0 51.9 19,8 23,4 23,4 
National accounts definition, excluding loans, advances and equities. 
Estimates. 
Forecasts. 
Including miscellaneous current transfers for 1979. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Belgium, in which countries the overall rate of taxation was 
already particularly high in 1979. However, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands had even higher rates in 1979 and have 
nonetheless registered a significant further increase since 
then. The general upward movement in the Community has 
been coupled with a reduction in the dispersion of overall 
rates of taxation among the Member States. It can also be 
seen that the weight of social security contributions has 
increased most between 1979 and 1983 (by 2 points of GDP), 
followed by that of indirect taxes (up by 1,9 points). 
As for public expenditure, Table 5.2 shows for 1983 a 
slowing of the increase in all the Member States except 
Greece. The share of public expenditure in GDP (see 
('.,,oJGDP) 
Direct taxes Social security Other current 
contributions receipts 
1979 1983 2 1984 3 1979 1983 2 1984 J 1979 1983 2 1984 J 
19,0 18,9 19,3 12,6 13,4 14,1 2,0 2,6 2,6 
24,3 25,8 26,5 1,6 3,1 3,3 6,4 6,4 6,5 
12,6 12,2 12,2 15,4 17,6 17,9 2,6 3,6 3,3 
4,8 6,5 6,7 8,4 9,5 9,5 2,2 3,3 3,4 
7,9 9,5 9,6 19,4 21,5 22,4 2,5 3,4 3,4 
11,9 15,2 15,9 4,7 6,2 6,0 5, 1 6,2 6,0 
9,7 15,0 16,6 14,4 15,5 15,4 2,5 2,1 3,2 
18,8 19,9 19,9 15,3 16,3 16,1 5,4 7,5 7,7 
16,3 14,4 13,8 17,8 22,1 21,3 7,1 8,7 8,8 
13,0 15,0 14,9 6,0 6,8 6,8 3,8 4,3 4,1 
11,4 13;3 13,6 13,5 15,5 15,8 3,1 3,8 3,8 
Actual interest Government Net capital 
payments 4 consumption transfers and gross 
capital fonnatiori 
1979 1983 2 1984 J 1979 1983 2 1984 J 1979 1983 2 1984 J 
5,3 9,8 10,4 18,6 18,3 18,1 4,4 4,0 3,6 
4,9 8,1 8,7 24,9 27,5 26,6 4,5 3,2 3,0 
1,7 3,1 3,2 20,0 20,1 19,6 5,6 4,5 4,3 
4,5 3,3 3,4 16,3 18,7 18,9 4,4 4,2 4,5 
1,6 2,7 3,3 14,8 16,1 16,1 3,3 3,3 3,3 
6,6 10,0 10,4 19,5 21,9 21,1 6,8 6,8 6,6 
6,0 9,6 9,8 15,7 18,8 18,7 4,5 5,8 5,9 
0,9 1,0 1,2 15,2 17,4 17,4 8,3 10,3 9,3 
3,0 5,9 6,7 17,9 17,9 16,9 4,2 5,2 5,1 
4,6 4,9 4,5 19,9 22,1 21,7 3,1 2,4 2,4 
3,0 5,1 5,4 17,2 19,4 19,1 4,1 4,0 4,0 
Table 5.3) has increased by 8 points between 1979 and 1983, 
reaching 52% for the Community as a whole. In three 
Member States, Denmark, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands, it is above 60% in 1983; it is close to 60% in Belgium 
and Ireland; is above 50% in France and Italy; is close to 50% 
in the Federal Republic of Germany; and exceeds 40% in 
Greece and the United Kingdom. Of the main categories of 
expenditure, current transfers have contributed most to the 
rising share of public expenditure in GDP in the Community, 
while interest payments have contributed almost as much as 
public consumption. The weight of current transfers is 
highest in France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (close 
to or above 30% of GDP). 
The virtual stability in 1983 of net borrowing of general 
government as a percentage of GDP in the Community 
masks an increase in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the 
United Kingdom, no change in Italy, and a fall in Denmark, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy and 
the Netherlands (see Table 5.4). 
While the main concern of the budgetary authorities for 1983 
has been to provide themselves with additional means of 
respecting their original budget targets in the face of the 
persistent weakness of activity, a number of Member States 
have set out broad guidelines covering several years ahead. 
Table 5.4 
Budgetary policy 
Public finance objectives over several years: 
Belgium: Reduction of central government borrowing 
requirement to 7% of GDP by 1985. 
FR of Germany: Quantified plan for federal government budget 
up to 1987. Regular reduction in deficit, going 
from OM 40 900 million in 1983 to OM 22 500 
million in 1987. 
Ireland: Gradual reduction in current budget deficit and 
elimination by 1987. 
The Netherlands: Reduction of general government borrowing 
requirement to 7,5% of net national income by 
1986. 
United Kingdom: Medium-term financial strategy setting public 
sector borrowing requirement at 8 OOO million 
UKL (2,5% of GDP) for financial year 1984/85 
and at UKL 7 OOO million (2% of GDP) for 
financial year 1985/86. 
In general, the preferred mode of action of the budgetary 
authorities is a moderation of public expenditure rather than 
an increase in taxes or social security contributions. No 
category of expenditure is spared in the search for economies. 
While a restructuring of expenditure in favour of productive 
expenditure is in principle being sought, the constraints 
imposed by the reduction of budget deficits do not always 
allow such forms of expenditure to be favoured or even to 
General government budgetary aggregates, 1 EC and Member States, 1981-84 
(% of GDP) 
Gross saving ( +) or Net lending ( +) or Net interest Net lending ( +) 
dissaving (-) borrowing ( - ) payments or borrowing ( - ) less net 
interest payments 
1981 1982 1983 2 1984 l 1981 1982 1983 2 1984 3 1981 1982 1983 2 1984 3 1981 1982 1983 2 1984 3 
B -8,2 -7,6 -8,2 -7,5 - 12,6 - 11,9 - 12,2 - 11, l 7,2 8,6 9,2 10,2 -5,4 -3,3 -3,0 -0,9 
DK -3,1 -5,4 -5,6 -4,8 -7,0 -9,1 -8,8 -7,8 1,8 2,5 4,9 5,4 -5,2 -6,6 -3,9 -2,4 
D 1,1 1,2 1,3 2,1 -3,9 -3,5 -3,3 -2,1 1,7 2,2 2,6 2,8 -2,2 -1,3 -0,7 -0,7 
GR -5,6 -2,8 -2,2 -1,9 -10,l -6,4 -6,3 -6,3 
F 1,4 0,6 0,1 -0,1 -1,8 -2,7 -3,1 -3,3 1,5 1,4 1,9 2,4 -0,3 -1,3 -1,2 -0,9 
IRL -7,3 -8,2 -6,6 -5,2 -15,8 -16,2 -13,4 -11,8 8,1 9,5 10,l 10,2 -7,7 -6,7 -3,3 -1,6 
I -6,8 -6,7 -6,1 -4,1 -11,7 -11,9 -11,9 -10,0 6,4 7,7 8,4 8,7 -5,3 -4,2 -3,5 -1,3 
L 6,8 7,5 7,5 7,8 -2,3 -2,0 -2,9 -1,5 -2,6 -2,2 -1,9 -1,5 -4,9 -4,2 -4,8 -3,0 
NL 0,5 -1,6 -1,5 -1,9 -5,2 -6,9 -6,7 -7,1 2,4 2,5 3,3 3,6 -2,8 -4,4 -3,4 -3,5 
UK -0,6 0,1 0,2 0,4 -2,9 --2,1 -2,2 -2,1 3,5 3,2 3,1 3,0 0,6 1,1 0,9 0,9 
EC -1,3 -1,4 -1,3 -0,7 -5,2 -5,2 -5,4 -4,7 3,04 3,3 4 3,8 4 4,1 4 -2,24 -1,94 -1,64 -0,64 
I National accounts definition, excluding loans, advances and participations. 
2 Estimates. 
3 Forecasts. 4 Excluding Greece. 
Source: Commission services. 
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escape reductions. The results for 1983, moreover, show that 
capital expenditure has decreased or remained unchanged (in 
nominal terms) in five of the ten Member States (it should be 
noted that not all capital expenditure is 'productive', and 
that some categories of current expenditure, notably some 
items of government consumption, can be 'productive'). 
Further, some Member States consider that priority should 
be given to the development of the productive private sector. 
In this respect, while increasing or maintaining productive 
public expenditure is not seen as a priority by certain 
countries (in particular Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), 
measures have been introduced there to support private 
investment by improving the fiscal and financial environ-
ment for companies. Further, a substantial public capital 
expenditure effort is being kept up in Greece, France, Italy 
and Luxembourg. 
5.2 Interest charges and general government 
indebtedness 
The strong growth of the net interest payments of general 
government has constituted an additional element of rigidity 
in budgetary management. Table 5.4 and Graph 5.1 show 
the development of these payments as a percentage of GDP. 
The increase in the Community in net interest payments was 
relatively modest up to 1978-79 (after, it is true, a jump in 
1975), but accelerated from 1980 onwards. The year 1975 
represents a turning-point for countries like Belgium and 
Italy whose interest charges as a percentage of GDP have 
grown regularly since that date. Another turning-point is 
constituted by the years 1979-80, since when net interest 
payments have grown substantially in all but one of the 
Member States. The notable exception is the United 
Kingdom, which has recently succeeded in reversing the 
upward trend. In 1983, the charge represented by interest 
payments on public debt is very heavy in three Member 
States, Italy (8,41~ of GDP), Belgium (9,2'~~) and Ireland 
(10,1%). Moreover, the charge has practically doubled 
between 1982 and 1983 in Denmark, reaching 4,9%. 
Table 5.4 and Graph 5.2 also show net borrowing of general 
government, after deduction of net interest payments, as a 
percentage of GDP. This presentation is justified to the 
extent that interest charges represent the present net financial 
cost of past budgetary operations via the accumulation of 
public debt. A calculation of net borrowing after deduction 
of net interest payments' thus gives a more precise indication 
of the contribution of current tax and expenditure policies to 
economic expansion. Thus corrected, the budget deficit of 
Actual interest payments minus interest receipts. 
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the Community, which moved from 1% of GDP in 1980 to 
2,2% in 198 I, dropped back to 1,9';~ in I 982 and 1,6% in 
1983. Net borrowing after deduction of net interest payments 
is being reduced this year in all the Member States except 
Luxembourg, while the net lending of generally government 
in the United Kingdom is dropping slightly. 
Debt interest charges depend directly on the size and 
development of budget deficits and on interest rates. The size 
of deficits explains the importance of interest payments as a 
percentage of GDP and, c:specially, the regular increase 
Belgium, Ireland and Italy have recorded since the beginning 
of the 1970s. The deterioration observable in 1980 and later 
years in all the Member States has been amplified by the 
slowdown in growth which has increased the burden or that 
debt contracted in a period of sustained growth. 
But the cost of debt service has also been increased since 1979 
by the general rise in interest rates. This increase, which took 
place -2ractically simultaneously with the acceleration of 
inflation and the slowdown in real activity, has very rapidly 
created an important additional charge in government 
budgets. This development has proceeded at a different pace 
in the various Member States: where the debt is principally 
longterm and its average maturity distant, the repercussions 
of the rise in rates come through more slowly. The same is 
true when the authorities issue indexed securities and when 
public debt is exclusively, or almost exclusively, held 
domestically and mainly on a fixed interest rate basis. By 
contrast, those Member States with a substantial external 
debt have very rapidly felt the impact of the rise in interest 
rates, partly because the increase in rates began in the United 
States and was transmitted through the international capital 
markets, and partly because the greater part of loans raised 
in the international markets are at floating rates. Thus 
Belgium, Denmark, Greece and Ireland found themselves 
relatively more exposed than the other Member States. 
A period of stagflation like that experienced by the 
Community in 1980 and 1981 is also likely to engender an 
explosion of interest charges. First, the slowdown in activity 
increases budget deficits; second, the persistence of strong 
inflation expectations pushes up interest rates. Economic 
agents, aware of the loss in the real value of their financial 
wealth, take up new government securities only at substan-
tially increased yields. Tf actual inflation is higher than 
anticipated inflation, expectations deteriorate further and 
the placing of government securities becomes more difficult. 
Moreover, it can be seen that the influence of such 
expectations on market behaviour and thus on the increase in 
or maintenance of high interest rates has increased in recent 
years. The slowdown in inflation in the Community which 
began in 1982 was taken account ofby the markets only after 
a delay. As a result, the fall in yields was held up and at times 
caused real difficulties in some Member States in securing the 
take-up of public sector securities. 
GRAPH 5.1: Trend of general government net interest 
payments, as % of GDP, since 1970 
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GRAPH 5.2: Trend in general government net lending ( + ) or 
borrowing ( - ) less net interest payments, as % of GDP, since 
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Table 5.5 
Public debt, 1973-82 
1973 1974 1975 
B 3 64,2 59,8 60,9 
DK 4 -13,6 -10,1 
D 3 17,8 19,0 24,2 
GR I 19,5 20,3 22,4 
F' 16,9 16,4 17,1 
IRL 4 58,2 65,5 73,6 
I 2 46,1 45,3 53,5 
L 4 20,5 16,7 18,1 
NL 3 39,4 37,2 38,0 
UK 5 68,1 65,8 60,2 
EC 32.5 34.8 
Central government. 
Treasury (Settore statale). 
General government excluding social security funds. 
General government. 
Public sector. 
Source: National sources and Commission services. 
Public debt amounted to about 43,4% of GDP at the end of 
1982 for the Community as a whole. Differences of definition 
mean that levels of debt are not strictly comparable among 
Member States. For some countries the concept used covers 
only central government (France and Greece) or the 
Treasury (Italy). For others it covers general government 
excluding the social security funds (Belgium, Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands), for others still it 
covers general government (Denmark, Luxembourg and 
Ireland), while for the United Kingdom the concept used is 
that of the debt of the public sector including public 
corporations. Nonetheless, it can be observed that Belgium, 
Ireland and Italy have recorded a substantial level of public 
debt for several years past. The debt has been growing 
steadily as a proportion of GDP, by 1982 reaching 97,8% of 
GDP in Belgium, 102,5% in Ireland and 70,3% in Italy. The 
United Kingdom, which in 1973 had a large public debt, is 
the only Member State to have reduced the debt, as a 
proportion of GDP, over the period 1973-82. The public debt 
data assembled in the table are normally consolidated at the 
level of the public sector definition used, so that financial 
transactions between sub-sectors of general government are 
consolidated out. The concepts are therefore as close as 
possible to being in net terms with respect to financial 
transactions. Thus the public debt series for general 
government in Denmark and Luxembourg take into account 
the considerable financial assets held by the social security 
funds. However, the consolidation of financial assets and 
liabilities does not apply to the shares and physical asssets 
108 
(% of GDP) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
60,9 64,3 68,1 71,7 77,9 88,6 (97,8) 
-7,7 -5,0 -2,2 1,8 7,2 16,1 25,8 
26,0 27,5 28,9 29,7 31,6 35,3 38,3 
22,1 22,4 29,4 27,6 27,7 40,4 
16,0 15,9 16,6 16,5 16,6 16,8 (16,8) 
79,0 77,0 80,3 87,8 90,6 97,7 102,5 
52,0 54,7 62,3 62,6 60,7 64,4 70,3 
16,5 16,8 15,4 13,9 13,7 14,2 
37,2 36,9 38,1 40,8 43,9 48,5 (54,0) 
60,9 61,7 60,7 56,0 52,l 55,1 54,7 
34,4 34.3 35,9 35,8 36.5 41,2 (43,4) 
held by the public sector, so that the series are not net in terms 
of total assets. They therefore overestimate the net debt, as is 
shown by comparing these series with series for the net worth 
of general government, where the latter series exist. 
The published debt series are generally at nominal values, 
and any foreign-currency component is periodically revalued 
at market exchange-rates. This method of valuation, though 
appropriate for purposes of the financial management of the 
public sector accounts, is, however, not entirely satisfactory 
if one wishes to consider the actual value of the debt at a 
given moment as it appears to the creditors. From this point 
of view, valuing the debt at market prices is clearly more 
meaningful. The public debt series for Denmark used in 
Table 5.5 is at market values, but the series for the other 
Member States are all valued in the traditional manner. 
5.3 Some aspects of structural budget deficits 
A trend change in public debt as a proportion of GDP 
necessarily implies a corresponding change in the structure of 
the financial assets (or liabilities) of households, enterprises 
or the rest of the world. The development of the public debt is 
thus an essential element in any appreciation of the 
budgetary policy stance. A fall in the debt/GDP ratio may 
even be a target of medium-term financial strategy, for 
example to reduce interest charges in the government 
accounts and to increase the financial resources available for 
private investment. 
The statistical passage from the budget deficit on harmo-
nized definitions (i.e., net lending or borrowing of general 
government on a national accounts basis) as a percentage of 
GDP on the one hand to an estimate of the change in interest-
bearing net public debt as a proportion of GDP on the other 
hand involves several adjustments, as is shown in Table 5.7 
for the Community as a whole: 1 
(i) First, the cyclical situation has to be taken into account: 
in a recession, receipts increase at less than their trend 
rate and certain items of expenditure (particularly 
unemployment benefits) are temporarily swelled. 
(ii) Second, it is necessary, simply in accounting terms, to 
take into account the effect of the increase in the 
denominator (nominal GDP) on the ratio in question. 
Growth in nominal GDP reduces the public debt/GDP 
ratio either through an inflation-induced reduction in the 
real value of the debt or through growth in the volume of 
The argument of this section should in principle refer to a consolidated 
public sector defined to include the central bank as well as general 
government. Unfortunately, available data do not easily permit the 
construction of consolidated accounts for a sector thus defined. In 
consequence, the quantification which follows in this section should be 
regarded as a first outline within this approach. 
Table 5.6 
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GDP and thus in the capacity of the economy to support 
a given level of public debt. 
(iii) Third, the fact that a budget deficit is partly financed by 
the issue of fiduciary money has to be taken into account. 
Monetary financing via an increase in the monetary base 
constitutes-in the form of seignorage-an invisible 
receipt for the public authorities which permits them to 
cover part of their borrowing without issuing interest-
bearing public debt. 
(iv) Fourth, exchequer operations in most of the Member 
States involve a number of transactions 'below the line' 
of net lending or borrowing. These transactions consist 
of loans, advance and participations through which 
general government acquires real assets or financial 
claims on the private sector. Depending on the nature of 
these transactions (see below), it may be necessary to 
take them partly into account in calculating the 
structural deficit. 
(v) Finally, the accounting movement from the budget 
balance to public debt involves transactions which do 
not normally appear in the current accounts. The 
question concerns the revaluation of public debt arising 
from, for example, indexation or from the effect of 
exchange-rate movements on the domestic-currency 
value of debt issued in foreign currency. 
All the above adjustments give rise to methodological 
problems, whether statistical or conceptual. However, 
Components of change I in budget deficits, EC and Member States, 1981-84 
(% o/GDPJ 
Actual change Effect of change in Effect of change in Residual change 
activity net interest payments 
1981 1982 1983 2 1984 3 1981 1982 1983 2 1984 3 1981 1982 1983 2 1984 3 1981 1982 1983 2 1984 3 
8 -3,9 0,7 -0,3 1,1 -1,7 -0,1 -1,2 -0,4 -1,6 -1,4 -0,6 -1,0 -0,6 2,2 1,5 2,5 
DK -1,1 -2,1 0,3 1,0 - 1,3 0,5 0,0 -0,7 - 1,3 -0,7 -2,4 -0,5 1,5 -1,9 2,7 2,2 
D -0,4 0,4 0,2 1,2 -0,9 -1,7 -0,9 0,2 -0,3 -0,5 -0,4 -0,2 0,8 2,6 1,5 1,2 
GR -4,7 3,7 -0,1 0,0 -0,8 -1,0 -0,9 -0,2 -3,94 4,7 4 0,8 4 -0,24 
F -2,3 -0,9 -0,4 -0,2 -0,8 0,1 -0,8 -0,7 -0,4 0,1 -0,5 -0,5 -0,9 -1,1 0,9 1,0 
IRL -3,0 -0,4 2,8 1,6 -0,8 -0,7 -1,2 -0,4 0,1 -1,4 -0,6 -0,1 -2,3 1,7 4,6 2,1 
I -3,3 -0,2 0,0 1,9 -1,1 -1,5 -1,2 -0,5 -1,0 - 1,3 -0,7 -0,3 -1,2 2,6 1,9 2,7 
L -0,5 0,3 -0,9 0,6 -1,1 -1,0 -1,5 -0,8 0,5 -0,4 -0,3 -0,4 0,1 1,7 0,9 1,8 
NL - 1,8 -1,7 0,2 -0,4 - 1,5 -2,1 -0,3 -0,3 -0,2 -0,1 -0,8 -0,3 -0,1 0,5 1,3 0,2 
UK 0,6 0,8 -0,1 0,1 -2,1 -0,3 0,5 0,3 -0,1 0,3 0,1 0,1 2,8 0,8 -0,7 -0,2 
EC4 -1,7 0,0 -0,2 -0,7 -1,3 -0,7 -0,6 -0,1 -0,5 -0,3 -0,5 -0,3 0,1 1,0 1,0 1,1 
A plus s:ign indicates a reduction in general government borrowing requirement, a minus sign indicates an increase. 
Estimates. 
Forecasts. 
Including the effect of net interest payments. 
Source: Commission services. 
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despite these problems and the uncertainties which result 
from them, it seems indispensable to take them into account 
as far as possible, with a view to making a judgement on the 
medium-term prospects with respect to 'structural budgetary 
problems'. An illustration of these adjustments and of their 
order of magnitude is given below. 
The total impact of the loss of receipts and of additional 
cyclical expenditure caused by the recession in 1981, 1982 
and 1983 is put in Table 5.6 at 2,6% for the Community as a 
whole. Of this, 1,3 points may be attributable to the decline in 
activity in 1981 following the second oil-price shock, while 
1,3 points may be attributable to the weakness of activity in 
1982 and 1983. A partial correction taking account only of 
the impact of the weakness in activity in 1982 and 1983 would 
thus reduce the net borrowing of general government from 
5,4% of GDP to 4, I%, while a correction also incorporating 
the effect of the decline in activity in 1981 would bring the 
deficit down to 2,8% of GDP (see Table 5.7). 
Since public debt at the beginning of 1983 was 43,4% of GDP 
and the rate of growth of nominal GDP in 1983 is put at 
6,9%, the budget deficit compatible with an unchanged debt/ 
GDP ratio can be estimated at 3,0~/~ (0,434 x 0,069). These 
figures for the EC as a whole mask, however, very divergent 
situations for the Member States. The budget deficit 
compatible with a constant debt/GDP ratio ranges from 
around 1,5% of GDP in Germany and France to around 101~ 
for Greece, Ireland and Italy. 
The change in the monetary base constitutes a source of 
implicit revenue to the government, through nominal 
monetary financing. Including only notes in circulation (for 
which statistical problems are relatively unimportant), the 
monetary base amounts to approximately 6~>:; of GDP on 
a verge for the Community. Nominal GDP growth of 6,9% 
should thus entail a rise in the monetary base equivalent to 
about 0,4'.;~ of GDP, showing that it should be considered as 
a source of budget financing on a par with tax receipts. 
The above analysis of the budget balance is founded on the 
notion of the 'net borrowing of general goverment', which 
represents the financial saving of this sector in the framework 
of harmonized national accounts. This budget balance 
concept includes only fixed investment and capital transfers 
by general government and not capital transactions involv-
ing the acquisition of financial assets, such as loans, advances 
and participations. But to some extent these transactions 
involve rescue operations comparable to capital transfers 
with no genuine counterpart in the form of finar!cial assets 
bringing an assured return. In other cases, by contrast, they 
involve loans (housing loans, for example) traditionally 
financed through the public sector, or the acquisition of real 
assets in the enterprise sector in pursuit of a particular 
industrial policy or of the enlargement of the public sector. In 
some cases (denationalization), the balance of these 
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transactions can become positive, thus allowing the Treasury 
to cover a part of its borrowing needs by the sale of real 
assets. The relative importance of this category of transac-
tions varies considerably from one Member State to another, 
often as a result of institutional differences in financial 
circuits. There is a high level in Belgium (2,41~ of GDP in 
1983), Italy (3,5%), Luxembourg (3,8~,:;), the Netherlands 
(2,0~lo) and the United Kingdom (1,0;~) but in Germany and 
Ireland the level is close to zero (data are not available for 
Denmark, Greece and France). 
Besides the financing of the acquisition of real or financial as-
sets by the public sector, the level of public debt can be 
affected by adjustments of principal through, for example, 
indexation or a change in the domestic-currency value of 
debt denominated in foreign currency. Finally, there may be 
a statistical difference between the net borrowing require-
ment of the public sector on the one hand and the change in 
public debt on the other if the central government borrows 
foreign currency abroad in order to supplement the central 
bank's foreign exchange reserves. The gross monetary debt 
of the central government increases by the amount of the 
loan, but the net debt of the public sector (including the 
Table 5.7 
Illustrative features of the structural budget balance, 
EC total, (1983) 
Net lending or borrowing of general 
government 
Correction for effect of cyclical fluctu-
ations 
Effect of nominal GDP growth on public 
debt/GDP ratio 
Change in monetary base (normal 
monetary financing) 
Loans, advances and participations 
Trend development of public debt as% of 
GDP 
JI 
-5.4 
2,6 
3,0 
0,4 
/% o(GDP) 
II 2 111 J 
- 5.4 -5.4 
1,3 I ,3 
3,0 3,0 
0,4 0.4 
-0,5 -1,0 
6 = -- ( 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5) -0,6 + 1,2 + 1,7 
Optimistic assumption about cyclical correction; no correction for loans. advances 
and participations. 
Cautious assumption about cyclical correction; some correction for loans, advances 
and participations. 
Cautious assumption about cyclical co1 r,:~tion; larger correction for loans, advances 
and participations. 
Source: Estimates of Commission services. 
Note: Sec text for methodology. 
central bank) is unaffected. The impact of these revaluation 
factors is not known directly. 
On balance, a relatively cautious interpretati.on of the 
estimates in Table 5.7 seems to show that after two years of 
major effortS' to compress expenditure (excluding interest 
payments), the Community may have been able to achieve a 
significant improvement in its underlying financial position; 
this is also shown by the reduction in net borrowing, 
Budgetary policy 
excluding net interest payments, since 1981. On the 
assumption of a medium-term growth rate higher than 2% 
(from 1983 onwards), public debt (net of financial assets 
acquired through loan transactions) could rapidly stabilize 
as a proportion of GDP. However, within this overall 
situation, in a number of Member States it would be possible 
for the debt/GDP ratio to be kept constant only through a 
high rate of inflation implying a corresponding erosion of the 
real value of the debt. In these cases, the aim of economic 
policy should remain that of a parallel reduction in inflation 
and the budget deficit. 
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Main budgetary policy measures in Member States 
affecting the financial years 1983 and 1984 
In Belgium, the draft central government budget for 1983 was 
tabled in parliament on 8 October 1982. Revenue was estimated 
at BFR I 278 200 million compared with BFR I 158 800 million 
in 1982, and authorized expenditure, excluding special funds 
financed under the budget, was set at BFR I 701 300 million 
compared with BFR I 597 700 million in 1982. The Treasury's 
net borrowing requirement was put at BFR 443 OOO million. On 
29 Octoher, the government adopted a series of tax measures, in 
particular a change in the method of calculating the taxable 
income of households with only one source of earned income, 
and the introduction of a new intermediate VAT rate of 19% for 
most goods and services previously taxed at 17% whilst other 
goods and services were taxed more heavily. This last measure 
was expected to bring in additional revenue amounting to BFR 
15 OOO million in a full year. In March 1983, the government 
noted that, on the basis of recent developments, the budget 
deficit would overshoot the original estimate by BFR 52 400 
million. In order to mop up this sum, the authorities decided on 
12 March to reduce expenditure by BFR 39 400 million, 
principally by deferring payment of the end-of-year bonus to 
public servants, and to increase revenue by raising social security 
contributions, by introducing measures to discourage house-
holds with a net annual income of BFR 750 OOO francs from 
combining unemployment benefit or income, and by increasing 
excise duty on certain oil products. On 22 June, the government 
decided to extend the reduced VAT rate of 6% on construction 
until the end of 1985, in order to boost this sector. According to 
the Commission, the net borrowing requirement of general 
government could amount to 14,6% of GDP in 1983, compared 
with 14,8% in 1982. The main features of the preliminary draft 
budget for 1984 were presented at the beginning of August. On 
30 September the government confirmed the measures announ-
ced and on 3 October it tabled its draft budget for 1984. A 
number of economies, notably in the public service, were 
envisaged, as well as an increase in the withholding tax on 
interest and in social security contributions (part of which was to 
take effect on I October 1983). The increase in current receipts 
(in comparison with the revised 1983 budget) was put at 8% for 
1984 and that in expenditure at 5,5%. The net borrowing 
requirement, on a cash basis, is put at BFR 507 400 million in 
1984 (11,3% of GDP), against BFR 530 900 million (12, 7%) in 
1983. 
In Denmark, the draft budget for 1983 prepared by the previous 
government in August 1982 provided for a deficit on current 
account, capital account and central government lending of 
DKR 80 200 million, or 15,4% of GDP. The new government 
presented its economic policy programme to parliament on 5 
October. It provided for a wage freeze until I March 1983, a 
suspension of the index-linking of remuneration until January 
1985 and a reduction in certain social transfer payments and 
subsidies. These measures. which parliament adopted with a few 
changes, make for an estimated deficit on current account, 
investment and lending of DKR 68 900 million in 1983 ( 13,4~;., of 
GDP). Bearing in mind the expected increase in 1983 of the 
public debt interest burden, the deficit, excluding those interest 
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payments, is likely to be smaller than in 1982. In the first half of 
1983, the Minister of Finance estimated that the deficit could be 
brought down to DKR 64 400 million (12,7% of GDP) through 
slower rises in prices and unemployment, lower interest rates and 
increased tax receipts. On Commission estimates, the net public 
sector borrowing requirement could amount to 10,3°1., of GDP in 
1983, compared with 12,3% in 1982. In mid-August the 
government presented its draft budget for 1984. This reduced the 
target for the 1984 current deficit to DKR 59 300 million ( I 0,9~~ 
of GDP, against 12,4% in 1983). Expenditure was to rise by I, 7°~ 
because of major budget cuts, and receipts were to rise by 8,5'.'~. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the new government 
presented its draft budget for 1983 on 27 October 1982. Total 
federal government expenditure was put at DM 253 400 million 
and the deficit at DM 41 500 million. The budget adopted by 
parliament in mid-December fixed expenditure at DM 253 200 
million and the deficit at DM 40 900 million, and provided for 
certain cutbacks, particularly in the area of social expenditure, 
and measures to encourage investment. It was also decided to 
raise the VAT rate by one point with effect from I July 1983. 
Budget expenditure in 1983 was set to rise by 2,9% over 1982 and 
the increase in revenue was projected at 3%, while the federal 
government deficit was planned to stand at 2,5% of GDP, as in 
1982. In March 1983, the government agreed on a four-year 
budget programme covering the years 1984 to 1987. Under this 
programme, the federal government deficit should be kept below 
DM 40 OOO million in 1984 through budget cutbacks amounting 
to DM 6 500 million. The measures adopted by the government 
in May set limits on the annual rate of increase in public 
expenditure of 2~;.; in 1984 and 3% in the following years until 
1987, aim at a federal government deficit ofDM 39 OOO million in 
1984 and its gradual reduction to DM25 OOO million in 1987, cut 
expenditure, essentially in public consumption and social 
transfer payments, and reduce the tax burden on companies. On 
29 June, the Government adopted its draft budget for 1984. 
Expenditure was set at DM 257 800 million, representing an 
increase of 1,8% compared with 1983, and the federal 
government deficit was estimated at DM 37 340 million. Budget 
savings mainly concerned transfers to households and public 
consumption. The net general government borrowing require-
ment was forecast by the Commission at 3,3% of GDP in 1983 
compared with 3,5% in 1982. In September, a quantified plan for 
the federal government budget up to 1987 was presented. It 
envisaged a steady reduction in the deficit from DM 40 900 
million in 1983 to DM 22 500 million in 1987. 
In Greece the draft government budget for 1983 was presented to 
parliament on 29 November 1982. Revenue was set to rise by 
34,3% and expenditure by 29,5%, with a deficit of DR 288 400 
million (9,4% of GDP) compared with DR 247 100 million in 
1982 (9,9~{ of GDP). It was decided to slash current expenditure 
and concentrate resources on public investment, which is to 
increase by 47,7%. Under the medium-term plan (1983-87) which 
was presented to parliament in draft form on 5 June 1983, the 
budgetary conditions for its success involved a reduction in the 
public sector borrowing requirement (in cash terms and 
including public enterprises) to 16% of GDP in 1983 (compared 
with 17% in 1981) and to 15% in 1984. Tax equity measures were 
also planned. Commission estimates made in October, put 
general net borrowing at 6,3% of GDP in 1983 as against 6,4% in 
1982. 
In France, the 1983 draft budget was passed by parliament in 
November 1982. The key macroeconomic assumptions on which 
it was based were GDP growth of 11, I~~ in nominal terms and of 
2% in real terms. Expenditure and revenue were forecast to rise 
by 11,8i~ and 10% respectively, i.e. much lower rates than in 
1982. The central government deficit was put at FF 117 OOO 
million and, as a result, remained within the limit of 3% of GDP 
set by the authorities. The intention was twofold: to impose a 
tight squeeze on current expenditure and to reinforce measures 
to promote research, industrial development, employment and 
low-cost housing. In addition, cuts in expenditure on unemploy-
ment benefits (FF 12 OOO million) and on social security benefits 
were decided on by the government in late November and early 
December. On 25 March, the government unveiled a package of 
measures to back up the 21 March devaluation of the French 
franc. Savings were to be made in the central government budget 
(FF 15 OOO million), in the social security budget (FF 4 OOO 
million) and in the budget for public enterprises (FF 11 OOO 
million), to be achieved in part through increases in public service 
charges. An exceptional, I% levy on incomes and a compulsory 
loan corresponding to I 0% of the amount of income tax paid in 
1981 were introduced and the taxation of oil products raised. In 
autumn, the Commission estimated that the general government 
net borrowing requirement could be equal to 3, I 1~ of GDP in 
1983, as against 2,4% in 1982. On 14 September the Council of 
Ministers adopted the draft budget for 1984. It limited the rise in 
central government expenditure to 6,3% and also estimated the 
increase irt receipts as 6,3%. The budget deficit target was FF 
125 OOO million, 3% of GDP. A shift in expenditure towards the 
areas given priority in the Ninth Plan (industry, research, 
employment, education) was implemented. The exceptional I;~ 
income tax was reimposed for 1984, a progressive surtax was 
introduced, and social security contributions were increased by 
one point. 
In Ireland, the 1983 budget was presented to parliament on 
9 February. The prime objective in the budget was to reduce the 
current budget deficit and the Exchequer Borrowing Require-
ment to 6,5% (IRL 897 million) and 12,5~;.; (IRL I 722 million) of 
GDP respectively in 1983, compared with the figures of 8% and 
I 6i~ recorded in 1982. To this end, it was decided to hold current 
expenditure steady in volume terms and to reduce capital 
expenditure slightly in real terms. Indirect taxes were raised, the 
measures including increases in the 18% and 30% VAT rates to 
23% and 35% respectively, and no indexation of direct tax scales 
was allowed. In July the government, in the face of upward 
pressures on the planned level of expenditure, announced cuts of 
some IRL 50 million in current expenditure and IRL 20 million 
in capital expenditure. Excise duties were also raised. As a result, 
the current deficit for 1983 was put at around IRL 950 million 
and the Exchequer Borrowing Requirement at some IRL I 750 
million. Commission estimates, made in October, put general 
government net borrowing at 13,4% of GDP in 1983, compared 
with 16,2% in 1982. 
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In Italy, the 1983 budget tabled by the outgoing goverment in 
November 1982. provided for a Treasury deficit of some LIT 
70 OOO OOO million (13% of GDP). The draft finance law 
envisaged a number of tax measures and proposed spending cuts. 
At the end of 1982, the new government took the view that, if no 
action were taken, the underlying Treasury deficit for 1983 
would easily exceed the figure of LIT 70 OOO OOO million. For this 
reason, the government approved on 30 December 1982 and 
7 January 1983 a set of decree-laws and draft laws designed, on 
the one hand, to finance part of the previous budget under 
provisions laid down in the finance law and, on the other, to meet 
new expenditure or to compensate for cuts that could not be 
carried through. A package of tax increases, most of them of an 
exceptional nature, was adopted in this context. When the 
quarterly report on public-sector accounts for 1983 was 
presented to parliament on 9 March, the government reaffirmed 
its determination to hold the public-sector deficit below the 
target of LIT 71 OOO OOO million (13,3% of GDP, compared with 
14,9;~ in 1982). At the end of March, the finance law approved 
by Parliament fixed the Treasury deficit at LIT 75 890 OOO 
million. Since the budget plan set in motion at the beginning of 
1983 proved only partially successful in the first half of the year 
(reduction of LIT 15 OOO OOO million in the underlying deficit as 
against one of LIT 30 OOO OOO million projected in January), the 
underlying budget deficit was, at the end of June, put at LIT 
86 300 OOO million. The government formed in September 1983, 
following the June elections, set out its 1984 budgetary policy on 
30 September. It decided to take a series of tax and expenditure-
cutting measures, amounting to some LIT 50 OOO OOO million, in 
order to limit the public sector deficit to LIT 90 OOO OOO million, 
or 15~1~ of GDP. To bring this programme into effect, the 
government passed a number of decree-laws and submitted the 
finance law. All of these measures were intended to be 
subsequently ratified by the parliament. This package of 
measures inolved receipts of I .IT 23 OOO OOO million and 
expenditure economies of LIT 21 OOO OOO million, including a 
fall of LIT 6 OOO OOO million in interest payments as a result of 
the reduction in the deficit trend and in the level of interest rates. 
"In addition to these economies, various public sector bodies were 
to transfer to the Treasury the sum of LIT 5 OOO OOO million from 
their bank deposits. 
In Luxembourg, the central government budget for 1983, 
incorporating minor changes from the draft budget drawn up in 
August 1982, was adopted by parliament on 15 December. 
Revenue totalled LFR 60 100 million and expenditure LFR 
60 OOO million, giving gross borrowing of LFR 493 million. In 
April, the government decided, as part of its restructuring plan 
for the steel industry, to grant financial assistance of LFR 11 500 
million spread over 1983 (LFR 7 500 million) and 1984 (LFR 
4 OOO million). In order to finance the plan, VAT rates and excise 
duties on tobacco and alcohol were increased, as were telephone 
charges and the solidarity tax. These measures, which took effect 
on I July, were expected to bring in LFR 4 500 million on an 
annual basis. In addition, the government intends to borrow 
LFR 2 OOO million in 1983 and LFR 2 OOO million in 1984. 
Accordingly, the Commission services estimated in October that 
the general government net borrowing requirement could rise 
from 2,2i~ of GDP in 1982 to 3,6% in 1983. The government on 
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1 August presented the draft 1984 budget: total expenditure is to 
be reduced by 1,5% while receipts (excluding borrowing) are to 
rise by 7,6%. The net borrowing requirement was estimated at 
LFR 1 200 million as against LFR 7 800 million in 1983. The 
gross budget balance is estimated to turn positive (LFR 
800 million as against a deficit of LFR 5 800 million in 1983). 
In the Netherlands, the outgoing government presented on 
21 September 1982 a draft budget for 1983 that was charac-
terized by only modest growth in exenditure as a result of 
retrenchment (amounting to HFL 12 100 million) in the social 
security and central government budgets. The general govern-
ment cash deficit for 1983 was put at I 0,8% of net national 
income. The new governing coalition of Christian Democrats 
and Liberals, which took office on 4 November, announced to 
parliament on 22 November the main thrust of its economic 
policy. For 1983, the general government net cash borrowing 
requirement indicated in the draft September budget, and now 
put at 11,9'.\ of net national income was maintained but the 
planned increases in taxation (HFL 1 600 million) were 
jettisoned and expenditure cuts announced instead. It was also 
decided that, after 1983, the deficit would be reduced each year 
by an amount equivalent to· 1,5% of net national income, 
bringing it down to 7,5% by 1986. In April, the updated budget 
notified by the government to parliament showed a deterioration 
in the net budgetary position of HFL 3 500 million, of which 
HFL 3 OOO million was due to additional expenditure. The 
government proposed expenditure cuts totalling HFL 2 OOO 
million (housing, national education, public servants, holiday 
bonus), increases in certain taxes, including petrol tax, and in 
social security contributions as well as reductions in social 
security benefits. Overall, it was estimated that the deficit would 
show a further increase equivalent to some 0,51~ of net national 
income. The revised budget was adopted by parliament in June. 
In preparation for the 1984 budget, the government decided in 
July to bring in a programme to reform public finances, the 
changes amounting to HFL 11 OOO million, with most of the 
proposed measures to take effect on I January 1984. The key 
points in the programme were savings in departmental 
expenditure, the wage and salary bill, public health spending, 
social security benefits and holiday bonuses payable in the event 
of sickness. The draft budget for 1984 was tabled on 20 Sep-
tember. According to it the net cash borrowing requirement for 
the public administration would be reduced from 12,4% of net 
national income in 1983 to 12, I% in 1984. With a view to limiting 
the growth of expenditure, the government proposed budgetary 
savings of HFL 11 700 million (of which 10 600 million with 
effect in 1984), in the fields of wages and salaries, social security, 
health and the spending of other ministerial departments. In the 
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field of receipts the proposal envisages a lightening of taxes and 
social premiums on firms amounting to HFL 2 OOO million, and 
an increase in other taxes (HFL 3 OOO million in 1984) including 
an increase of 1 point in both the reduced and the normal rate of 
VAT. 
In the United Kingdom, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
announced on 8 November 1982 a number of measures and a 
revised public expenditure programme for 1983-84. The main 
points were a further reduction in the National Insurance 
Surcharge in 1983, to 1,5%, and increases in employers' and 
employees' social security contributions in April 1983. The 
revised level of planned public expenditure for 1983-84 was put at 
UKL 120 100 million, slightly lower than the figure announced 
in March 1982, and the public sector borrowing requirement for 
1983-84 was, allowing for the introduction of further tax 
concessions or a UKL I OOO million increase in expenditure, 
estimated at UKL 8 OOO million, or 2,75% of GDP. On 
I February 1983, the government published the White Paper 
'The Government's Expenditure Plans 1983-84 to 1985-86', 
giving revised estimates of its public exenditure for the financial 
year 1982-83 and plans for the next three years. For 1983-84, 
expenditure was planned to increase by 5,8% over the previous 
financial year, its level in real terms remaining virtually 
unchanged. On 15 March, the government presented its budget 
for 1983-84, along with a revised version of the medium-term 
financial strategy. The budget provided for a rise in expenditure 
in line with that indicated in the White Paper (5,8%), increases in 
personal tax allowances running ahead of the rate of inflation, a 
reduction in taxation of North Sea oil production, increases in 
excise duties and a further reduction in the National Insurance 
Surcharge. The public sector borrowing requirement remained 
unchanged at UKL 8 OOO million (2,75~;. of GDP). The medium-
term financial strategy set a target range for monetary growth in 
1983-84 of 7%-11 % for a range of aggregates and fixed the public 
sector borrowing requirement at UKL 8 OOO million (2,5% of 
GDP) for 1984-85 and at UKL 7 OOO million for 1985-86. It 
·became apparent in April that the budget deficit of UKL 9 200 
million in 1982-83 was running substantially higher than had 
been estimated in the March budget (UKL 7 500 million). As a 
result, a relatively more restrictive bias was imparted to 
budgetary policy for 1983-84. On 7 July, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer announced a package of measures aimed at reducing 
the borrowing requirement for the current financial year by 
UKL I 100 million in order to keep it on the course mapped out 
in March. The measures included spending cuts of UKL 
500 million, the sale of public assets worth UKL 500 million and 
the postponement of capital expenditure totalling UKL I 00 mil-
li01~ to the next financial year. 
6. Monetary policy and the European Monetary System 
The international environment was characterized in the second half of 1982 by a marked 
relaxation of monetary policy in the USA, but in 1983 the unprecedented US federal 
budget deficit has led to a renewed tightening of conditions. The US dollar showed a rise 
against the ECU over the year to August 1983; the yen has been less strong than the US 
dollar since interest rates in Japan have not been high enough to prevent capital outflows. 
The international monetary system has been overshadowed by grave problems, but has 
been shored up at least temporarily by an increase in the resources of the /MF, and the 
development of the discussion on intervention. Within the EMS the realignment of 
14 June 1982 was followed rather quickly by a relaxation of interest rates; however, 
currencies remained under strain. After a new realignment ( 21 March 1983) the system 
has, however, shown greater signs of stability. The EMS has contributed to nominal 
exchange rate stability within the Community during a period of turbulence, and has 
worked against the over-shooting of real exchange rates. It has also promoted 
progressively convergence on low rates of inflation. The general stance of monetary policy 
within the Community as expressed,for example, by the growth of the real money supply, 
is now consistent with economic recovery, although pressures on interest rates originating 
in the USA may be a restraining factor; there remains a need to hold back public sector 
borrowing and credit expansion in some member countries. 
6.1. The international context 
The broad international environment within which Com-
munity monetary policies have to take their place.has been 
characterized by a succession of important changes during 
the period under review. From July 1982 onwards the 
meetings of the Open Market Committee of the US Federal 
Reserve System began to signal a shift in the stance of US 
monetary policy. Innovation by US financial institutions 
following the lifting of certain regulatory constraints made 
the interpretation of the monetary data, particularly that 
relating to MI, difficult, but the Open Market Committee 
was also influenced to some extent by a deterioration in 
business sentiment, by the rising number of bankruptcies and 
by a general perception of an increased demand for liquidity. 
The outcome was that over the year ending in the fourth 
quarter of.1982, M2 grew by 9,3% in the US (just above the 
upper limit of its target range), and thus considerably more 
rapidly than did nominal GDP, whereas in the previous year 
the reverse had been the case. In parallel with this process 
interest rates fell in New York and the 13-week Treasury bill 
yield was virtually halved between the middle of February 
1982 and a low of just over 7% in the second half of 
September; and the USD was temporarily weak on the 
exchanges. 
Since the turn of the year, however, the emergence of an 
unprecedented federal budget deficit, which virtually 
doubled in one year to reach 6,5% of GDP in the fiscal year 
ending in September 1983, has prevented any further easing 
of monetary conditions in the USA and tended to put the 
process into reverse. M2 rose by an annualized 16% over the 
six months to May 1983 and a large part of that rise was 
accounted for by banks' acquisition of Treasury securities. 
Notwithstanding persistent difficulties of interpretation, the 
development could not be ignored by the Federal Reserve. 
The discount rate, which had been progressively cut by 
3,5 points in the second half of 1982 was held at 8,5% and 
official operations were conducted in a way which tended to 
push th~ 13-week Treasury bill yield towards 9,5%; the first 
rise in the prime rate for 18 months-to 11 }~-came in early 
August 1983. Whereas nominal interest rates thus remained 
much below earlier levels, the rapid deceleration of inflation 
meant that the improvement in real interest rates was much 
less; in July 1983 the long term government bond yield was 
8,5 points above the 12-month rise in consumer· prices, an 
unprecedented margin. The availability of high yields led, in 
a process which came to feed on itself, to renewed upward 
pressure on the exchange rate of the US dollar-see 
Graph 6.1. The Federal authorities persisted for a long time 
in their determination not to intervene on the foreign 
exchange market and the USD, having gained 21% against 
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GRAPH 6.1 : Movement of major currencies and the EMS I against the ECU 
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the ECU in 1981, rose a further 13% in the fi rst ha lf of last 
year ; although the process moderated in the second half of 
1982, the impact of the Federal government's b!:mowing 
requirement reignited the process. A particula rly sharp rise 
in the middle of August 1983 was countered by concerted 
intervention by the major authorities ( other than those of the 
UK), but even at the end of that month the USD/ ECU rate 
stood 12% above its levels ofa year previously. The rise of the 
USO has damaged the price competitiveness of US products 
and contributed to the record current account deficit of 1983. 
The Japanese yen rose more slowly in the period under 
review, gaining 5% against the ECU in the course of 1982. 
The relative performances of the yen and the USO are the 
more remarkable for the fact that Japan is running a balance 
of payments current account surplus. The weak ness of the 
yen against the USO is in fact explained by the very large net 
outflow of private capital from Japan last yea r, fo llowing the 
relaxation of exchange control in December 1980, and this in 
its turn suggests that interest rates in Japan may not be 
sufficiently high ; the discount rate has remained at 5,5% 
since the end of 1981 and the cost of bank loans in Japan 
came down about half a point during 1982. to abo ut 7%, 
whereas the US prime rate came down only to 10,5% in 
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February 1983. The public sector borrowing requirement 1 in 
Japan was below 3% of GNP in 1973 but subsequently rose 
sharply and was equa l to 7, 1% of GNP in 1982. M2 2 rose by 
7,9% in Japan in 1982, while M3, 2 which is particula rly 
influenced by public s~cto r borrowing, rose by 9,2%. Both 
these rates of monetary expansion were well above the rate of 
growth of nominal GNP. Although the liquidity ratio has 
shown a long-run upward trend in Japan these figures 
nevertheless suggest that interest rates may not have been 
high enough in that country to prevent an inappropriate 
degree of monetary financing of the public sector. 
The international monetary system has been overshadowed 
for. the past year by the problems of certain highly-indebted 
countries . A number of measures have however been taken to 
strengthen it, mainly by way of increasing the resources 
available to assist the adjustment process. The Community 
played its full part in the rapid and timely procedure by 
which the Interim Committee of the International Monetary 
Fund acted to bring forward the eighth quota increase of the 
Conso lidated fina ncia l defici l of central go vernment . local autho rities and 
public corporations. 
Including cert ificates of deposit. 
Fund and agreed to raise quotas by approximately 47%, in 
parallel with a substantial extension of both the resources 
and the role of the General Arrangements to Borrow. The 
IMF should be enabled to continue the conditional lending 
which helps to maintain confidence generally and acts as a 
catalyst to promote important private capital flows. 
In pursuance of their commitment to promote a stable 
system of exchange rates as developed in the Joint Statement 
on Monetary Undertakings made at the Versailles Summit in 
June 1982, the eight summit participants have jointly 
reviewed the role of official intervention in the foreign 
exchange markets, drawing on the report of their working 
group. There is now general agreement that intervention can 
be useful not only to counter disorderly market conditions 
but also to reduce short-term volatility; and that interven-
tion is more likely to be effective ifit is not sterilized (see box). 
It might also be argued from recent experience that exchange 
rates can diverge over long periods from the path that would 
be indicated by economic fundamentals; on the other hand, 
intervention cannot resolve the problems which arise when a 
country's domestic policies are inconsistent with its exchange 
rate objectives. The participants at the Williamsburg Summit 
at the end of May renewed their commitment to a 
consultation process 'to promote convergence of economic 
performance in our countries and greater stability of 
exchange rates' and declared their willingness 'to undertake 
coordinated intervention in exchange markets in instances 
where it is agreed that such intervention would be helpful'. 
The 'Group of Ten' in September 1983 decided to follow up 
this work with a study by the Deputies of the group of ways 
to improve the functioning of the international monetary 
system. 
Table 6.1 
Changes in EMS exchange rates 
Monetary policy and the European Monetary System 
6.2 Developments in EMS countries in the 
second half of 1982 
The easing of monetary conditions in the USA after the 
middle of 1982 was paralleled to some extent in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, although interest rates in the 
Community have generally followed a smoother course than 
have US rates. On I July 1982 the Deutsche Bundesbank 
reaffirmed, in view of the improved balance of payments 
position, its intention of keeping the growth of the central 
bank money stock in the upper half of its target range. This 
policy was supported by cuts in the discount rate in August, 
October and December totalling two and a half points, and 
by a one-tenth cut in reserve ratios taking effect on 
I October. In the outturn the target variable rose over 6% 
over the 1982 target period, a considerable acceleration from 
3,5% in 1981-see Graph 6.5. In December it was decided to 
continue with a target range of 4-7% in 1983. The French 
authorities had buttressed the realignment of their currency 
on 12 June 1982 by a five-month wages and prices freeze and 
by de-indexing arrangements which could subsequently link 
pay to targeted and not actual price increases; and by other 
measures including action designed to keep the general 
government borrowing requirement to 3% of GDP. The way 
thus seemed open for Paris money rates to fall and the 
intervention rate of the Bank of France was progressively cut 
by two and a half points in the second half of the year to stand 
at 12,75% at the year end, the process being supported by a 
cut in compulsory reserves on I July 1982 and 10 January 
1983 which had the effect of cutting these ratios by more than 
half (to 2,5% for sight deposits). In a broadly parallel policy 
the Belgian authorities, who had moved economic policy to a 
more rigorous stance in the early months of 1982, 
Realignment I of central rates (%) Cumulative 
change 
Dates of rcalignr.icnts in central 
rates to 
24 September 30 November 23 March 5 October 22 February 14 June 21 March 21.3.83 
1979 1979 1981 I ~81 1982 1982 1983 
BFR/LFR 0 +5 0 0 -8,5 0 + 1,5 -11,06 
DKR -2,9 0 0 0 -3 0 +2,5 -11,91 
DM +2 +5 0 +5,5 0 +4,25 +5,5 + 13,34 
FF 0 +5 0 -3 0 -5,75 -2,5 -14,64 
IRL 0 +5 0 0 0 0 -3,5 -7,59 
LIT 0 +5 -6 -3 0 -2,75 -2,5 -17,21 
HFL 0 +5 0 +5,5 0 +4,25 +3,5 +9,01 
A new notional central rate was attributed to the pound sterling on 17 May 1983 · sec p. 121 and Annex Table 42. 
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GRAPH 6.2: Bilateral spreads in the EMS 
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progressively reduced their discount rate from 14% at the 
beginning of July to 11 ,5% on 13 November. 
The Italian authorities signalled, by a one point cut in their 
discount rate in late August, a willingness to see a fall in 
interest rates but the public finances deteriorated in the 
second half of 1982 and prevented such an outcome. In order 
to regain control over bank liquidity- which had been 
boosted by treasury operations- and in response to events in 
the foreign exchange market, the Banca d' Italia had to push 
up market interest rates in November and eventually raised 
marginal reserve requirements on the banks from 20 to 25% 
at the year end. The Government experienced increasing 
difficulty in placing Treasury bills throughout the autumn 
and took credit from the Banca d'Italia in an amount which 
.eventually required special approval from parliament. In the 
outcome total domestic credit grew by 20,8% in 1982 (and 
thus considerably faster than GDP), whereas the target had 
been for 15,5% ; the over-run was entirely due to credit taken 
by the State sector which amounted to LIT 67 900 OOO 
million instead of a planned LIT 43 OOO OOO million . The 
target for total domestic credit in 1983 is 18,2% and thus 
rather less ambitious than that set for 1982. Until the middle 
of October 1982 the Italian authorities were able to keep their 
currency above the narrow band which constrains other 
EMS currencies ; over the next six weeks severe pressures in 
Monetary policy and the European Monetary System 
the foreign exchange market were countered by substantial 
intervention- the official reserves fell by LIT 4 500 OOO 
million in two months- but the lira nevertheless fell 
temporarily to the middle of the system, subsequently rising 
above the narrow band towards the end of the year. 
6.3 The realignment of 21 March 1983 and its 
aftermath 
In the early weeks of 1983 the Belgian franc and the Irish 
pound remained under pressure close to the bottom of the 
system. The Belgian authorities, indeed, had recourse in 
February to the very-short-term financing facility for the 
third successive month ; the relative success of their strategy 
was, however, shown by the discount of their currency on the 
non-regulated market, which opened briefly to 7% in the 
middle of January, but was quickly reduced to 3,5%. The 
Irish pound was stronger after the introduction of a budget 
on 9 February which aimed to reduce the Exchequer deficit 
by about three points to some 12,5% of GDP and implied a 
reduction of the public sector borrowing requirement to 17% 
of GDP. The accompanying sharp fall in private consump-
tion and investment led the authorities to reduce the credit 
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expansion target-for bank lending to persons and corpor-
ations-from 14% in 1982 to 11% in 1983. 
These were in fact the weeks in which it became clear that 
conditions across the Atlantic would not permit a further 
reduction of interest rates generally, although the Deutsche 
Bundesbank showed its flexibility by raising rediscount 
quotas at the beginning of February and the Dutch 
authorities also acted to ease strains in the EMS by a half 
point discount rate cut at the beginning of March. Pressure 
nevertheless built up relentlessly on the French franc, 
reflecting both the need to finance a substantial current 
account deficit (USD 4 OOO million in the first quarter) and 
private capital flows. The French authorities made intra-
marginal interventions, in both US dollars and EMS 
currencies, which became heavy in February. Their strategy 
was to keep their currency glued to the DM, and in this they 
were successful until the beginning of March, reinforcing 
their action in that month by a renewed squeeze on the Euro-
FF market, where rates for short-term money rose to 300~1,, 
per annum at one point. After the federal German elections 
of 6 March, however, the strains within the EMS became 
more severe. The French franc and the Italian lira had fallen 
substantially-the latter passing below the narrow EMS 
band-while the Belgo-Luxembourg authorities protected 
their position by a tightening of exchange control and a two 
and a half point rise in the Belgian discount rate. Finally, at 
the completion of the municipal election process in France, 
the Council Presidency called a meeting to consider the 
situation in the foreign exchange markets and this led to the 
ECU-parity changes announced on Monday 21 March (see 
Table 6.1). 
In terms of trade-weighted changes within the EMS, the 
central rate adjustment was equivalent to a significant 
change for the German mark ( + 5,7%) on the one side and 
for the French franc ( - 4,4%), the lira ( - 4,3%) and the Irish 
pound ( - 5,0%) on the other; the change was less pro-
nounced for the other currencies. Effective exchange rates 
based on a wider group of currencies and on market 
developments give a slightly different impression because the 
inclusion of third currencies, including a strong dollar, in the 
comparison dampens the effect of intra-EMS changes and 
because Italy and Ireland in particular were able to hold a 
higher position within their respective bands after the 
realignments than in the weeks preceding it. Between the end 
of February and the end of March the effective exchange 
rates against 19 partners of the French franc, the Irish pound 
and the Italian lira fell (- 4,0%, - 3,0% and - 1,3% 
respectively), while those of the German mark, the Danish 
krone and the Belgian franc rose ( + 2,2%, + I ,8% and 
+ 1,3% respectively), that of the Dutch guilder remaining 
virtually unchanged. 
The origins of the weakness of the French franc are complex: 
France's large external trade deficit (USD 14 200 million in 
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I 982) is partly due to the strong growth of domestic demand 
while major partners have fallen into recession; but it is also 
partly attributable to the continuance of high rates of 
inflation in France. The pressures on the franc came not only 
from the current account but also from private capital 
outflows, and these in turn were related to very rapid 
domestic credit expansion in I 982, supported to a significant 
degree by external borrowing undertaken by the banking 
sector. On March 25, the French Government introduced a 
comprehensive set of measures designed to correct the 
situation and make a success of the realignment. With the 
declared intention of halving the external trade deficit by the 
end of 1983 and eliminating it by the end of I 984, and in 
order to respect a target for the budget deficit equal to 3% of 
GDP, extended to both years, internal demand was cut by an 
amount equal to 2~:, of GDP, principally by tax and public 
expenditure changes. In line with a more modest expectation 
of GDP growth, the money supply target for 1983 was 
reduced by one point to 9%. In comparison with both the 
target (12,5-13,5;~) and the outcome (I 1,5~;;) in 1982 this 
represents a considerably stricter stance, the more so since 
the improvement in the balance of payments will put upward 
pressure on the money supply, so that the deceleration of 
domestic credit will be even more notable than that of the 
money supply. The authorities have in fact reduced the 
indices limiting the growth of credit substantially below 
those applied in 1982. The French Government's measures 
were completed by a request for a Community loan of 4 OOO 
million ECU for balance of payments financing, which was 
agreed to by the Council of Ministers on 16 May. 
The EMS was helped to re-find its cohesion by a one-point 
cut in the German re-discount rate (which was in fact 
announced just before the realignment). In the middle 
summer of 1983, indeed, it seemed that the measures of the 
spring had been successful. Very little of the leeway opened 
by the realignment had been used. The French franc 
remained close to its upper limit against the German mark 
until the end of June, when it was replaced at the top of the 
system by the Irish pound. The Italian authorities were able 
to cut their discount rate one point in April and kept their 
currency well above the narrow EMS band throughout the 
Italian electoral campaign; the lira was even held briefly 
above its upper divergence threshold during the difficult 
period of government formation, with the help of favourable 
seasonal factors. Over the two months following the 
realignment official discount rates were cut by four and a half 
points in Belgium and by two and a half points in Denmark 
to 9,5% and 7,5% respectively and both countries were able 
to make relaxations in their exchange controls. The solidity 
of the EMS was reinforced by substantial intervention in the 
reverse direction to that which characterized the earlier 
period. By the end of June, Belgium had fully cleared its 
indebtedness under the very-short-term financing facility, 
while being able to cut its discount rate by a further half 
point, and both Italy and France were purchasing foreign 
exchange on a large scale. The reversal of the flow of 
speculative funds was, indeed, so strong that the Netherlands 
had to raise its discount rate by one point early in May and by 
a further half point, to 5~1~, in September 1983. The Italian 
authorities felt sufficiently sure of their position to introduce 
a certain liberalization of their regulatory system by allowing 
their formal credit ceiling arrangements to lapse at the 
beginning of July 1983. As the summer progressed, however, 
it was by no means clear that the general relaxation would 
continue. Money market interest rates began to creep 
upwards in Frankfurt in May and the Deutsche Bundesbank 
had to assess the implications of the growth of its target 
variable; on the basis of quarterly averages this grew at an 
annual rate of 10,6% in the first quarter, partly for non-
recurring reasons, and even in the second quarter the 
annualized rate was 8,6~{. The first rise in official German 
rates since February 1981 came into effect on 9 September 
1983 with a rise of half a point in the Lombard rate. 
In the realignment of 21 March the notional ECU central 
rate of the UK pound was reduced by 11,02;~ on the basis of 
the preceding market exchange rate of that currency. On 
17 May 1983 a new notional central rate based on market 
exchange rates of 13 May was attributed to the UK pound, 
7,3~~ higher than that attributed on 21 March, and new ECU 
central rates for all EMS currencies were derived. The 
bilateral central rates and the upper and lower intervention 
limits between the currencies participating in the EMS 
exchange rate mechanism remained unchanged. 
6.4 The pound sterling and the drachma 
The pound sterling has remained outside the EMS exchange 
rate mechanism, while constituting an element in the ECU 
basket; as has been seen, this has raised practical difficulties, 
particularly for agro-monetary decisions. The Greek 
drachma is represented neither in the exchange rate 
mechanism nor in the ECU basket. Two themes have 
dominated the development of the monetary situation in the 
United Kingdom. First, at the centre of official concern has 
been the medium-term financial strategy (MTFS), based on a 
gradual reduction of the rate of monetary growth and of the 
public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR: a concept 
which includes the borrowing of State industries) as a 
percentage of GDP; but, secondly, the markets have 
produced a prolonged adjustment of the exchange rate. For 
most of 1982 bank lending to the private sector in the UK 
was expanding at an unprecedented rate, but the authorities 
did not counter this by a rise in interest rates; they chose 
instead to sell long-term government debt to the non-bank 
private sector in sufficient quantity to enable the public 
sector to make net repayments to the banking system. 
Technical measures were also taken to facilitate bond issues 
by private companies. 
Monetary policy and the European Monetary System 
The authorities were able to conduct these operations while 
encouraging a fall of four points in market interest rates over 
the first I O months of 1982 (to I 0,5% for bank loans to first 
class borrowers). They also advanced yet further in the 
liberalization of their regulatory system by abolishing 
controls on hire purchase finance on 27 July 1982. In 
November, however, pressure built up on sterling in the 
foreign exchange market, related to the dwindling of the UK 
current account surplus in the presence of continuing capital 
exports. The fall in the price of oil, reducing the relative 
weakness of other countries' current accounts, was also 
thought by some to be a factor. Interest rates were pushed up 
three-quarters of a point at the end of November and again, 
by the same amount, in January. By the end of March 
sterling had lost 14;0 in effective terms over five months and 
from some points of view this adjustment was welcome. A 
number of calculations show that the long rise of the pound 
sterling after 1976 and domestic inflation had left UK 
industry in 1981 with a severe cost disadvantage, but the 
exchange rate adjustment of September 1981 and 1982/83 
has, alongside the substantial drop in inflation I which has 
been a conspicuous achievement of recent UK policy, greatly 
reduced this problem-on the basis of GDP prices, the 
estimate of Commission staff is that UK price competitive-
ness in 1983 is ten points worse than that of 1970. 
The UK Government achieved its financial objectives in 
1981-82: the PSBR was a little below target at UKL 9 OOO 
million (3,3% of GDP), albeit somewhat bunched in the early 
months of 1983, and, for the first time since the introduction 
of the MTFS, the growth of the broadly-defined sterling 
money stock was, at 10,8%, within its target range. All the 
financial target variables are to be reduced slightly in 
nominal tern1s in 1983-84. In the middle of 1983 there were 
signs that a persistence of the bulge in PSBR and a fall-off in 
sales of government bonds would make attainment of the 
new money supply target difficult and put in question the 
durability of the one-and-a-half point fall in interest rates 
which started in March. The pound sterling, however, made 
a substantial recovery on the exchanges in the second 
quarter. 
Greece has continued with the long task of recovery from the 
inflationary burst of 1981, when M3 grew 34,7% over the 
year and consumer prices rose 24,5% in terms of annual 
averages. M3 is forecast to decelerate to 23'.i~ growth in 1983 
as the PSBR is reduced to 12% of GDP, having been 15,2%in 
1981. The implication is, however, that inflation will still be 
twice as high in Greece as in the Community as a whole and 
thus that the Greek economy remains very different from 
that of its partners. The Greek authorities succeeded in 
In terms of changes over 12 months, UK consumer price innation was 
21,9'.Y,, in May 1980 and 4,2~~ in July 1983. 
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keeping the ECU value of their currency stable for the 
greater part of last year, but became increasingly preoc-
cupied with their balance of payments position: while the 
current account benefited from increased net transfers from 
the Community and an officially arranged de-stocking of oil, 
the balances of both non-oil trade and tourism deteriorated 
while the support from private capital flows diminished. On 
9 January 1983the Greek authorities decided unilaterally to 
devalue the drachma by 15,5% against all currencies. For 
some months official policy was to maintain the newly 
established drachma/USO rate and this entailed a rise of the 
drachma against other currencies and notably the ECU. By 
the beginning of August it was recognized that the 
consequent rise of the drachma effective exchange rate had 
been excessive and it was announced that the link with the 
.dollar would be weakened. The drachma/ECU rate has since 
come back to the levels recorded immediately after the 
devaluation. 
6.5 Assessment-the development of the EMS 
The EMS has now undergone seven realignments of central 
rates in its history of rather more than four years, which has 
coincided with an epoque of extreme exchange rate 
instability in the wider system. By the end of June 1983 the 
market rates of both the French franc and the Italian lira had 
fallen 23% from their initial DM central rates of 13 March 
1979; this may be compared with the experience of the 
previous four and a quarter years, that is from the end of 
1974 to 13 March 1979, during which the French franc fell 
20% but the Italian lira had fallen 41% against the DM. Thus 
even on the basis oflong-term nominal exchange rates before 
and after the introduction of the EMS there has been a 
certain gain in stability, at least as far as the Italian lira is 
concerned. A fairer comparison would, however, be with the 
behaviour of non-EMS currencies over the recent turbulent 
period. To take just one conspicous example, the exchange 
rate between the US dollar and "the pound sterling changed 
by 34% over the four years to the end of October 1980 but 
then underwent an even larger change, in the reverse 
direction, over the next 33 months, i.e. to the end of July 
1983. In contrast to developments in the wider system, 
nominal changes within EMS have been more modest, and 
consistent in their direction. 
Developments in real exchange rates are perhaps rather more 
illuminating (see Table 6.2, based on GDP prices). By 1978 
the pre-EMS arrangements had permitted large dis-
crepancies to emerge between members of the new system: 
Italy's nominal exchange rate had more than compensated 
for its inflation differential and its real exchange rate had 
fallen a long way, exacerbating its inflationary problem and 
adding to the resource cost of balancing its external account, 
while Denmark. the FR of Germany and the Netherlands 
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tended to be pushed into an uncompetitive position. Since 
1978, however, exchange rate relationships within the EMS 
have ceased to over-compensate for inflation differentials. In 
the cases oflreland and Italy, in particular, the real exchange 
rate rose to a level which, while no means unsustainable, 
corrected earlier distortions and gave a clear warning of the 
problems posed by inflationary developments in those 
countries. Thus, although convergence of inflation rates has 
still not -been achieved (12-month consumer-price inflation 
rates varied from 15,2% in Italy to 2,5% in Germany in July 
1983), the EMS has not fully accommodated this, and has 
exerted a systematic, although not extreme, pressure for 
greater price stability. Conversely, the lower-inflation 
countries have not been subjected to upward distortions of 
their (intra-EMS) real exchange rates, although the figures 
for the Netherlands are difficult to evaluate because of the 
impact of that country's energy exports. 
The EMS has, however, worked less rapidly to produce 
monetary stability than it might have done because some 
participating countries have had recourse to large external 
official and quasi-official market borrowing to deal with 
balance of payments problems and thus avoided or delayed 
recourse to the conditional facilities associated with the 
system. Attention has been given at Community level to the 
growing recourse among member countries to external 
public sector market borrowing to an extent greater than 
would have been necessary to finance transitory current 
account deficits; such borrowing seems in fact in some cases 
to have financed private capital outflows which should have 
been a signal for policy adjustments. Meanwhile the 
arrangements for short-term monetary support and 
medium-term financial assistance have never been used in the 
history of the EMS and the Community loan facility for 
balance of payments purposes had not featured in the EMS 
context until the French request of May 1983. 
In addition to market borrowing, some member countries 
have also sought in certain periods to alleviate their position 
by tightening exchange controls on intra-Community flows; 
a conspicuous example was the restriction introduced after 
the realignment of 21 March 1983 on French residents' 
tourist expenditure outside the franc zone. It must also be 
noted that no progress has been made in reducing the wider 
fluctuation margin enjoyed by the Italian lira. Thus a 
number of factors have retarded or prevented recourse to the 
conditional finance which might have led to earlier 
convergence of inflation rates; they may also have impeded 
the development of consultation and policy coordination 
which might have permitted an earlier reaction to policies 
which were insufficiently convergent. 
These factors have not in the end prevented the EMS from 
being effective, and their identification may enable certain 
lessons to be learned. It .remains, however, a substantial 
defect of the exchange rate mechanism of EMS that it 
Table 6.2 
Real effective exchange rate I based on GDP prices 
1975 1976 
B 101,8 104,0 
DK 108,9 112,5 
D 103,3 105,7 
F 100,0 99,3 
IRL 86,3 84,4 
I 83,1 76,0 
NL 114,3 119,7 
GR 88,1 89,3 
UK 93,7 84,7 
USA 72,1 73,3 
Calcula!ed using double export weights, variable from year to year until 1980. 
Forecasts by Commission services. 
Note: The EMS started on 13 March 1979. 
excludes the pound sterling. Quite apart from the technical 
difficulties which this has produced for the management of 
the system, the participation of the pound sterling would 
greatly increase the value of the system as a central reference 
point in the development of Community economic policy 
and as an expression of the monetary identity of Europe in its 
relations with the rest of the world. The recent substantial 
improvement in the UK's price and cost competitiveness 
suggests that it may now be time to reconsider the question of 
the relation of the pound sterling to the EMS exchange rate 
mechanism. 
6.6 Assessment-the stance of monetary policy 
In 1982 the broadly defined Community money stock 
resumed the deceleration which had characterized it over the 
period 1978-80 (in terms of annual averages-see Table 6.4) 
and its rate of growth is expected to fall again in 1983. The 
performance of individual countries varied-in the UK the 
deceleration did not begin until 1982, whereas in Germany 
monetary growth was allowed to accelerate again from the 
middle of 1982; the rate of monetary growth remains 
dangerously high in Italy and Greece-but in broad terms 
the contrast with the early 1970s is evident and reveals in the 
period 1978-82 a fairly cautious approach to monetary policy 
which has had its reward in the slowdown of inflation in 
some countries. 
Monetary policy and the European Monetary System 
(annua averages, 1970= /()()) 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 2 
Against EMS partners only 
108,5 107,7 104,9 100,8 97,8 88,0 87,0 
111,3 111,0 108,7 101,5 104,5 101,4 101,6 
107,8 109.3 107,8 102,0 98,4 100,4 101,3 
93,6 94,0 96,1 99,3 101,1 97,0 93,3 
82,9 84,8 88,9 93,4 101,0 108,2 107,7 
77,0 76,1 78,7 85,9 89,6 92,3 98,I 
123,7 123,5 120,5 117,9 115,9 120,1 116,8 
Against 19 partners 
90,4 86,6 90,5 83,9 83,7 89,7 83,4 
85,0 87,9 100,1 120,9 125,5 119,9 110,2 
71,5 65,1 63,1 62,2 71,7 78,8 84,4 
The assessment of the present stance of monetary policy is 
more difficult. It is, however, helpful to review the money 
supply data in the light of a number of supplementary 
indicators, and one of these is the liquidity of economy (the 
ratio of money to nominal GDP, which can also be 
understood as the inverse of the velocity of circulation-see 
Table 6.5 (a)). The reasons for expecting a stable relationship 
between money and nominal GDP are not entirely clear-cut. 
First, money is held not only to conduct the transactions 
which underlie GDP, but also, particularly in the EC, 
although to an extent which varies between member 
countries, as a savings medium. The search for a 'transac-
tions balances' definition of money, which has been made 
difficult in the USA by recent institutional changes, has 
always been in vain on this side of the Atlantic. Secondly, 
nominal GDP (final output) does not coincide with the total 
of transactions in an economy, which includes intermediate 
output and financial transactions. Nevertheless, in a long-
term perspective and over two decades the growth of the 
broadly defined money stock was very similar in the 
Community as a whole to the growth of nominal GDP, 
showing a slight tendency to rise in Germany, France and 
Italy, and to fall in the UK in line with the development of 
alternative savings media. 
Over the last three years, however, liquidity has increased 
significantly in the Community. In the absence offully tested 
models a considerable element of judgment is involved in 
assessing this development. The demand for money has 
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probably risen as economic agents seek to build up 
precautiona ry balances in response both to the recession and 
to the difficulty of making long-term investment decisions in 
a period of rapidly changing infla tion rates: but it is a lso 
possible to argue that the available evidence points to a 
disequilibrium situation in which there is now a certain 
overhang of liquidity which could lead to additional 
spending over the coming year. It is even possible that such a 
development will be reinfo rced by a reve rsal o f precautiona ry 
saving as the recovery gathers pace. The built-up of liquidity 
appears recently to have been even more rapid in the U SA 
than in Europe. 
GRAPH 6.4: Divergence indicator 
This situa tion represent s the working out of a medium term 
policy based on quantita tive ta rgets: such targets represent 
nominal qua ntities and as infla ti on falls they place less of a 
constra int on the economy and open up possibilities of 
growth . This can a lso be shown by a ca lcula ti on of the 
growth of the ·rea l money suppl y' , or money defl a ted by 
GDP prices- see part(b) o f Table 6.5. Real money growth 
has been positi ve and signi fica nt in the Community fo r three 
years, but no t as la rge as the average result over two decades; 
to some ex tent thi s co rresponds to a more modest growth of 
po tenti a l output, but it a lso refl ects a ca utio us a tti tude, 
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Table 6.3 
Intermediate objectives and outturns 
1981 1982 1~83 
Country Key variable 3 Objective Ounurn Objective Oullurn Objective Outturn over 
12 months lo: 
D MZ 4-7 3,5 4-7 6,0 4-7 7,9 August 
GRI PSCE 19,3 25,6 23,0 24,0 23,0 19,5 July 
F M2 10,0 11,4 12,5-13,5 11,5 9,0 2 9,4 June 
IRL PSCE 15,0 3 15,6 14,0 3 10,4 11,0 13,5 August 
I TDCE 16,0 18,2 15,5 20,8 18,2 20,7 June 
UK4 LM3 6-10 13,8 8-12 !0,8 7-11 11,0 August 
The Greek monetary authorities also fix a target for the rate of growth of the note circulation. 
Change between Nov./ Dec. 1982 / Jan. 1983 and Nov./ Dec. 1983 / Jan. 1984. 
Financial year February to February. 
At an annual rate for the period from February of the current year to April of the following year. Targets have also been fixed for MI and PSL2 (private sector liquidity). 
Note: TOCE: lolal credit expansion of domestic origin; MZ: central bank money; PSCE: domestic credit extended to the private sector; LM3: sterling M3. For further details, sec technical 
annex. 
Source: Central banks. 
entirely appropriate that planned real monetary growth 
should be low or negative in France and Italy, where progress 
in the struggle against inflation has been slow, and one may, 
indeed, ask whether the monetary growth in prospect for 
Greece is appropriate in view of the inflationary problems of 
that country. 
Table 6.4 
Growth of money stock 
Country Definition 2 1970 1974 1960 1970 
B M2 8,2 13,8 
DK M2 10,4 9,8 
D M3 10,1 11,6 
GR M3 17,7 20,1 
F M2 12,7 16,8 
IRL M3 10,0 16,3 
I M3 13,2 18,4 
NL M2 9,1 14,8 
UK LM3 5,3 18,5 
EC 103 M2/3 10,0 15,8 
EMS3 M2/3 11,3 14,9 
Forecasts by Commission services. 
Two other supplementary indicators of the stance of 
monetary policy are interest rates and exchange rates. While 
nominal interest rates in themselves are not without a certain 
direct effect on the profitability of firms, real interest rates 
generally give a better indication of the impact of monetary 
policy. The calculation of real interest rates depends on the 
( Yearly averages, annual% change) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 J 1984 I 
1974 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
12,7 8,2 3,6 4,7 8,9 6,5 6,0 
14,4 9,8 9,4 5,2 10,3 17,0 9,5 
9,3 9,5 5,3 6,3 6,5 7,4 5,7 
24,8 22,0 17,0 30,4 31,5 21,9 22,9 
14,9 13,5 11,8 11,9 11,4 9,0 7,9 
17,8 29,0 14,5 20,6 13,5 13,9 14,4 
22,4 22,9 19,8 17,1 16,7 16,6 12,8 
10,6' 4,8 8,0 4,3 7,8 6,3 5,6 
9,9 12,8 14,9 17,0 11,4 11,0 9,5 
13,5 13,4 11,6 11,8 11,1 10,5 8,7 
14,2 13,4 10,7 10,2 10,6 10,1 8,1 
B: up lo 1964: monetary claims on the main monetary institutions; new definition from 1982. IRL: revised series as from 1971. I: up lo 1975: M2. Linkage on lhc basis of growth rates. 
NL: 1976, 1977, 1978: break in series. DK: new definition from 1975. F: from 1982, resident's holding of M2. For further details sec technical annex. 
Rale of growth of the geometric average, weighted by GDP at current prices and purchasing power parities, of the money stock indices of the countries concerned (1975 = 100). The 
weight of Luxembourg has been added to the weight of Belgium. 
Source: Up to 1982, central banks. 
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GRAPH 6.5: Monetary targets and outcomes, 1981-83 I 
Indices November 1980 = 100 
130 USA : MI USA: M2 
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I The USA also has targets for M3 and credit ; the UK also has targets for MI and private sector liquidity. 
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expected rate of inflation and is likely to differ from one 
economic agent to another but a simple calculation (part(c) 
of Table 6.5) indicates that real long term interest rates are 
now high in the Community by historic standards. The 
results for the decade 1971-80 are influenced by prolonged 
periods of negative real interest rates in some countries which 
corresponded to periods of excessively slack monetary 
policy, but real interest rates are now in general well above 
their levels of the 1960s, which would appear to indicate that 
monetary policy is now rather tight for a recessionary phase. 
On the other hand the evidence of nominal effective exchange 
rates (Table 6.5 part (d))might seem to point in the opposite 
direction. The medium-term divergence of currencies within 
the Community has already been noted, but the effective 
Table 6.5 
Subordinate indicators of the stance of monetary policy 
(a) Liquidity of the economy 
(M: GDP) (annual% changes) 
1960- 1970- 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
70 80 
B -0,3 1,2 1,3 -3,6 1,2 0,8 0,3 
DK -0,8 -0,5 -1,5 1,7 -5,1 -2,9 6,6 
D 1,6 1,5 1,1 -1,0 2,0 2,7 3,5 
GR 6,0 2,3 -0,8 -2,2 9,7 4,8 2,0 
F 2,3 1,5 -0,4 -1,1 -0,2 -3,0 -0,4 
IRL 0,1 -0,3 11,5 -2,2 1,4 -4,0 2,5 
I 2,5 1,9 1,1 -4,5 -0,2 -0,3 2,1 
NL -1,3 0,5 -1,5 1,6 -0,1 3,6 4,4 
UK -1,8 -1,7 -3,6 -1,7 6,5 1,8 2,9 
EC 0,8 1,0 0,3 -0,5 3,0. 1,5 3,4 
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exchange rate of the Community as a whole has been falling 
for several years and is now well below its level of 1970. In 
fact the signals given by real interest rates and by the nominal 
effective exchange rate are both greatly influenced in the 
third quarter of 1983 by the deficit of the US Federal 
Government which is forcing up real interest rates in New 
York and thus putting pressure on the foreign exchange 
market. The resulting interest rate/exchange rate combi-
nation in Europe cannot be interpreted as directly revealing 
the objectives of Community monetary authorities, but 
rather as representing the best compromise which the 
situation permits, albeit one which on balance dims 
somewhat the prospect for real growth opened up by 
quantitative monetary policy. 
(b) Real money supply 
(M: GDP prices) (annual% changes) 
1960- 1970- 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
70 80 
4,5 4,5 3,8 -0,7 -0,6 1,8 -0,6 
4,1 1,8 2,2 0,6 -5,0 0,4 8,9 
6,3 4,4 5,2 0,9 2,2 1,7 4,2 
14,1 7,1 2,8 -0,7 9,0 4,8 1,8 
8,0 5,2 2,8 0,2 0,0 -1,2 -0,7 
4,3 3,7 14,3 0,6 2,5 -2,8 3,0 
8,3 5.1 6,0 -0,8 -0,4 -0,4 0,2 
3,8 3,5 0,6 2,6 -1,3 2,0 4,6 
1,0 0,1 -2,0 -3,6 4,4 3,3 5,8 
5,5 4,0 3,7 0,8 2,5 1,9 4,0 
USA 0,0 0,0 -2,7 -1,0 -2,1 5,0 4,7 _I 3,8 2,9 -0,5 -1,2 -0,1 3,2 8,31 
(c) Real long-term interest rate 
(averages)~{ p.a. 2 
(d) Nominal efTective exchange rates 1970 = 100, 
against rest of world 3 
1960- 1970- 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1960- 1970- 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
70 80 70 80 
B 3,2 1,2 5,0 5,2 5,7 4,4 3,9 98,7 111,1 122,9 123,1 116,7 105,8 103,7 
DK 2,1 4,3 6,6 5,7 6,8 9,4 7,4 103,7 106,0 109,6 100,5 93,8 89,8 89,8 
D 4,0 2,8 3,2 2,8 4,2 3,5 4,9 89,4 130,9 161,0 161,9 153,3 161,0 168,2 
GR -4,2 -6,5 -6,2 -5,5 -4,6 -2,l 98,5 75,5 63,2 54,8 49,9 46,2 38,2 
F 2,2 0,6 0,2 0,1 2,6 3,6 4,6 109,9 101,7 101,7 103,0 94,2 86,5 81,0 
IRL -0,8 1,7 -2,5 -2,4 -0,3 2,7 104,5 81,4 72,0 70,4 64,6 63,9 61,8 
I 2,6 -2,1 -0,6 -4,3 0,9 3,8 2,6 99,1 70,9 54,2 52,5 46,1 42,9 41,5 
NL 1,3 1,1 4,5 3,5 5,0 4,3 5,5 98,8 118,3 134,2 135,0 128,2 135,0 138,2 
UK 2,8 -1,0 -0,3 -3,5 2,6 3,7 5,0 110,5 75,9 65,8 72,2 72,6 69,6 64,8 
EC 2,8 0,4 1,2 -0,4 2,8 3,6 5,1 101,8 100,9 102,3 103,0 97,3 89,4 85,2 
USA 2,0 -0,5 -2,3 -2,4 2,3 5,7 6,8 99,0 85,5 . 78,5 77.8 88,9 99,8 107,9 
Based on increase of M2 over nine months to August 1983. 
Average of monthly observations each deflated by the rise in consumer prices over the previous 12 months. 
Calculated using double export weights variable from year to year. 
Note: Except as indicated, 1983 figures represent forecasts by Commission services; money definitions and aggregation method as for Table 6.4. 
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GRAPH 6.6: Short term money market interest rates (end of month) 
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Monetary policy must also be evaluated in the light of the 
structure of the counterparts of the money stock (Table 6.6). 
There are at present substantial difficulties in the way of 
aggregating these figures at Community level, but the 
contrasts at the level of member countries are revealing. The 
data shows, first, the extent to which public sectors have 
dominated the money creation process. A useful rule of 
thumb might be to concentrate attention on those countries 
in which bank credit to the public sector is greater than bank 
credit to the private sector (parts 6 and 7 of Table 6.6). In 
1983 this is particularly true of Belgium, Italy and Ireland; in 
Greece a certain balance has been restored (regrettably in the 
context of high inflation), and in Denmark a remarkable 
adjustment appears to be occurring. The tables also reveal 
the differing roles of external counterparts. While special 
considerations may apply in particular cases, there must be a 
primafacie assumption that a persistent, significant negative 
Table 6.6 
Counterparts of money creation I 
2 
Country Money creation = rate Domestic money 
of growth of creation 
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figure under this heading indicates that the extension of bank 
credit has gone beyond the willingness ofresidents to acquire 
claims on the domestic banking system at existing interest 
rates and that domestic monetary conditions are therefore 
ill-adapted to the needs of the domestic economy. The 
improving position of Belgium and Denmark is reflected in a 
progressive reduction of their external counterparts. Greece 
is a special case in that its negative figure partly reflects a 
traditional form of capital inflow. The UK position largely 
reflects the problem of managing the transition to complete 
freedom of capital movements. The programmes of the 
French authorities implicitly recognize the need to eliminate 
the negative external counterpart and they intend to effect a 
major adjustment by reducing the expansion of bank credit. 
Success in achieving this adjustment will be an indispensable 
sign that their policies to correct their balance of payments 
and defeat inflation are working. 
I as ~; of money stock al the end of the preceding period) 
4 
External creation ( +) Other 
and destruction ( - ) 
M2/3 ( I = 2 + 3 + 4) (2 = 5 = 6 + 7 - 8) of liquidity 
1982 1983 1984 1982 1983 1984 1982 1983 1984 1982 1983 1984 
B 5,7 5,0 6,7 16,2 13,8 12,0 -9,8 -7,9 -4,8 -0,7 -0,9 -0,5 
DK 11,7 12,5 7,5 25,3 18,3 9,9 -13,6 -5,8 -2,4 -0,0 0,0 0,0 
D 7,1 7,5 5,5 7,2 6,7 6,2 0,4 -0,2 0,4 -0,5 1,0 -1,1 
GR 29,1 22,6 20,2 33,8 24,8 23,3 -4,7 -2,2 -3,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 
F 10,8 8,8 6,5 14,1 10,6 7,5 -3,6 -1,8 -1,0 0,3 0,0 0,0 
IRL 13,0 14,4 14,4 14,8 11,8 12,2 -1,8 2,6 2,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 
I 17,2 16,0 11,0 20,6 17,7 15,2 -0,6 1,1 0,0 -2,8 -2,8 -4,2 
NL 7,6 5,5 6,0 5,5 4,8 4,5 2,8 3,2 3,6 -0,7 -2,5 -2,1 
UK 9,3 10,6 8,6 10,8 10,6 9,6 -2,3 -1,1 -1,9 0,8 1,1 0,9 
5 = 2 6 7 
Domestic Lending lo the Lending lo !he Non-monetary 
money creation public sector private sector liabilities 
(5 = 2 = 6 + 7 - 8) 
1982 1983 1984 1982 1983 1984 1982 1983 1984 1982 1983 1984 
B 16,2 13,8 12,0 20,9 19,7 18,0 2,7 3,7 4,2 7,4 9,6 10,2 
DK 25,3 18,3 9,9 18,1 13,2 6,2 10,6 6,9 5,6 3,4 1,8 1,9 
D 7,2 6,7 6,2 4,9 4,3 2,5 8,5 9,8 11,0 6,2 7,4 7,3 
GR 33,8 24,8 23,3 20,3 14,6 13,6 17,6 13,5 12,3 4,1 3,3 2,6 
F 14,1 10,6 7,5 2,2 3,4 3,3 16,0 11,4 9,2 4,1 4,2 5,0 
IRL 14,8 11,8 12,2 8,2 9,9 10,2 6,4 3,8 3,9 -0,2 1,9 1,9 
I 20,6 17,7 15,2 16,8 18,2 15,9 8,1 8,0 9,4 4,3 8,5 10,1 
NL 5,5 4,8 4,5 4,0 5,1 5,6 5,1 5,6 5,6 3,6 5,9 6,7 
UK 10,8 10,6 9,6 -6,1 0,0 0,5 20,3 14,3 12,4 3,4 3,7 3,3 
Money stock broadly defined (same definition as Table 6.4 except that the change of definition in Belgium in 1982 docs not apply). The figures for the counterparts arc generally difficult 
to compare between one country and another. 
Source: 1982 Central banks; 1983-84: Forecasts by Commission services. 
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In section 6.5 on the EMS it was noted how recent policy 
developments in particular countries favour convergence 
within the Community on a low rate of inflation. This 
conclusion can now be extended by noting that at the level of 
the Community as a whole quantitative monetary policy 
seems to be consistent with non-inflationary recovery from 
the recession. This situation is emerging because certain 
countries, notably the United Kingdom and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, have persisted in the pursuit of 
moderate quantitative monetary targets which have held 
back inflation and now in consequence open up some room 
for recovery. A similar degree of success has been achieved by 
the Netherlands. The recovery will however be impeded by 
the persistence of high real interest rates having their origin 
on the other side of the Atlantic. The monetary authorities of 
the UK and Germany are faced, in the third quarter of 1983, 
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with signs of overshooting of their monetary targets. It 
would be consistent with past policy declarations in both 
countries if reactions to the present situation were designed 
not with a view to eliminating month-to-month variations 
but with a view to securing a steady and reasonable growth of 
the aggregate over the medium term while avoiding, for 
example, the kind of sustained departure from target seen in 
Germany in 1978. The adjustment programmes of Belgium, 
Denmark and France have begun to bear fruit but do not yet 
allow of any relaxation. In Greece, Italy and, to some extent, 
Ireland the persistence of inflation rates well above the 
Community average suggests that the struggle against 
inflation must be at the centre of policy, and that targets for 
aggregate credit expansion in 1984 should be set well below 
the rate of growth of nominal GDP in 1983, in parallel with a 
reduction of public sector borrowing requirements. 
Sterilization of foreign exchange intervention in 
the EMS 
I. The distinction between ·sterilized' and 'unsterilized' inter-
ventions has played an important role in the discussion of central 
bank interventions following the 1982 Versailles Summit. This 
note recalls, in a highly simplified manner, the theoretical issues 
and describes the current practice of EMS monetary authorities. 
2. An intervention operation, i.e. a purchase or sale of foreign 
exchange by the central bank against the domestic currency, 
raises or reduces the monetary authorities' net foreign assets. 
Intervention is sterilized when the increase (decrease) in the net 
foreign assets is matched by a decrease (increase) in the monetary 
authorities' net domestic assets. In consequence, the liability side 
of the monetary authorities' balance sheet is not affected by a 
sterilized intervention operation. This implies that sterilized 
intervention has no impact on the monetary base, defined as 
currency in circulation plus deposits of the banking sector at the 
central bank. 
3. A purely hypothetical example may serve to illustrate the 
definition. Suppose the central bank of an EMS country wants to 
purchase its own currency against DM on its foreign exchange 
market in an attempt to prevent it from depreciating to its 
bilateral fluctuation limit. Upon agreement of the Bundesbank 
to the desired intervention operation, the central bank obtains 
the required DM from the Bundesbank against transfer of a 
corresponding amount of US dollars taken from its reserves. It 
then buys the domestic currency from domestic commercial 
banks and pays for it from the newly acquired DM deposit at the 
Bundesbank. This produces an increase in German commercial 
bank reserve accounts at the Bundesbank as well as in their 
demand deposit liabilities to commercial banks of the weak 
currency country. 
In turn, demand deposits held by commercial banks of the weak 
currency country at German commercial banks increase; and 
their reserve accounts at their central bank decline. 
Since bank reserves have fallen in the weak currency country, the 
monetary base decreases as a result of this foreign exchange 
market operation. On the other hand, since German commercial 
banks' reserves have risen, the German monetary base increases. 
If the central banks concerned do not want the foreign exchange 
intervention to affect their monetary base, they may sterilize its 
impact with an offsetting sale or purchase of domestic assets, 
injecting reserves into the commercial banking system in the case 
of the weak currency country and draining off newly created 
reserves in the case of the strong currency country. 
4. From a technical point of view, the foreign exchange 
operation described above gives rise to unsterilized intervention 
in the first place since foreign exchange holdings and bank 
reserves are affected simultaneously. A subsequent action of 
monetary policy (e.g. an open market operation) is necessary to 
restore the latter to their original level. A sterilized intervention 
operation is thus made up of unsterilized intervention and a 
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monetary policy operation that offsets the implied change in the 
monetary liabilities of the central bank. For analytical purposes, 
however, it is convenient to change perspective and view 
unsterilized intervention as a joint decision on sterlized 
intervention on the one hand, and on monetary policy on the 
other. In studies on the effects of intervention on exchange rates, 
it then becomes possible to separate the impact of sterilized 
intervention from that of monetary policy, and to analyse 
whether monetary authorities can operate simultaneously a 
monetary policy and an exchange rate policy. 
5. Two conditions must be met to allow both an exchange rate 
target and a monetary aggregate target to be pursued in-
dependently. 
First, the size of intervention operations must not exceed the 
central banks' ability to absorb the liquidity effect in their 
domestic markets, i.e. their capability to sterilize. 
Secondly, for sterilized interventions to exert an impact on 
exchange rates, assets denominated in different currencies must 
be imperfectly substitutable. I If, in the example above, investors 
regard securities denominated in DM and in the weak EMS 
currency as perfectly equivalent, they will be indifferent as to 
which of the two they hold. The change in the relative size of net 
asset stocks denominated in the two currencies brought about by 
the intervention operation then will have no direct effect on the 
exchange rate. If, however, these securities are not perfect 
substitutes, investors will be unwilling to hold the new portfolio 
at the original exchange rate and/or interest rates. A change in 
one or all of these variables is required to incite investors to 
accept the new relative amounts outstanding. 2 
6. In monetary theory, the monetary base is sometimes regarded 
as an efficient instrument for the control of money supply 3 i.e. 
currency plus deposit assets held by the public. Intervention, 
that--in theory~is sterilized instantaneously, does not affect the 
monetary base nor in consequence the monetary conditions in 
the countries concerned. Its impact on exchange rate behaviour 
is therefore thought to be more pronounced in the short run than 
in the long run, since imperfect asset substitutability is likely to 
vanish in the long run. Investigations undertaken in the 
framework of the Report of the Working Group on Exchange 
Market Intervention 4 set up at the Versailles Summit confirm 
that sterilized intervention generally has been effective in 
influencing the exchange rate in the short run. 
7. In practice, however, it is often felt that the link between the 
monetary base and money supply is less tight. Monetary 
Sterilized intervention may also affect the exchange rate by 
innuencing expectations with respect to future monetary and 
exchange rate policies by the central bank. Strictly speaking, it is not 
independent of monetary policy in this case. 
It has been shown that imperfect substitutability is not a sufficient 
condition for sterilized interventions to affect exchange rates. For a 
survey of the theory and the literature, see Solomon (1983). 
See e.g. Mussa (1981 ), Ballen and Kamphoefner (1982). 
Jurgensen ( 1983). 
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aggregates other than the monetary base may be affected by 
sterilized intervention, depending on the type and maturity of 
deposits preferred by the public, and the domestic interest rate 
structure may change accordingly. Therefore, the concept of 
sterilization as defined above is too narrow for the assessment of 
the monetary effects of interventions by EMS central banks 
which do not express their monetary targets in terms of the 
monetary base. For the remainder of the note, intervention 
effects will also be considered as sterilized if they do not hamper 
monetary management oriented at the achievement of quantitat-
ive intermediate monetary objectives. 
8. The relationship of intervention to monetary policy m 
Germany is as follows: 
The Bundesbank undertakes smoothing operations in the DM/ 
US dollar market when exchange rate fluctuations are deemed 
excessively large or erratic. Within the EMS, it intervenes in 
partner currencies at the obligatory intervention points, and may 
also do so before the limit rates have been reached. Moreover, 
the function of the DM within the EMS to a certain extent is 
similar to that of the US dollar in the wider international 
monetary system, in that the DM is used as the preferred EMS 
currency for interventions by other EMS central banks within 
the fluctuation margins. I 
As to monetary policy, the intermediate target variable adopted 
by the Bundesbank is a weighted monetary aggregate: the central 
bank money stock. It comprises currency in circulation and 
minimum reserve requirements on domestic liabilities, calculated 
at constant 1974 reserve ratios. 
The Bundesbank conceives the way it exerts monetary control as 
a multi-stage procedure. 2 At the money market level, the 
Bundesbank accepts foreign exchange purchases as one means of 
providing liquidity to the banking sector, when this fits in with 
the evolution of other market influences and does not upset its 
short-term operational instruments (in particular money market 
interest rates). However, interventions are sterilized when they 
are likely to have a disruptive effect on domestic money market 
conditions. At the level of the intermediate target variable, the 
Bundesbank closely monitors the development of the central 
bank money stock. Short-term (one to three months) and 
possibly reversible deviations of the central bank money stock 
from the target path arc not corrected by an immediate change of 
monetary policy. The Bundesbank neutralizes, however, the 
secondary effects of interventions as well as those of other 
determinants of money stock growth, if the achievement of the 
annual growth target is believed to be endangered. 
The flexible use of EMS financing and intervention arrange-
ments has, in many cases, facilitated the neutralization of 
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G/eske (l 982 b), and Scholl ( 1982). On the role of the OM, see also 
Baer ( 1982). 
See Dud/er (l 982), Schles11i11ger ( 1982) and Deutsche B1111desba11k 
(1982). 
unwarranted liquidity effects in Germany. 3 EMS central banks 
often were able to purchase DM sold either at the intervention 
points or intra-marginally after foreign exchange flows had 
reversed. Since the proceeds of such recouping operations mostly 
were deposited at the Bundesbank or used for the advance 
settlement of debtor balances under the EMS very-short-term 
financing facility, the preceding liquidity expansion tended to be 
offset. 
9. In France, the quantitative target of monetary policy is 
expressed in terms of M2 money supply. The target aggregate is 
not, however, pursued through the influence of money market 
conditions on bank liquidity, but mainly through the regulation 
of credit ceilings. 4 The liquidity needs of commercial banks 
being determined by a number of automomous factors, illfer alia 
changes in foreign reserves, and by reserve requirements, they are 
not directly related to credit expansion as the means of 
implementing the monetary policy objective. 
Since commercial banks hold a large stock of highly liquid 
securities, they can usually even out intervention induced 
liquidity swings. From a quantitative point of view the scope for 
systematic non-sterilization is restricted in France. However, the 
French monetary authorities use discretionary changes in the 
money market intervention rate to enhance the effectiveness of 
interventions. 
10. The order of monetary objectives in France-a monetary 
aggregate at the policy level and a credit target at the operational 
level-is reversed in Italy. The Italian target of monetary policy 
is total domestic credit expansion and the monetary base is the 
short-run operational target adopted by the Banca d'Jtalia. 
At the setting of the credit expansion target, the Banca d'Italia 
makes a decision as to the extent to which the forecast foreign 
sector impact on base money creation should be sterilized. At the 
operational level, the Banca d'Italia is flexible in the pursuit of 
the monetary base target through operations in the Treasury bills 
market. Deviations from the target path may lead to adjustments 
of money market interest rates, and the sterilization of the impact 
on monetary base creation from the foreign channel is by no 
means automatic. 5 
11. Ireland's monetary policy target is formulated with respect 
to bank lending to the private sector. Deviations from the target 
are penalized through a system of supplementary deposits which 
licensed banks are obliged to hold at the central bank in case of 
excessive lending activity. 
In its short-term management of liquidity, the Central Bank of 
Ireland smoothes irregular liquidity flows. 6 In general, 
More detail, also on the period of OM weakness in the EMS 1980/81, 
is given in Scholl ( 1981 ). 
See Raymond ( 1982). 
For an example, see Banca d"Italia (1983), pp. 232 and 233. 
See Barry ( 1983). 
therefore, interventions in Ireland can be considered as sterilized, 
although on occasion, the Bank has allowed interest rates to 
reflect tension in the foreign exchange market. 
12. Similarly as in Ireland, monetary policy in Denmark 
operates on bank lending to the private sector. It is guided 
through liquidity policy and by way of a target for credit 
expansion by banks. 
Repercussions of exchange rate strains are allowed to feed 
through into domestic money markets. A system of borrowing 
and deposit limits, under which banks can smooth over liquidity 
swings, is used flexibly in response to the foreign exchange 
situation. Measures range from increases in the interest rate at 
which the central bank supplies additional liquidity to the 
banking system to the suspension altogether of the borrowing 
limits. l Non-sterilization is not automatic, bur rather more a 
consequence of a deliberate liquidity and interest rate policy 
pursued by Danmarks Nationalbank. 
13. No quantitative money supply or credit objective guides the 
conduct of monetary policy in Belgium. Nevertheless, the 
tightening of domestic liquidity caused by the National Bank's 
interventions in the foreign exchange market is regularly 
counterbalanced to a great extent by the creation of base 
money. 2 
The policy constraint under which interventions are sterilized is 
the financing requirement of the Treasury which the central bank 
in its function as lender oflast resort is obliged to fulfil. The need 
to replenish the supply of Treasury funds imposes limits on the 
Bank's ability to avoid offsetting liquidity shortages in the 
money market. To a certain extent, however, the Bank allows 
money market interest rates to reflect pressure on the exchange 
rate. 
14. In the Netherlands, monetary policy aims at the control of 
the liquidity ratio. i.e. the money supply in relation to national 
income. A credit target-the domestic counterpart of money-is 
used for operational purposes, being the easiest to control in view 
of the openness of financial markets and the exchange rate 
constraints of the EMS. 
Foreign exchange interventions in the Netherlands have a double 
function. 3 On the one hand, they are an instrument of monetary 
policy used for the regulation of the money market which is 
essentially an interbank market. On the other hand, they are 
effected for the purposes of an exchange rate target. In case of 
conflict, external factors dominate the evolution of the domestic 
money market as interventions arc left unsterilized. 
15. In the United Kingdom, which does not participate in the 
EMS exchange rate mechanism, the stated monetary objectives 
See Danmarks Nationalbank (1983). 
See National Bank of Belgium ( 1983). 
See Timmerman ( 1981 ). 
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cover three different monetary aggregates, one narrow (MI) and 
two broad (sterling M3 and private sector liquidity broadly 
defined). 4 On the operational level, debt management is 
considered to have the 'most immediate and direct quantitative 
linkage' 5 with M3. 
The quantity of base money in the UK serves neither a target nor 
an operational function. Foreign exchange interventions carried 
out through the Exchange Equalization Account are automati-
cally sterilized by sales or purchases of Treasury bills to the 
banking system. 6 
16. The narrow theoretical concept of sterilization which is 
related to the monetary base is of no great significance for the 
practice of EMS monetary policies which are expressed and 
operated in a variety of other monetary variables. In the EMS 
context, it is therefore more appropriate to consider foreign 
exchange interventions as sterilized when they do not affect the 
conduct of monetary policy. 
At the level of the money market, the effects of interventions on 
liquidity volumes are more or less automatically sterilized in all 
EMS countries (with the exception of the Netherlands and, in a 
way, Denmark), given various institutional factors and practices. 
But EMS central banks do have recourse-although to varying 
degrees-to money market interest rates as a policy instrument 
when strains on foreign exchange markets call for a reaction of 
monetary policy. 
When drawing up monetary policy, EMS monetary authorities 
tend to take a view on the probable influence of their economics' 
external position on their policy objectives-however different 
these may be at both the policy and the operational level. 
Intermediate targets are generally set in the light of such 
considerations, and this implies a certain neutralization of the 
liquidity effects of anticipated changes in foreign reserve 
holdings. 
When strains on foreign exchange markets occur, they generally 
are not allowed to cause substantial or longer-term deviations of 
intermediate objective variables from their target path, although 
persistent interventions to support a weak currency will usually 
be interpreted as requiring some tightening of domestic 
monetary management. 
17. In conclusion, repercussions of intervention on monetary 
policy in EMS countries generally remain limited. Therefore, the 
situation in these countries is different from but not diametrically 
opposed to that in the US, where intervention is sterilized 
automatically and immediately and hence deemed independent 
of domestic monetary policy. 
See Fforde ( 1982). 
Coleby (1982). 
See Bootle ( 1983). 
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Private use of the ECU 
In last year's Review, the private ECU market was described, 
with a list of the transactions carried out and a summary of the 
ECU's status in the light of national rules. It is worthwhile 
returning to the subject this year in order to present further 
information on this fast-developing market. We begin by 
highlighting some of the significant aspects of the market's 
development, and go on to mention initiatives on the part of 
private operators and the Commission of the European 
Communities to facilitate the use of the ECU as a foreign 
currency. We then consider some of the features that make this 
new currency unit attractive. 
The deYelopment of the market 
The ECU market has now achieved a recognized place on the 
European monetary scene, as was expected in view of its 
activities during 1982. A few facts will illustrate its rapid 
development: 
- Public issues: Twenty-eight public issues, totalling I 545 
million ECU, were launched on the Euro-market in the first 
nine months of 1983; this compares with 17 issues totalling 
722 million ECU in the whole of 1982. The ECU is now the 
third-ranked issuing currency on the market, after the US 
dollar and the German mark, with a share of 4,5%. If all 
international issues are considered (Euro-issues and foreign 
issues launched on domestic markets), the ECU was the sixth 
most important currency in the first half of 1983, after the 
dollar, the mark, the Swiss franc, the yen and the guilder. 
Outstanding issues, amounting to 2 012 million ECU, break 
down as follows: 1981: 190 million ECU, five issues; 1982: 
722 million ECU, 17 issues; 1983 (seven months): I 100 
million ECU, 19 issues. 
- The Community institutions are increasingly resorting to the 
ECU; if the sum of 150 million ECU raised under 
arrangements for balance of payments support for the 
Member States is included, these institutions now rank 
second among issuers, with 627 million ECU in 10 oper-
ations, behind French operators, the leading issuers with 805 
million ECU in 14 operations. Other major issuers are the 
Italians, the North Americans, the Swedes and two Japanese 
banks; the Council of Europe's Resttlement Fund has floated 
three issues. 
Bank loans: By the end of the first half of 1983, bank loans 
outstanding totalled over I OOO million ECU in amounts 
ranging from 2 million ECU to 200 million ECU. Among the 
borrowers are important names such as Saint-Gobain, the 
Credit National, Fiat, Air France, the Kingdom of Denmark, 
the Cassa per ii Mezzogiorno and the IRI. 
Short-term loans: Importers and exporters in need of short-
term foreign currency loans are showing a growing pre-
ference for ECU loans, which cost less, on balance, than 
loans in other currencies. This type of loan is particularly 
popular in Italy (where I 628 million ECU had been 
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borrowed by the end of 1982), but is also developing rapidly 
in other countries, and notably in France. 
Commercial transactions: By reason of its stability, the ECU 
is particularly suitable for denominating transactions and 
keeping accounts between firms and subsidiaries operating 
Europe-wide. Applications of the ECU in the commercial 
world arc fairly recent, and not many details are available; 
but the field is interesting, for the ECU will graduate beyond 
the level of just another Euro-currency only if it is actually 
used by economic agents. Already, some European multi-
nationals are tending to prefer the ECU to Community 
currencies and to the dollar for invoicing and even settling 
transactions with their subsidiaries; by so-doing they reduce 
their exchange risk and simplify their cash management. 
New departures 
The operators: Much the most prom1smg initiative by 
operators is the organization of a multilateral ECU clearing 
by the banking profession. The working party set up in 1982 
by a few banks interested in the ECU's development has since 
welcomed a number of new members, and is now embarking 
on the practical application of its work. This group could be 
the hard core of a future association of banks that will 
manage the clearing of ECU transfers, expected to become 
operative in 1984. 
- The Commission of the European Communities: To date, the 
ECU has developed on the spontaneous initiative of the 
private sector, without any commitment or responsibility 
being undertaken by Community or national authorities. The 
Commission feels that the time has now come for the 
Member States to take their share of responsibility in the 
development of the private use of the ECU, which is now 
emerging more and more as an efficient instrument to 
reinforce European monetary identity both inside and 
outside the Community; it has therefore exercised its 
prerogative to draw the Council's attention to the matter in 
two communications, on financial integration (18 April 
1983) and on the international promotion of the ECU 
(24 May 1983) (see annexes). 
In the first of these communications, the use of the ECU is 
considered one of the most important means of reviving the 
financial integration process, which has come to a standstill. The 
aim is to create a Community financial area which would 
contribute to the economic development of Europe. This area 
should be as homogenous as possible; its relations with the 
outside world would be orderly, and it would have available a set 
of efficient instruments to tap savings; the idea is to improve 
opportunities for raising resources to contribute to financing 
investment in the Community. 
In the Commission's view, one of the means of setting up an 
integrated financial market would be to give Community 
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residents access to the ECU, for example by enabling them to 
subscribe to ECU loans issued by Community institutions on the 
basis of official exchange rates; at present, such operations are 
either prohibited or made difficult in some of the Member States. 
Besides contributing to financial integration within the Com-
munity, the ECU could also act as a buffer between the dollar 
and certain Community currencies. This would make it possible 
to spread the effects of movements that often disturb inter-EMS 
relations over all the ECU component currencies. The second 
communication therefore deals specifically with promoting the 
international role of the ECU. To this end, the Commission 
suggests that the ECU should be treated as a foreign currency by 
all the Member States, and that its use should be facilitated. For 
its own part, the Commission is prepared to draw up, in due 
course, a document that would serve as the single reference text 
on the ECU, setting out the provisions to be respected by all users 
of the currency instrument. 
On 16 May 1983, the Council instructed the Monetary 
Committee to examine these proposals. 
Attractiveness of the ECU 
Despite the irregular behaviour of short-term interest rates on 
the occasion of some realignments, the ECU's essential 
advantage is that it is more stable than other currencies whether 
one looks at it from an exchange rate or an interest rate point of 
view. This double advantage, which has been demonstrated by 
work done in several quarters, I is extremely valuable to 
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In particular, work on this point has been done at three conferences 
held in 1983: one in London on 27 April on financing, accounting and 
invoicing in composite currencies, organized by the Fondation pour 
l'etude du droit et des usages du commerce international (FEDUCI); 
one in Paris on 10 June on the ECU as a currency for the bank and the 
firm, organized by the Groupement pour la cooperation monetaire 
europeenne; and one in Luxembourg from 13 to 15 September on the 
future of the ECU organized by Euromoncy Publications 
commercial and financial operators. Past experience shows that 
the ECU has provided one of the cheapest means of foreign 
currency financing from the point of view of the real average cost 
(interest charges plus exchange rate gains or losses against 
national currency); moreover, for borrowers in practically all 
countries. the ECU has been the least risky currency. It is also the 
most predictable currency in the short term, as a comparison of 
actual short-term rates with three-month forecasts has shown. In 
brief, the ECU is attractive mainly because it is stable and little 
risk is involved in its use as a foreign currency. 
Public international bond issues I 
(million Ecu) 
1981 1982 1983 
Whole 1st _2SI I" yd 
year half half half quarter 
USD 20 445 26 654 19 293 21 850 7 328 
DM I 896 2 294 2 461 4 006 I 304 
FF 581 156 76 208 
UKL I 162 715 I 283 858 717 
HFL 792 394 606 997 303 
SFR 3 570 2 398 2 676 2 702 I 144 
ECU 190 185 525 900 460 
Other units of 
account 420 17 
Yen 2 346 I 863 I 331 I 948 670 
CDN 541 I 002 285 505 346 
Other currencies 379 185 229 219 159 
Total 32 322 35 863 28 765 34 193 12 431 
Euro-issues and foreign issues on domcslic markets. 
Source: EIB. 
7. Balance of payments 
The world economy has continued to adjust to the changes in the terms of trade between 
major country groups that were set off by the sharp increase in oil prices in 1979. However 
during 1982-83, in contrast to the preceding two years, the most striking adjustment, 
particularly in real terms, has been made by the non-oil developing countries, while in the 
industrial countries progress towards external balance, which had been especially rapid in 
1980-81, has slowed down. The experience of the European Community has conformed 
closely to that of industrial countries generally in this respect, while that of the United 
States has been noticeably worse and that of Japan somewhat better than the industrial 
countries' average. During the last five years industrial countries have experienced 
significant changes in the strucwre of their exports and imports. As a general rule they 
have increased their traditional surplus on trade in manufactured goods to offset the 
larger deficit on trade in primary products which has resulted from the rise in oil prices. 
There have, however, been considerable variations in the degree of success with which 
individual countries have met his challenge. Much of this variation can probably be 
explained by real exchange rate movements, which have exerted a powerful influence on 
trade inflows in manufactured goods. The Community's current deficit has now been al-
most eliminated, but the deficits accumulated in recent years have been aggravated by a 
heavy net outflow of autonomous capital. The resulting basic deficit has been financed by 
large-scale official borrowing and an inflow of short-term banking capital. In some 
Member States this has produced a situation in which debt service now constitutes a 
serious and persistent drain on resources. Several member countries have also had to draw 
upon their official reserves and the ratio of reserves to imports has fallen to a level that is 
decidedly low by historical standards. 
7 .1 International payments adjustment 
The process of international payments adjustment that was 
set in motion following the eruption of the second 'oil crisis' 
in 1979 has continued during 1982-83. The current surplus of 
the oil exporting countries has, at least according to the 
recorded figures, been transformed into a deficit. The deficit 
of the industrial countries, taken as a whole, has been 
virtually eliminated, while that of the non-oil developing 
countries has been substantially reduced. When allowance is 
made for statistical errors, mainly in the recording of service 
and investment income receipts of residents of the oil 
exporting and industrial countries, it is probable that these 
two groups have both had a small current surplus this year 
roughly offsetting the USO 50-60 OOO million deficit of the 
non-oil developing nations. 
In nominal terms the current balance of the oil exporting 
countries has oscillated wildly over the last five years the 
huge improvement during 1979-80 being followed by a rapid 
deterioration over the following three years. In real terms the 
adjustment of this group of countries to the changes in their 
terms of trade has proceeded more steadily. Between 1978 
and 1982 the terms of trade improved by almost I 00;~ and 
real net imports of goods and services (excluding investment 
income) increased by USO 85 OOO million at 1975 prices, an 
amount roughly equal to 25% of GOP. This process has now 
been reversed. The oil exporting countries are estimated to 
have experienced a deterioration of 14;~ in their terms of 
trade this year and this has obliged them to cut back the 
volume of their imports sharply. As a result the balance of 
trade on goods and services is expected to show some 
improvement in real terms this year, although this will not be 
enough to offset the effect of the adverse movement of the 
terms of trade, so that in nominal terms both the trade and 
current balances will continue to deteriorate. 
The counterpart to these developments is to be found in the 
changes that have occurred in the current balances of the 
industrial and non-oil developing countries. However the 
adjustment process in these two groups has not been closely 
synchronized. The industrial countries achieved the greater 
part of their external adjustment between 1980 and 1981, 
their current deficit being reduced by two thirds or 
USO 42 OOO million in the space of a single year. Progress 
since then has been much slower. The non-oil developing 
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countries, by contrast, did not begin to reduce their current 
deficit in nominal terms until 1982, but progress in the last 
two years, despite an unfavourable international economic 
environment and the unremitting burden of debt service, has 
been impressive (see Table 7.1 ). 
The pattern of nominal adjustment followed by the 
European Community has conformed closely to that of the 
industrial group as a whole-a very strong improvement in 
1981, but rather slow progress in the following two years. 
Table 7.1 
Nominal and real external adjustment by major country groups 
Oil exporting countries 
(i) At current prices: 
Balance of trade in goods & services 
Investment income & transfers (net) 
Current balance 
(ii) At constant 1975 prices: 
Balance of trade in goods & services 
(iii) Terms of trade 
(index: I 975 = 100) 
Industrial countries 
(i) At current prices: 
Balance of trade in goods & services 
Investment income & transfers (net)· 
Current balance 
(ii) At constant 1975 prices: 
Balance of trade in goods & services 
(iii) Terms of trade 
(index: 1975 = 100) 
Non-oil developing countries 
(i) At current prices: 
Balance of trade in goods & services 
Investment income (net) 
Unilateral transfers (net) 
Current balance 
(i) At constant 1975 prices: 
Balance of trade in goods & services 
(iii) Terms of trade 
(index: 1975 = 100) 
In percent. 
Source: IMF, Commission estimates. 
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The United States achieved a sharp improvement ( + 
USO 20 OOO million) between 1978 and 1981 but the 
deterioration of USD 35 OOO million that has occurred 
during 1982-83, as a result of more buoyant economic 
activity in the US than elsewhere in the world economy and a 
serious loss of competitiveness brought about by the 
appreciation of the dollar on the foreign exchange markets, 
has left the US with a significantly weaker position than in 
1978. The current deficit this year is expected to be twice as 
large in absolute terms and about 50% larger in relation to 
(USD '()(J{)mil/io11) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Change 
1978/83 
+9 +74 + 118 +67 -2 -20 -29 
-8 -8 -7 -6 -2 -1 +7 
+I +66 +Ill +61 -4 -21 -22 
+ 13 +22 -10 -48 -72 -62 -75 
96 123 175 194 191 164 +711 
+20 -28 -57 -II -9 +3 -17 
-4 +3 -6 -10 -16 -18 -14 
+ 16 -25 -63 -21 -25 -15 -31 
+7 -6 +36 +72 +50 + 55 +48 
102 99 93 92 94 95 -7 1 
-30 -41 -59 -60 -28 -11 +19 
-27 -39 -53 -70 -79 -79 -52 
+24 +31 +36 +36 +33 +35 + II 
-33 -49 -76 -94 -74 -55 -22 
-41 -47 -35 -24 -I +7 +48 
108 108 IOI 97 94 95 -121 
GDP than it was five years ago. Japan has registered a steady 
improvement in its current account in each of the last four 
years and the surplus this year is expected to be close in dollar 
terms to the record figure of 1978 (see Table 7.2). 
The oil importing countries were quick to adapt their policies 
to the events of I 979 and the process of real adjustment to the 
deterioration in their terms oftrade-i.e. of improvement in 
the balance of trade in goods and services in volume terms-
had already begun in I 980. So far as the industrial countries 
are concerned this process was completed in the two years 
1980-81, in the course of which USO 78 OOO million worth of 
Table 7.2 
Balance of payments 
goods and services or 1,6% of GDP at 1975 prices was shifted 
into net exports. Since 1981, however, the real trade balance 
has deteriorated; exports have fallen while imports have 
remained frozen at their I 980-8 I level. The continuing 
improvement in the current balance in nominal terms during 
1982-83 has been due to more favourable terms of trade (see 
Table 7.1). 
The record of the Community in the field of real, as of 
nominal, adjustment, has mirrored that of industrial 
countries generally, with a sharp improvement of the real 
trade balance during 1980-81 followed by some deterioration 
Nominal and real adjustment in the European Community, the United States and Japan 
(USD 'OOO million) 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Change 
1978/83 
EC 
(i) At current prices: 
Balance of trade in goods & services +32 +6 -17 + 10 + 13 +25 -7 
Investment income & transfers (net) -13 -17 -20 -24 -29 -30 -17 
Current balance + 19 -9 -37 -14 -16 -5 -24 
(ii) At constant 1975 prices: 
Balance of trade in goods & services +22 +8 + 16 +49 +39 +34 +12 
(iii) Terms of trade 
(index: 1975 = 100) 101 99 95 92 95 96 -5 I 
USA 
(i) At current prices: 
Balance of trade in goods & services -31 -26 -22 -22 -30 -47 -16 
Investment income & transfers (net) + 16 +25 +22 +27 +19 + 17 +I 
Current balance -15 -I 0 +5 -II -30 -15 
(ii) At constant 1975 prices: 
Balance of trade in goods & services -19 -I +20 + 15 +3 -16 +3 
(iii) Terms of trade 
(index: 1975 = 100) 96 90 82 85 88 94 -21 
Japan 
(i) At current prices: 
Balance of trade in goods & services + 17 -10 -10 +7 +7 + 18 +I 
Investment income & transfers (net) 0 +I -I -2 0 0 0 
Current balance + 17 -9 -II -5 +7 + 18 +I 
(i) At constant 1975 prices: 
Balance of trade in goods & services +4 -4 +18 +26 +25 +30 +26 
(iii) Terms of trade 113 96 77 79 80 81 -28 I 
In percent. 
Source. Eurostat and Commission estimates. 
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during the last two years. The United States has suffered a 
much more severe deterioration in its real trade balance 
(USO 36 OOO million at 1975 prices between 1980 and 1983) 
while Japan, having registered a strong improvement ( + USO 30 OOO million between 1979 and 1981) has main-
tained its trade surplus at a roughly constant level in real 
terms over the last three years (see Table 7.2). 
In last year's annual report it was observed that the process 
of real adjustment in the non-oil developing countries had 
not really got under way until 1982. In the light of the more 
complete data now available it is clear that in fact the non-oil 
developing countries had already begun to shift resources 
into real net exports on a substantial scale as early as 1980 
and the process has continued unabated throughout the last 
four years. On the basis of present estimates the real trade 
balance of this group of countries will have improved 
between 1979 and 1983 by USO 54 OOO million or ap-
proximately 6% of GDP at 1975 prices. Thus net exports 
have absorbed half the total increase in real output in this 
group of countries during the last four years. In fact, at 1975 
prices, these countries are now running a small surplus on 
goods and services (excluding investment income flows). 
Even at current prices their trade deficit is smaller in relation 
to output and exports than at any time during the 1970s. The 
fact that this remarkable real adjustment effort has not been 
more fully reflected in the current balance of these countries 
is due to the ever growing transfer burden entailed by debt 
service which has offset a large part of the improvement in 
the resource balance. The deficit on investment income 
account, most of it accounted for by debt service, has 
increased threefold, or by more than USO 50 OOO million 
since 1978 (see Table 7.1). 
7 .2 External adjustment and changes in the 
structure of trade and payments, 1978-82 
The second oil crisis produced a deterioration of nearly 10% 
in the terms of trade of industrial countries between 1978 and 
1980, only a small part of which was reversed in the two 
following years. As a general rule the effects of this terms of 
trade deterioration were concentrated on trade in primary 
products (a term which, throughout this chapter, is used to 
include all goods within categories O to 4 of the Standard 
International Trade Classification). Industrial countries. 
have traditionally run a deficit on their trade in primary 
products with the rest of the world, but in the two years from 
1978 to 1980 this increased from USO 172 OOO million to 
USO 314 OOO million on a fob/cif basis (see Table 7.3). 
This increase in net imports of primary products has been by 
far and away the most important single factor contributing 
to the deterioration in the combined current account of 
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industrial countries since 1978, although others, in particular 
the growing burden of debt service, have exerted a significant 
influence upon the performance of individual countries. 
Adjustment by the industrial countries has taken two main 
forms. In the first place they have endeavoured with some 
success to cut back on the volume of primary product 
imports, in particular, energy imports. As a result of their 
efforts their deficit on trade in primary products narrowed 
from USO 314 OOO million in 1980 to USO 250 OOO million 
in 1982. Some of this improvement was due to energy saving 
and the substitution of internally produced for imported 
sources of energy and where this is the case it should endure. 
A large part, however, is simply the result of the recession 
and may therefore be expected to be reversed once economic 
activity in the industrialized world recovers to a more normal 
level. 
The second form of adjustment and the one on which the 
main emphasis must be placed in the medium term since it is 
the only one that will enable industrial countries to reconcile 
external with internal equilibrium, consists of increasing the 
traditional surplus on trade in manufactured goods. 
Industrial countries as a whole have achieved some progress 
in the pursuit of this objective, increasing their trade surplus 
on manufactured goods from USO 135 OOO million in 1978 
to USO 165 OOO million by 1982. 
There have, however, been considerable variations in the 
performance of individual countries. Starting out from a 
position of current account deficit, the United States suffered 
a deterioration in its trade balance in primary products of 
rather modest dimensions (USO 22 OOO million or less than 
I;~ of GDP) between 1978 and 1982. Over the same period, 
despite il short-lived improvement during 1978-80, the 
balance of trade in manufactured goods showed no change 
and the United States external adjustment, such as it was, 
took the form of an improvement in the balance on services 
and investment income. This was sufficient to produce an 
outturn for the current account in 1982 that was marginally 
better in current dollar terms than in 1978. 
Japan, by contrast, suffered a deterioration in its balance of 
trade in primary products during 1978-82 that was much 
more severe-equivalent to USO 40 OOO million or 4% of 
GDP. However, aided by an exchange rate at which Japanese 
traded goods were~and still are-extremely competitive, 
Japanese exporters succeeded in offsetting most of the 
adverse movement on trade in primary products by an 
increase in net exports of manufactures. Despite a modest 
deterioration in the balance on services and transfers, this 
was enough to restore the current account by 1982 to a 
surplus of USO 7 OOO million, which, in relation to GDP, 
was roughly equivalent to the average of the years 1975-78 
between the two oil shocks. Thus already by 1982 Japan may 
be considered to have successfully completed the process of 
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Table 7.3 
Contributions to changes in current balances of industrial countries, 1978-82 
(USD 'OOO million) 
1978 1980 1982 Change 
1978-82 
I. All industrial countries 
Trade balance on primary products (fob/cif) -172 -314 -250 -78 
Trade balance on manufactures (fob/cif) + 135 + 172 + 165 +30 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) -37 -142 -85 -48 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) +5 -75 -25 -30 
Services, investment income and transfers +5 +5 -9 -14 
Current balance + 10 -70 -34 -44 
2. United States 
Trade balance on primary products (fob/cif) -26 -48 -32 -6 
Trade balance on manufactures (fob/cif) -5 +20 -5 0 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) -31 -28 -37 -6 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) -34 -25 -36 -2 
Services and investment income +24 +34 +33 +9 
Unilateral transfers -5 -7 -8 -3 
Current balance -15 +2 - II +4 
3. , Japan 
Trade balance on primary products (fob/cif) -56 -105 -96 -40 
Trade balance on manufactures (fob/cif) +74 +94 + 103 +29 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) +18 -II +7 -II 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) +25 +2 + 18 -7 
Services and investment income -7 -II -10 -3 
Unilateral transfers -I -1 -1 0 
Current balance + 17 - II +7 -10 
4. European Community 
Trade balance on primary products (fob/cif) -88 -152 -119 -31 
Trade balance on manufactures (fob/cif) +84 +87 +93 +9 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) -4 -65 -26 -22 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) + 13 -35 -3 -16 
Services and investment income +21 + 19 +7 -14 
Unilateral transfers -15 -21 -20 -5 
Current balance + 19 -37 -16 -35 
Source: Eurostat; OECD. 
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external adjustment to the higher level of real energy costs 
which have prevailed since 1980. 
The European Community, like Japan, experienced a very 
severe deterioration in its balance of trade in primary 
procflucts-USD 64 OOO million or 4% of GDP in the two 
years 1978-80 above. Since 1980 it has been somewhat more 
successful than Japan in reducing its net primary product 
imports in current .price terms and approximately half of the 
increase in the trade deficit on such goods that had occurred 
during 1978 to 1980 was eliminated over the next two years. 
On the other hand it has been much less successful than 
Japan-although rather more so than the United States-in 
expanding its net exports of manufactured goods. The 
Community's surplus on trade in manufactures increased by 
a modest USO 9 OOO million between 1978 and 1980, an 
improvement equivalent to less than 0,5% of 1978 GDP. 
In addition to the deterioration in its visible trade balance, 
the Community as a whole has experienced an adverse swing 
on invisible transactions. Much of this has been due to the 
swing from surplus to deficit on investment income account, 
as a result of borrowing to finance current deficits in the past. 
There has also been a steady increase in official transfers to 
developing countries. The net result of all this has been that, 
despite a significant improvement since 1980, the Com-
munity's current account in 1982 was still USO 35 OOO mil-
lion worse than it had been four years earlier. In 1978 the 
Community had a current surplus equal to I;.; of GDP; in 
1982 it had a deficit equal to 0,5% of GDP. Clearly the 
adjustment process for this group of countries, taken as a 
whole, still has quite a long way to go before it can be 
considered to have been completed. 
Within the Community there have been significant dif-
ferences between the Member States in the extent to which 
they have adjusted and the manner in which that adjustment 
has been achieved (see Table 7.4). 
The most remarkable adjustment was achieved by the 
Netherlands which, through a combination of restrictive 
internal economic policy and a sharp improvement in cost 
and price competitiveness managed both to increase its net 
exports of primary products and to reduce its net imports of 
manufactures, thereby improving the current balance by 
nearly 5 OOO million ECU or 5% of GDP. This is much more 
than was necessary to achieve a satisfactory outturn· on 
current account and it may be thought that external 
adjustment in the Netherlands has been pushed rather too 
far. 
The pattern of adjustment followed by the FR of Germany 
has been very similar to that in Japan, with the worsening of 
the trade balance on primary products continuing throug-
hout the whole four years from 1978 to 1982, but being 
somewhat more than fully compensated for by a massive 
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increase in net exports of manufactures. Consequently 
despite a deterioration in services, investment income and 
transfers, the current account again registered a surplus in 
1982, albeit a slightly smaller one than in 1978. Thus 
Germany, like Japan, may be thought to have successfully 
completed its external adjustment. 
The second oil shock coincided with the transition of the 
United Kingdom from the status of a net importer of energy 
products to that of a small net exporter. This, combined with 
a continuing redm:tion in llt:pendence on imported foods-
tuffs completely transformed the country's balance of trade 
on primary products. In 1978 net imports of primary 
products still amounted to 12 OOO million ECU or 5% of 
GDP. By 1982 they had fallen to 3 800 million ECU or less 
than I% of GDP. However, in sharp contrast to the 
Netherlands, whose situation is in some respects rather 
similar, by reason of its status as an energy-sufficient 
economy, the United Kingdom has not combined an 
improving trade balance on primary products with an 
improving trade balance on manufactures. On the contrary, 
despite restrictive economic policies leading to stagnation of 
domestic demand, net exports of manufactures declined 
from 6 600 million ECU in 1978 to I I 00 million ECU or 
0,2% of GDP in 1982. This appears to have been the 
consequence of the steep appreciation of sterling in real 
terms, which has severely damaged the competitiveness of 
British manuacturing industry. Over the period under 
review, however, this worsening of the United Kingdom's 
manufacturing trade performance has not been sufficient to 
offset the improvement on trade in primary products, so that 
both the merchandise trade balance as a whole and the 
current account improved substantially and registered 
comfortable surpluses in 1982. This year, however, the 
United Kingdom, for the first time since statistics on the 
composition of its foreign trade have been compiled, is 
expected to record a deficit on its trade in manufactured 
goods and the surplus on current account is likely to be 
almost, if not completely, eliminated. 
In other Community countries adjustment proceeded more 
slowly and in some cases there was no adjustment at all in the 
period under consideration. Italy, Belgium-Luxembourg 
and Denmark have all made some progress in offsetting the 
increase in their net imports of primary products by 
improving their balance of trade in manufactured goods. But 
in all three countries the effect of this on the current balance 
has been to some extent offset by an adverse swing on 
investment income account-the result of the need to service, 
in a period of high interest rates, the debts that were incurred 
to finance current deficits in previous years. The growing 
burden of debt service has proved a particularly serious 
obstacle to adjustment in Denmark, where the deficit on 
goods and services (excluding investment income flows) was 
virtually eliminated between 1978 and 1982, but in spite of 
this the current deficit more than doubled over the same 
period. 
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Table 7.4 
Contributions to changes in current balances of Community countries, 1978-82 
('000 million £CU) 
1978 1980 1982 Change 
1978-82 
I. Belgium-Luxembourg 
Trade balance in primary products (fob/cif) -5,4 -8,7 -9,4 -4,0 
Trade balance in manufactures (fob/cif) +3,6 +3,7 +6,2 +2,6 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) -1,8 -5,0 -3,2 -1,4 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) -2,3 -4,1 -4,0 -1,7 
Services + 1,7 + 1,4 +2,5 +0,8 
Investment income +0,5 0,0 -0,5 -1,0 
Unilateral transfers -0,6 -1,0 -1,3 -0,7 
Current balance -0,8 -3,8 -3,3 -2,5 
2. Denmark 
Trade balance in primary products (fob/cif) +0,3 -0,4 -0,2 -0,5 
Trade balance in manufactures (fob/cif) -2,5 -1,5 -1,6 +0,9 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) -2,2 - 1.9 -1.8 +0,4 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) -1,8 -1,5 -1,1 +0,7 
Services +0,9 +0,9 +0,9 0,0 
Investment income -0,7 -1,3 -2,3 -1,6 
Unilateral transfers +0,4 0,0 -0,2 -0,6 
Current balance -1.2 -1,8 -2,6 -1,4 
3. Federal Republic of Germany 
Trade balance in primary products (fob/cif) -25,2 -40,3 -46,6 -21,4 
Trade balance in manufactures (fob/cif) +42,1 +44,5 +68,4 +26,3 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) + 16,9 +4,2 +21,8 +4,9 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) + 18,7 +5,8 +24,8 +6,1 
Services -6,6 -9,1 -8,6 -2,0 
Investment income +2,0 +1,7 -1,0 -3,0 
Unilateral transfers -7,0 -9,7 -11,8 -4,8 
Current balance +7,1 -11,3 +3,5 -3,6 
4. Greece 
Trade balance in primary products (fob/cif) -0,7 -1,1 -1,8 -1,1 
Trade balance in manufactures (fob/cif) -2,6 -2,8 -3,7 -1,1 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) -3,3 -3,9 -5,5 -2,2 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) -2,8 -4,0 -4,6 -1,8 
Services + 1,3 + 1,8 +2,2 +0,9 
Investment income -0,1 -0,2 -0,6 -0,5 
Unilateral transfers +0,8 +0,8 + 1,5 +0,7 
Current balance -0,8 -1,6 -1,5 -0,7 
5. France 
Trade balance in primary products (fob/cif) -12,0 -22,0 -27,4 -15,4 
Trade balance in manufactures (fob/cif) +8,0 +5,1 +3,5 -4,5 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) -4,0 -16,9 -23,9 -19,9 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) +0,6 -9,4 -16,2 -16,8 
Services +6,7 +7,7. +5,1 -1,6 
Investment income +0,8 + 1,6 -0,2 -1,0 
Unilateral transfers -2,6 -3,0 -4,7 -2,1 
Current balance +5,5 -3,0 -16,0 -21,5 
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Table 7.4 ( continued) 
Contributions to changes in current balances of Community countries 1978-82 
6. Ireland 
Trade balance in primary products (fob/cif) 
Trade balance in manufactures (fob/cif) 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) 
Services 
Investment income 
Unilateral transfers 
Current balance 
7. Italy 
Trade balance in primary products (fob/cif) 
Trade balance in manufactures (fob/cif) 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) 
Services 
Investment income 
Unilateral transfers 
Current balance 
8. Netherlands 
Trade balance in primary products (fob/cif) 
Trade balance in manufactures (fob/cif) 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) 
Services 
Investment income 
Unilateral transfers 
Current balance 
9. United Kingdom 
Trade balance in primary products (fob/cif) 
Trade balance in manufactures (fob/cif) 
Total merchandise trade balance (fob/cif) 
Total merchandise trade balance (BOP basis) 
Services 
Investment income 
Unilateral transfers 
Current balance 
Source: Eurostat. 
France achieved no external adjustment during the four 
years 1978-82. The balance of trade on primary products 
grew steadily worse throughout the whole period, while at 
the same time the surplus on manufactures, which in 1978 
had largely offset the deficit on primary products, was 
reduced by more than half so that a massive deficit on total 
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( 'OOO million £CU I 
1978 1980 1982 Change 
1978-82 
+0,6 +0,2 0,0 -0,6 
- 1,7 -2,1 -1,6 +O,l 
-1,1 -1,9 -1,6 -0,5 
-0,8 - 1,5 -1,6 -0,8 
0,0 -0,1 +0,3 +0,3 
-0,3 -0.5 -0,9 -0,6 
+0,7 +0,9 +0,7 0,0 
-0,4 - 1,2 - 1,5 - l.l 
- 16,5 -28,0 -35,5 -19,0 
+ 16,3 + 12.4 +22,0 + 5,7 
-0,2 - 15,6 -13,5 - 13,3 
+2,3 - I l,8 -8,1 - 10,4 
+3,8 +4,3 + 5,6 + 1,8 
-0,9 -0,5 -4,0 -3,1 
-0,3 +0,9 +0,9 + 1,2 
+4,9 -7,1 -5,6 -10,5 
+ 1,9 +0,9 +3,7 + 1,8 
-4,1 -2,9 0,0 +4,l 
-2,2 -2,0 +3,7 +5,9 
-1,2 -1,0 +3,9 +5,1 
+0,8 +0,1 + 1,0 +0,2 
0,0 -0,2 -0,1 -0,1 
-0,8 -0,9 -1,3 -0,5 
- 1,2 -2,0 +3,5 +4,7 
- 12,0 -9,6 -3,8 +8,2 
+6,6 +6,2 +I,l -5,5 
-5,4 -3,4 -2,7 + 2,7 
-2,4 +2,3 +4,0 +6,4 
+5,6 +6,9 +6,4 +0,8 
+0,9 -0,5 +0,6 -0,3 
-2,7 -3,5 -3,7 -1,0 
+ 1,5 +5,2 +7,3 +5,8 
merchandise trade emerged. The deterioration of the trade 
balance may be attributed to the fact that economic policy in 
France during this period was less restrictive than in most of 
the country's major trading partners as well as to the 
appreciation of the franc in real terms up till 1981 which 
somewhat eroded the competitiveness of French manu-
facturing industry. With the surplus on services and transfers 
also declining, the current account registered an adverse 
swing of 21 OOO million ECU or 5% of 1978 GDP. Ireland 
and Greece also failed to make significant progress towards 
adjustment during the years up to and including 1982. In 
both countries the deterioration in primary product trade 
continued unabated and little success was achieved in 
offsetting this by reducing net imports of manufactures. This 
year Ireland's trade balance, both in primary products and 
manufactured goods has registered a marked improvement, 
but in Greece external performance remains a cause for 
serious concern. In particular the deterioration of the 
balance of trade in manufactures which appears to have 
resulted from the opening up of the Greek market to 
exporters from other Member States following Greek 
accession to the Community in 1981 has yet to be halted. The 
problems of both Ireland and Greece, like those of other 
persistent deficit countries, have been seriously aggravated 
by the rising cost of debt service. 
7.3 Competitiveness and international trade 
The second oil shock, like the first, exacerbated existing 
inflation differentials and triggered off substantial move-
ments in exchange rates. As a result of these two factors, 
which have sometimes tended to offset and at other times to 
reinforce each other there have been some rather large swings 
in international cost competitiveness and these in turn have 
exerted a significant influence on trade flows: In the short run 
at least price elasticities of demand tend to be very low for 
most primary products and probably also for the majority of 
service transactions, with the notable exception of tourism. 
As a result the effect of changes in relative costs and prices 
tends to be felt mainly in trade in manufactured goods. 
However, manufactured goods account for approximately 
75% of total merchandise exports and 60% of merchandise 
imports of industrial countries, so that relative price changes 
in this sector, provided that they are accompanied by 
appropriate internal economic policies, can have a signific-
ant impact upon the sum of current transactions. 
Changes in competitiveness tend to be spread over a period 
of several years and their effects sometimes only occur with a 
lag and then last for several years. Consequently some of the 
changes in trade in manufactured goods which have occurred 
during the last few years have their origin in changes in cost 
and price competitiveness which occurred in the middle 
1970s. Some of the more recent changes in competitiveness 
have yet to produce their full effect on trade flows. Indeed in 
some cases the effects have not yet even begun to show 
through. 
The basic data concerning the international competitiveness 
of the European Community, the United States and Japan 
are set out in Table 7.5. The table compares the performance 
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Table 7.5 
Inflation, exchange rate movements and competitiveness 
in the European Community, the United States and 
Japan 
(Indices: 1970-75 = JOO) 
EC USA Japan 
I. Re/ati\le inflation 
1978 ll3 87 90 
1979 ll6 90 82 
1980 121 92 72 
1981 ll9 92 70 
1982 ll7 · 94 66 
1983 120 92 65 
2. Trade-weighted exchange rate 
1978 95 90 141 
1979 100 87 132 
1980 101 87 127 
1981 94 99 144 
1982 86 Ill 137 
1983 82 119 151 
3. Competitiveness 
1978 107 79 127 
1979 116 78 108 
1980 123 80 92 
1981 112 91 101 
1982 101 105 90 
1983 98 109 98 
Source: Commission estimates. 
of each of these three economies against a weighted average 
of all other industrial countries with respect to inflation 
(measured here by the movement of unit labour costs in 
manufacturing), nominal exchange rates and competitive-
ness. Graph 7.1 shows movements in cost competitiveness 
and trade performance (measured here by the balance of 
trade in manufactured goods as a percentage of GDP) and it 
can be seen fairly clearly from the graph that changes in 
competitiveness have been followed, with a variable lag of 
anything up to three years, by changes in trade performance 
in the direction that both common sense and economic 
theory would suggest. 
During the 1970s inflation in the European Community as a 
whole was well above the international average, but this was 
not fully reflected in exchange rate movements. In particular, 
during the second half of the decade Community currencies 
appreciated on average against the currencies of competitor 
countries and this, together with the adverse inflation 
differential, produced a very substantial loss of competitive-
ness during 1977-80. This in due course affected the 
Community's trading performance in the manufactured 
goods sector, which deteriorated sharply during 1978-80. 
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GRAPH 7.1: Competitiveness and trade performance in the 
EC, USA and Japan 
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Since 1980 labour costs in the Community have risen at 
abo ut the same rate as in the rest of the wo rld , but the 
Community's average exchange rate has depreciated by 
nearly 20%. As a result the competitive loss experienced 
during the previous years has been recouped. Already by 
1982 the fruits of thi s hea lthier competitive position were 
beginning to show in the Community's trade perfom1ance 
and this trend seems to be persisting during 1983. 
The United Sta tes' experience has been the mirror of the 
Communi ty ' s. During the I 970s infla ti on in the USA was in 
fact sli ghtly lower than in competitor countri es, but during 
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the la tter half of the decade the dollar depreciated, so that by 
1980 US competitiveness was abo ut 20°10 stronge r than in 
I 970-75. This produced a sharp improvement in US 
manufacturing trade performance during the second half of 
the decade. Since I 980, however, the position has been 
drama tically reversed. US labour costs have ri sen a t about 
the same rate as labour costs in competitor countries but the 
dollar app reciated by 28% between l 980 and I 982 (a nd by a 
further 7-;~ this year). As a result US competitiveness has 
deteriorated by about one third. This had a lready produced a 
very sharp deterioration in US ma nufacturing trade 
performance by 1982 and there are clear indications that the 
decline has cont inued this year. 
During the 1970s Japan had the lowest rate o f manufa cturing 
labo ur cost inflation of any industrial country. In the long 
term the exchange rate has tended to appreciate and thus 
more or less to offset the favourabl e inflation d ifferential, but 
these exchange rate movements have been very irregular. 
wit h the resu lt that the competitive posi tion has shown 
marked variations in the short and medium term . 
Thus appreciation of the exchange rate caused a deterio r-
at ion of compet iti veness during the mid- l 970s and thi s had 
begun to have some effect on trade performa nee by l 977-78. 
However the second o il shock precipitated a steep fall in the 
yen's exchange rate (since the Japanese economy was 
thought at the time to be especia lly vu lnerable to higher oil 
prices) and the recovery since then has been insufficient to 
offset Japan's below average rate of labour cost inflation. 
Japan's competitive position is thus still substantiall y 
stronger that it was in the late 1970s and thi s has undoubtedl y 
con tributed to the striking improvement in Japanese trade 
performance since 1980. 
Inside the Community too there have been some quite large 
nominal and real exchange rate movements and these have 
also, in most cases, produced changes in trade perfom1ance 
in the direction , if no t always on the sca le, that would have 
been expected (see T a ble 7.6 and Graph . 7.2). 
Thus in Germa ny, competitiveness was eroded during the 
1970 as a result of the continuous appreciation of the 
German mark and this produced a deterioration in German 
trade performance during I 978-80. During I 980-83 com-
petitiveness has improved sign ificantl y the result of a 
continued below-average rate of inflation combined with a 
fa irl y stable exchange rate, and this has been fo llowed by a 
revival of manufacturing trade performance which began in 
1982 and seems to have been maintained during 1983. 
France experienced a rate of inflation above that of its 
competitors during I 979-80 but thi s was not reflected in the 
behaviour of the exchange rate wh ich was held fairly stable 
during this period. As a resu lt there was a loss of 
competitiveness which, with the no rmal lag of one to two 
years, produced a marked falling-off in French manufactur-
ing trade performance during 1980-82. Inflation in France 
has continued to run above the international average, but 
exchange rate adjustments within the EMS, combined with 
the strength of other major third currencies, have by now 
produced a trade-weighted depreciation of the franc of over 
20% since 1980. This has been more than enough to offset the 
adverse inflation differential and competitiveness has 
improved substantially. This did not at first produce any 
positive effect on trade performance, probably because, as 
mentioned earlier, the pressure of demand in France was 
maintained at a somewhat higher level than in the country's 
principal trading partners, but there is some evidence that an 
improvement is now getting under way. 
In Italy inflation has been persistently well above the 
international average. In recent years, however, the exchange 
rate has been managed so as to offset this adverse inflation 
differential. The relative cost position improved markedly in 
the mid-1970s and has been maintained at a satisfactorily 
competitive level since then. There has been a considerable 
improvement in trade performance in response. 
Table 7.6 
Balance of payments 
In the United Kingdom the combination of a higher than 
average rate of inflation and a strongly appreciating 
exchange rate has produced a massive loss of competitive-
ness since 1978 and this has predictably been accompanied 
by a very serious deterioration in the UK's trading 
performance in manufactured goods. The sharp deceleration 
of inflation together with the fall in the exchange rate during 
1982-83 has repaired some of the damage done to UK 
competitiveness and may arrest the decline in the UK's 
manufacturing trade performance but it is unlikely that these 
developments will be sufficient to recover the ground lost 
over the last four years. At today's exchange rate UK 
manufacturing costs are about the same, in relation to those 
of competitors, as they were before the sterling devaluation 
in 1967. 
Among the smaller member countries the Netherlands, 
Belgium-Luxembourg and Denmark, have all substantially 
improved their competitiveness during the last three to four 
years. In the Netherlands this result has been achieved by a 
lower than average rate of inflation which has been less than 
fully offset by exchange rate appreciation. In Belgium and 
Inflation, exchange rate movements and competitiveness in Community countries 
(Indices: 1970-75 = JOO) 
BLEU DK D GR F IRL NL UK 
I. Relative inflation 
1978 92 99 81 137 106 125 151 88 138 
1979 87 101 78 153 107 126 155 85 150 
1980 85 97 75 173 108 138 160 80 169 
1981 81 93 73 197 I 10 142 177 75 171 
1982 76 95 70 233 113 151 194 73 168 
1983 75 95 67 262 119 157 213 71 165 
2. Effective exchange rate 
1978 116 107 136 74 98 78 62 123 69 
1979 119 107 144 71 100 78 60 126 74 
1980 118 98 144 62 101 76 58 126 81 
1981 112 91 137 56 92 70 51 120 81 
1982 102 88 144 52 85 69 48 126 78 
1983 100 88 149 43 79 67 46 129 73 
3. Competitiveness 
1978 107 106 Ill 102 104 97 93 108 95 
1979 103 107 112 108 106 99 93 107 110 
1980 101 95 108 107 109 105 93 101 137 
1981 91 85 100 110 102 99 90 90 140 
1982 77 83 IOI 120 96 104 92 92 131 
1983 75 83 100 113 95 105 98 91 120 
Source: Commission estimates. 
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GRAPH 7.2: Competitiven~ and trade performance in EC countries 
70-75 = 100 
FR of Germany. 
70-76 
100 
110 
France 
7 
77-80V 
78-80 
% 
9 
8 
100 t 
110 
Italy 
70-74 
. 79-80 
S.J -82 j 2 
'80-82 
90 
100 
110 
/ 76-82 
~ 
// 
70-75/ 
/ 
United Kingdom 
73-77 
100 
110 
120 
Netherlands 
100 
110 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 
- Index of competitiveness 1970-75 = 100 (left hand scale). 
- - Balance of trade in manufactures or % of GDP (right hand scale). 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
-2 
-3 
70-75 = 100 
BLEU 
90 
100 
110 
Denmark 
80 
90 
100 
110 
Ireland 
90 
100 
110 
Greece 
JOO 
110 
70-71 
I 
13.19 I 
14-15-- I 
'-.J 
76-79 
76-79 
... _ 
I 
I 
I 
80-82 
80-82 
80-82 
I 
I 
I 
80-82 
/ 72.75 ___ _ 
- - 76-82 
76-82 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 
% 
7 
6 
- 3 
- 4 
- 5 
- 6 
- 14 
- 15 
- 16 
- 10 
- I I 
Note : A fall in either of the two curves denotes a deterioration (i.e. a loss of competitiveness or a fall in the trade balance in relation.to GDP). A rise denotes an improvement. 
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Denmark, not only has inflation been below the inter-
national average, but the franc and the krone have 
depreciated on a trade-weighted basis, thus producing very 
large improvements in competitiveness, of the order of 20-
30% since 1978. The effects of these changes on trade 
performance have been particularly striking in the Nether-
lands, but they have been impressive in Belgium and 
Denmark too. 
The position of the Irish pound is exceptional in that the 
EMS countries, to whose currencies it is pegged, account for 
only about 25% of Irish foreign trade. Ireland's principal 
trading partner, the United Kingdom, which accounts for 
about 45% of Irish foreign trade, remains outside the EMS. 
There have been sizeable exchange rate fluctuations between 
sterling and the Irish pound since the parity between them 
was broken in 1979 with the result that the movement of the 
Irish pound on a trade-weighted basis over the last four years 
has, to a large extent, escaped the Irish authorities' control. 
Despite this Ireland has over the years managed-sometimes 
more by accident than design-to offset a persistently higher 
than average rate of inflation by a generally downward 
movement of the exchange rate on a trade-weighted basis. 
Variations in competitiveness have been fairly moderate and 
changes in relative pressure of demand appear to have 
exerted a more important influence on trade performance, 
which has fluctuated considerably over the medium term. 
Greece, on the other hand, has failed to offset its higher than 
average rate of inflation by exchange rate adjustment and its 
competitiveness appears to have been quite seriously eroded 
during recent years, although so far the effect on trade 
performance has not been as damaging as might have been 
expected. The devaluation of the drachma at the beginning of 
this year has recouped less than half of the competitive loss 
suffered during 1979-82. 
7.4 Financing the Community's deficit 
As mentioned earlier, progress towards the elimination of the 
Community's current deficit which had been substantial in 
1981 has slowed down considerably since then. Nevertheless, 
according to present forecasts the Community as a whole will 
have almost eliminated its current deficit this year. As usual 
performance has varied considerably from one member 
country to another. The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, the BLEU and Ireland have continued the 
process begun in 1981 ( or in some cases in 1982) and have 
either moved back into comfortable surplus or considerably 
reduced their deficits. The United Kingdom and France on 
the other hand have both suffered a serious deterioration, the 
surplus of the former having almost disappeared, while the 
deficit of the latter has substantially increased. In Denmark 
and Greece there has been little change in an already 
unsatisfactory situation (see Table 7.7). 
Balance of payments 
Table 7.7 
Current balances of Community countries 
('OOO million ECU) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 I 1984 I 
BLEU -3,6 -3,6 -3,3 -2,1 -1,4 
DK -1,8 -1,7 -2,6 -1,3 -0,7 
D -11,3 -5,6 +3,5 +6,0 +6,1 
GR -1,6 -2,l -1,5 -1,9 -2,1 
F -3,0 -4,3 -16,0 -8,6 -4,8 
IRL -1,2 -2,0 -1,5 -0,4 -0,1 
I -7,1 -7,4 -5,6 -2,8 +0,3 
NL ---:2,1 +2,6 +3,5 +4,6 +5,7 
UK +5,2 +11,0 +7J + 1,2 -0,4 
EC -26,4 -13,1 -16,2 -5,3 +2,6 
Forecast. 
Source: Eurostat and Commission estimates. 
The Community has now been in deficit on current account 
for five consecutive years (1979-83). This is by far the longest 
uninterrupted period of deficit in its history. Over the four 
years 1979-82 for which reasonably reliable and comprehen° 
sive data are available the Community as a whole recorded a 
cumulative current account deficit of 62 OOO million ECU. 
To this was added a net outflow of private non-bank capital 
of 65 OOO million ECU, making a total 'basic' deficit to be 
financed of 127 OOO million ECU. 
Over this four year period every single Member State has 
recorded a substantial deficit on its basic balance of 
payments. In Germany, France and the BLEU the current 
deficit was aggravated by a net outflow of private non-bank 
capital. In Italy, Denmark and Ireland only a small part of 
the current deficit was covered by a net capital inflow. Greece 
alone managed to finance more than half its current deficit 
through a net inflow of private non-bank capital. In the only 
two members to record a current surplus over the period as a 
whole, the United Kingdom (where developments have 
clearly been influenced by the removal of exchange controls) 
· and the Netherlands, the net capital outflow greatly exceeded 
the· current surplus (see Table 7.8). 
There have been considerable variations between Member 
States in the manner in which these basic deficits have been 
financed. The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the 
BLEU, Denmark and Greece have had recourse mainly to 
official borrowing, with use of reserves playing a significant, 
although secondary, role in the German case. France, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands have financed their 
deficits almost entirely by means of short-term borrowing by 
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Table 7.8 
Balance of payments financing in the Community, 1979-82 
BLEU DK D 
I. Cumulative current account deficit -12,6 -8,3 -17,9 
2. Private non-bank capital (net) -4,9 +2,5 -8,0 
3. Total to be financed ( = I + 2) -17,5 -5,8 -25,9 
Financed by: 
4. Banks + errors and omissions +5,9 -0,6 -4,5 
5. Official long and short-term capital 
(net) +9,8 +5,6 +21,1 
6. Change in reserves ( - denotes increase) + 1,8 +0,8 +9,3 
Source: Eurostat and Commission estimates. 
banks. 1 In the Netherlands' case such borrowing exceeded 
the basic deficit and thus allowed a small addition to reserves. 
During the period under review the five smallest Member 
States-the BLEU, Denmark, Greece and Ireland-all 
registered cumulative current deficits equal to between 15% 
and 30% of 1982 GDP. Except in the case of Greece, where, 
as already mentioned, inflows of private non-bank capital 
covered a substantial proportion of the deficit, financing has 
been achieved almost entirely by a combination of official 
borrowing and short-term borrowing by banks. Thus debts 
have been incurred which are decidedly large in relation to 
the economies of the countries concerned, while there must 
be considerable doubt whether the funds have been used 
productively in the sense of generating additional tradeable 
output in the future. With high rates of interest at present 
being applied to such large amounts of outstanding debt, 
debt service has become a serious burden for some of these 
countries. The annual net outflow on investment income 
account, most of it debt service, is now estimated to amount 
to 5% of GDP in Denmark and 6% in Ireland. 
Notwithstanding that most of the Community's deficit 
during 1979-82 was financed by borrowing, the net effect of 
transactions over this period was to reduce gross reserves by 
the equivalent of 18 OOO million ECU. The fact that over the 
same period the level of gross reserves (excluding the 80% of 
gold reserves that have not been swapped against ECU), 
expressed in terms ofECU, has risen by 27 OOO million ECU 
is to be explained entirely by valuation changes. Over this 
period the ECU value of the Community's foreign currency 
and SOR denominated holdings has been considerably 
Including 'errors and omissions'. 
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( 'OOO million ECU) 
GR F IRL NL UK EC 
-7,0 -19,4 -5,4 -16,1 +2,4 +22,2 -62,1 
+4,1 -12,1 + 1,4 +2,3 -6,9 -43,2 -64,8 
-2,9 -31,5 -4,0 -13,8 -4,5 -21,0 -126,9 
+ 1,0 +28,9 +2,2 +2,6 +6,8 + 18,2 +60,4 
+ 1,5 +0,5 +2,1 +9,6 -0,7 -1,2 +48,2 
+0,4 +2,1 -0,3 + 1,6 -1,6 +4,0 + 18,3 
Table 7.9 
Gross reserves in the European Community 
('/HJO millicm ECUJI 
1978 1981) 1982 1983 
end of year June 
8/L 3,4 6,0 3,7 6,0 
(7,5) (8,7) (4,3) (6,5) 
DK 2,3 2,6 2,3 3,4 
(15,3) (13,5) (9,5) (13,0) 
D 39,5 36,2 47,2 50,4 
(32,2) (21,0) (22,6) (24,0) 
GR 0,8 1,2 1,2 1,2 
(13,0) (14,2) (8,8) (8,8) 
F 9,6 22,3 16,2 20,1 
(10,5) (16,0) (8,9) ( 10,3) 
IRL 1,9 2,1 2,7 2,4 
(29,2) (21,9) (24,0) (21,8) 
10.4 17,6 14,5 20,8 
(20,0) (21, I) (13,5) ( 19,3) 
NL 5,0 8,8 10,4 11,2 
(10,0) (12,6) (12,3) (13,2) 
UK 11,3 15,7 12,7 13,2 
(15,0) (14,1) (9,3) (9, I) 
EC 84,2 112,5 110,9 128,5 
USO OOO million 116;0 145,5 107,5 114,2 
( 18, I) (16,5) (12,9) ( 14,5) 
Figures in brackets indicate the ratio of reserves to imports of goods and services. 
Souce: Commission. · 
inflated by the appreciation of the dollar against the ECU, 
while the value of ECU holdings has been inflated both by 
the appreciation of the dollar and by the increase in the price 
of gold. 
Despite the rise in the level of reserves, the ratio ofreserves to 
imports declined by nearly one third between 1978 and 1982, 
an experience which the Community has shared with 
industrial countries generally. Reserve to import ratios had 
sunk to particularly low levels in France, the United 
Kingdom, the BLEU, Denmark and Greece. During the first 
Balance of payments 
half of 1983 some of these countries, and indeed the 
Community as a whole, were able to replenish their reserves 
to a limited extent, although in most Member States reserves 
are still on the low side in relation to imports when viewed in 
the light of historical experience (see Table 7.9). Only in the 
Netherlands is the ratio of reserves to imports higher today 
than it was five years ago. Moreover, since in almost all 
Member States the present level of gross reserves has only 
been achieved by heavy foreign borrowing in one form or 
another, the gross figures conceal the considerable absolute 
decline in net reserves that has occurred since 1978. 
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8. Some properties of the European economies 
in the light of econometric models 
The Commission services are at present using two econometric models for macroeconomic 
forecasts and analyses. The earlier of these models, Comet, was used especially in the 
studies associated with the fifth medium-term programme. The second model, Euro/ink, 
groups four large national models (those for Germany, France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom), which are linked with each other and with the rest of the world via bilateral 
international trade flows. In 1983, Euro/ink was used to construct a set of economic policy 
multipliers for a number of budgetary and monetary measures, and to analyse the reaction 
of the countries covered to certain external shocks and to changes in exchange rates. One 
may, of course, question and discuss how faithfully economic systems can be represented 
by means of models, however complex they may be. The lessons drawn from the analyses 
presented here should therefore be treated with caution. Yet they illustrate the impact of 
certain economic policy measures depending on whether they are taken in isolation or 
coordinated, on whether the budgetary measures are taken against an accommodating or 
a restrictive monetary background, and on whether their environment is one of controlled 
or freely floating exchange rates. 
8.1 The economic policy scenarios 
This chapter presents a systematic analysis of the Eurolink 
model's responses to a normalized series of shocks involving 
public expenditure and revenue, interest rates, changes in 
nominal wages, the influence of the import price of oil (or 
export price in the United Kingdom's case), and deliberate 
devaluations and revaluations of national currencies. The 
opportunity was also taken of comparing the impact of each 
measure according to whether the shock is given in isolation 
in one country or jointly by all the European countries at 
once. Also, the presence in each national model of a 
monetary and financial sector was used to compare.the effect 
of the budgetary measures taken against an accommodating 
monetary background (in the sense that interest rates are 
held constant) with the effect against a non-accommodating 
monetary background. Whenever the model permits, each 
shock is applied first with an unchanging exchange rate, and 
then with a freely floating exchange rate, except, of course, 
for the shocks to the exchange rates themselves, where the 
variant is a comparison of the effect of a 10% devaluation 
against the dollar with that of a I 0% revaluation. Lastly, we 
tested the impact of a reaction to the rise in raw material 
prices under an expansionary budgetary policy (via public 
investment). 
8.2 Summary of the main results: general 
comments 
Several million numerical data and well over a thousand 
pages of detailed commentaries would be needed for an 
exhaustive presentation of the variations observed in all the 
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models' variables in response to the shocks in all their 
variants; the picture would be too complex to be grasped and 
there would be a good chance of not being able to see the 
wood for the trees. 
Therefore, all that we can do here is to present an overall 
macroeconomic summary of the results obtained, putting the 
emphasis on a comparison of changes rather than absolute 
levels. 
The analysis will be made in two stages: the first will examine 
the comparative effectiveness of the measures tested in terms 
of the fundamental objectives of economic policy: growth, 
-inflation, employment, external equilibrium and general 
government borrowing requirement. Since the Eurolink 
models are basically geared to short-term or short medium-
term forecasting, the period considered was deliberately 
limited to 16 quarters. 
This section will confine itself to examining the measures in 
the most usual simulation of the national models, i.e. action 
in isolation, fixed exchange rate and non-accommodating 
monetary policy. t These assumptions will be relaxed in the 
following sections. 
Table I of the annex summarizes the results obtained for 
growth and prices. 
With regard to growth,.the magnitude of the multipliers may 
vary substantially from one shock to another but broadly 
A situation where interest rates are free to fluctuate in response to shocks 
to the other variables. 
Some properties of the European economies in the light of econometric models 
speaking, one might say that a 1 % variation in public income 
or expenditure is equivalent to a 6 to 8% variation in the 
exchange rate. 
It is more difficult to compare the shocks to the main items of 
revenue ( direct and indirect taxes, social security contri-
butions) and expenditures (public consumption and invest-
ment, social transfer payments) in that the results are clearly 
affected by the level of disaggregation of the public sector, 
which can vary from one model to another. Nevertheless, the 
results clearly show that measures in the form of direct 
injections of spending into the economy (public consumption 
and investment) have greater immediate effects than shocks 
acting on the components of disposable income ( direct taxes, 
social security contributions and social transfer payments) or 
on the price elasticity of demand (indirect taxes), this of 
course reflecting the leakage into saving. 
Also, on the revenue side, the negative effects of putting up 
direct taxes are appreciably weaker than the effects of an 
initial increase of the same amount in indirect taxes or social 
security contributions. For, in all the models, the general fall 
in domestic demand resulting from the increase in direct 
taxation is reflected in a downward pressure on prices which 
improves the external competitiveness of the country in 
question, whereas the two other shocks are characteristically 
reflected in 'stagflation', with falling GDP, rising unemploy-
ment and accelerating inflation. 
Lastly, the simulation of a 20% fall in the price of oil has 
comparable initial effects for France and Germany (an 
increase of 0.5 points of GDP), with Italy reacting much 
more sharply (an increase of 1.2 points). The Treasury 
model's reaction is very interesting in that althQugh the 
United Kingdom exports more oil than it imports, the net 
overall effect on growth is slightly positive because of the fall 
in the inflation rate. 
Table 8.1 
lfwe now consider the dynamic profile, the comments on the 
instantaneous impacts change a little. With regard to 
budgetary measures, the initial substantial impact of 
increases in public consumption and investment diminishes 
very rapidly over the period, and by the end of the fourth year 
is down to under half the starting level, whereas the 
weakening is far less marked for measures acting on incomes 
or prices. There are, nevertheless, two notable exceptions to 
this rule; France, where the impacts remain virtually at their 
starting level throughout the period and Italy, where public 
investment also maintains its initial impact. Table 8.1 gives 
the initial and final ranking of economic policy instruments 
in decreasing order of power of impact (in absolute value). 
With regard to the inflation rate, the results clearly reflect the 
structural differences that have been observed amongst the 
EC countries. Whatever the measure, the induced in-
flationary or deflationary mechanisms are generally weaker 
in Germany than in the other three countries, except for the 
impact of a 2% reduction in the growth rate of nominal 
wages. However, this is partly for technical reasons: given 
the growth rate of nominal wages in Germany, a 2% 
reduction is a modification in the trend far more substantial 
in relative terms than it is in the high-inflation countries. 
When one compares the dynamic profiles (with fixed 
exchange rates), however, substantial divergences appear 
between Germany and the United Kingdom on one side and 
France and Italy on the other side. In the former group, the 
impacts on prices do not fall over time, although the real 
impacts of the shocks are decreasing (see Graphs 8.1 and 
8.3). For France and Italy, on the other hand, the price 
profile duplicates the output profiles. However, since large 
divergences exist between the models in the modelization of 
the wage-price block (notably in the inclusion of demand-
pull versus cost-push factors), further investigations are 
clearly needed in this field before making any structural 
conclusions about inflation dynamics in the four Eurolink 
countries. 
Ranking by decreasing initial and final impact (in absolute value) of budgetary policy instruments. Effects on real GDP 
( I = the most poll'erful instrument: 6 = tht• least poH'erful instrumem) 
Germany France Italy UK 
Measure I Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final 
Increase in direct taxes 2 4 6 6 5 5 4 3 
Increase in indirect taxes 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 I 
Increase in social security contributions 6 6 4 4 2 2 5 2 
Increase in social transfer payments I 2 L 2 6 6 6 6 
Increase in public consumption 3 I 2 I 3 4 1 4 
Increase in public investment 4 3 3 3 I I 2 5 
In all cases, the increase is I ~~ of GDP, ex ante. 
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GRAPH 8 .1 : Comparative dynamic profile of the multipliers linked to an increase in public investment equal to I % of 1981 real GDP-
Impact on GDP 
(a = accommodating monetary policy; b = non-accommodating monetary policy ; r = fixed exchange rate ; f = flexible exchange) 
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Two shocks stand somewhat apart: first, the reduction in the 
price of oil has positive effects on the growth of real GDP and 
negative effects on the inflation rate, both of which increase 
over time in all countries. 
Second, the change in the trend rate of growth of nominal 
wages differs markedly from the other measures. In all the 
countries, the negative effects on prices are very sharp 
(ranging from - 1,5% initially to - 3% or even -4% at the 
end of the period). 
The real effects of the wage compression, by contrast, differ 
appreciably depending on whether or not its negative effects 
on private consumption are offset by positive effects on 
investment and exports; whether or not this happens also 
depends on the net effect on imports of the variations in the 
above three aggregates. In France, the 'private consumption' 
effect is much larger, producing an appreciable reduction 
(over one half of a percentage point) in GDP. In Germany, 
positive and negative effects virtually cancel each other out, 
the net negative effect on GDP being very close to zero. In 
Italy and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the net 
overall effect is positive on GDP and growing over time 
(ranging from +0,15 to 0,5% in Italy, and from +0,17 to 
+ 1,0% in the United Kingdom). 
With regard to employment and unemployment, our analysis 
confirms the results obtained in all the similar exercises 
undertaken elsewhere: the induced employment effect of 
shocks bearing initially on aggregate demand fluctuates with 
the variations in GDP and in prices and wages but remains 
relatively marginal. More specifically, none of the measures 
studied hen:: produces a variation in the unemployment rate 
of more, in absolute value, than half a percentage point 
relative to the starting level, with the most powerful measures 
(if we can use this term) for bringing down the unemploy-
ment rate being an increase in public consumption and a 2% 
reduction in the growth of wages. In the other direction, 
indirect taxes and the increase in social security contributions 
have effects which are virtually similar (ranging from + 0,2 
to + 0,3 percentage points) and greater than the effect of 
direct taxes and a revaluation. Lastly, the increase in interest 
rates produces no more than a negligible variation in 
employment and unemployment. These results confirm the 
great inertia of demand for labour observed in Europe since 
1962. 
With regard to the external equilibria, the changes in current 
account balances stem from the combination of two effects 
which can either reinforce each other or cancel each other 
out. The first effect is the result of the variation in aggregate 
demand. As a general rule, and all things being equal, the 
current account balance will deteriorate if domestic demand 
expands, and will improve in times of recession. Added to 
this demand effect is a price effect since every acceleration 
(deceleration) in inflation tends to worsen (improve) the 
current account balance. As a general rule, however, the 
·volume' effects outweigh the 'price' effects. 
The current balance effect of increases in public revenue is 
consistently positive, with indirect taxes this time having a 
markedly greater effect due to the working of value-added 
tax (VAT), which is charged on imports but not on exports. 
In this case, therefore, both the volume effect and the price 
effect depress imports. 
The current balance effects of public expenditure increases 
are consistently negative. But we note a smaller deterioration 
with shocks to public consumption and investment (which 
have a low import content and which affect the other 
components of demand only indirectly) than with shocks to 
social transfer payments, which act directly on private 
consumption. 
The effects of the reduction in wage growth are consistently 
positive for France and Germany. For Italy and the United 
Kingdom, however, the effects change from positive to 
negative from the third year on as a result of the deterioration 
in the terms of trade. The two percentage point rise in the 
short-term interest rate has favourable effects for France, 
Germany and Italy. For the United Kingdom, however, the 
positive effect on the balance of goods is accompanied by a 
negative effect, greater in absolute value, on the balance of 
services and transfers. The net overall effect is therefore a 
slight deterioration in the current account balance. 
The contrast between the United Kingdom and the other 
countries recurs, as had to be expected, for the oil price shock 
( - 20~{): in the United Kingdom, the drop in export revenue 
produces a deterioration in the balance of trade which grows 
from 0, 1 % of GDP in the first year to 0,6% at the end of the 
period, relative to the base solution, whereas for the other 
countries, there is an improvement of over I% of GDP. 
Lastly the devaluations and revaluations have the expected 
effects, but with a J-curve phenomenon in the first year in all 
the countries. We also note marked differences in the lags 
with which imports and exports adjust to the new prices, 
these lags being longest in Germany. 
The general government borrowing requirement also reacts 
to the combination of a volume effect on real income and 
transaction and a price effect, which can either come on top 
of each other or can cancel each other out, in addition, of 
course, to the possible initial shock. So we find that for the 
same ex ante increase, the increases in social security 
contributions produce an ex post reduction in net borrowing 
greater than that deriving from direct and indirect taxes. 
However, on the public expenditure side, the effects in 
increasing the deficit are the same once the slight differences 
in impact on the nominal taxable bases have been eliminated. 
Lastly, we find that from a dynamic point of view, the final ex 
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post effect is always smaller than the initial effect and 
represents only 60-70% of the shock defined ex ante. 
The effect of the reduction in the growth rate of wages is 
strongly affected by the differences in the way in which public 
revenue and expenditure are incorporated into the models, 
and in particular by the divergent role played by the private 
sector nominal wage rate in the determination of public 
sector wages and social transfer payments: thus we find that 
for France and the United Kingdom, the fall in tax revenue 
caused by the reduction in the wage bill is virtually offset by a 
drop in current public expenditure. By contrast, for 
Germany and Italy, the revenue reduction effect markedly 
outweighs the induced variation of expenditure. 
The effects on the general government borrowing require-
ment of raising the short-term interest rate also vary 
considerably from one model to another, depending partly 
on institutional differences. The direct effect depends on the 
interactions first, between the various interest rates (con-
trolled/not controlled, short-term/long-term, private/public) 
and second, on the repercussions which these interactions 
have on the servicing of the public debt broadly defined. 
Added to this there is, of course, the induced effect of the fall 
in transactions and incomes. Conclusions on the economies 
concerned rather than on the way they are represented in the 
model would therefore be risky. In any event, the public 
finance effects measured by Eurolink in this area are 
everywhere very small. 
The effects of the external measures (oil price, devaluation, 
revaluation) do not call for any special comments, since the 
borrowing requirement varies relatively little, except for the 
United Kingdom, where the public sector borrowing 
requirement increases by half a percentage point of GDP as a 
result of the drop in oil revenue. 
8. 3 Analysis of the variants 
As stated in section 8.2, the multiplier effects described apply 
to the models used in isolation, assuming a fixed exchange 
rate and a non-accommodating monetary policy in the sense 
that interest rates will react to fluctuations in the transactions 
level and the inflation rate. 
This section will analyse the implications for the multipliers 
of relaxing these assumptions in succession. 
A priori, the linkage of the models might seem to be merely a 
technical problem since, to simplify the point, in Eurolink the 
only difference between a 'linked' model and its 'non-linked' 
equivalent is that the global export function to the world is 
replaced by five export functions to the three European 
partners, the United States and the rest of the world. 
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Further, the disaggregated functions may be so calibrated 
that the introduction of disaggregated growth and price 
assumptions compatible with the former aggregated one will 
produce the same result, the sum of the five partial 'linked' 
flows being equal to the global 'non-linked' export flow. This 
can actually be achieved for the purposes of forecasting. 1 
However, when policy simulations are carried out, a non-
linked model will necessarily supply multipliers which are 
underestimated in relation to its linked equivalent. For, in a 
non-linked national model, exports are virtually exogenous, 
and the only element under the model's control is the export 
price. The explanatory factors, movements in export demand 
and competitors' prices are, by their nature, exogenous and 
hence unchanging in relation to the shocks which do not 
affect them directly. In the same way, where imports are 
concerned, although domestic demand and prices are 
controlled by the model, the import price itself is also 
unchanging in relation to economic policy shocks. 
Once the model is linked, any expansionary shock (for 
example) will increase imports as before, but this increase 
will necessarily be reflected in an increase in the partner 
countries' exports; this in turn will increase their import 
demand, which will create additional export possibilities for 
the country to which the initial shock is applied. In other 
words, the effect of the leakage into imports is partly offset 
by an increase in exports to the partner countries, which 
boosts the multipliers. Conversely, if a measure is de-
flationary, the transmission of the fall in demand to the other 
countries will reinforce the negative domestic effects of the 
measure by an induced reduction in export demand. The 
same will occur for prices once the import price ceases to be 
an exogenous datum to become the average of the other 
countries' export prices. 
Eurolink clearly illustrates the phenomenon described 
above: the mere linkage of the models is sufficient to increase 
the absolute value of the multipliers by I 0-15% with all the 
measures. The exceptions are the fall in the oil price which, by 
its nature, applies to all the countries at once and will 
therefore be analysed below, and the changes in exchange 
rates, where the effect of the linkage is to reduce the value of 
the non~linked model's multipliers, since the non-linked 
changes in the exchange rate are made at the expense (or to 
the advantage) of the partner countries, the reduction in 
imports which accompanies a devaluation produces, ceteris 
paribus, a reduction in demand from those same countries 
vis-a-vis the devaluing country. Conversely, the negative 
This implies also linkages'in the monetary and financial part of the model 
where consistency of interest rates and exchange rates must be ensured. In 
Eurolink, this is obtained through ad hoe linkage equations ensuring the 
unicity of bilateral parities once the US dollar-national currency parity is 
defined, the dollar being the 'numcraire' (or in more technical terms, the 
nth country money). 
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effect of a revaluation will be smaller in the linked than in the 
non-linked version. 
If we now examine the effect of joint measures, taken by all 
the countries together, as compared with measures taken in 
isolation, the effects described above will be further 
reinforced, with the multipliers being increased in value by 
between 10% and 25% as compared with the non-linked 
version. Of course, this operates at all levels. Consequently, 
the stimulatory effects of a joint expansionary policy will be 
distinctly greater than the effects of isolated efforts, but so 
will the induced inflationary pressures. 
The oil price simulation is particularly interesting here. As 
.said before, by its very nature it applies to all countries at the 
same time just as a concerted action on domestic policy 
instruments. Therefore, linked and non-linked multipliers 
are quite similar except for the single net exporter in the 
group, the United Kingdom. In this country,the decrease in 
export revenue due to the fall in the price of oil becomes.less 
important in the linked version, where the induced expansion 
of the partner countries' demand is explicitly taken into 
account. 
Also here too parity changes differ from the other shocks in 
that joint devaluation by the four European Eurolink 
countries does not greatly change their relative positions and 
improves their competitiveness only in relation to the rest of 
the world, i.e. in respect of some 50% of their trade instead of 
total trade as in the non-linked simulations. The value of the 
joint multipliers will therefore be 10-30% lower than with 
isolated measures. 
The action of monetary policy also deserves some attention. 
The simulations can be carried out using either free interest 
rates (non-accommodating monetary policy) or constant 
interest rates, with money supply adjusting as a result. The 
section 8.2 exercises reveal a Keynesian (or Hicks' effect) of 
the shocks to interest rates which clearly respond to the 
variations in transactions demand and thus act on the 
interest-rate-sensitive components of real demand. Added to 
this effect are, of course, the portfolio effects with regard to 
the equilibria between assets, with the implications of such 
effects for the interest rate being a priori indeterminate. It is 
nevertheless clear that the role of portfolio or wealth effects is 
only a minor one in the Eurolink models as compared with 
the effects of the transactions demand for money balances. 
The models left to themselves therefore point to private 
expenditure being crowded out by public expenditure via the 
induced interest rate variations. This crowding-out effect can 
be measured by fixing interest rates within an 'accom-
modating' monetary policy, with money supply adjusting 
immediately so as to hold interest rates constant. 
Examination of the results shows that an accommodating 
policy has a greater effect on the dynamic profile of the 
public expenditure multipliers than on their initial level: 
given the response lag of transactions demand to the public 
expenditure shock, the adjustment lag between that response 
and the change in interest rates and lastly the response lag of 
the components of final demand to the variations in the 
interest rate, the immediate impacts are almost identical 
under the two monetary policy assumptions. 
By contrast the multipliers which are characteristic of the 
simulations for a stimulus to public consumption or 
investment no longer taper off here; they stabilize at a level 
close to the maximum generally reached at the end of the 
second period. The shift observed for GDP for example 
reached relative values ranging from - 25% (Germany) to 
- 60% (United Kingdom) in the 'non-accommodating' 
multipliers as compared with the 'accommodating' multip-
lier. The exception to the rule is France, where the differences 
between the two sets of multipliers are surprisingly small: 
this seems to be due to the fact that interest rates almost 
completely fail to react to the· shocks affecting the real part of 
the model. 
The crowding out of private expenditure by public expendi-
ture is therefore apparent in the models (other than Metric) 
but its short-term effect is weak. It is possible, however, that 
the present models (for the most part estimated before the 
large rise in interest rates in 1981-82) slightly underestimate 
both the possible reaction of interest rates to restrictive 
monetary policies and the economy's speed of response to 
such changes in rates. In addition, because the present 
linkage system operates only in respect of goods and services, 
it disregards the international transmission effects of interest 
rate movements and is therefore liable to underestimate the 
effects of restrictive monetary policies, especially in the event 
of joint policies. 
With the exception of Prometeia, all the Eurolink models 
contain a set of equations for the endogenous determination 
of exchange rates, which varies in specification from one 
model to another, but which takes direct or indirect account 
of the inflation differentials and of the degree of dis-
equilibrium of the balance of payments on current account. 
The United Kingdom model additionally takes account of 
the interest differential and of capital movements. 
The single country simulation results thus show marked 
differences in the country changes. Ifwe consider France, the 
current balance effect is clearly predominant in determining 
the exchange rate. Consequently, the measures which 
improve the balance (shocks to public revenue, the growth 
rate of wages, the rise in the interest rate, the oil price) 
produce an induced exchange rate appreciation which is 
small to begin with but which reaches 2% at the end of the 
period. The appreciation thus modifies the dynamic profile 
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of the multipliers by increasing the medium-term depressive 
effect of the deflationary measures (or by reducing the 
favourable impact of the fall in the oil price), the absolute 
value of the final multiplier being 15-20% higher than that of 
the multiplier obtained under a fixed exchange rate, all other 
things being equal. Converse effects can be observed with 
measures which cause the current balance to deteriorate. 
For Germany, the greater weight attached to the inflation 
differential reduces the net effects of the exchange rate 
shocks: thus the shock to VAT improves the current balance 
and therefore tends to cause appreciation of the exchange 
rate but it also widens the inflation differential, which tends 
to cause depreciation of the exchange rate. As a general rule, 
however, the balance of payments effect is dominant and the 
exchange rate appreciates but far less sharply than in France. 
The effect on the multipliers is therefore very small. 
Lastly, for the United Kingdom, we find that the induced 
interest rate variations and their effects on the balance of 
services, transfers and foreign capital tend to outweigh the 
balance of trade effects. We thus find marked differences in 
the effects of floating rates on the multipliers depending on 
whether monetary policy is accommodating or not. In the 
former case, we observe that an increase in public expendi-
ture (for example) will initially produce an appreciation of 
the exchange rate which will not be transformed into a 
depreciation (as in the other models) until after the second 
year of the simulation period. Where budgetary policies are 
concerned, the distortions in the dynamic profile of the 
multipliers are therefore a good deal more complex than in 
the other models, making any generalization difficult. 
By contrast, the simulation of a restrictive monetary policy in 
the shape of a deliberate increase in interest rates is far 
clearer: in all cases, a restrictive monetary policy tends to 
cause exchange rate appreciation, which reinforces the 
policy's depressive effect by destroying with varying rapidity 
the current balance gain observed in a fixed rate situation. 
The effect of these policies is therefore both more pro-
nounced and longer lasting. This would therefore tend to 
confirm the theoretical findings of Mundell and Fleming on 
the comparative effectiveness of monetary policies under 
fixed and floating exchange rates. However, the simulations 
do not confirm the other part of the Mundell-Fleming 
propositions, namely that budgetary policies have no 
permanent effect in a floating rate situation. On the contrary, 
and as indicated above, in a floating rate situation, the 
expansionary or contractionary effect of budgetary measures 
tends to strengthen in the medium-term. 
However, the simulation of joint policies under floating 
exchange rates produces a different picture. For, once the 
exchange rates vary in the same direction for everyone, the 
relative changes in competitiveness diminish, which reduces 
the impact of variations in rates. 
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Graph 8.1 summarizes all these results for the shock to 
public investment. 
Lastly, the simulation ofa shock public investment was used 
to test the effects of a rise in raw material prices in response to 
joint expansionary action in the four European Eurolink 
countries and in the United States, making the assumption 
that this action would result in a 10~~ increase in the price of 
raw materials with respect to the base case. As shown in 
Table 2 of the annex this price rise practically cancels the 
impact of the participation of the US to the European 
concerted action. 
More precisely, these effects are obtained with ·a 10~~ rise in 
the price of raw materials (oil and non-oil) in the first year, 
with prices thereafter stabilizing in nominal terms to return 
to their baseline level at the end of the simulation period. 
The effects of this rise are shown in Table 2 and in Graph 8.2 
where we note an appreciable decline in growth accompanied 
by an equally appreciable acceleration in inflation, with the 
impact of imported inflation much greater than the 
deflationary effect of the fall in the activity level. 
8 .4 Conclusion 
Although the Eurolink results should be treated with some 
caution in that certain differences in impact clearly have 
more to do with 'technical' differences between the models 
than with the structural differences between the economies 
concerned, it is evident from the multipliers that the actual 
structural differences are indeed taken into account: 
examples are the weaker response of the inflation rate in 
Germany, the United Kingdom's position as an oil exporter, 
the fact that indirect taxes contribute a larger proportion of 
French budget revenue than direct taxes, etc. 
The variables also throw light on the fundamental impli-
cations of the environments in which the shocks take place. 
For instance, in the case of expansionary measures, the most 
favourable results are obtained with concerted action under 
an accommodating monetary policy and a fixed exchange 
rate, provided that the pressures on prices are kept under 
control, which may, however, be more difficult to realize. 
More generally, we find that empirical models often do not 
completely reflect the theoretical reasoning based on the so-
called Hicks-Hansen-Mundell generalized IS-LM diagrams 
on the crowding-out effect of public expenditure or the 
comparative effectiveness of budgetary and monetary 
policies in situations of fixed and floating exchange rates. 
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GRAPH 8.2: Comparative dynamic profile of the multipliers linked to an increase in public investment equal to 1 % of 1981 real GDP -
Average of the four Eurolink countries 
(a = accommodating monetary policy; b = non-accommodating inonetary policy ; r = fixed exchange rate; f = flexible exchange 
rate) 
Case I : Concerted action Case 2: Concerted action with rise in the price of raw materials 
% % 
1,4 Real GDP 1,4 Real GDP 
1,2 1,2 
1,0 1,0 
af 
ar 
0,8 0,8 
af 
bf ar 
0,6 0,6 
br 
bf 
0,4 0,4 br 
0,2 0,2 
0 0 
81 82 83 84 81 82 83 84 
% % af 
1,4 Deflator 1,4 
1,2 af 1,2 
1,0 1,0 bf 
br 
ar 
0,8 0,8 
br 
0,6 ar, bf 0,6 
0,4 0,4 
0,2 0,2 
0 0 
81 82 83 84 8 1 82 83 84 
159 
Annual Economic Review 1983-84 
GRAPH 8.3: Comparative dynamic profile of the multipliers linked to an increase in public investment equal to 1 % ofl981 real GDP-
Impact on GDP price 
(a= accommodating monetary policy; b = non-accommodating monetary policy; r = fixed exchange rate; f = flexible exchange 
rate) - . 
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Lastly, the most fundamental conclusion for the use of these 
models seems to be that they will always gain by being used in 
a multinational linkage (even a very simplified one) if they 
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are not to produce appreciable biases with respect to the 
multipliers for foreign trade, the inflation rate and the 
interest rate. 
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The Eurolink model 
Two opposite approches may be adopted in modelling the 
economies of the European Community member countries: 
either a set of 10 ad hoe models is built ex nihilo, giving them an 
identical structure and using a harmonized Community data 
base, or the national models considered to be the most 
representative or just the most accessible are brought together 
and interlinked by a set of bilateral international trade flows. 
Each of the two approaches has advantages and disadvantages 
which would take too long to go into here but which, in fact, 
make them complementary rather than antagonistic. The 
Commission uses both approaches, the 'centralized' approach 
being represented by the Comet model and the 'decentralized' 
approach by the Eurolink model. 
Eurolink does not cover the entire Community; for essentially 
logistical reasons, it groups only the four largest countries, 
Germany (the Sysifo model-University of Hamburg), France 
(the Metric model -INSEE) Italy (the Prometeia model-
University of Bologna) and the United Kingdom (HM Treasury 
model). The system in addition includes the United States 
component of the Federal Reserves multinational model (MCM) 
and a linkage block connecting the five countries with each other 
and with the rest of the world via bilateral flows and prices. 
All these models are large and cover the real and monetary 
sectors of the economy at a far finer level of disaggregation than 
is possible with Comet. They therefore represent a very valuable 
information base on the structure of the economies considered, 
which can be used both for short-term forecasting (the system is 
based on quarterly data) and for simulation analyses of the 
effects of economic policy measures. 
Nevertheless, despite their considerable size, the Eurolink 
models are still no more than a considerably simplified 
representation of the economy as a whole. Consequently, the 
results obtained will be influenced by simplifying assumptions 
made by the authors in the light of the underlying theoretical 
options, for example, the degree to which the monetary sector is 
integrated into the behaviour of the real economy. 
To take just a few examples, it will be seen that the Treasury 
model strongly reflects the effect of crowding out private 
expenditure under an expansionary budgetary policy; this affects 
the model's responses although it cannot necessarily be claimed 
that such crowding out effects are really stronger in the United 
Kingdom than elsewhere, all other things being equal. 
Similarly, the interest rate/inflation rate relationships will 
depend on how the 'user cost of capital' variables are defined and 
how they are taken into account in determining prices. In the 
Treasury model, a two percentage point increase in the Treasury 
Bill rate works through to an identical rise in mortgage rates, 
which itself works through to a 0, 7 point rise in the retail price 
index. Raising the interest rate therefore accelerates inflation 
despite negative effects on output and employment. In the other 
models, by contrast, this mechanism is either ignored or treated 
less directly, producing a deceleration of inflation rates when the 
interest rate is raised. 
The international comparison of economic policy simulations is 
therefore still very difficult because, despite the model's 
mathematical objectivity, it is based on theoretical economic 
options which, while ensuring its internal coherence, may make it 
incomparable with other models. 
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Annex 
This annex gives a sample of the Eurolink system's multipliers. 
Table I shows the relative differences between the I 981-84 
baseline solution and the levels obtained as a result of economic 
policy shocks for real GDP (1975 prices) and the GDP price 
detlator. 
The multiplier values correspond to measures taken in isolation 
in each country, in the linked model, under a non-accommodat-
ing monetary policy, and under a fixed exchange rate. 
The modifications of the multipliers' dynamic profile in the case 
of joint measures and/or floating rates are presented in graphic 
form. 
The following abbreviations are used to identify the shocks: 
+ID: + I% of nominal GDP to direct taxes; 
Table 1 
Multipliers of GDP and of the GDP deflator 
Germany France 
GDP 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 
+II: +I% of nominal GDP to indirect taxes; 
+CS: +I% of nominal GDP to social security contributions; 
+ G: + I% of real GDP to public consumption; 
+VG: + I% of real GDP to public investment; 
+TS: + 1% of nominal GDP to social transfer payments; 
- W: - 2% to the average growth rate of nominal wages; 
+is: + 2% to short-term interest rates; 
- Pu: - 20'.;,~ lo the price of crude oil: 
Dev: I 0% devaluation against the dollar; 
Rev: 10% revaluation against the dollar. 
Italy 
1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 
United Kingdom 
1982 1983 1984 
+ ID -0,74 -1,35 - 1,24 -0,55 - 0,08 - 0,26 - 0,3 I - 0,28 -0,21 -0,38 -0,42 -0,35 - 0,39 - 0,59 - 0,60 - 0,48 
+ II - 0,58 - 1,02 - 0,95 -0,54 - 0,42 - 0,40 - 0,39 - 0,52 -0,18 -0,49 -0,66 -0,63 -0,36 -0,69 -0,79 -0,68 
+ CS - 0,07 - 0,39 - 0,63 - 0,46 -0,17 -0,41 -0,67 -0,78 -0,19 -0,58 -0,71 -0,73 -0,17 -0,48 -0,61 -0,49 
+G 1,12 1,33 1,28 1,02 1,05 1,37 1,33 1,35 0,52 0,55 0,50 0,42 0,94 0,99 0,73 0,46 
+ VG 1,15 1,23 0,98 0,59 1,18 1,01 0,95 0,94 0,72 0,89 0,95 0,94 0,84 0,90 0,59 0,29 
+ TS 0,76 1,39 1,40 0,74 0,94 1,51 1,40 1,31 0,21 0,38 0,42 0,35 0,29 0,34 0,16 0,00 
-w -0,04 -0,02 -0,03 -0,1 I -0,40 -0,70 -0,50 -0,40 0,03 0,15 0,33 0,52 -0,06 0,17 0,66 1,12 
+ is -0,18 -0,42 -0,49 -0,30 -0.04 -0,12 0,04 0,10 -0,03 -0,13 -0,16 -0,19 -0,04 -0,12 -0,26 -0,24 
-Po 0,10 0,49 0,80 0,75 0,24 0,48 0,78 1,01 0,36 1,23 1,63 1,68 0,02 0,14 0,38 0,49 
Dev 0,08 0,15 0,56 1,05 1,01 1,93 1,73 1,36 1,61 1,80 1,62 1,77 0,60 1,06 1,06 0,67 
Rev -0,04 0,09 - 0,23 - 0,97 -0,98 -2,04 -1,93 -1,44 -1,86 -2,17 -1,98 -2,19 - 0,55 - 0,93 - 0,90 - 0,59 
GDP deflator 1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 
+ ID - 0,03 - 0,20 - 0,40 - 0,40 0,00 -0,04 0,04 0,04 0,02 - 0,03 - 0,08 - 0, I 0 0,03 0,15 0,06 -0,12 
+ II 0,41 0,49 0,39 0,41 1,03 1,42 1,73 2,02 0,82 1,17 0,96 0,80 1,03 I, 15 1,06 0,80 
+ CS 0,30 0,75 0,79 0,70 0,57 1,39 1,96 2,46 0,27 0,32 0,30 0,28 0,65 0,95 0,81 0,49 
+G 0,15 0,25 0,35 0,33 0,76 0.80 0,92 0,90 0,14 0,37 0,35 0,35 0,11 0,55 I ,II 1,56 
+ VG 0,05 0,20 0,29 0,23 0,01 0,18 0,11 0,06 0,28 0,50 0,45 0,40 0,15 0,60 1,21 1,68 
+ TS 0,02 0,19 0,39 0,40 -0,12 -0,19 -0,13 -0,14 -0,02 0,03 0,08 0,11 0,10 0,37 0,68 0,92 
-w - 0,36 - 1,28 - 2,39 - 3,54 -0,60 -1,30 -1,92 -2,39 -0,14 -0,45 -0,77 -1,08 -0,76 -1,91 -3,09 -4,21 
+ is 0,00 -0,03 -0,08 -0,10 -0,03 -0,10 -0,16 -0,11 - 0,04 - 0,08 - 0,09 - 0,06 0,12 0,30 0,36 0,30 
-Po -0,25 -0,66 -1,22 -1,48 0,69 -0,28 -1,19 -2,15 -0,42 -1,09 -0,74 -0,76 -0,85 -1,91 -2,45 -2,51 
Dev 0,22 0,67 0,73 0,96 0,29 1,37 3,59 5,77 0,38 2,72 2,93 2,74 0,33 2,47 4,04 5,45 
Rev -0,10 -0,45 -0,44 -0,66 -0,19 -1,31 -3,37 -4,72 - 0,20 - 2,45 - 2,65 - 2,40 - 0,24 - 1,99 - 3,37 - 4,36 
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Some properties of the European economies in the light of econometric models 
Table 2 
Public investment multiplier for different variants 
a: accommodating monetary policy b: non-accommodating monetary policy 
r: fixed exchange rates f: floating exchange rates 
( average of tire four Euro/ink countries as a percentage of shift from the baseline simulation) 
Isolated action Concerted action Concerted action, four Concerted action, five countries, 
country by country I four European countries European countries plus the with increase in raw 
Real GDP United States (impact on the material prices (impact on four European countries) the 4 European countries) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 
af 1,01 1,18 1,16 1,06 1,09 1,30 1,28 1,32 1,22 1.56 1,57 1,67 1,07 1,27 1,27 1,36 
ar 1,04 l,11 1,04 0,99 1,14 1,24 1,19 1,24 1,27 1,46 1,46 1,57 1,10 1,21 1,19 1,30 
bf 1,04 1,09 1,01 0,78 1,12 1.20 1,11 0,92 1,25 1,42 1,36 1,17 1,08 1,18 1,19 0,97 
br 1,01 1,04 0,87 0,67 LI I 1,16 1,00 0,84 1,24 1,37 I, 18 1,07 1,07 1,14 0,96 0,88 
Deflator 1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 
af 0,11 0,43 0,78 1,00 0,12 0,51 0,91 1,18 0,13 0.55 1,00 1,32 0,66 1,15 1,40 1,67 
ar 0,09 0,26 0,46 0,52 0,10 0,31 0,56 0,61 0,11 0,35 0,61 0,68 0,45 0,87 0,88 1,01 
bf 0.08 0,24 0,45 0,52 0,09 0,28 0,53 0,61 0,10 0,33 0,58 0,69 0,55 0,96 1,04 1,14 
br 0,09 0,30 0,48 0,55 0,10 0.33 0,56 0,64 0,11 0,38 0,61 0,72 0,45 0,91 0,92 1,02 
These figures arc purely theoretical indicators, calculated as the weighted average of the effects, on each country. of individual actions. 
Table 3 
Public investment multipliers for various aggregates 
(increase hy I~{ <>/real /98/, ex-ante) 
Germany France Italy United Kingdom 
Variables 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Private consumption 0,16 0,42 0,48 0,36 0.13 0,20 0,18 0,18 0,36 0,61 0,74 0,70 0,13 0,28 0,22 0,14 
Private investment (plant and equipment) 2,90 4,11 1,50 -2,09 3.52 1,66 1,75 0,85 0,30 2,05 3,71 4,65 1,07 2,14 1,37 0,06 
Current balance (% of nominal GDP) I -1,78 -2,91 -2,88 -1,83 - 1.30 -0,81 -0,43 -0,56 - 3,06 - 4,65 - 5,87 - 6,89 - 0,44 - 0,69 - 0,65 - 0,61 
Total employment 0,47 0,60 0,61 0,47 0.27 0,44 0,44 0,44 0,26 0,42 0,47 0,48 0,30 0,65 0,54 0,27 
Long-tenn interest rate I 0,29 1,08 1,28 0,98 0.30 -0,20 -0,13 -0,15 0,16 0,53 0,52 0,54 1,07 2,12 2,88 3,58 
Wage-cost rate - 0,54 - 0,26 - 0,06 0,07 -0,03 0,09 0,27 0,35 0,05 0,22 0,22 0,19 -0,32 0,67 1,66 2,24 
Net lending, public authorities(% of nominal GDP) I -0,82 -0,76 -0,72 -0,66 -0,90 -0,83 -0,78 -0,70 - 0,88 - 0, 78 -0,66 - 0,68 -0,70 -0,70 -0,60 -0,80 
Expressed as absolute difference between shock and base case, in percentage points. 
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Commission report on budget discipline and economic convergence, 
and on restructuring public expenditure 
in favour of productive expenditure 
Part I 
Budget discipline and economic convergence 
I. Control over public expenditure 
In its communication of I July 1982 on budget discipline and 
economic convergence I the Commission stressed that, to 
improve convergence of economic trends in the Community, 
it was important to increase the degree of control over the 
main budget headings. In particular, it adverted to the need 
for a reduction, or at least a stabilization, in net borrowing, a 
slower rate of expansion of public expenditure, adjustment 
of taxation and social security contributions, and more 
frequent recourse to increases in public service charges and 
licence fees. 
It emphasized, moreover, that the structure of public 
expenditure should be modified in favour of budget 
appropriations intended to expand production capacity. 
Although the estimates for general government budget 
outturns are still only provisional, they show encouraging 
results; nevertheless, they imply that more vigorous efforts 
are stil! needed in certain areas. 
Expenditure in cash terms has increased much less than in 
1982, but there has also been a pronounced decline in 
inflation rates, In real terms, public expenditure by main 
items has contracted only in three Community countries: the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and Ireland. In most 
of the Member States, however, the expansion in cash terms 
has been lower than planned, which shows that the general 
approach to budget management has been restrictive. 
The trend of budget resources illustrates clearly the influence 
of cyclical weakness: not only have they expanded less than 
in 1982, but they have even been lower than initially 
estimated (except in Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands), in 
spite of increased tax rates and higher thresholds in some 
countries. 
Borrowing requirements at budget level have been consistent 
with the Commission's recommendations, having contracted 
in all the countries with external equilibrium problems. 
However, the outturns are less favourable than the initial 
estimates in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. 
COM (82) 422 final. 
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In all the Member States except Denmark and the United 
Kingdom, where the Treasury actually managed to con-
solidate part of the floating public debt, Treasury financing 
has generated considerable liquidity. Public borrowing 
increased much faster than the money supply in Belgium, 
France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. 
In spite of the progress made, foreseeable outturns for 1983 
still give cause for serious concern: borrowing requirements 
(defined broadly as the deficit of general government or the 
public sector including loans, advances and purchases of 
equity) as a percentage of GDP range from about 10% in the 
Netherlands to 18,5% in Ireland through 11,5% in Denmark 
and Greece, 14,5% in Belgium and about 16% in Italy. With 
these orders of magnitude, interest on the public debt 
represents a very heavy burden, particularly in just those 
countries that have best managed to control inflation, where 
the rate of growth of nominal GDP-and consequently tax 
revenue-is below 10%. 
To reduce the deficit, the only alternative to increased 
taxation is to reduce certain items of expenditure, and often it 
is investment expendiure that is crowded out. 
II. Budget procedure and management 
In its communication to the Council of I July 1982, the 
Commission proposed guidelines for improving budget 
management and adapting certain procedures, taking the 
view that the exercise of budgetary powers in accordance 
with the main economic equilibria is an essential factor in 
improved convergence of economic trends. 
The discussions that have been held by several bodies, in 
particular the Economic Policy Committee, and the studies 
undertaken on this subject since last summer, have 
concentrated on two main areas: the monitoring and 
adaptability of public expenditure, and medium-term budget 
planning. 
I. The monitoring and adaptability of expenditure 
All the Member States organize periodic monitoring of the 
management of budget appropriations, but methods ob-
viously differ according to national budget systems. 
The parliamentary voting procedure could, however, be 
speeded up in most of the Member States, and take place 
more frequently both to improve information on implemen-
tation of the budget and to avoid the need for financing from 
advances to be ratified subsequently by the legislature, or to 
prevent excessive financing from unlimited appropriations. 
The technique of using reserve funds can avoid the need for 
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too frequent recourse to parliamentary approval and make 
for more flexible management, but strict rules must govern 
the use of such funds so that available appropriations are not 
used up too rapidly. 
When appropriations are carried over from one year to the 
next, this can weigh very heavily on the authorities' 
commitments, as in Italy; such operations could be limited to 
cases where a project takes several years to complete, and 
apply only to commitments that are strictly necessary. 
Monitoring would also be improved, and overshooting less 
frequent, if the actual preparation of the budget were 
organized on the basis of more accurate assessments. A large 
proportion of budget appropriations depends on the 
implementation of existing laws, and if savings are to be 
made here, amendments to these laws must be prepared in 
good time, or incorporated in the approval of the draft 
budget. It would be particularly useful to provide an 
opportunity for reconsidering the application of indexation 
mechanisms that apply to certain categories of expenditure 
in the light of the economic situation and financing 
possibilities. 
The most appropriate method for containing expenditure 
under other headings is systematic review, every year. This 
procedure seems more efficient than the frequent method of 
applying a linear reduction to proposals from the various 
government departments. 
Changes in the scope of application (where items are 
removed from or reincorporated in the budget) are usually a 
logical consequence of political choices by the executive or 
legislativle authorities. For the sake of clarity and easier 
monitoring, the budgetary consequences of such changes 
should be made explicit; a document listing items of 
expenditure with an indication of the extra-budgetary fund 
involved would also be helpful. 
National laws, finally, are not always strict enough to ensure 
that expenditure by social security funds and local autho-
rities is properly monitored, with all due respect for the 
autonomy of the authorities concerned. 
In the countries where expenditure on social protection is not 
an integral part of the general budget, such expenditure is 
frequently kept in check by imposing the requirement for a 
balanced budget on the sector concerned while maintaining, 
although strictly limiting, the contribution from the central 
government budget, As to local authorities, access to the 
financial market is supervised in all the Member States, but it 
is more difficult to keep the current account in line with the 
budget adopted because of the time required for gathering 
information on its implementation. 
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2. Medium-term public finance planning and budgetary 
norms 
All the Member States are anxious to situate the annual 
approval of public budgets in a context of medium-term 
financial planning, although planning is formally organized 
only in Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom. 
Reference to a medium-term plan has numerous advantages: 
in particular, it makes for a more accurate assessment of the 
budgetary situation in the prevailing economic context, for 
evaluations of the permanent volume of expenditure 
resulting from new initiatives, for the establishment of links 
with medium-term monetary planning and thus for more 
consistency between monetary and budget policies. 
However, it may have disadvantages if estimated expendi-
ture is regarded by the prospective recipients as a definite 
promise rather than as a provisional estimate that should be 
flexible and adaptable to circumstance. 
Generalized financial planning in the Community would be a 
potential means of ensuring greater convergence, for it would 
make it possible to measure more precisely the medium-term 
consequences of initial budget and monetary policies, thus 
indicating whether certain changes were suitable. If the 
extension of such planning to all Member States is to be 
useful, it should be organized with reference to uniform basic 
notions and apply to revenue as well as to expenditure. 
Similarly, it is worth while to examine the possibility of 
adopting certain benchmarks for assessing the medium-term 
trend of the budget position, In its communication to the 
Council of I July 1982, the Commission pointed out that the 
budget situation appeared more satisfactory in 1982 in the 
Member States that at least managed to achieve balance on 
current transactions. However, for reasons of short-term 
regulation in particular, it might be too severe to impose as a 
rule that current expenditure and revenue must be in balance. 
But it would perhaps be worthwhile to check how far the 
adoption of the notion of a permanent budget position, 
already used to some extent in Germany, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom, for example, could contribute to 
improving the convergence of budget policies in the 
Community. 
III. Financing criteria 
In its communication of I July 1982, ' the Commission 
suggested that certain types of financing should be avoided 
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Commission report of 6 July 1983 on budget discipline 
Principal public finance aggregates 1 
Table 1: General government expenditure 
As% of GDP Percentage change 
1970 1980 1983 1981 1982 1983 
X-82 1-83 V-83 
B 36,5 53,9 60,0 12,9 10,3 9,0 6,1 
DK 43,l 58,6 61,7 16,4 15,8 11,0 11,8 
D 37,6 46,9 49,4 6,8 4,5 5,1 3,4 
GR 29,1 35,6 42,1 (33,5) (24,4) 24,1 25,7 
F 38,9 46,2 52,2 18,5 18,2 13,3 12,6 
IRL 40,1 55,2 59,2 27,2 23,1 17,5 10,5 
I 33,4 46,3 55,5 30,0 22,8 19,6 20,4 
L 33,4 57,0 61,4 9,4 11,8 8,8 12,2 
NL 44,7 57,9 63,8 7,2 7,9 4,8 5,8 
UK 39,4 44,3 46,0 12,5 9.6 8,6 8,9 
EC 37,9 47,1 52,0 14,7 12,0 10,8 9,5 
Table 2: General government receipts 
As% of GDP Percentage change 
1970 1980 1983 1981 1982 1983 
X-82 1-83 V-83 
B 35,4 44,8 48,3 6.1 11.6 10,2 8,3 
DK 46,1 52,5 52,2 8,0 12,0 10,8 11,2 
D 37,9 43,5 45,6 4,2 4,8 4,9 3,7 
GR 26,8 30,2 35,6 22,1 39,5 26,9 26,7 
F 39,8 46,6 49,1 12,4 16,2 13,4 11,8 
IRL 36,1 42,0 46,0 23,7 23,9 20,5 16,7 
I 30,6 37,8 44,2 23,4 23,7 22,1 23,3 
L 36,3 55,7 58,4 7,5 11, I 8,5 8,6 
NL 43,9 54,2 57,0 6,3 5,7 5,3 5,5 
UK 42,0 40,7 43,8 15,4 11,9 9,7 7,6 
EC 38,2 43,6 46,6 11,2 12,1 11,1 9,4 
Table 3: General government net lending ( +) or borrowing ( - ), as % of GDP 
1970 1980 1981 1982 1983 
X-82 1-83 V-83 
B -1,1 -9,4 -13,3 -12,7 -12,1 -12,3 -11,7 
DK 3,0 -5,9 -7,1 -8,9 -9,6 -9,7 -9,5 
D 0,3 -3,5 -4,0 -3,9 -4,1 -4,1 -3,8 
GR -2,3 0,4 -10,1 -6,4 -8,6 -8,9 -6,5 
F 0,9 0,0 -1,5 -2,7 -3,0 -3,1 -3,1 
IRL -4,0 -12,8 -15,4 -15,8 -15,1 -13,0 -13,2 
I -2,8 -8,4 -11,9 -11,9 -11,0 -10,5 -11,3 
L 2,9 -1,8 -0,7 -1,0 -1,0 -1,6 -3,0 
NL -0,8 -3,4 -4,6 -6,4 -5,5 -6,2 -6,8 
UK 2,6 -3,5 -2,1 -1,7 -0,5 -0,9 -2,2 
EC 0,3 -3,5 -5,2 -5,3 -4,9 -5,0 -5,4 
The definitions used arc national accounts definitions. Figures do not necessarily add up because of rounding. 
1. Expenditure: current and capital expenditure excluding Joans. advances and equities. 
2. Receipts: direct and indirect taxes, social security contributions, other current resources and consumption of fixed capital. 
3. Net lending or borrowing: balance of receipts-expenditure (2-1). 
Sources: Eurostat and services of the Commission. 
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or at least limited; direct financing of the Treasury by the 
central bank; monetization of public debt securities by the 
banking system; compulsory subscription to public debt 
securities on favourable terms; index-linked public debt; the 
issuing of securities with very short maturities (i.e. shorter 
than some specified minimum); massive recourse to short-
term issuing, public borrowing abroad and Government 
guarantees for such borrowing by public-sector and private-
sector undertakings. 
When the Monetary Committee met on 15 December 1982, it 
expressed its approval of these principles. 
In fact, some of these practices are of limited application. 
Index-linked government securities exist only in Ireland and 
the United Kingdom, and are subject to very strict terms that 
confine them to certain categories of savers. Favourable 
terms for public debt securities, and the issue of very short-
term certificates are extremely rare. 
PART II 
The restructuring of public expenditure in 1983 
The joint Council meeting (Ecofin and Social Affairs) of 16 
November 1982 concluded that, in 1983, 'in connection with 
the annual approval of budget guidelines and on the basis of 
a Commission report, the Council (Economic and Financial 
Affairs) would undertake an analysis of Member States' 
public sector budgets in order to review the evolution of 
productive public expenditure', taking account however of 
'the risk which could arise if all the Member States 
undertook, to the same extent, restrictive measures with 
regard to public expenditure, irrespective of their levels of 
inflation, real interest rates or their financial situations'. 
The present report has been drawn up to meet this request. It 
has been prepared with the active help of the Economic 
Policy Committee and in particular its working party on 
public finance. 
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Central bank financing of the Treasury is kept within certain 
limits; these limits have been widened in recent years in 
several countries (e.g. Belgium, Greece, France, Italy, 
Netherlands). 1 
The monetization of public debt securities and the issuing of 
short-term loans are more frequent, and constitute an 
important source of financing in Belgium, Greece, France, 
Italy and Ireland. 
With the steep increase of public deficits, national capital 
markets have not managed to satisfy demand-sometimes 
despite substantial monetary financing of the public debt; 
recourse to foreign markets has increased particularly in 
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and to a lesser extent 
France. Denmark has outstandingly increased public 
borrowing abroad to finance the current account deficit of 
the balance of payments. 
In some cases the adaptation is automatic. 
I. Introduction 
In recent years, the adaptation of economic structures in 
response to the changes that have occurred, particularly with 
regard to growth rates, world trade and technology, have 
become a more pressing cause for concern among those 
responsible for economic policy, who had previously 
concentrated on the problem of the appropriate response to 
short-term developments by means of traditional demand 
management measures. The emphasis of budgetary policy 
has accordingly shifted away from the control of the main 
budgetary aggregates and the balance between revenue and 
expenditure. 
If growth potential is to be improved by encouraging 
structural adjustment, then the main budgetary aggregates 
must be reorganized in such a way as to promote the best 
possible development of production capacity, with regard 
both to capital and to labour. 
The restructuring of budgetary resources was dealt with in a 
Commission communication on 'Tax and financial measures 
in favour of investment' (COM(83)218 final of 18 April 
1983), which analysed existing arrangements and put 
forward suggestions for measures that would have a 
favourable impact on the magnitude and structure of 
productive potential. 
This report considers, from a similar viewpoint, the 
possibilities for adapting the structure of public expenditure 
and analyses, against this background, the efforts made by 
the Member States within the framework of the public sector 
budgets for 1983. 
2. Restructuring public expenditure and the possibilities for 
future growth 
It is generally accepted that the budget of the public sector 
can contribute in a variety of ways (direct investment, capital 
transfers, loans, equity purchases, tax concessions) to 
increasing productive potential, improving its structure, and 
improving productivity and efficiency in the private sector. 
During a recession the selection of budgetary priorities 
becomes particularly difficult especially when the question is 
whether public expenditure of a structural kind (geared to 
future growth), should be preferred to expenditure in 
support of demand. To the extent that the latter results from 
the operation of the automatic stabilizers, the choice may be 
temporarily avoided; but eventually in the medium-term the 
need to control the balance between revenue and expenditure 
imposes itself. 
With the considerable slowdown in overall economic growth 
since the mid- l 970s the restructuring of public expenditure in 
favour of so-called productive expenditure implies a 
deliberate reduction in other categories of expenditure; there 
are at least three reasons for this: 
(i) The growing share of expenditure accounted for by the 
operation of the automatic stabilizers; 
(ii) The increase in the relative share of expenditure required 
to service public sector debt, itselfa result of the growing 
total of accumulated public sector deficits; 
(iii) The limits on public sector deficits imposed by anti-
inflationary policies while, at the same time, the elasticity 
of tax revenue is on a downward trend. 
The stabilization of the financial situation may even mean 
reducing the overall total of public expenditure; if it does, 
any increase in that part of public expenditure in favour of 
increasing productive potential, will require even more 
vigorous reductions elsewhere. 
The authorities thus find themselves confronted to an extent 
which varies from country to country according to their 
economic circumstances, by a double constraint made up of: 
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(i) The need to favour the most productive forms of public 
expenditure with a need to promoting economic 
development over the longer term; 
(ii) The near impossibility of reducing the part taken up by 
other types of expenditure, other because of their very 
nature (public sector debt) or because of the social costs 
that would result from such a move. 
3. Policies implemented in 1983 
A. Problems of definition 
Macroeconomic analysis alone is insufficient to identify, a 
priori, the items of public expenditure that will contribute to 
improving or extending productive capacity. Most cate-
gories of expenditure have widely differing effects in this 
context, and only microeconomic analysis, which takes 
account of profitability, can supply a clear answer. 
As it is impossible in practice to analyse each item of 
expenditure individually, a more approximate analysis must 
suffice, concentrating on the main areas of expenditure that 
are assumed to correspond most closely to the methodology 
under study. 
Comparison with the development of other categories of 
expenditure may be useful to assess progress. It is apparent 
even from a cursory examination that the usual distinction in 
the national accounts between current and capital expendi-
ture is unsuitable for the purposes of this study. Some items 
of current expenditure contribute to improving or maintain-
ing productive potential, while some items of capital 
expenditure make a direct contribution to public or private 
consumption. 
After considering the different options m detail, the 
Commission departments have adopted a framework for 
classification intended to monitor the trend of public 
expenditure in a practical way (breaking it down into capital 
expenditure, consumption expenditure and other current 
expenditure), by identifying: 
(i) Items of expenditure that improved the productive 
capacity and/or productivity of resident undertakings in 
the private and public sectors; 
(ii) Items of expenditure that increase the productive 
capacity of government departments; 
(iii) Other expenditures, distinct from transfers (both current 
and capital) abroad, and interest on the public debt, that 
deserve separate treatment. 
This classification is tabulated in Annex I, and provides a 
framework that makes possible an approximate assessment 
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of the contribution of public expenditure to the growth of 
production potential and improvement of productivity on 
the one hand or public and private consumption on the 
other. The experts from the Member States have provided 
statistical information based on, although not strictly 
adhering to, this framework. 
B. The main thrust of national policies and restructuring 
A number of common features are apparent: 
I. The promotion of productive public expenditure is a 
major objective of budgetary policy everywhere; 
2. However, adoption of this general aim does not always 
lead to the required result because the aggregate volume 
ofin public expenditure is subject to the constraint of the 
deficit; some member countries even consider that the 
best policy is to reduce the share of public expenditure in 
national income; 
3. Private and public investment is often complementary so 
that relative weakness in one often leads to a decline in 
the other; 
4. Infrastructure investment depends very much on popu-
lation trends, which may lead to an increase or a decrease 
in its relative share, depending on the country con-
cerned; 
5. Some categories of expenditure, especially transfer 
payments to households are still on a strongly rising 
trend, in particular because existing legal arrangements 
tend to bring about such a result; 
6. In more and more countries the burden of the public debt 
is so heavy that other categories of expenditure, and 
especially so-called productive expenditure, are being 
crowded out. 
The role of the budget as an instrument for improving 
productivity and productive potential thus depends as much 
on the judicious choice of certain forms of action as on 
alternative spending allocations within clearly defined 
budgetary limits; those allocations themselves are subject to 
the adverse effects of the almost inevitable expansion of 
certain items of expenditure. 
C. Restructuring policy in the Member States 
Belgium: The government has given priority to placing the 
budget on a sounder footing by aiming for a major reduction 
in net borrowing by 1985. The restructuring of budget 
expenditure is thus subject to the pressing constraint of an 
overall reduction. 
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In practice, there is no room for manoeuvre to increase the 
efforts to stimulate the economy, with respect to productive 
expenditure, in the short term (until 1985-86). 
Belgium's efforts are concentrating, therefore, on improving 
the utilization of public investment programmes by favour-
ing, in the allocated programmes, particular expenditures of 
a productive nature. At best the level of such expenditures 
could be stabilized in real terms (maximum forecast growth 
6,5~1~ per annum in current prices). 
Formerly, the use of investment programmes was, above all, 
subjected to quantitative modifications as an instrument of 
short-term economic policy. 
Belgium has made extensive use of budgetary expenditure to 
encourage and stimulate initiatives of the private sector and 
of companies, in favour of productive investment, with 
various priorities (energy-saving. contribution to risk 
capital, etc.). 
Denmark: One of the main aims of the government that took 
office in October 1982 is to reduce the public sector budget 
deficit and increase the scope for the private sector in the 
economy, whilst giving priority to public expenditure that 
will tend to improve the structure of the economy. The drive 
to put the budget on a sounder footing involves a 
considerable decline in the rate of growth of public 
expenditure, which is not always possible without a 
reduction in real capital expenditure. 
Nevertheless, aggregate expenditure for 'structural im-
provement' continues to increase in real terms (by about 
2,5%) in 1983, after a large increase in 1982, while 
expenditure for traditional purposes, and on aid to 
households remains stationary. 
In December 1982, the government launched a programme 
for the recovery of productive investment that was intended, 
in particular, to change some of the priorities of education 
and research,to carry out infrastructure investment, and to 
relax rules applying to enterprises. The programme also 
included changes in tax legislation and market arrangements 
to promote risk capital. 
Germany: The structure of public expenditure has de-
teriorated, mainly because of increasing unemployment and 
weaker public investment especially that of local authorities, 
which are suffering from the effects of a reduction in their tax 
revenues. 
The restructuring of public expenditure in favour of 
productive expenditure is considered to be a priority. 
In 1983, the declining trend of investment may at least be 
halted, while the accent is on strictly limiting the expansion of 
expenditure on public sector employees and on social 
transfer payments. This policy will be continued in 1984 and 
reinforced by changes in the tax regime that involve using the 
increase in VAT applicable from I July, to reduce taxes that 
fall specifically on enterprises, so as to gear tax arrangements 
to the promotion of innovation and investment. 
Greece: The development of public investment is a very 
important feature of the 1983 budget (it increases by 48~1~). 
The main effort involves infrastructure investment in 
transport, education and regional development. 
This approach will, in 1983, reverse the tendency for the 
share of investment to decline. However, the 1983 budget 
implies a relative reduction in subsidies (particularly to 
agriculture), aggregate wages in the civil service, and 
transfers to the social security system. As in other 
Community countries, the burden of the public debt is 
expanding rapidly. 
France: In 1983, in line with the efforts undertaken in 1982, 
the accent has been on expanding investment expenditure 
strongly (22%) 1 combined with the restraining of operating 
expenditure (8.4%). This policy is aimed particularly at 
developing the productive sector by encouraging research, 
improving the effectiveness of aid to private industry, and 
providing financial support for the newly-nationalized 
industrial groups. This is accompanied by a major budgetary 
effort in favour of vocational training. On the other hand, 
expenditure on public sector services has been reduced by 81~ 
in real terms, and in 1983, State intervention will be 
systematically reviewed. 
Ireland: For a long time, major efforts have been made to 
expand public investment and investment by firms in the 
public sector. However, the correction of the public sector 
deficit has now been given absolute priority. Moreover, in 
view of the growing burden of public sector debt and of 
unemployment, and the weakness of private investment, the 
share of 'productive ' public expenditure declined in 1983. 
The government is still doing its best to give this type of 
expenditure priority in the allocation of budget resources. 
Italy: The structure of public expenditure is considerably 
distorted by a substantial increase in interest payments on 
the public debt (85% in two years). However, the government 
has confirmed, in the 1983 budget, the reversal of trends 
established in 1981-82, when public capital expenditure 
began once again to expand faster than current expenditure. 
The main accent is on the development of housing, road 
networks, means of transport and the southern regions, 
According to payment appropriations in the 1983 Finance Act: however, 
later decisions have since reduced this figure. 
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while aid directed towards the development of technology, in 
small and medium-sized firms, has expanded sharply. 
The uncertainty due to forthcoming elections and the 
formation of a new government could, however hamper the 
programme. 
Luxembourg: The government reinforced its strict position 
in 1983, in view of the outlook for zero economic growth in 
the medium-term, which will affect future resources. The 
restructuring of expenditure is thus hampered by the strict 
limits placed on the development of budgetary expenditure 
overall. Nevertheless, the specific efforts to stimulate 
economic growth, ensure a satisfactory level of employment 
and bring about structural transformation in the economy 
have been reinforced, in particular through direct and 
indirect assistance to the consolidation and diversification of 
industry and to research and innovation. 
A budgetary programme for the restructuring and moderniz-
ation of the Luxembourg steel industry and for maintaining 
the competitiveness of the economy was recently drafted by 
the government within the framework of negotiations with 
the two sides of industry. 
The Netherlands: The large increase in the public deficit is 
forcing the authorities to reduce public expenditure severely 
in relation to what it would have been had no changes in 
legislation occurred. Most of the savings come from salaries, 
expenditure on health and social transfer payments. The 
government attaches great importance to strengthening the 
position of the private sector, and regards stabilizing the 
burden of taxation and reducing the borrowing require-
ments, as key elements in this strategy. 
In these circumstances, the process of reinforcing productive 
capacity is essentially a process of negative selection, 
intended to waive, as far as possible, the application to 
productive expenditure. of general restrictions. Indeed, the 
percentage of 'consumption' expenditure increased rapidly, 
not only during the 1960s and 1970s, but also in recent years. 
United Kingdom: The government does not, in principle, 
regard direct public investment as one of the principal means 
of promoting economic growth. In the authorities' view, this 
objective can best be attained by creating a climate conducive 
to the efficient development of the private sector. 
Within the budgetary amount allocated to public invest-
ment, priority has been given to productive investment 
rather than the development of infrastructures. 
Morevover, public investment is required to fulfil the 
criterion profitability (a real rate of return ofat least 5'.!~), not 
only in the nationalized industries,but also in such categories 
of investment as the development of roads, and means of 
transport for the benefit of manufacturing industry. 
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D. Analysis of tendencies observed in 1970-80 and 1982-
83 (see attached tables in Annex 2) 
The experts from the Member States have provided 
Commission departments with public expenditure figures 
broken down into categories according to the framework 
reproduced in Annex 1. 
To avoid excessively laborious research, the best possible 
grouping under present circumstances has been made; the 
detailed scheme of classification, the range of application, as 
wel) as the reference period may differ from country to 
country. 
For example, some countries have sent figures for the public 
sector, others for general government, and others for central 
government. 
Consequently, developments over time in individual count-
ries should be considered rather than comparisons between 
countries. 
The instructions for the classification into the 12 boxes in the 
table were not always strictly adhered to, because sufficiently 
detailed figures were not always easily available. 
A great deal of caution is also required in interpreting the 
figures. 
For example, in category IA, it was not always possible to 
separate capital transfers or lending to firms to improve 
productivity and structures; subsidies to cover operating 
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deficits are probably also included. Similarly, in the same 
category, infrastructure investment to improve general 
economic conditions is not always separably identified (for 
example, the building of certain roads may in certain cases 
not provide sufficient social returns). Similar remarks could 
be made about research and development expenditure. Some 
items of expenditure on education and vocational training, 
on the other hand, may lead to a major increase in the 
productivity of capital. It would therefore be dangerous to 
assume that expenditure in category II is always Jess 
'productive' than that in category I. With these reservations, 
the tables in Annex 2 show two features common to all 
countries. 
From 1970 to 1980, the share of category IA ( extension of 
capacity or the improvement of productivity in private sector 
and public sector enterprises) in the total has clearly 
contracted, whereas there has been a relative increase in 
transfers to households and interest on public debt. In 
certain countries there has also been a fall, in relative terms, 
in public consumption expenditure. The available partial 
information suggest that these trends continued from 1980 to 
1983. 
4. Conclusions 
No-one denies that it is useful and opportune to restructure 
public expenditure in favour of 'productive' spending. This 
objective does, however, imply that the authorities manage 
to control the expansion of other categories of expenditure, 
otherwise it would be impossible in most of the Member 
States to create the required room for manreuvre. 
Annex 1 
Classification of the direct effects of public expenditure 
by broad economic category 
Capital expenditure 
(a) investment 
(b) capital transfers 
(c) loans, advances 
and equities 
A' 
Expenditure on cur-
rent purchases of 
goods and services 
(government con-
sumption) B I 
Other current ex-
penditure 
(a) subsidies 
(b) other current 
transfers 
(c) interest on public C 
debt 
Expenditure devoted to expand 
productive capacity and/or to in-
crease the productivity of domestic 
private or public enterprises 
Public infrastructure 
investment in so far as 
it promotes produc-
tivity and improves the 
general conditions for 
the economy 
Research investment 
Capital transfers and 
lending to enterprises 
devoted to improve 
productivity or struc-
tures 
R & D expenditure in 
so far as it is such as to 
help improve produc-
tivity 
Interest subsidies and 
other current transfers 
to promote investment 
and structural changes 
Research subsidies 
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Expenditure devoted to maintain or 
expand the productive capacity of 
the domestic government sector 
(capacity to provide government 
services) 
II 
Public investment serv-
ing social consumption 
(schools, hospitals, 
sports facilities, parks, 
etc.) 
Expenditure on gov-
ernment employees 
Expenditure on mi-
litary buildings and 
equipment 
Other consumption ex-
penditures 
(showing the main items in the relerant boxes) 
Expenditure not having any in-
fluence on the domestic productive 
capacity of enterprises or of the 
government sector (serving private 
consumption) 
Ill 
Capital transfers and 
lending to enterprises 
and households for re-
sidential construction 
Other capital transfers 
and lending to enterpr-
ises not devoted to 
bring about structural 
change (aids towards 
continued operation) 
Other capital transfers 
and lending to private 
households 
Subsidies for the pur-
poses of the use of 
housing 
Subsidies to enterprises 
for the purposes of re-
ducing prices and tem-
porarily maintaining 
production and in-
comes 
Current transfers to 
households 
Expenditure not attribut-
able to groups I, II or Ill 
IV 
Capital trans-
fers and lending 
abroad 
Current trans-
fers abroad 
Interest on 
public debt 
Major maintenance expenditure is included in row A and minor maintenance expenditure in row B in accordance with the classification of the relevant investment. 
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Annex 2 
Classification of public expenditure by broad economic category 
% 
I. Expenditure devoted to II. Expenditure devoted to lll. Expenditure not having any IV. Expenditure not attributable 
expand productive capacity maintain or expand the pro- influence on the domestic to groups I, II or lII 
and/or to increase the produc- ductive capacity of the dom- productive capacity of en-
tivity of domestic private or estic government sector (ea- terprises or of the govern-
Total public enterprises pacity to provide government mcnt sector (serving private 
services) consumption) I to 
IV 
A B C A B C A B C A B C 
-- -- -- --
Capi- Govern- Other Total Capi- Govern- Other Total Capi- Govern- Other Total C',api- Govern- Other Total 
ta! mcnt cur- I ta! mcnt cur- 11 ta! mcnt cur- lII tal ment cur- IV 
expen- con- rent expen- con- rent expcn- con- rent cxpcn- coo- rent 
diture sump- expen- diture sump- ex pen- diturc sump- cxpcn- diturc sump- expen-
lion diture tion diturc tion diture lion diturc 
expen- expen- cxpcn- expen-
diture diturc diture diturc 
Belgium l 1970 10,4 4,6 15,0 3,2 39,0 42,2 0,4 22,8 23,2 1,0 5,7 12,9 19,6 100 Central government 1980 8,1 1,7 9,8 3,1 37,3 40,4 1,4 28.7 30,1 0,7 4,9 14,1 19,7 100 1982 8,2 1,9 IO,I 3,1 33,5 36,6 1,1 28,5 29,6 0,7 4,3 18,6 23,7 100 1983 7,2 1,8 9,0 2,6 33,9 36,5 1,1 28,0 29,1 0,8 4,3 20,2 25,3 100 
Denmark l 1970-71 14,6 14,6 47,0 47.0 1,5 32,4 33,9 4,4 4,4 100 Public sector 1975-76 10,5 I0,5 51,1 51,1 0,9 32,7 33,6 4,8 4,8 100 1980 8,1 8,1 47,7 47,7 0,8 33,5 34,3 9,9 9,9 100 1982 7,0 7,0 47,0 47,0 100 
Greece 1970 16,6 0,1 1,5 18,2 3,6 66,1 69,7 0,8 6,3 7,1 5,0 5,0 100 
1975 14,4 0,1 4,1 18,5 5,0 63,6 68,6 0,4 6,5 6,9 6,0 6,0 100 
1980 9,5 0,1 1,9 11,4 3,4 68,7 72,I 0,6 5,2 5,8 10,7 I0,7 100 
FR of Germany 1970 11,0 2.2 13,2 9,6 46.6 56.2 5,1 19,1 24,2 0,8 5,7 6,5 100 
1975 8,7 2,0 10.7 8,5 46,7 55,2 3,6 21,5 25,1 0,6 7,6 8,2 100 
1980 8,2 1,5 9,7 7,0 46,4 53,4 4,3 20,8 25,1 0,8 10,6 11,4 100 
1983 7,6 1.8 9.4 5,6 47,1 52,7 3,4 20,9 24,3 0,8 14,2 15,0 100 
France 
Ireland l 1970 11,3 0,9 3,3 15,5 3,6 38,4 42,0 5,5 26,4 31,9 10,6 10,6 100 Public authorities 1975 15,5 0.8 2,6 18,9 2,8 35,1 37,9 7,2 27,4 34,6 8,6 8,6 100 1980 0,8 2,7 37,7 27,1 12,4 12,4 100 
Central { government 1980 11,2 0,9 2,8 14,9 2,5 38,2 40.7 5,2 26,3 31,5 12,9 12,9 100 1983 8,7 0,7 2,2 11,6 1,8 36,2 38.0 5,1 28,7 33,8 16,6 16,6 100 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands { 1970 11.4 1,6 0,1 13, I 3,5 30,4 33,8 4,5 40,0 44,5 1,7 6,8 8,5 100 General 1975 9,9 1,3 0.1 11,3 2,7 28,6 31.3 3,7 45,4 49,1 0,4 8,0 8,3 100 
government 1980 9,2 1,2 0,1 10.5 2,2 27,3 29,5 3,3 47,5 50,8 0.4 8,8 9,1 100 
Central { government 1980 I0,6 0.8 3, I 14,5 1,8 19,0 19,7 40,5 6,7 29,9 36,6 1,4 7,0 8,4 100 1983 I0.5 0.8 2.3 13,6 u 17,9 16,4 35.8 8.6 28,2 36,8 1,3 12,5 13,8 100 
u,;,o, K;,,a= l 1977-78 3,7 3,5 4,2 11,4 3,6 45,8 3,5 52,9 5,4 1.7 28,6 35,7 100 
Public sector 1981-82 4,9 3,4 6,3 13,6 2,8 46,5 3,3 52,7 2,3 1,7 29,8 33,8 100 
1982-83 5,0 3,3 5.4 13.6 2,6 46,4 3,2 52.3 2.0 1,7 30,5 34,1 100 
1983-84 4,4 3,3 5,1 12.7 2,8 46,6 3, I 52.4 2,5 1.8 30,6 34,8 100 
Note: The breakdown of public expenditure. according to the large groupings laid down in the Economic Policy Committee's (budget team) classification schedule. has not been completely 
adhered to by certain countries; thus only the breakdown according to economic categories is in compliance. Nevertheless it has been possible to establish a provisional table, the 
following comments on which should be noted: 
DK: Capital expenditure has been split between Group I (investments and capital transfers to enterprises) and Group Ill (capital transfers and lending to enterprises); public 
consumption expenditure is largely included in Group Ill. Other current expenditure is split between Group lII (subsidies and transfers to household) and Group IV (transfers 
abroad and public debt interest). 
UK: Transfers abroad and public debt interest which would normally appear in Group IV arc included in the Group lII data. 
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Communication from the Commission 
to the Council on financial integration 
Introduction 
The considerable development of international financial 
relations over the past 20 years-the spectacular growth of 
Euromarkets being the most striking example-contrasts 
sharply with the sluggishness of European progress in the 
area of finance. 
Indeed, it is amazing that free trade in goods is so much easier 
to achieve than freedom to provide insurance services, or that 
the mechanisms of cooperation among European currencies 
apparently do not facilitate portfolio arbitrage among the 
investment instruments available on the various Community 
markets. 
This day-to-day reality can be expressed analytically by 
observing that the degree of financial integration in the 
Community is far from an optimal situation which would 
have two features: 
(i) the existence of a single, homogeneous market open to 
the outside world on an orderly basis. Market operators 
seeking to optimize the return on their investments 
would be in a position freely to buy, sell and trade in 
financial assets, which would ensure maximum mobility 
of capital within the Community's financial sector; 
(ii) mechanisms and instruments tailored to providing the 
financial basis for efficient mobilization of Community 
savings and their allocation to productive investments. 
This means that the process of financial integration involves 
the mobilization, circulation and allocation of financial 
resources within the Community. Consequently, the barriers 
set up by exchange regulations and taxation techniques must 
be removed, and, beyond the field of Community financial 
instruments, the coordination of policies for regulating 
financial markets must be encouraged. This effort must be 
backed up by a common, or at least coordinated, approach 
to organizing international monetary and financial relations 
and by greater solidarity with the Member States with 
balance of payments problems. It goes without saying that 
the scope and rate of integration, both financial and 
monetary, depend on the degree of convergence of economic 
policies; this convergence is essential to stabilize the 
expectations of investors and savers. 
Taking into account the vast domain over which it applies, 
the movement of financial integration can and must be 
undertaken through intermediate stages involving greater 
freedom for capital movements, more stable exchange rates, 
closer convergence of economic and monetary policies and 
fuller institutional harmonization. In fact this process has 
not developed over so wide a front, so that the specifically 
financial dimension of European construction is at present 
undeveloped and fragmentary. The failure to progress 
Brussels, 20 April 1983 
towards financial integration contrasts with hard-earned 
achievements in other fields of Community integration. 
There are probably historical and economic reasons for this 
situation. And yet the conditions for financial integration 
now appear in quite a new light. A European financial 
market is as necessary as ever: its failure to appear is 
hampering the reinforcement of the common market and 
preventing the Community economy from efficiently 
tapping available savings. 
This communication describes the present situation, assesses 
possibilities for progress and points to practical initiatives 
that could, if adopted lead the way to renewed progress 
towards financial integration. 
I. Deadlock in the process of financial 
integration 
I. The facts 
(a) Unlike the Treaty's provisions concerning the right of 
establishment and the free movement of goods, services and 
persons, the provisions on freedom of capital movement are 
not directly applicable, as a recent Court of Justice judgment 
has confirmed. The Member States' obligations are thus at 
present defined in the Council Directives of 1960 and 1962 
for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty. 
Certain transactions are unrestricted, and freedom can be 
suspended only by applying the safeguard clauses provided 
for in Articles 73, 108 and 109 of the Treaty. These 
transactions are: direct investments, operations in securities 
dealt in on a stock exchange, commercial credits and capital 
movements of a personal character or connected with the 
supply of services. A second group of transactions may be 
restricted on certain conditions: a Member State may 
maintain or reintroduce restrictions operative on the date of 
entry into force of the Directive, or on the date of accession, 
where free movement of capital might form an obstacle to the 
achievement of its economic policy objectives. These 
transactions are: flotation of foreign securities on domestic 
markets and introduction of foreign securities on a domestic 
stock exchange, transactions in unquoted securities, ac-
quisition of units in unit trusts and the granting and 
repayment of financial credits. For the remaining transac-
tions, concerning mainly short-term capital movements, the 
Member States are free to impose restrictions as they see fit. 
The adoption of these two Directives was the last occasion on 
which any progress was made towards freedom of capital 
movements. None of the subsequent attempts to advance 
one step further towards the goal came to anything. Indeed, 
financial markets are probably even less integrated now than 
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in the 1960s since capital movements within the Community 
are less free now, and the differences between the Member 
States are more marked. Exchange restrictions for all capital 
transactions have been discontinued in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, Belgium and Luxembourg (although there is a 
two-tier exchange market in those two countries). In the 
Netherlands, obligations to the Community are respected 
and capital transactions not covered by the requirement for 
free movement are treated liberally. In France, Italy, Ireland 
and Denmark, controls have been maintained for most 
capital movements, and these countries have been authorized 
by the Commission under the safeguard clauses to introduce 
restrictions on some of the capital transactions freed by the 
provision of the Directives of 1960 and 1962. 
(b) The possibility of restrictions when movements of capital 
lead to disturbances in the functioning of the capital market 
in a Member State (Article 73 EEC) or when a Member State 
is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with difficulties as 
regards its balance of payments (Article I 08 EEC) is one of 
the aspects of solidarity between the Member States. But the 
spirit and scope of the safeguard clauses implies that such 
measures should be exceptional: they should not be kept in 
force--although they have in fact been-for long periods. 
Otherwise, direct exchange controls become a permanent 
economic policy instrument, which is incompatible with the 
intentions of the Treaty. 
There is a tendency to prefer recourse to the safeguard 
clauses rather than another, better but also more difficult, 
expression of solidarity: mutual assistance. Apart from 
credit mechanisms between central banks the Community 
has added two instruments to its arsenal since the beginning 
of the 1970s: medium-term financial assistance and the 
Community loans mechanism. Under both these instru-
ments, the support is conditional upon observance by the 
recipient country of certain jointly agreed economic policy 
conditions. The instruments of mutual support ought not to 
be regarded as a last resort: on the contrary they should be 
brought into play early enough to prevent balance of 
payments crises and facilitate the required adjustments in 
conformity with the obligations under the Treaty. In fact, in 
spite of a considerable increase in the amounts available, the 
mutual support instruments have not been used since 1977. 
(c) At institutional level, a series of Directives has been 
adopted to cover the activity of financial intermediaries and 
stock markets. The arrangements that have gradually been 
introduced are intended to translate into reality the right to 
freedom of establishment within the Community for banks 
and insurance companies and to safeguard their freedom to 
supply services. The aim in connection with stock markets 
was to increase transparency and make it easier for issuers to 
enter the stock markets of the various Member States. 
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But the incidence of past and future progress towards 
institutional harmonization of the activities of financial 
intermediaries and markets will inevitably be limited if it is 
not backed up by parallel progress towards free capital 
movements. Free establishment alone does not lead to the 
integration of markets, even though it permits some 
interpenetration of the markets through the opening of 
agencies and branches. Similarly, the freedom to provide 
financial services or to choose the desired investments on 
behalf of the savers is sharply constricted if the correspond-
ing movements of funds are subject to restrictions. 
2. The explanation 
The approach laid down in the Treaty and the economic 
analysis on which it was based were coherent. In a situation 
of fixed exchange rates, implicitly assumed in the Treaty, the 
twofold objective of free trade in goods and services and free 
capital movement implies that national monetary policies 
must take account of the requirements of the balance of 
payments situation. Since most Member States wished to 
keep control of monetary policy for purposes of domestic 
regulation, they have had to ignore one or more of the other 
constraints, or come to terms with them in various ways. 
They obviously preferred to loosen what looked like the 
weakest constraint: free capital movements. There are two 
attitudes that seem to make this constraint less than urgent. 
First, fluctuations in capital movements are sometimes due 
as much to speculation as to the trend of basic economic 
variables. Secondly, a net outflow of long-term capital is 
often regarded as a loss of real resources for the national 
economy, the resulting accumulation of claims on the rest of 
the world being ignored. This explains why the Bretton 
Woods system justified restrictions on capital movements 
when such restrictions were essential to ensure the freedom of 
current transactions and the stability of exchange rates (see 
Article VI of the Articles of Agreement). The EEC Treaty, 
while it lays down the principle of'the abolition, as between 
Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for 
... capital', (Article 3(c)), permits the abolition of restrictions 
to be 'progressive ' to the extent necessary to ensure the 
proper functioning of the common market (Article 67). 
II. The need to relaunch efforts towards 
financial integration 
It is an evident disadvantage from the point of view of 
Community law, that Europe is not an integrated financial 
area. It is also, increasingly, a serious obstacle to reinforcing 
the common market, to restructuring the Community 
economy and even to stabilizing the international financial 
system. The economic policy considerations that long 
justified this situation have now become much less relevant. 
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I. Macroeconomic incompatibility has been attenuated 
Experience has constantly shown that direct controls 
contribute little to restoring basic economic equilibrium, and 
in particular that the impact of direct controls of c~pital 
movements on the balance of payments fades away quickly. 
More generally, the Member State governments are fir~ding 
that controlling financial flows is less and less certam t_o 
ensure a degree of autonomy in the pursuit of economic 
policy. The extent of convertibility of currencies and 
persistent external deficits in most of the Member States 
sing~larly restrict monetary policy independence. But most 
of all, major progress towards coordinating econ~mic and 
monetary policies in the Community, helped by the mterplay 
of the European Monetary System, has widened the margin 
available to the authorities in defining arrangements for 
capital movements. It is therefore possible to reconsider 
traditional controls introduced or reinforced under the 
Bretton Woods system, when the coordination of economic 
policies was embryonic and the economic cycles in the 
national economies were not synchronized. 
Experience has also shown that control mechanisms have 
most effect on long-term capital movements, easier to 
identifv but usually corresponding to the investment or 
realloc'ation of savings; short-term capital movements, 
which are more likely to involve speculation, are more 
difficult to regulate, since operators are very clever at finding 
ways through the tangled web of national rules. 
2. The reinforcement of the internal market also involves the 
question of financial services 
If firms are to exploit to the full the possibilities provided by 
the large single market of the Community, they must be in a 
position not only to move products around but also to 
choose the location of their production establishments 
without sacrificing the economies of scale obtainable 
through centralized management of a number of depart-
ments, especially those dealing with financial and ba~kin_g 
matters. Freedom to carry out direct investment, which 1s 
now almost complete in the Community, is not enough to 
ensure actual mobility of the factors of production. Firms 
develop through the accumulation of financial assets as well 
as through productive investment. In recent years, net 
purchases of financial assets have represented some 20% to 
30% of capital formation by German, French and UK 
companies, and even more in Italy. 
Financial costs are absorbing a growing proportion of firms' 
gross operating surpluses. These c~s.ts could useful!y be 
minimized through increased compet1t1on and economies of 
scale if the common market in banking were reinforced. 
Freedom to provide insurance services would also help: 
premiums on insurance against damage now often account 
for over 3% of gross operating surplus. If industrial groups 
are to operate efficiently on the single market, they must not 
be artificially forced into fragmented and piecemeal financial 
relations. 
3. Direct tapping of European savings would make for more 
effective restructuring of the Community economy 
Considerable capital is required for the or~ered restructuring 
of industrial sectors in difficulty and the development of new 
activities. 
Gross savings in the Community amounted in 1980 to 
430 OOO million ECU compared with a figure of only 
340 OOO million ECU for the United States. Very little of this 
total is tapped by national financial markets. Total 
transferable securities issued on the five major markets 
(Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom) amounted to 142 OOO million ECU, much lower 
than the corresponding figure of 212 OOO million for the US 
market. The disproportion is even more striking in the 
specific area of venture capital: the market capitalization of 
national shares quoted on Community stock exchanges 
amounts to only about 40% of that of shares quoted on Wall 
Street alone. 
In general, financial flows between Community countries are 
extremely underdeveloped in comparison with trade in goods 
and services. It is striking that long-term capital movements 1 
between Member States involve less than one-twentieth of 
the value of commercial flows (average sums between 1976 
and 1980 were I O OOO million ECU and 230 OOO million ECU 
respectively). 
This partitioning of Community financial markets is even 
more paradoxical in the light of the fact that f?reig_n 
borrowing on those markets by non-member countnes 2 1s 
much greater than that of non-member countries, and covers 
almost the samy proportion of their borrowing requirements. 
In 1987, Community borrowers issued loans totalling USO 
2 200 million on the markets of their partners, accounting for 
8% of their foreign borrowing, while non-member borrowers 
issued a total of USO I O OOO million, covering 6% of foreign 
borrowing. The only significant contribution to capital 
movements in the Community is that of the Community 
institutions, more than half of whose loans were floated on 
Member States' markets in 1981. 2 
Direct investment, portfolio investment, other long-term capital including 
banking capital. 
Including international loans denominated in Community currencies. 
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The activity of financial intermediaries is never neutral in its 
effects on the allocation of available savings. The partition-
ing of financial circuits at national level leads to waste; but 
the free application of the criterion of maximum financial 
yield does not always ensure maximum economic efficiency. 
Similarly, at the level of the Community, it may be that a 
financial system with too many internal partitions and not 
enough homogeneous regulation of external relations, which 
encourages too far the diversion of savings to outside 
destinations, does not serve the best interests of productive 
investment in the Community. 
4. Excessive intermediary activity for European savings on 
international markets and for non-member currencies 
probably undermines the stability of the international 
financial system 
The considerable development of the international financial 
system originated to a large extent in the Community. 
Community financial centres deal with about two thirds of 
Euro-loans. This demonstrates remarkable technical ca-
pacity, which it is in the Community's interests to preserve. 
However, the Euromarkets' contribution to connecting up 
national markets is indirect and imperfect, because of the 
wide variety of national exchange rules governing the 
conditions in which residents have access to Euromarkets. In 
particular, communication via the Euromarkets usually 
involves non-member currencies and conditions beyond the 
control of the authorities of the member countries. 
An unnecessarily large share of Community savings actually 
moves through international markets. for ill-defined econ-
omic purposes and subject to somewhat uncertain arrange-
ments, as recent events have shown. 
Only half the Member States' trade involves non-Com-
munity trade partners, but it is estimated that two thirds of 
their external long-term financial transactions take place 
outside Community financial circuits. Similarly, the BIS has 
established that the assets of non-bank Community residents 
with reporting banks amounted to the equivalent of about 
USO 70 OOO million at the end of 1981; it is estimated that at 
least 80% of this amount is in the form of deposits in non-
Community currencies. 
III. Practical proposals for a realistic process of 
financial integration 
To get the gradual process of financial integration under 
way, a set of specific initiatives is required; no single one on 
its own is determinant, but their simultaneoas application 
would represent considerable progress towards affirming the 
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financial identity of the Community and reinforcing its 
financial network. Such progress would supplement and 
support the Community's existing identity as a trading area 
and its emerging identity as a monetary union. 
1. A financial system of more direct service to the Com-
munity's economic development 
(a) Gradual dismantling of partitions betll'een capital markets 
The Commission recognizes that the present balance-of-
payments situation in several Member States prevents 
substantial immediate liberalization of capital movements, 
but restrictions retained under Articles 73 and 108 of the 
EEC Treaty should be kept to a minimum. 
It intends to consider the situation as a whole during the 
coming year, so as to explore,jointly with the Member States 
concerned, the possibility of gradually removing restrictions 
applied pursuant to the safeguard clauses. 
At the same time, action should be taken concerning the 
Commission's proposal for a list of exchange control 
measures and monetary policy measures with equivalent 
effect that can hamper current transactions, with a view to 
prohibiting such measures where they affect relations with 
other Member States unless they have been agreed at 
Community level and apply for a limited period. 
Apart from the above-mentioned consideration of restric-
tions under the safeguard clauses, the Commission feels that 
the gradual removal of barriers to capital movements in the 
Community should concentrate on the establishment of a 
European venture capital market. 
In the initial stages the restrictions on transactions in 
transferable securities applied pursuant to the safeguard 
clauses could be gradually lifted for purchases of shares 
traded on a Community stock exchange and issued by 
Community companies. Foreign exchange should be 
available at official market rates for such transactions. 
Where institutional investors are authorized to invest in 
venture capital, there should be no discrimination between 
the securities of national companies and those of the 
companies of other Member States. The principle of non-
discrimination should be extended to cover tax incentives for 
venture capital investment in the framework of the 
coordination of such incentives. 
It is worth noting that the full effects of freeing venture 
capital movements would be felt if, at the same time, 
corporation tax systems in the Community were harmo-
nized. The Commission would recall that it has presented a 
relevant proposal, at present under discussion in Parliament, 
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to avoid a situation where decisions about investment in 
shares at Community level are taken, all other things being 
equal, on the basis of tax considerations. 
(b) A more unified netll"ork of financial services 
I. The initial aim for banking was to encourage integration 
through the establishment of agencies and branches. The 
Directive of 12 December 1977 laid down rules for the 
coordination of national laws in this respect. The Commis-
sion intends to continue and step up its work in this field 
concentrating in particular on adjusting systems of control 
so as to facilitate the development of banking transactions 
within the Community. 
2. In the field of insurance, the right of establishment has 
been a practical reality since the First Directive of 24 July 
1973 was adopted. The same is not true of freedom to provide 
services, in spite of the direct effect of the relevant provisions, 
Articles 59, 60 and 106 of the Treaty. A proposal for a 
directive on insurance other than life assurance was sent to 
the Council in late 1975, with the purpose of ensuring 
freedom to provide services; it was followed by a proposal 
for amendments in early 1978. Since then, participations 
have been at a standstill for technical reasons. 
The development of services in this branch will help to 
strengthen the internal Community market. As to its 
financial impact on balances of payments, the transfer of 
premiums abroad will not be a one-way process, and will 
probably not affect more than a small percentage of total 
premiums paid in any one Member State, and there would 
probably be some correspondence between the descriptions 
of premiums collected and placements made. Management 
would be easier for those firms whose activity at Community 
level had developed most. Competition between insurers 
would encourage new insurance techniques, to the advantage 
both of customers and of the insurers themselves who are 
desirous of expanding their international activities. 
3. In the field of stock exchanges, the Commission thinks 
that links between national stock markets should be 
strengthened so that orders from clients may be carried out 
on the market offering the best terms at any given moment. 
The idea is not to set up a new stock market, but to link 
existing exchanges so that Europe can pool its resources and 
end the present compartmentalization. In the first stages the 
link-up could be confined to European shares quoted on 
several exchanges, eventually spreading to other securities 
and other markets. The Commission, in close collaboration 
with the European Stock Exchange Committee, is at present 
considering ways of achieving this aim. It is prepared to 
consider granting financial assistaDce if necessary to get the 
link-up system currently under study of the ground, and in 
particular to help with investment in data-processing and 
information technology infrastructures. 
If stock exchanges in all the Member States are to be in a 
position to participate fully in the system from the outset, the 
restrictions on listing foreign shares which some of them 
apply should be lifted. 
Moreover, to avoid distortions of competition between the 
exchanges of the different Member States, the Council must 
rapidly adopt the proposal for a Directive on indirect 
taxation of transactions in securities, with a view to 
eliminating double taxation and reducing the burden of taxes 
on such transactions as a first step to abolishing them. 
The Commission also feels that the development or 
establishment of markets for unlisted securities, particularly 
geared to the financing needs of small and medium-sized 
firms, could help to reinforce European markets and boost 
venture capital markets in Europe. 
Encouragement should also be given to collective investment 
undertakings for transferable securities (CIUTS) established 
in the Community to play a role in the interpenetration of 
Community markets. Consequently the two proposals for 
Directives concerning, respectively. the coordination of 
national provisions relating to CIUTS and freedom for 
transactions in their units should be adopted as soon as 
possible by the Council to enable CIUTS to provide services. 
(c) Ne1r instruments for tapping sm•ings in the Community 
The Community institutions, including the EIB, havt: a 
useful contribution to make here. At the same time, it is 
necessary to develop financial instruments that can result in 
the effective interpenetration of financial circuits and ensure 
efficient tapping and circulation of capital within a 
geographically wider financial sector. 
The Commission intends to take action on three fronts: 
I. It will encourage closer collaboration between medium-
term and long-term credit institutions on programmes or 
projects of common interest, and in particular develop 
cofinancing operations like those already carried out by the 
Community's club of specialized long-term credit insti-
tutions. Such collaboration might be based for example on a 
programme of unified loans issued simultaneously on the 
Member States' markets. 
2. It may consider the establishment of collective investment 
undertaking for industrial purposes; their units would be 
placed freely on the markets in the Member States and their 
portfolio made up of shares issued by Community firms. The 
adoption of the two Directives on CIUTS mentioned above 
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would make it easier to set up such undertakings and 
distribute their units. 
3. The third type of action concerns mortgage loans. 
Housing credit establishments financed by the issuing of 
mortgage bonds should be allowed to place their bonds, up to 
a certain ceiling, in other Member States, using the proceeds 
for mortgage loans in the country of issue. The establish-
ments financed by deposits, whose freedom of establishment 
is hampered at the moment by administrative barriers, 
should be authorized to move into the markets of other 
Member States. 
2. Contributing to better balanced international financial 
relations 
The Community should set itself for international financial 
relations a goal similar to that adopted on the monetary 
front: an area of stability, to help create more balanced 
relations between the world's major financial centres. To 
take this approach, the Community must assume a financial 
personality vis-a-vis the rest of the world. 
(a) Greater control of capital flows between the Community 
and the rest of the world 
The steps taken towards freeing capital flows early in the 
Community's existence were the product rather of a 
movement towards global financial exchanges. At the same 
time, within the Community national measures governing 
financial flows to the outside world were in force in several 
Member States. To date, Article 70 of the Treaty, which 
provides for the progressive coordination of the exchange 
policies of the Member States in respect of the movement of 
capital between those States and third countries, has only 
once been applied: in the 1972 Directive on regulating 
international capital flows and neutralizing their undesirable 
effects on domestic liquidity. The instruments created by the 
Member States in this respect are of general application, with 
no differentiation between capital movements within the 
Community and those between the Community and non-
Member States. Some of them were or are solely intended to 
improve control over speculative inflows of capital (e.g. the 
Bardepot system). 1 
The Community's aim should be to maintain a high degree of 
freedom in relation to the rest of the world and to safeguard 
In 1972 and 1973 the German authorities introduced the requirement for a 
frozen deposit, called the Bardepot, corresponding to a certain percentage 
(it has varied from 20~~ to 50%) of foreign borrowing by residents. 
It does not operate in the same way as the compulsory non-interest-
bearing deposit that Italian rules have required on several occasions 
(under measures taken in 1974, 1976 and 1981) on purchases of foreign 
currency by residents. 
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the international activity of its financial centres. At the same 
time, the relevant Community authorities should consider 
whether instruments should be set up at Community and 
international level to be used if necessary to improve control 
over flows of capital between Member States and the rest of 
the world, and if so, how. 
(b) Joint consideration of international banking supervision 
Once the Community has well-defined instruments of 
integration at its disposal, it can, through the coordination of 
banking laws, create an area of stability that would not only 
achieve a homogenous internal structure control at inter-
national level in a way better adapted to banks' growing 
international exposure. 
For example, the Commission has drawn up a proposal for a 
Directive on banking supervision on a consolidated basis in 
close collaboration with the EEC's Banking Advisory 
Committee on the basis of work done at the Bank for 
International Settlements; the proposal is intended to enable 
the supervisory authorities of the country where the parent 
company of a banking group has its headquarters to assess 
the financial situation of the entire group, including 
subsidiaries in other Member States. 
The Commission has also taken steps concerning annual 
accounts of banks and the content of regular returns to be 
supplied to the supervisory authorities, the supervision of 
large exposures, in particular large loans granted by banks 
and cooperation between credit information exchanges; the 
calculation of banking solvency and liquidity ratios; 
procedures for the reorganization, or if necessary winding up 
of international banks in a critical situation. 
Among these measures the calculation of coefficients (which 
the Banking Advisory Committee considers very important) 
is especially likely to lead to international cooperation in the 
field of capital requirements and day-to-day supervision of 
banks operating at international level, particularly since the 
methods of calculation are also being considered outside the 
Community, by a Committee of the Group of Ten in Baste. 
In the Commission's opinion, action on these fronts, and in 
particular the adoption of the Directive on supervision on a 
consolidated basis, is a necessary first step to proper 
assessmen of the international activity of European banks. 
These measures could also help to improve the management 
of international risks. The basic techniques developed should 
be used for a Community approach to official discussion of 
the risks to the international financial system, and the 
rescheduling of the external debt of countries in difficulty. A 
common position is especially necessary when these matters 
involve geographical regions or countries with which the 
Community's relations are intense or privileged. 
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(c) Coordinating the foreign borrowing policies of the 
Member States 
A joint attempt at Community level to find the proper 
balance between the constraint of international adjustment 
and the advantages of external financing is one of the basic 
factors in the convergence of the Member States' economic 
policies. 
As announced in the programme put forward in 1980 in its 
report on recycling, the Monetary Committee has just set up 
a mutual information and monitoring procedure on the 
balance-of-payments and external indebtedness position of 
the member countries. This work should lead to the 
definition of general guidelines for foreign borrowing policy. 
This opportunity should be taken to assess whether 
Community instruments are suitable in view of the new 
technical features of financial markets, and whether they are 
adequate to meet the needs of the Member States. 
3. Promoting the use of the ECU 
Financial integration in the Community cannot make 
genuine progress unless it is based on a higher degree of 
monetary identity. At this stage, the development of the role 
of the ECU is an essential factor here, both as the most 
important vehicle for increased transferability of financial 
assets within the Community and as the expression of an 
emerging monetary union that aspires to be one of the three 
pillars of an ordered international monetary system. 
(a) Recognition of foreign currency status 
It would be a decisive step forward if the ECU were 
recognized as a foreign currency so that transactions 
denominated in ECUs could be treated as transactions in a 
convertible currency. Official rates for the ECU quoted on all 
the Community's exchange markets, even if the rates are 
based on those for the component currencies, would sanction 
the ECU's status in the eyes of operators. 
(b) Privileged treatment for financial transactions in EC Us 
Community residents should be able to carry out transac-
tions in securities denominated in ECUs, at least within 
certain limits, under normal conditions; in several Member 
States this would mean waiving rules now in force. 
(i) First, all residents of Member States should be allowed to 
subscribe freely, at official exchange rates, to ECU issues 
floated by Community borrowers, and in particular to 
issues of this type floated by Community institutions. 
(ii) Under the rules governing the composition of the 
portfolios of institutional investors, securities de-
nominated in ECUs should be assimilated to national 
securities of the same type, subject to possible provisions 
to limit the exchange risk. 
(iii) Any new instrument for tapping savings introduced at 
Community level should preferably be based on the 
ECU. 
(c) Enlarging the official role of the ECU 
At present, official use of the ECU between central banks 
participating in the EMS takes place in a closed circuit. If the 
EMS is opened to the outside, as recommended by the 
Commission in its communication of 15 March 1982 on 
strengthening the EMS, this would extend the area of 
stability of the system by associating in exchange and 
intervention mechanisms the currencies of non-member 
countries having special economic and financial links with 
the Community and its Member States. It would also 
increase opportunities for using and mobilizing the official 
ECU, and, by setting an example, contribute to developing 
private use of the ECU by operators outside the Community. 
Conclusions 
With a view to ensuring the development of productive 
activity and to tapping savings to obtain required financing, 
the Commission would ask the Council: 
I. To recognize the need for the financial integration 
process to get under way once more, with the removal of 
partitions and the establishment of interconnections 
between capital markets the actual provision of financial 
services and the gradual establishment of genuine 
financial unity in Europe, vis-a-vis non-member count-
ries. 
2. To note the Commission's intention to present the 
Monetary Committee with a request for an opinion 
based on this communication, to help it assume its 
responsibilities of management and proposal, concern-
ing in particular: 
(i) consideration by the Commission of justification for 
partial or complete retention of national measures 
authorized under Articles 73 and I 08 of the Treaty; 
(ii) the proposed list of exchange control measures or 
monetary policy measures of equivalent effect liable to 
hamper current transactions in the Community, which 
Member States should not introduce unless there has 
been a joint decision under the procedures of the 
safeguard clauses; 
(iii) the definition of instruments, and the conditions of their 
use, which the Member States could set up to control 
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exchange and regulate capital movements involving non-
member countries. 
3. To request the Member States, irrespective of the 
consideration of safeguard clauses to be undertaken by 
the Commission, to take the required steps: 
(i) to remove barriers to the free movement of shares issued 
by Community undertakings and traded on a Com-
munity stock exchange, and to bring arrangem·ents for 
investment in equity, in particular rules governing 
institutional investors and tax incentive measures, closer 
into line with a Community approach; 
(ii) to recognize the ECU as a convertible currency with the 
same status as all major currencies, and to treat 
transactions denominated in ECUs, especially loans 
floated by Community institutions, as privileged trans-
actions for the purposes of exchange control regulations 
and provisions applying to institutional investors. 
4. To set itself the following aims: 
(i) the adoption of the Directive coordinating national 
provisions concerning insurance services other than life 
assurance to facilitate freedom to provide services, as a 
priority measure for strengthening the internal market; 
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(ii) the adoption by the end of 1983 of the Directive on 
banking supervision on a consolidated basis; 
(iii) the adoption as soon as possible: 
(a) of the two Directives on collective investment 
undertakings for transferable securities, in particular 
to make it easier to set up CIUTS with an industrial 
purpose and to place their units on the markets of the 
Member States; 
(b) of the Directive concerning indirect taxation of 
transactions in securities; 
(iv) the intensification of efforts to smooth the way for the 
gradual emergence of a common market in banking, 
both from the point of view of conditions of entry to the 
market and from that of the coordination of measures on 
prudential control and the establishment of harmonized 
accounting procedures; 
(v) further coordination of foreign indebtedness policies, 
with consideration of the respective roles of the various 
forms of official borrowing; 
(vi) the association of non-member central banks in the 
mechanisms of the European Monetary System; in the 
present international economic and monetary situation 
this would be particularly useful in strengthening the 
EMS. 
Communication from the Commission to the Council 
on the promotion of the international role of the ECU 
I. The conclusions of the Presidency of the European 
Council in Bremen stipulated, in paragraph I of the annex, 
that the ECU should be at the heart of the EMS; the 
Resolution of the Brussels European Council foresaw, in 
paragraph 2.7, that the ECU would be at the centre of the 
EMS. Both national and Community authorities have 
repeatedly stressed the need to develop the role and usage of 
the ECU, both public and private. This communication deals 
only with the private use of the ECU. 
2. The private use of the ECU, which commenced only two 
years ago, has taken off rapidly: it is a method of invoicing 
which is becoming more and more widespread, particularly 
in the case of multinational companies; its role as a means of 
payment should be reinforced by a better exploitation of the 
existing usage possibilities; it is, in some Member States, an 
increasingly important instrument for the denomination of 
financial investment; finally, the volume of ECU-de-
nominated isuues makes it the third most used currency, after 
the dollar and the German mark for the floating of bonds on 
the international markets. 
3. Nevertheless, steps must be taken to secure the develop-
ment of the private use of the ECU; such a development is, in 
fact, a necessary means of reinforcing the European 
monetary identity, internal and external. 
(a) Increased use of the ECU would constitute, first of all, an 
important element in a renewed movement towards 
internal financial integration in the Community; it is 
clear that the ECU, the expression ofa monetary zone in 
formation, cannot continue to be subject, within the 
EEC, to those restrictions which in some Member States 
are imposed on foreign currencies. 
(b) It is even more necessary that the development of the 
ECU in international markets should permit the 
progressive distributions over all Community currencies 
of capital movements which, at present take place 
between, on the one hand, the dollar, and, on the other, 
those European monies which are alternatives to the US 
currency. The enlargement of the ECU market would, 
moreover, bring about a better equilibrium between the 
source of funds, at present very limited geographically, 
and their use. 
Brussels, 24 May 1983 
4. The Commission proposes that the promotion of the role 
of the private ECU should take place under three main 
headings: 
(a) Status of the ECU 
The ECU is treated differently, de facto or de Jure, in the 
various Member States. This differentiation ranges from a 
total ban to complete freedom, encompassing formulae 
which, while not forbidding operations in ECUs nevertheless 
result in increased costs for such operations. 
The Commission proposes that the necessary measures be 
taken, in all Member States, to accord foreign currency 
status to the ECU. To this end, it proposes that the Council 
adopt the draft Resolution attached in the annex. 
(b) Use of the ECU 
Transactions in ECU-denominated bonds must be libera-
lized, that is to say, made accessible to Community residents 
under normal conditions. This privileged access to the ECU 
market by residents requires, on the part of several Member 
States, derogations from their exchange control laws. 
The Commission has made proposals in this respect in its 
communication on financial integration. 
(c) Protection of the ECU trade mark 
Although the banking profession follow uniform procedures 
when referring to the ECU, private initiatives, taken in the 
context of national regulations, often designed for other 
purposes, risk giving rise to divergent applications of the 
ECU and, therefore, prejudicing its development. 
The Commission will, therefore, propose, when all Member 
States have recognized the ECU as a foreign currency, a 
document which will constitute a reference text for the ECU. 
This text will define the status of the ECU and clearly state 
the rules which users will have to follow; it will reproduce the 
various texts regarding the definition of the ECU, refer to its 
recognition by the Member States and assure the protection 
of the ECU trade mark. 
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Annex 
The Commission request the Council and the Member States 
to adopt the following draft Resolution regarding the ECU: 
' The Council considers that the development of the role of 
the ECU is an important part of the internal consolidation 
of the EMS and the affirmation of its external role. 
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It has noted the communication of the Commission in the 
matter and, particularly, the suggestions made to facilitate 
the treatment and promotion of the use of the ECU. The 
relevant authorities have expressed their intention to take 
all the measures necessary to ensure that ECU operations 
are treated, in the context of their internal regulations, as 
foreign currency operations.' 
Technical annex 
1. Basic concepts and forecasting techniques 
1.1 Aggregation in Community data 
In general, national accounts variables in national currencies 
for the Member States are aggregated using Purchasing 
Power Standards (PPS) for domestic variables and market 
exchange rates (ECU) for foreign trade variables. Volume 
series (constant price series) are aggregated on the basis of 
1975 prices and 1975 PPS/exchange rates. Value series 
(current price series) are aggregated on the basis of current 
prices and current PPS/exchange rates. National accounts 
implicit price deflators are obtained by dividing current price 
series by the corresponding constant price series. 
Money supply indices for the Community are derived from 
geometrically-weighted indices for the Member States, the 
weights being the share of each country in total Community 
GDP at current prices and current PPS in the year in 
question. Long-term and short-term interest rates for the 
Community are similarly derived as a geometrically-
weighted average of rates in the Member States, the weights 
being the same as for the money supply calculations. 
1.2 Forecasting procedures 
Short-term forecasts are prepared by the Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs twice a year, in 
May-June and September-October. The time horizon of 
these forecasts is to the end of the following year. The 
forecasts contained in this Review are those given by the 
September-October 1983 exercise. The forecasts are built up 
separately for each of the 10 member countries of the 
Community, but within a framework of common assump-
tions about the external environment, exchange rates and 
interest rates, and subject to controls and checks on the 
consistency of foreign trade forecasts. The forecasts are 
made on the basis of the assumption of unchanged 
government policies. 
The forecasts for each Community country cover the main 
components of gross domestic product in volume, price and 
value terms; the income and expenditure accounts of 
households and of general government; the current account 
of the balance of payments; saving, investment and the 
financial balance of the main institutional sectors; employ-
ment and unemployment; and domestic money supply and 
its counterparts. Figures are mainly compiled on an annual 
basis, but half-yearly estimates are made for gross domestic 
product and its components in volume terms and for certain 
other key indicators such as industrial production, un-
employment, and the current account balance. Quarterly 
profiles for gross domestic product are also made for the 
whole forecast period. 
Although in principle the definitions used are those of the 
ESA, in practice national definitions and sources are used in 
some cases because the statistics become available more 
quickly, and in order to facilitate discussion of the forecasts 
with national authorities. 
The forecasting round starts with the setting of assumptions 
about exchange rates, interest rates, and demand and prices 
in the rest of the world. These initial assumptions may be 
amended as the round progresses in the light of new 
information and of the emerging forecast for the Community 
countries. 
(i) Exchange rate forecasts are normally based on the rates 
implied by the forward exchange markets, modified to 
take account of the EMS and other considerations. In the 
present forecast the forecast rates were based on those 
future rates prevailing at the beginning of July 1983. 
(ii) Short-term interest rate assumptions are set for the USA 
and for each of the Community countries taking account 
of exchange rate developments, domestic monetary 
policies, etc. 
(iii) Forecasts are made for the growth of real GDP and its 
components for the USA, Canada and Japan, and in a 
more summary form for each of the other non-EC 
member countries of the OECD. In the light of output 
growth and other considerations, forecasts of the change 
in the volume of total imports of goods are made for each 
of these countries, and for three other world zones-
OPEC. non-oil developing countries, and other countries 
(consisting principally of the centrally planned econ-
omies, South Africa, and Yugoslavia). An assumption is 
made, having regard to oil market conditions and recent 
OPEC decisions, about the export price of oil, and 
forecasts are also made for the world export prices of the 
main groups of non-oil primary commodities (based on 
UN indices) and for the export prices of manufactured 
goods of the major non-EC developed countries. 
The forecasts of the change in import volumes for the non-
EC countries and zones, together with initial import 
forecasts for each of the Community countries, are weighted 
together according to the structure of exports to provide 
estimates of 'export market growth' for each country. 
Similarly, the forecasts of rest-of-the-world export prices for 
primary commodities and manufactures, together with 
initial forecasts of total export prices of goods for each of the 
Community countries and with the necessary exchange rate 
adjustments, are weighted together according to the 
structure of imports to provide estimates of 'import costs' for 
each country. On the basis of this and other information the 
country desks make their first forecasts of export volumes 
and import prices and, if necessary, revise their forecasts of 
import volumes and export prices, with in all cases a split 
between trade within the Community (intra-EC) and trade 
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with non-EC countries (extra-EC). Particular attention is 
paid to ensuring that the changes in total intra-EC imports 
and exports should be close in both volume and price terms. 
Checks are also made at world level to make sure that world 
exports and imports are in line with each other. In order to 
reach this desired convergence and in response to the country 
desks' forecasts which are being developed at the same time, 
this procedure for achieving trade consistency is reiterated 
several times. 
2. Balance of payments exchange rate and 
competitiveness concepts 
2.1 Sources of balance of payments and related data 
Indices of the terms of trade (Tables 7.1 and 7.2) refer to 
merchandise trade. The sources are Eurostat for EC 
countries, the IMF ('International Financial Statistics' and 
'World Economic Outlook') for other groups of countries. 
Tables on nominal and real adjustment (Tables 7.1 and 7.2) 
are based on data for current balances taken from Eurostat 
for EC countries ( except for 1983 forecasts, which are made 
by the EC Commission) and from the IMF ('World 
Economic Outlook') and the OECD ('Economic Outlook') 
for other groups of countries. The data in these tables for 
trade in goods and services at constant 1975 prices, which 
exclude investment income flows, are based on balance of 
payments figures, deflated by price indices of exports/ 
imports of goods and services (expressed in ECU or dollar 
terms) taken from the national accounts of the country, or 
group of countries concerned, where such data are available. 
Where price deflators for goods and services are not available 
(i.e. in the case of oil-exporting and non-oil developing 
countries) merchandise unit values have been used. 
In Tables 7.3 and 7.4 the terms 'primary products' and 
'manufactures' denote respectively categories 0-4 and 5-9 of 
the Standard International Trade Classification. 
In Table 7.9, gross reserves are defined to include foreign 
currency, SOR, IMF reserve positions, ECU and net 
positions vis-a-vis the EMCF. They exclude the 80% of 
official gold reserves which are not swapped against ECU. 
For comparability with later years, the figures for 1978, 
before the EMS was established and the ECU came into 
existence, include 20~~ of official gold reserves valued at 
market prices. The same procedure has been applied for all 
years to Greece, which is not a member of the EMS and has 
no official holdings of ECU. Note that this definition of 
gross reserves differs from that used in Table 40 of the 
Statistical Annex, which includes total official gold reserves. 
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2.2 Effective exchange rates 
Changes in the effective exchange rate of a currency i 
measure the average change in the exchange rates between 
currency i and a representative sample or 'basket' of other 
currencies between two points in time in order to express in a 
single figure the average direction and magnitude of change 
over the period in question. The model used in the 
Commission to calculate these average exchange rate 
changes involves 20 countries-the members of the Com-
munity (with Belgium and Luxembourg treated as a single 
entity), the two candidates for membership (Spain and 
Portugal), and the nine other countries with the greatest 
importance in world trade. An effective exchange rate 
change for currency i is obtained by multiplying the 
percentage change against each of the other 19 currencies in 
the model by that currency's weight and summing the results. 
The weights attributed to each currency reflect the import-
ance of the currency concerned, both as a bilateral trading 
partner for country i and as a competitor against exports 
from country i in third markets. For this reason the term 
'trade-weighted exchange-rate changes· is sometimes used in 
place of the tenn 'effective exchange rate changes·. The 
weights used arc based on trade data for the year in question 
up to and including 1980. For subsequent years, the weights 
are based on 1980 trade data. 
For certain purposes it may be useful to use a more restricted 
sample of currencies. For example, following a realignment 
within the EMS it is possible to calculate the effective 
exchange rate of each EMS currency against all other EMS 
currencies taken together using the same technique as 
described above. but using a 'basket' composed of EMS 
currencies only. 
2.3 Statistical measures relating to the European Monetary 
System (EMS) 
2.3. 1 Bilateral dil'ergence between currencies of the European 
Monetary System ( EMS) 
The width of the EMS band depends on the positions of the 
two currencies that diverge most in relation to their bilateral 
central rate. The maximum divergence allowed between two 
currencies is 2,25;.,, although the lira may diverge by up to 
6;0 ; sterling is not in the exchange mechanism. 
The average point in the band is determined by half the 
bilateral divergence of the two currencies with the widest 
divergence (not counting the lira). In the graph, the 
currencies do not diverge by more than 1 ,25% from the 
average point. 
2.3.2 Divergence indicator in the European Monetary System 
(EMS) 1 
The divergence indicator (DI) measures the degree of 
movement of a specific currency against its maximum 
divergence spread (MOS), which differs for each currency as 
a function of its weight in the ECU basket. The formula for 
the divergence indicator is: 
± 2,25 x ( 1 - p;), where P; is the weight of the currency in 
the ECU basket. 
For a given currency, the divergence indicator is obtained: 
(i) first by calculating the premium (P) or discount (D) 
shown by the market rate of the ECU in terms of that 
currency against its ECU-related central rate; 
(ii) and then by comparing the result obtained with the 
maximum divergence spread. 
In order to permit a comparison of movements in the 
divergence indicators for each of the EMS currencies, the 
maximum divergence spread for each currency is assigned an 
index of I 00. The indicator will therefore be expressed as a 
figure from O to 100. A currency reaches its divergence 
threshold when the indicator stands at 75. 
Expressed as a formula, calculation of the indicator is as 
follows: 
P or D ECU market-ECU central 
ECU central 
P or D DI---
MOS 
X JOO 
X JOO 
The result is adjusted to ensure that the indicator for 
currencies observing narrow margins of 2,25~,-;; against one 
another is not distorted by exchange rate movements in the 
lira and the pound sterling outside those margins (which are 
not, of course, operationally compulsory for Italy and the 
UK). 
2.4 Unit labour costs and competitiveness 
An index of competitiveness for country i is derived by 
multiplying the effective exchange rate index (see above) for 
currency i by an index of relative inflation (calculated in 
exactly the same way, except that it measures changes in price 
or cost levels, expressed in national currency, rather than 
average changes in exchange rates). The resulting index 
shows how prices or costs in country i, when corrected for 
exchange rate changes, have moved in relation to a weighted 
For a detailed explanation of the EMS. see European Economy, No 3 of 
July 1979. 
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average of 19 other countries' prices or costs, also corrected 
for exchange rate changes, over a given period. Such an index 
is usually referred to as an index of price or cost 
competitiveness. 
In this Review competitiveness is measured in terms of unit 
labour costs in manufacturing (see Chapters 3 and 7). 
Labour cost per unit of output is defined as the ratio of 
compensation of employees (including employers' social 
security contributions) in manufacturing at current prices to 
value added in manufacturing at constant prices (base 1970 
to 1975 = 100). 
'Manufacturing' in principle refers to branch 3 of the NACE 
('Nomenclature des activites dans Jes Communautes eu-
ropeennes'). For the period 1960-69, data on value added in 
manufacturing were as far as possible taken from Eurostat 
for Community countries and from OECD sources for non-
member countries. Where figures were not available from 
these sources, national sources were used. Thus in Denmark 
prior to 1965 the figures include repairs and maintenance. 
Irish figures for the whole period are from national sources 
and relate to industry, i.e. they include construction and 
energy. For Switzerland, figures were not available on a 
national accounts basis and the OECD index of industrial 
production was used. For a number of other countries data 
were unavailable from 1960 to 1962 and industrial produc-
tion indices were linked to the value added series for these 
years. For figures on income from employment, national 
sources were used for Denmark, Luxembourg, Italy, France, 
the Netherlands and Ireland (including construction and 
energy) OECD data were used for the United Kingdom and 
the Federal Republic of Germany. For Belgium estimates 
were made on the basis of the change in total remuneration of 
employees. Figures for Japan were from national sources 
and for Switzerland and Austria were constructed on the 
basis of indicators of changes in hourly earnings, hours 
worked and employment (source OECD). The remaining 
figures are from OECD national accounts data except in 
certain cases for the period 1960-62 where indicators were 
used. 
For the period 1970 to 1981, Eurostat data were used for the 
Community countries and OECD data were used for other 
countries. For the period 1982 to 1984, estimates of 
Commission services were used. 
In order to calculate relative costs, non-EC countries had to 
be taken into account so that the study covers 20 OECD 
countries whose foreign trade is more than I 1~ of total world 
trade: EC 2 plus USA, Canada, Japan, Austria, Australia, 
Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Finland and Portugal. 
Belgium and Luxembourg aggregated in the calculations of relative data. 
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Labour costs per unit of output are then weighted by an 
effective exchange-rate matrix, the weights being those used 
by Commission services in competitiveness index calcu-
lations. The weighting matrix used is that described in section 
2.2 above. The actual weights used are shown in Table A I. 
The weighting coefficients take account not only of bilateral 
trade but also of the intensity of competition in third markets 
and in the domestic market of each country. The exchange 
rate used is that of the number of dollars per unit of national 
currency. This first calculation gives a 'competitors' labour 
cost'. The ratio of labour cost per unit of output calculated 
on the basis of national currency data to this 'competitors' 
cost' gives the 'relative cost'. 
The same calculation can be made without including the 
exchange rate, giving a 'relative cost in national currency'. 
Thus, three series are used as a basis for the study. 
(i) Labour cost per unit of output: 
RSN 
ULC = --
=VA75 
(ii) Relative labour costs in national currency: 
ULC; 
ULCR; = ---
20
----
antilog L W ij Log ULC1 
;-1 
(iii) Relative labour costs in USO: 
RSN 
ULCUSD; 
ULCR USO; = ---
20
-----
antilog L W ij Log ULCUSD1 ;-I 
TCH; 
= ULCR; x ---19 ____ _ 
antilog L WijLogTCH1 
1-1 
Compensation of employees (wages plus 
total social security charges) in national 
currency; 
Value added in manufacturing 1975 prices; 
Exchange rate of the currency of country i 
against the USO; 
ULCUSD; ULC; x TCH; = labour cost per unit of 
output in USO; 
Weighting for country i. 
TCH; 
---
19
---- = effective exchange rate 
antilog L W ij Log TCH1 
J-1 
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All the data have been calculated on the basis of costs in 
national currencies expressed as an index (base 1970 to 1975 
= 100) for each country. 
The data relating to the effective exchange rate for the 
Community are calculated for the ECU by reference to a 
weighted average of the ten competing countries, the 
Community being considered as one market. Relative labour 
costs for the Community were calculated using the same 
matrix of weighting coefficients. 
3. Prices and costs 
3.1 Origin of price increases 
The deflator of total final expenditure (TFE) at market prices 
in period O (P~ is defined as follows: 
Do Wo + No + To - Mo 
p~ = - = ------
do do (3.1.i) 
where D total final expenditure at market prices; 
w income from employment; 
N gross operating surplus (profits and self-
employment income); 
T indirect taxes less subsidies; 
M imports. 
Upper-case variables are expressed in current prices and 
lowercase variables in constant prices. 
Thus pd 
W 0 .W N0 .N T0 .t M0 .M 
--+--+--+--
Do Do Do Do 
ci (3.1.ii) 
Where a dot over a variable here denotes its value in period 1 
divided by its value in period 0. 
Defining unit labour costs (ULC), profits and self-
employment income per unit of output (UNC) and indirect 
taxes per unit of output (UTC) as income from employment, 
profits and self-employment income and indirect taxes, 
respectively, divided by gross domestic product in constant 
prices (y), then 
Wo . No To Mo 
y(ULC.- + UNC.- + UtC.-) + ri1 pm __ 
Do Do Do Do 
pd= ----------------- ().I.iii) 
ci 
where pm is the import price deflator. 
Then if 1j ~ ri1: 
Wo No To Mo 
pd:e Ui.C.- + UNC.- +Ute.-+ i>m.- (3.1.iv) 
Do Do Do Do 
i.e., one plus the rate of change of the TFE deflator is 
approximately equal to one plus the base-weighted sum of 
the rates of increase in unit labour costs, profits and self-
employment income per unit of output, indirect taxes per 
unit of output and import prices. Table 4.2 is based on the 
approximate equation (3.1.iv) to allow the 'contributions' of 
unit labour costs, import prices, etc., to be presented in an 
easily recognizable form. In consequence, the sum of the 
components in the table is, in general, not exactly equal to the 
increase in the TFE deflator, but the differences are all very 
small. 
For the Community as a whole, the import weight (Mo/Do) 
used in this Review (see Table 3.2) is the share of extra-EC 
imports in TFE. In last year's Review (Table 4.2), the share of 
total imports was used. As a result of this change, the 
'contribution' of import prices to the increase in the TFE 
deflator is this year shown as being smaller than was shown 
last year. 
The rise in import prices results from a number of different 
phenomena and measures of these influences have been 
attempted in this year's presentation. 
Two basic effects have been isolated in the first stage. The 
first is the effect of the increase in world export prices on 
import prices of the country in question and the second is the 
change in the nominal effective exchange rate. 
Various measures of nominal effective exchange rates are 
available (import, export, double weighted). While it would 
have been more appropriate to use the import weighted 
effective exchange rate in this case, as the first stage of the 
analysis is to find the effect of the increase in export prices of 
suppliers on the country in question, the more normal double 
weighted measure, used elsewhere in this Review and 
generally regarded as 'the' effective exchange rate, is used 
since at the second stage of the analysis competitiveness (in 
terms of relative unit labour costs in the total economy 
expressed in a common currency) is measured: this last 
requires the double weighted measure. Another problem 
arises in so far as the trade weighting matrix relates to goods, 
while the price increases relate to goods and services. Other 
more minor problems which arise are: 
I. the fact that the trade weighting matrix covers only 
20 countries and that exchange rate movements of 
countries outside this sample will be regarded as 
movements in basic export prices rather than exchange 
rate movements; 
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2. the problem of invoicing in third currencies, which can 
distort the breakdown in some countries; 
3. the rationale of attributing the rises in world prices to 
exogenous factors. 
In the second stage of the analysis the effect of the change in 
the nominal effective exchange rate on prices is ascribed to 
two factors: 
(i) the effect on prices of changes in real exchange rates; 
(ii) the effect of the exchange rate change which would be 
required to compensate for movements in domestic costs 
relative to competitors' costs. 
The breakdown of the total increase in import prices into the 
three elements identified follows the methodology described 
above for the breakdown of increases in the TFE deflator, 
except that the elements are weighted geometrically rather 
than arithmetically. The three elements therefore do not, in 
general, exactly sum to the total import contribution 
previously identified. 
3.2 Real product wage 
The real product wage is in this Review defined identically 
with real unit labour costs adjusted for the changing 
proportion of self-employment in total employment. The 
change in real unit labour costs is derived as the change in: 
where W 
E 
W ~ E 
GDP~ N 
total compensation of employees; 
number of occupied persons; 
GDP = gross domestic product at constant factor 
cost; 
N number of employees; 
P GDP deflator of GDP at factor cost. 
It can be seen that this expression is equivalent to that for the 
adjusted labour income ratio: the share of compensation of 
employees in GDP, adjusted for the ratio of the number of 
employees to the total number of occupied persons. The 
adjustment is equivalent to attributing to self-employed 
persons, as labour income, the average amount of compen-
sation per employee. 
The consistency, in an ex post accounting sense, of the 
measure of the movements of the real product wage adopted 
here with movements in the labour-income ratio does not 
remove the need for great caution in interpretation of such 
movements. 
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First, the measure of the re,t! product wage used in this 
Review refers to the economy as a whole, and movements in it 
can therefore be created simply by shifts in the sectoral 
pattern of production, the exploitation of oil and gas reserves 
in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands providing a 
good example. 
Second, the assumption embodied in the adjustment for the 
share of employees in total employment may not be adequate 
in the presence of segmented lahour markets. This may pose 
an important problem, for instance in the case of countries in 
a state of transition from a predominantly low-productivity 
agricultural economy to a more industrially-oriented 
economy. 
Third, the measure computed in the Review covers the public 
sector as well as the private sector. The conventional nature 
of the measurement of productivity in the public sector thus 
causes problems. Further, the principles on which public 
sector employment is determined are not the same as those 
governing the labour-hiring decisions of the private sector. 
Indeed, during the 1970s it may not have been an untypical 
experience for a weakening of private sector employment 
associated with the emergence ofa 'real wage problem' to be 
offset by increased public sector employment, so that the 
'real wage problem' manifested itself not so much (or at least 
not exclusively) in a shortfall of total employment as in a 
sectoral employment shift and in budgetary and balance of 
payments disequilibria. 
Fourth, the interpretation which can be given to any 
movement of the real product wage is very dependent on the 
parameters of the production function which is supposed to 
underlie it. As long as the elasticity of substitution is, in the 
short run, less than unity, a ceteris paribus increase in wages 
will increase the real product wage and the labour income 
ratio. However, if the elasticity of substitution is higher in the 
long run than in the short run, the real product wage and the 
labour income share will subsequently decline as labour-
shedding produces a rise in labour productivity. A 'real wage 
problem' may still exist, but may eventually disappear from 
view in the real product wage statistics. Thus it may be the 
case that a sudden upward movement in the real product 
wage, assuming an equilibrium position to begin with, may 
be prima facie evidence ·or the emergence of a 'real wage 
problem'. However, subsequent movements of the real 
product wage may be a very poor guide as to the extent to 
which that problem has been resolved or as to how that 
problem has been resolved. 
Fifth, movements in the real product wage may for long 
periods have had little impact on output, investment and 
employment decisions in some countries which have, or had 
at some time during the period examined, low wage levels 
and 'abnormally' high profits during the process of 
industrialization. 
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Further problems are encountered if an attempt is made, 
using data on real product wages, to frame policies on the 
basis of a classification of unemployment as either 'Classical' 
or 'Keynesian'. 
First, labour productivity has often behaved procyclically in 
the past and even now there is almost certainly a cyclical 
influence on productivity, and hence on real product wages, 
even if that influence is in some cases swamped by other 
factors. 
Second, there may be confusion between the symptoms of a 
wage problem and those of a demand shortfall. Thus in a 
large, relatively closed economy where mark-up pricing was 
prevalent, a wages push (or a fall in productivity following 
some other supply shock) might be more likely to result in 
higher prices and interest rates and in a loss of price 
competitiveness, and thence 'Keynesian' unemployment' 
than in the emergence of excessive real wages and thence 
'classical' unemployment, even though the problem could be 
thought of as initially arising on the supply side. By contrast, 
in a small, open economy a shortfall of world demand might 
manifest itself principally in downward pressure on output 
prices. If wages did not adjust, the real product wage would 
rise in the short run (before the process of an induced rise in 
productivity started) and might be followed by a fall in 
employment. Analysts could easily be led into classifying this 
fall in employment as a 'classical' or supply-side pheno-
menon, even though the root of the problem was a shortage 
of demand. 
4. Monetary and budgetary concepts and 
definitions 
4.1 Money supply 
Each country uses several definitions of money supply, which 
do not coincide with those of other countries since financial 
structures and behaviour mean not only that some assets are 
regarded as money in one country but not in another, but 
even that definitions in the same country may change as 
structures and behaviour evolve. 
The basic elements for defining the money supply are: 
(a) the characteristics of monetary assets; 
(b) the holders of monetary assets; 
(c) the issuers of monetary assets. 
There are two main definitions of money supply: money 
supply narrowly defined (M 1 }, comprising circulating coins 
and notes and current bank accounts; money supply broadly 
defined (M2 or M3), comprising MI and various assets with 
banks and other financial institutions in the form of deposit 
accounts, savings accounts or short-term notes. The 
principal components of money supply broadly defined (M2 
or M3) for each country are described below. 
Belgium: Money supply broadly defined (M2). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, current bank 
accounts and all other assets with a maximum maturity 
of one year in national or foreign currency. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and private firms. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks and other 
financial intermediaries; the figures from 1982 onwards 
include monetary claims on the external sector. 
Denmark: Money supply broadly defined (M2: new 
definition from 1975). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, current bank 
accounts, deposit accounts, foreign currency deposits, 
Treasury bills. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, non-monetary 
financial institutions, local authorities. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks, main savings 
banks, postal service. 
FR of Germany: Money supply broadly defined (M3). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, current bank 
accounts except those of the authorities with the central 
bank, deposit accounts, banking commitments up to 
four years, savings accounts with a legal period of notice, 
foreign currency deposits. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, local autho-
rities. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks, with the 
exception of building societies. 
Greece: Money supply broadly defined (M3). 
(a) Afonetary assets: Coins and notes, current accounts' 
savings and deposit accounts. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, public autho-
rities. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks and special 
credit institutions. 
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France: Money supply broadly defined (M2R from 1982). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, current bank 
accounts, current bank books, five year home-purchase 
saving plans, time deposits (all maturities), bank tap 
notes up to five years, foreign currency accounts. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, certain central 
government agencies, local authorities, social security 
funds. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank and commercial banks, postal 
cheque office, banques populaires, cooperative banks, 
savings banks, Treasury. 
Ireland: Money supply broadly defined (M3). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, current and deposit 
accounts. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, including 
government and local authority deposits with licensed 
banks. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank and licensed banks. 
Italy: Money supply broadly defined (M3). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, current and deposit 
accounts, current accounts in foreign currency, savings 
accounts, postal savings certificates, Treasury bonds up 
to 12 months, foreign currency deposits. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, local autho-
rities, social security funds. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks, savings banks, 
Treasury postal service. 
The Netherlands: Money supply broadly defined (M2). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, current bank and post 
office accounts, bank and post office time deposits up to 
two years, foreign currency deposits, savings accounts 
with high velocity of circulation, Treasury liabiltiies in 
the form of bonds, certificates and loans or deposits, and 
liabilities up to two years of the Bank voor Nederlandsche 
Gemeenten and the Nederlandse Waterschapbank. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, local autho-
rities. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank and commercial banks, Treasury 
and local authorities. 
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United Kingdom: Money supply broadly defined (sterling 
M3). 
(a) Monetary assets: Coins and notes, all types of sterling 
bank deposits including certificates of deposit. 
(b) Holders: Resident households and firms, general 
government. 
(c) Issuers: Central bank, commercial banks, discount 
houses. 
4.2 Monetary targets 
At present, monetary targets are set in Germany, France, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Greece. 
The aggregates used are as follows: 
FR of Germany: Central bank money (MZ), compnsmg 
notes in circulation and comrulsory reserves of banks 
calculated as a constant fraction of residents' claims on 
banks: 16,6% on current accounts, 12,4;'~ on deposit 
accounts, 8, I% on savings accounts. 
Greece: Private sector bank credit (PSCE) and notes m 
circulation (MO). 
France: Money supply broadly defined (M2). M2 is equal to 
M2R plus the deposits of non-residents. 
Ireland: Private sector credit (PSCE): lending by licensed 
banks in Irish pounds and foreign currency to house-
holds, private firms and State-sponsored bodies. 
Italy: Total domestic credit (TOCE), including bank loans 
and loans from special credit institutions, bonds issued 
by firms and local authorities, and the public sector 
borrowing requirement (Treasury, Cassa Depositi e 
Prestiti, Cassa del Mezzogiorno and public utilities, 
except Treasury financing of financial intermediaries). 
United Kingdom: Broadly defined money supply, national 
currency (£ M3) and, from March 1982, money supply 
narrowly defined (Ml) and private sector liquidity 2 
(PSL2 = £ M3 plus deposits with savings institutions, 
securities issued by these institutions and money market 
instruments held outside the banking system). 
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4.3 Counterparts of the money supply 
The money supply and its counterparts are analysed on the 
basis of the consolidated balance sheet of money-creating 
financial institutions which is analysed into: 
(a) public sector credit; 
(b) private sector credit; 
(c) miscellaneous items, covering residual items which vary 
from country to country; 
(d) external contribution, the balance of financial in-
stitutions' external liabilities and claims; 
(e) non-monetary liabilities, covering medium-term and 
long-term liabilities and, for some countries, proprietors' 
funds. 
Domestic money creation is the sum ofaggregates (a), (b), (c) 
minus the amount of aggregate (e). 
In countries where the Treasury and other public institutions 
have monetary liabilities (coinage, short-term Treasury 
bonds, etc.), these are included as liabilities in the consolidate 
account of financial institutions, and an equivalent amount 
is added under the heading for public sector credit. 
National monetary analyses also differ according to the 
definitions of the three sectors: public sector, private sector, 
foreign sector. For example, loans to local authorities and 
social security funds may be included either in public sector 
or in private sector credit, and banking claims on non-bank 
non-residents may be included either in the private sector or 
in the foreign sector. 
In the following descriptions, the financial institutions are 
those described as issuers of the money supply in Section 4.1 
'Money supply'. 
Belgium: 
(a) Public sector credit: Net claims (loans and purchases of 
securities) of financial institutions on general govern-
ment (except social security funds) and net foreign 
borrowing by general government. 
(b) Private sector credit: Claims of financial institutions on 
households and firms. 
(c) Miscellaneous: Capital and own resources, items in 
transit, statistical residuals, social security debt. 
(d) External contribution: Net external position of financial 
institutions plus net foreign borrowing by general 
government. 
(e) Non-monetary commitments: Claims, with maturities of 
more than one year by firms and households on the 
financial institutions. 
Denmark: 
(a) Public sector credit: Net claims (loans and purchases of 
securities) of financial institutions on central govern-
ment (including public borrowing abroad sterilized in the 
central bank). 
(b) Private sector credit: Claims of financial institutions on 
households and firms, local authorities public sector 
undertakings and non-money-creating financial insti-
tutions. 
(c) Miscellaneous: Capital and own resources, items in 
transit, statistical residuals. 
(d) External contributions: Surplus on current external 
payments, net borrowing abroad by business, local 
government authorities, etc. and net sales of krone-
denominated bonds to non-residents. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: None. 
FR of Germany: 
(a) Public sector credit: Claims (loans and purchases of 
securities at issue) of financial institutions on general 
government. 
(b) Private sector credit: Claims (loans and purchases of 
securities) of financial institutions on household and 
firms, the railways, federal postal services, State 
corporations and home-savings institutions. 
(c) Miscellaneous: Items in transit, statistical residuals, 
authorities' deposits with the central bank. 
(d) External contribution: Net external position of financial 
institutions, including balance on financial institutions' 
foreign dealings in securities. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: Liabilities of financial insti-
tutions other than M3 held by households, firms and 
authorities. 
Greece: 
(a) Public sector credit: Claims (loans and purchases of 
securities) of financial institutions on central govern-
ment, local authorities, social security and public 
corporations. 
(b) Private sector credit: Claims (loans and purchases of 
securities) of financial institutions on households and 
private firms. 
(c) Miscellaneous: None. 
(d) External contribution: Net external position of financial 
institutions. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: Private blocked deposits, 
deposits, other than sight deposits, of authorities, 
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securities issued by financial institutions, items in transit, 
capital and reserves. 
France: 
(a) Public sector credit: Claims (loans and purchases of 
Treasury bonds) of financial institutions on the 
Treasury, postal cheque deposits and deposits with 
Treasury branches. 
(b) Private sector credit: Loans to households, firms and 
local authorities, excluding loans to non-resident 
households and firms. 
(c) Miscellaneous: Items in transit. 
(d) External contributions: Net external position of money 
creating banks. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: The balance between certain 
liabilities of financial institutions (capital, reserves, 
securities issued) and certain assets (buildings and 
securities portfolio); net commitments towards other 
financial intermediaries. 
Ireland: 
(a) Public sector credit: Loans by financial institutions to 
central government, local authorities and State-spon-
sored bodies (net of central government deposits with the 
central bank), plus government bond issues to finance 
the purchase of agricultural products on behalf of the 
EEC. 
(b) Private sector credit: Loans by financial institutions to 
households and private firms, not including purchast: of 
government bonds issued to finance the purchase of 
agricultural products on behalf of the EEC. 
(c) Miscellaneous: None. 
(d) External contribution: Net external position of licensed 
banks, official external reserves. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: Items in transit, capital and 
reserves. 
Italy: Balance sheet of financial institutions consolidated 
with supply and demand in the securities market. 
(a) Public sector credit: Borrowing requirement of Treasury 
and other government agencies, excluding public 
financing of the private sector and foreign borrowing. 
(b) Private sector credit: Claims of financial institutions and 
special credit institutions on households firms, local 
authorities and social security funds; net issue of private 
bonds and shares not held by financial institutions. 
(c) Miscellaneous: Capital and own resources, items in 
transit. 
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( d) External contributions: Net external position of financial 
institutions. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: Assets of households and firn1s 
consisting of: deposits with special credit institutions 
(ICS), bank acceptances, bonds issued by firms and ICS, 
public securities and shares. 
The Netherlands: 
(a) Public sector credit: Short-term loans by financial 
institutions to central government and local authorities. 
(b) Private sector credit: Short-term and long-term loans to 
households, firms in the private and public sectors and 
institutional investors, as well as investments on the 
capital market. 
(c) Miscellaneous: Items in transit and statistical adjust-
ment. 
( d) External contribution: Net external position of financial 
institutions and Treasury. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: Liabilities of financial insti-
tutions other than M2 held by housholds, firms, 
institutional investors and the authorities, and the 
capital and own resources of financial institutions. 
United Kingdom: 
(a) Public sector credit: Net claims of commercial banks, the 
Banking and Issue Departments of the Bank of England 
and the Exchange Equalization Account on general 
government and public corporations. 
(b) Private sector credit: Loans by banks to the private 
sector and commercial bills held by the Issue Department 
of the Bank of England. 
(c) Miscellaneous: Net claims by banks on residents in 
foreign currency. 
(d) External contribution: Net external position of commer-
cial banks; official reserves net of liabilities to IMF. 
(e) Non-monetary liabilities: Liabilities of financial insti-
tutions other than sterling M3 including capital and 
reserves. 
4.4 Components of changes in budget deficits 
The calculation is intended to break down the actual year-to-
year change in the budget deficit into a number of 
components which may be useful for purposes of policy 
analysis. 
The calculation is based on the definition: 
dB = dA + di + dR, 
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where dB is the actual change in the deficit, dA is the effect on 
the deficit of changes in the level on activity (see below), di is 
the effect of changes in net interest payments (receipts) from 
general government to (from) other domestic and foreign 
sectors, and dR is the residual component. dR is identified 
with the effects of changes in budgetary policy, defined in 
terms of changes in the average net tax rate (taxes, social 
security contributions and other government charges, minus 
transfers other than interest flows and unemployment 
benefits, expressed as a percentage of GDP) and changes in 
general government consumption and investment spending 
as a percentage of potential output. 
The effect of a change in activity on the budget balance in a 
given year is here defined as the difference between the actual 
budget balance and what the budget balance would have 
been had activity, defined as the ratio of actual to potential 
output, in that year been at the same level as in the previous 
year. Changes in activity affect the budget balance through 
changes in taxes and transfers under a given set of tax/ 
transfer rules. (General government consumption and 
investment is assumed to be unaffected by variations in the 
level of activity.) In the calculations, a single marginal overall 
tax rate is used and is assumed to be equal to the average tax 
rate. Social transfers vary with the level of unemployment. 
The methodology does not necessarily imply that deviations 
of actual from potential output are 'cyclical' or represent 
either an excess or an insufficiency of aggregate demand. The 
notion of potential output, as used here, can be seen simply as 
corresponding to the expected trend of output; random 
supply disturbances can thus equally well cause deviations of 
actual from potential output. 
A plus sign in the table indicates a reduction in the budget 
deficit. Thus, for example, in a year in which activity, as 
defined here, declined dA would be negative. If both di and 
dB were zero dR would be positive and equal in (algebraic) 
magnitude to dA, indicating that discretionary changes in 
budgetary policy worked in the direction of reducing the 
deficit. 
5. Labour force, employment, unemployment 
and hours worked definitions 
The civilian labour force in the Community and Member 
States comprises all persons employed (including self-
employed and family workers but excluding the armed 
forces) plus the unemployed. The national concept is used: 
all employed or unemployed persons resident in the territory 
of the country in question are included. Basic data are annual 
averages except for Belgium, Greece and the United 
Kingdom, where the data relate to 30 June of each year. 
Total employment in the Community and Member States 
includes all persons in employment or self-employment, as 
well as family workers. The domestic concept is used: all 
persons employed or self-employed within the territory of the 
country in question. whether or not they are resident, are 
included. 
The unemployment rate in the Community and Member 
States is defined as the number unemployed as a percentage 
of the civilian labour force; data for numbers unemployed 
and the labour force relate to the same year, i.e. the 1981 
unemployment rate is the average number unemployed in 
1981 as a percentage of the 1981 labour force. Rates for 1970-
82 are historical data supplied by Eurostat; 1983-84 rates are 
estimates using Eurostat definitions based on forecasts, 
prepared by the Commission departments, for numbers 
unemployed and the labour force. Data for unemployed 
persons are derived from statistics of registered unemployed 
supplied to Eurostat by national agencies in accordance with 
standardized procedures: in principle, the definition of 
unemployed persons covers persons without a job, seeking 
employment as an employee and immediately available for 
work. For more specific detail on the individual series for 
Member States, see Employment and Unemployment 
(Eurostat, 1983). 
Table Al 
Competith-eness weighting matrix 
B/L DK D GR 
Belgium/Luxembourg 3,1 5,8 4,1 
Denmark 1,3 1,6 1,2 
FR of Germany 24,1 21,4 16,5 
Greece 0,5 0,6 1,1 
France 18,7 8,2 16,6 12,8 
Ireland 0,5 0,6 0,5 0,4 
Italy 7,6 6,8 10,9 12,7 
The Netherlands 10,5 4,9 8,8 7,0 
United Kingdom 10,1 13,3 10,4 8,9 
Norway 1.2 4,3 1,4 0,9 
Sweden 2,2 9,2 3,5 1,8 
Austria 1,2 1,4 5,0 1,9 
Switzerland 3,6 2,6 5,5 2,3 
Japan 4.2 5,5 6,6 8,0 
Canada 1,2 1,5 1,9 1,9 
USA 9,4 11,1 14,6 14,7 
Austria 0,7 0,9 1,2 1,4 
Spain 1,7 1,5 2,3 1,8 
Portugal 0,5 0,5 0,7 0,5 
Finland 0,8 2,6 1,6 1,2 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Fixed 1974 weights. 
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Total hours is obtained by multiplying the number of 
employees by the average number of hours worked per 
employee (average hours). 
5.1 The Community labour force survey is a sample survey, 
harmonized and synchronized, carried out every two years 
ince 1973 in each Member State (from 1981 onwards in 
Greece), in a sample of households resident in these Member 
States at the time of the survey. The sample size is between 
60 OOO and 100 OOO households in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Italy and the Untied Kingdom; between 
30 OOO and 50 OOO for Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and 
Ireland; between 30 OOO and 40 OOO for Denmark and 
around 10 OOO for Luxembourg. Information is gathered on 
each of the members of the households included in the 
sample. The survey covers: (a) the individual characteristics 
of these persons; (b) their employment activity (occupational 
status, branch of activity hours of work, etc.) at the time of 
the survey and one year before it; (c) job search, taking 
account of the type of employment sought and the methods 
and duration of search; (d) participation in training courses; 
(e) employment experience of working-age people without an 
occupation. 
The results of the survey are published in Labour Force 
Sample Survey (Eurostat, 1980, 1981 ). 
F IRL 
6,4 5,0 5,4 
I.I 1,2 1,2 
16,6 11,9 18,4 
1,0 0,4 1,2 
8,1 13,2 
0,6 0,6 
14,6 6,0 
7.7 6,8 7,0 
11,5 30,0 10,8 
1,2 2,3 1,1 
2,4 2,2 2,3 
1,8 1,0 3,0 
4.9 1,8 4,9 
7,3 4,1 7,6 
1,9 2,2 1,9 
14,5 12,6 15,2 
1,0 1,0 1,2 
3,6 1,9 3,2 
0,8 0,5 0,7 
1,1 1,0 I, I 
100,0 100,0 100,0 
NL 
9,7 
1,8 
23,6 
0,8 
12,5 
0,7 
7,8 
11,7 
1,6 
2,9 
2,0 
3,5 
4,9 
1,3 
10,6 
0,8 
2,1 
0,6 
1,1 
100,0 
( 1980 trade flows - export cL'lpect) 
UK 
5,6 
1,7 
15,1 
0,6 
10,0 
2,9 
6,3 
7,2 
1,5 
3,9 
1,4 
5,8 
8,6 
2,6 
19,6 
2.1 
2,6 
0,9 
1,6 
100,0 
EC I 
2,2 
8,7 
6,3 
8,5 
21,2 
4,2 
35,7 
4,4 
5,7 
3,1 
100,0 
Note: The figures in each column show the importance, on all markets, of the countries listed on the left of the table as trading partners and competitors of the countries listed in the head of 
tr.e table. 
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Statistical annex 
Notes on the statistical annex 
General remarks 
This year's November edition of European Economy again gives in its statistical 
annex updated time series of annual data, starting in 1958 with the beginning of 
the European Economic Community. 
Unless otherwise specified, aggregates up to 1981 are defined as in the ESA 
(European System of Economic Accounts). National accounts figures for 1958 
and 1959, generally not available in terms of ESA, have been adjusted as far as 
possible but are not fully comparable with subsequent years. National accounts 
figures for 1982 and 1983 are estimates and forecasts made by Commission staff 
using the definitions and latest figures available from national sources, and so 
they are not fully comparable with ESA figures for earlier years. However, in 
those tables showing the level and structure of GDP (Tables 4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 16, 
26, 30) an attempt has again been made to avoid major discontinuities by 
projecting forward ESA figures from 1980 using estimates of volume and price 
changes in 1982 and 1983. 
Community totals are for EC 10 unless otherwise stated. Community totals for 
national accounts data are aggregated using purchasing power parities, except in 
Tables 6, 28, 29, 32-34, 45-47, where current exchange rates have been used. 
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Table 1 
Population; total 
('OOO persons) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 9 024 4 515 54 292 8 173 44 789 2 853 49 476 311 11 185 51 870 236 488 
1959 9 072 4 547 54 876 8 258 45 240 2 846 49 831 313 II 347 52 157 238 487 
1960 9 119 4 581 55 433 8 327 45 684 2 832 50 198 314 11 483 52 559 240 530 
1961 9 166 4 617 56 175 8 398 46 163 2 818 50 523 317 11 637 52 954 242 768 
1962 9 218 4 647 56 837 8 448 46 998 2 830 50 843 321 II 801 53 414 245 357 
1963 9 283 4 684 57 389 8 480 47 816 2 850 51 198 324 I I 964 53 691 247 679 
1964 9 367 4 720 57 971 8 510 48 310 2 864 51 600 328 12 125 54 033 249 828 
1965 9 448 4 758 58 619 8 550 48 758 2 876 51 987 331 12 293 54 378 251 999 
1966 9 508 4 797 59 148 8 612 49 164 2 884 52 332 334 12 455 54 653 253 887 
1967 9 556 4 839 59 286 8 716 49 548 2 900 52 667 335 12 597 54 933 255 377 
1968 9 590 4 867 59 500 8 741 49 914 2 913 52 987 336 12 726 55 157 256 731 
1969 9 613 4 891 60 067 8 773 50 318 2 929 53 317 338 12 873 55 372 258 490 
1970 9 638 4 929 60 651 8 793 50 772 2 950 53 661 339 13 032 55 522 260 287 
1971 9 672 4 963 61 284 8 831 51 251 2 978 54 005 342 13 194 55 712 262 233 
1972 9 709 4 992 61 672 8 889 51 701 3 024 54 412 347 13 330 55 869 263 945 
1973 9 738 5 022 61 976 8 929 52 118 3 073 54 913 350 13 438 56 OOO 265 558 
1974 9 768 5 045 62 054 8 962 52 460 3 124 55 413 355 13 543 56 01 I 266 735 
1975 9 795 5 060 61 829 9 047 52 705 3 177 55 830 359 13 660 55 981 267 443 
1976 9 81 I 5 073 61 531 9 167 52 891 3 228 56 168 361 13 773 55 959 267 962 
1977 9 822 5 088 61 400 9 308 53 077 3 272 56 461 361 13 856 55 919 268 564 
1978 9 830 5 104 61 327 9 430 53 277 3 314 56 714 362 13 939 55 902 269 199 
1979 9 837 5 117 61 359 9 548 53 480 3 368 56 914 363 14 034 55 946 269 966 
1980 9 847 5 123 61 567 9 642 53 714 3 401 57 070 364 14 148 56 010 270 886 
1981 9 852 5 122 61 682 9 740 53 962 3 443 57 197 366 14 247 56 290 271 901 
1982 9 858 5 118 61 639 9 820 54 579 3 483 57 340 366 14 312 56 337 272 853 
(1983) 9 864 5 114 61 639 9 900 54 835 3 523 57 434 366 14 363 56 395 273 433 
Table 2 
Employment; total economy 
( annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 -1,1 0,7 0,4 -0,3 -1,5 0,0 0,0 -0,9 -1,1 -0,3 
1959 -0,6 3,1 0,9 -0,9 -0,7 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,3 0,2 
1960 0,3 2,8 1,4 0,1 -0,5 -0,2 0,1 1,9 -0,1 0,5 
1961 0,8 1,5 1,4 1,1 0,1 -0,2 0,2 1,1 1,5 1,2 0,8 
1962 1,6 1,5 0,4 -0,8 0,2 0,7 -1 ,1 0,3 2,0 0,7 0,2 
1963 0,7 1,2 0,2 -0,9 1,0 0,6 - 1,6 -0,4 1,4 0,1 0,1 
1964 1,3 2,1 0,1 -0,9 1,1 0,5 -0,1 1,7 1,8 I ,1 0,6 
1965 0,2 1,8 0,6 -0;8 0,4 -0,2 -2,0 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,1 
1966 0,5 0,5 -0,3 -0,8 0,8 -0,3 -1,6 0,5 0,8 0,6 -0,0 
1967 -0,3 -0,6 -3,3 -0,9 0,3 -0,6 1,2 - 1,1 -0,3 -1,5 -1 ,0 
1968 -0,1 1, 1 0,1 -0,9 -0,1 0,3 -0,2 -0,4 0,9 -0,7 -0,2 
1969 1,7 0,9 1,6 -0,8 1,7 0,3 0,4 1,4 1,7 0,1 0,9 
1970 -0,5 0,7 1,3 -0,8 1,0 -1,2 1,2 1,8 1,2 -0,5 0,6 
1961-70 0,6 1,1 0,2 -0,7 0,6 -0,0 -0,4 0,6 1,2 0,2 0,2 
1971 1,0 0,6 0,3 -0,9 0,4 0,2 -0,1 3,1 0,6 -1,5 -0,2 
1972 -0,1 2,1 0,1 0,4 0,5 -0,5 -1,1 2,6 -0,9 -0,1 -0,1 
1973 1,3 1,2 0,7 0,5 1,3 0,7 0,8 1,9 0,0 2,4 1,2 
1974 1,4 -0,3 -1,3 -0,1 0,7 1,1 1,5 2,5 0,0 0,4 0,2 
1975 -1,4 -1,2 -2,8 0,6 -1,0 0,4 0,2 1,6 -0,7 -0,5 -1,1 
1976 -0,6 1,8 -0,8 1,3 0,7 -0,8 0,8 -0,6 -0,2 -0,7 -0,0 
1977 -0,2 0,8 -0,2 -0,9 0,8 1,8 0,7 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,3 
1978 0,1 1,0 0,6 1,6 0,4 2,5 0,6 0,0 0,7 0,1 0,5 
1979 1,2 1,2 1,3 1,5 -0,1 3,2 1,0 1,0 1,3 0,9 0,9 
1980 - 0,1 - 0,4 0,9 1,7 0,0 1,6 0,9 1,1 0,5 -1,6 0,1 
1971-80 0,3 0,7 -0,1 0,6 0,4 1,0 0,5 1,3 0,2 -0,0 0,2 
1981 -2,1 -1,9 -0,7 0,1 -0,7 -1,9 0,5 0,2 -1 ,3 -5,3 -1,6 
1982 -1,7 0,1 -1,9 -1,3 -0,8 -1,1 - 0,4 0,1 -2,5 -1,7 -1,3 
(1983) -2,0 -0,4 -2,0 -1,0 -1,0 · -2,5 0,5 -1,1 -2,1 -0,6 -0,9 
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Table 3 
Unemployment 
( as ~ of ci•ilian labour force) 
B DK D F IRL L NL UK EC9 
1958 3,1 3,2 2,9 0,5 5,7 8,1 0,1 1,8 1,9 3,3 
1959 3,5 2,2 2,1 0,7 5,4 7,7 0,1 1,2 1,8 3,0 
1960 3,1 1,5 1,0 0,7 4,7 7,2 0,1 0,7 1,6 2,5 
1961 2,5 1,2 0,7 0,6 4,2 6,6 0,1 0,5 1,4 2,2 
1962 2,0 1,1 0,6 0,7 4,2 5,5 0,1 o.~ 1,9 2,0 
1963 1,5 1,5 0,7 0,7 4,5 5,2 0,2 0,6 2,3 2,1 
1964 1,5 0,9 0,6 0,6 4,3 5,2 0,0 0,5 1,6 l ,9 
1965 1,8 0,7 0,6 0,7 4,5 5,7 0,0 0,6 1,4 1,9 
1966 2,0 0,8 0,6 0,7 4,3 5,5 0,0 0,8 1,4 1,9 
1967 2,6 1,0 1,8 1,0 4,5 5,0 0,1 1,7 2,2 2,4 
1968 3,1 1,7 1,3 1,3 4,8 4,7 0,1 1,5 2,3 2,3 
1969 2,3 1,4 0,7 1,1 4,6 4,4 0,0 1,1 2,3 2,0 
1970 2,2 1,0 0,6 1,3 5,3 4,4 0,0 1,0 2,5 2,0 
1961-70 2,2 l , l 0,8 0,9 4,5 5,2 0,1 0,9 1,9 2, 1 
1971 2,2 1,2 0,7 1,6 5,2 5,1 0,0 1,3 3,0 2,5 
1972 2,8 1,2 0,9 1,8 6,0 5,2 0,0 2,3 3,4 2,7 
1973 2,9 0,7 1,0 l ,8 5,6 4,9 0,0 2,3 2,4 2,4 
1974 3,2 2,0 2,2 2,3 6,0 . 4,8 0,0 2,8 2,4 2,9 
1975 5,3 4,6 4,1 3,9 8,5 5,3 0,2 4,0 3,7 4,3 
1976 6,8 4,7 4,1 4,3 9,5 5,6 0,3 4,3 5,1 4,9 
1977 7,8 5,8 4,0 4,8 9,2 6,4 0,5 4,1 5,4 5,3 
1978 8,4 6,5 3,8 5,2 8,4 7,1 0,7 4,1 5,3 5,4 
1979 8,7 5,3 3,3 6,0 7,4 7,5 0,7 4,1 4,9 5,5 
1980 9,4 6,1 3,3 6,4 8,3 8,0 0,7 4,7 6,3 6,1 
1971-80 5,8 3,8 2,8 3,8 7,4 6,0 0,3 3,4 4,4 4,2 
1981 11 ,6 8,3 4,7 7,8 10,2 8,8 1,0 7,2 9,6 7,9 
1982 13,2 8,9 6,8 8,9 12,5 10,5 1,3 12,0 11 ,1 9,6 
(1983) 14,5 10,7 8,6 9,1 15,3 10,8 1,8 15,6 11 ,7 10,4 
Table 4 
Gross domestic product at current market prices 
('000 million national currtnciu) 
B DK D GR F DlL L NL UIC 
1958 506,6 34,50 246,6 94,2 244,3 0,560 20 107 22,800 35,00 22,80 
1959 522,5 38,10 264,9 97,9 265,0 0,600 21 351 23,300 36,80 23,90 
1960 557,0 40,94 302,7 105,2 296,5 0,631 23 207 26,029 44,00 25,51 
1961 592,4 45,43 331,7 118,6 323,5 0,680 25 810 27,272 46,46 27,24 
1962 633,7 51 ,19 360,8 126,0 361 ,2 0,736 28 998 27,370 50,01 28,52 
1963 681 ,3 54,49 382,4 140,7 404,9 0,791 33 215 29,484 54,26 30,32 
1964 762,5 62,29 420,2 158,0 449,2 0,901 36 360 33,407 63,85 33,08 
1965 830,0 69,97 459,2 179,8 483,5 0,959 39 124 35,142 71 ,31 35,54 
1966 892,1 77,18 488,2 200,0 523,4 1,010 42 391 36,799 77,65 37,91 
1967 955,3 84,81 494,3 216, l 565,4 1,104 46 695 37,769 85,19 40,04 
1968 1 022,3 94,36 533,3 234,5 614,5 1,245 50 614 41 ,374 94,46 43,38 
1969 I 134,2 107,32 596,9 266,5 700,7 1,438 55 876 47,573 106,98 46,44 
1970 1 262,1 118,63 675,3 298,9 782,6 1,620 62 883 54,043 120,50 50,93 
1971 1 382,0 131 ,12 750,6 332,3 872,4 1,853 68 510 55,970 136,36 57,16 
1972 1 545,4 150,73 823,7 377,9 981 ,1 2,237 75 124 62,414 154,32 63,27 
1973 1 755,0 172,86 917,3 484,2 1 114,2 2,701 89 746 76,405 176,80 72,84 
1974 2 056,8 193,63 984,6 564,5 1 278,3 2,987 110 719 93,242 200,13 82,92 
1975 2 271 ,1 216,26 1 026,5 672,2 1 452,3 3,728 125 378 86,631 220,25 104,49 
1976 2 574,6 251,21 1 119,7 824,9 1 678,0 4,570 156 657 99,504 252,59 124,24 
1977 2 780,3 279,31 1 196, 1 963,7 I 884,6 5,492 190 083 101,869 274,93 143,40 
1978 2 984,5 311 ,38 I 285,1 1 161 ,4 2 141 ,1 6,437 222 254 112,084 297,01 164,95 
1979 3 182,0 346,89 I 392,5 1 428,9 2 439,6 7,448 270 198 123,322 315,96 192,95 
1980 3 415,9 373,30 1 481 ,1 I 710,6 2 758,7 8,719 339 068 135,200 335,85 225,54 
1981 3 530,3 414,11 1 543,9 2 033,8 3 094,4 10,376 398 125 143,202 350,54 247,72 
1982 3 816,8 470,41 1 600,5 2 550,9 3 552,8 12,271 466 080 152,862 364,54 271 ,02 
(1983) 4 053,2 516,44 1 661 ,1 3 048,6 3 888,8 13,641 531 912 161 ,466 371 ,41 292,42 
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Table 5 
Gross domestic product at current market prices 
(national currency, annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 0,8 4,5 7,1 5,1 15,l 3,6 7,4 - 1,2 0,8 4,2 7,6 
1959 3,1 10,9 7,4 3,9 8,5 · 6,9 6,2 2,8 5,1 4,8 6,6 
1960 6,6 7,9 14,3 7,5 11,9 5,8 8,7 8,9 13,6 6,7 10,4 
1961 6,4 11,0 9,6 12,8 9,1 7,7 11,2 4,8 5,6 6,8 8,9 
1962 7,0 12,7 8,8 6,2 11 ,7 8,3 12,4 0,4 7,7 4,7 8,8 
1963 7,5 6,4 6,0 11,7 12,l 7,5 14,5 7,7 8,5 6,3 8,9 
1964 11 ,9 14,3 9,9 12,3 10,9 13,8 9,5 13,3 17,7 9,1 10,4 
1965 8,8 12,3 9,3 13,8 7,6 6,5 7,6 5,2 11 ,7 7,4 8,4 
1966 7,5 10,3 6,3 11,2 8,3 5,4 8,4 4,7 8,9 6,7 7,5 
1967 7,1 9,9 1,3 8,1 8,0 9,2 10,2 2,6 9,7 5,6 6,1 
1968 7,0 11,3 7,9 8,5 8,7 12,8 8,4 9,5 10,9 8,3 8,8 
1969 10,9 13,7 11,9 13,6 14,0 15,5 10,4 15,0 13,3 7,1 11 ,2 
1970 11,3 10,5 13,1 12,2 11,7 12,6 12,5 13,6 12,6 9,7 12,3 
1961-70 8,5 11,2 8,4 11,0 10,2 9,9 10,5 7,6 10,6 7,2 9,1 
1971 9,5 10,5 11,l 11,2 11 ,5 14,4 8,9 3,5 13,2 12,2 11,2 
1972 11,8 15,0 9,8 13,7 12,5 20,8 9,7 11,5 13,2 10,7 11 , l 
1973 13,6 14,7 11,4 28,1 13,6 20,7 19,5 22,4 14,6 15,l 15,0 
1974 17,2 12,0 7,3 16,6 14,7 10,6 23,4 22,0 13,2 13,8 13,4 
1975 10,4 11,7 4,3 19,1 13,6 24,8 13,2 -' 7,1 10,1 26,0 12,2 
1976 13,4 16,2 9,1 22,7 15,5 22,6 24,9 14,9 14,7 18,9 14,7 
1977 8,0 11,2 6,8 16,8 12,3 20,2 21 ,3 2,4 8,8 15,4 11,2 
1978 7,3 11 ,5 7,4 20,5 13,6 17,2 16,9 10,0 8,0 15,0 10,9 . 
1979 6,6 11,4 8,4 23,0 13,9 15,7 21 ,6 10,0 6,4 17,0 12,5 
1980 7,4 7,6 6,4 19,7 13,l 17,l 25,5 9,6 6,3 16,9 12,5 
1971-80 10,5 12,1 8,2 19,1 13,4 18,3 18,4 9,6 10,8 16,0 12,5 
1981 3,3 10,9 4,2 18,9 12,2 19,0 17,4 5,9 4,4 9,8 9,3 
1982 8,1 13,6 3,7 25,4 14,8 18,3 17, l 6,7 4,0 9,4 9,0 
(1983) 6,2 9,8 3,8 19,5 9,5 11,2 14,1 5,6 1,9 7,9 6,4 
Table 6 
Gross domestic product at current prices 
('()()O million ECU) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 9,2 4,6 53,5 2,9 53,0 1,4 29,3 0,4 8,4 58,2 220,9 
1959 9,9 5,2 59,7 3,1 50,8 1,5 32,3 0,4 9,2 63,4 235,5 
1960 10,5 5,6 68,2 3,3 56,9 1,7 35,2 0,5 11 ,0 67,6 260,5 
1961 11,1 6,2 77,0 3,7 61 ,4 1,8 38,7 0,5 11 ,9 71,5 283,7 
1962 11,8 6,9 84,3 3\9 68,4 1,9 43,4 0,5 12,9 74,6 308,8 
1963 12,7 7,4 89,4 4,4 76,7 2,1 49,7 0,6 14,0 79,4 336,2 
1964 14,3 8,4 98,2 4,9 85,0 2,4 54,4 0,6 16,5 86,6 371 ,3 
1965 15,5 9,5 107,3 5,6 91,5 2,5 58,5 0,7 18,4 93,0 402,5 
1966 16,7 10,4 114,1 6,2 99, l 2,6 63,4 0,7 20,1 99,2 432,6 
1967 17,9 11,4 116,1 6,8 107,5 2,8 70,2 0,7 22,1 103,3 458,9 
1968 19,9 12,2 129,6 7,6 121 ,0 2,9 78,7 0,8 25,4 101 ,2 499,2 
1969 22,2 14,0 148,3 8,7 132,4 3,4 87,5 0,9 28,9 109,0 555,3 
1970 24,7 15,5 180,5 9,7 137,8 3,8 98,4 1, I 32,6 119,6 623,7 
1971 27,2 16,9 205,9 10,6 151,1 4,3 105,8 I, l 37,3 133,4 693,6 
1972 31,3 19,4 230,3 11,2 173,4 5,0 114,8 1,3 42,9 140,9 770,5 
1973 36,7 23,3 280,0 13, l 203,8 5,4 125,3 1,6 51,6 145,0 885,7 
1974 44,3 26,7 319,3 15,8 222,9 .5,9 142,7 2,0 62,5 162,7 l 004,8 
1975 49,8 30,4 336,6 16,8 273,0 6,7 154,9 1,9 70,3 186,6 1 126,9 
1976 59,6 37,2 397,7 20,2 313,9 7,4 168,4 2,3 85,5 199,9 l 292,0 
1977 68,0 40,7 451,7 22,9 336,2 8,4 188,8 2,5 98,2 219,4 I 436,7 
1978 74,5 44,4 502,8 24,8 373,0 9,7 205,7 2,8 107,8 248,5 1 594,0 
1979 79,2 48,1 554,6 28,1 418,5 11,l 237,3 3,1 115,0 298,5 I 793,5 
1980 84, l 47,7 586,7 28,8 470,0 12,9 285,1 3,3 121 ,7 376,8 2 017,3 
1981 85,5 52,3 614,2 33,0 512,3 15,0 315,2 3,5 126,3 447,9 2 205,l 
1982 85,4 57,7 673,8 39,0 552,9 17,8 352,6 3,4 139,5 480,8 2 403,0 
(1983) 89,6 63,5 732,2 39,3 576,l 19,0 394,4 3,6 146,4 493,5 2 557,5 
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Table 7 
Gross domestic product per head of population 
(ECU) 
B DK D GR F lRL L NL UK EC 
1958 1 024 1 008 986 355 1 183 499 592 1 337 751 1 122 934 
1959 1 091 1 148 1 088 375 1 123 557 649 1 407 808 1 216 987 
1960 1 157 1 225 1 231 399 1 245 591 700 1 570 955 1 287 I 083 
1961 1 211 1 335 1 371 441 1 330 633 766 1 613 I 024 1 349 I 169 
1962 1 285 1 491 1 483 465 1 455 680 853 1 595 1 094 1 397 1 258 
1963 1 372 1 574 1 557 517 .1 603 727 970 1 701 1 171 1 478 1 357 
1964 1 522 1 786 1 694 579 1 760 823 1 054 1 905 1 360 1 602 1 486 
1965 1 642 1 990 1 831 655 1 877 873 1 126 1 982 1 498 1 711 1 597 
1966 1 754 2 177 1 929 723 2 016 917 1 211 2 060 1 610 1 816 I 704 
1967 1 878 2 361 1 958 776 2 171 982 1 332 2 118 1 754 1 880 1 797 
1968 2 072 2 512 2 178 869 2 424 997 1 485 2 394 1 993 1 835 1 945 
1969 2 309 2 862 2 468 990 2 632 1 153 1 640 2 758 2 246 1 969 2 148 
1970 2 562 3 139 2 976 1109 2 715 1 289 1 834 3 117 2 499 2 154 2 396 
1971 2 809 3 408 3 359 1 197 2 949 1 452 1 959 3 214 2 826 2 394 2 645 
1972 3 225 3 876 3 734 1 263 3 354 1 648 2 110 3 648 3 216 2 522 2 919 
1973 3 770 4 641 4 517 1 467 3 910 1 750 2 281 4 560 3 838 2 589 3 335 
1974 4 538 5 287 5 146 1 760 4 250 1 876 2 576 5 659 4 615 2 903 3 767 
1975 5 088 6 OOO 5 444 I 858 5 180 2 095 2 774 5 296 5 143 3 333 4 214 
1976 6 079 7 324 6 463 2 201 5 936 2 278 2 999 6 389 6 206 3 572 4 822 
1977 6 924 8 007 7 356 2 463 6 334 2 568 3 344 6 893 7 086 3 923 5 350 
1978 7 579 8 691 8 198 2 633 7 002 2 926 3 628 7 727 7 737 4 444 5 921 
1979 8 OS3 9 404 9 038 2 948 7 825 3 303 4 170 8 458 8 191 5 335 6 644 
1980 8 545 9 309 9 530 2 991 8 751 3 792 4 996 9 139 8 600 6 728 7 447 
1981 8 677 10 205 9 957 3 389 9 494 4 361 5 510 9 483 8 866 7 956 8 110 
. 1982 8 661 11 274 10 931 3 975 10 131 5 099 6 149 9 334 9 750 8 535 8 807 
(1983) 9 081 12 414 11 879 3 966 10 506 5 402 6 867 9 750 10 193 8 752 9 353 
Table 8 
Gross domestic product at 1975 market prices 
(annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 -0,7 2,6 3,4 3,4 3,0 -2,1 4,9 - 1,0 0,4 2,2 
1959 2,3 6,4 6,6 3,7 2,6 4,5 6,1 3,8 3,9 3,8 4,7 
1960 5,8 6,6 10,5 3,8 7,2 5,8 6,7 5,6 9,9 5,0 7,6 
1961 5,0 6,4 5,2 11,1 5,5 5,0 8,2 4,4 2,9 3,3 5,2 
1962 5,2 5,7 4,5 1,5 6,7 3,2 6,2 1,4 4,3 1,0 4,3 
1963 4,3 0,6 3,2 10,1 5,3 4,8 5,6 2,6 3,3 3,9 4,3 
1964 6,9 9,3 6,7 8,3 6,5 3,8 2,8 7,5 8,6 5,2 5,8 
1965 3,6 4,6 5,5 9,4 4,8 1,9 3,3 1,7 5,3 2,3 4,1 
1966 3,2 6,4 2,7 6,1 5,2 0,9 6,0 1,7 2,7 2,0 3,7 
1967 3,9 3,7 0,0 5,5 4,7 5,8 7,2 1,6 5,3 2,6 3,4 
1968 4,2 3,8 5,7 6,7 4,3 8,2 6,5 .4,2 6,4 4,1 5,2 
1969 5,9 6,5 7,4 9,9 7,0 5,9 6,1 8,9 6,4 1,5 5,6 
1970 6,2 2,3 5,2 8,0 5,7 2,7 5,3 2,2 6,7 2,2 4,8 
1961-70 4,8 4,9 4,6 7,6 5,6 4,2 5,7 3,6 5,2 2,8 4,6 
1971 3,9 2,4 3,3 7,1 5,4 3,5 1,6 4,3 4,3 2,7 3,4 
1972 5,3 5,4 4,2 8,9 5,9 6,5 3,2 6,2 3,4 2,2 4,1 
1973 6,2 3,8 4,5 7,3 5,4 4,7 7,0 10,8 5,7 7,5 5,9 
1974 4,4 -0,7 0,7 -3,6 3,2 4,3 4,1 3,6 3,5 - 1,0 1,7 
1975 - 1,9 - 1,0 - 1,6 6,0 0,2 2,0 - 3,6 - 6,1 - 1,0 - 0,7 - 1,2 
1976 5,7 6,9 5,4 6,4 4,9 1,9 5,9 1,9 5,3 3,6 5,0 
1977 0,7 2,0 3, 1 3,4 3,1 6,8 1,9 0,6 2,4 1,3 2,4 
1978 3,0 1,8 3,1 6,7 3,3 5,9 2,7 4,5 2,7 3,7 3,2 
1979 2,4 3,7 4,1 3,7 3,2 2,5 4,9 4,0 2, 1 1,6 3,3 
1980 3,0 - 1,1 1,9 1,6 1,3 2,8 3,9 1,7 0,9 - 2,0 1,3 
1971-80 3,2 2,3 2,8 4,7 3,6 4,1 3,1 3,1 2,9 1,9 2,9 
1981 -1 ,8 0,1 0,2 -0,7 0,2 1,1 - 0,2 -1,8 - 1,2 - 2,0 - 0,4 
1982 1,0 3,4 - 1,0 - 0,0 1,8 1,2 - 0,3 - 1,1 - 1,6 1,5 0,4 
(1983) -0,9 2,2 0,7 - 0,2 -0,3 0,5 - 0,8 - 2,4 0,3 2,7 0,5 
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Table 9 
Industrial production 
(annual percentage change) 
B DK D . GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 - 4,7 3,0 2,6 4,0 3,0 3,6 - 4,3 2,2 - 1,3 1,7 
1959 4,6 11 ,5 7,1 l , 1 8,8 10,6 4,5 8,7 5,2 5,7 
1960 6,8 8,7 11,7 8,9 6,9 16,7 9,0 10,0 6,8 10,1 
1961 6,2 5,1 6,1 5,5 8,5 9,5 2,9 3,6 0,0 4,8 
1962 5,7 8,9 8,4 5,1 7,2 7,8 -4,2 3,5 1,1 5,7 
1963 7,4 1,3 3,5 10,1 6,0 5,9 7,8 1,0 5,1 4,0 4,8 
1964 6,5 11 ,7 7,8 10,8 6,2 7,6 1,3 9,2 9,7 7,9 6,8 
1965 2,5 6,6 5,3 8,8 1,6 4,2 3,8 0,8 4,4 3,3 3,8 
1966 2,0 2,9 1,2 15,7 5,9 3,2 12,0 - 3,2 4,2 1,4 3,6 
1967 1,8 3,9 -2,6 4,7 2,4 7,9 8,9 - 0,6 2,7 0,2 1,1 
1968 5,5 7,4 9,4 7,7 3,5 10,5 6,7 6,0 9,2 6,4 7,0 
1969 9,7 12,4 12,9 11 ,8 10,9 7,2 3,0 12,8 10,8 3,5 9,0 
1970 3,1 2,5 6,2 10,4 5,6 4,4 6,4 0,5 8,7 0,6 4,9 
1961-70 5,0 6,2 5,7 5,2 6,6 6,7 2,4 6,2 2,8 5,1 
1971 1,7 2,4 1,5 11,3 6,4 3,7 -0,5 - 1,3 6,0 0,1 2,3 
1972 7,5 4,4 4,1 14,2 5,5 4,2 4,9 4,2 4,7 2,2 4,3 
1973 6,2 3,4 7,1 15,3 6,7 9,9 9,7 12,0 7,2 8,2 7,4 
1974 4,0 -1,1 -1,1 -1,4 2,5 2,9 3,9 3,5 5,0 -2,6 0,6 
1975 - 9,8 -5,7 - 6,2 4,3 - 7,2 -6,1 -8,8 -21 ,9 - 4,8 -4,8 -6,6 
1976 8,1 9,3 7,4 10,5 8,6 8,7 11,6 3,8 7,7 2,8 7,4 
1977 0,4 0,8 2,8 1,5 1,9 8,0 0,0 0,5 0,5 4,7 2,4 
1978 2,4 2,3 2,0 7,5 2,3 7,7_ 2,1 3,2 0,8 3,7 2,5 . 
1979 4,3- 3,6 5,5 6,0 4,0 6,9 6,7 3,4 3,1 3,8 4,9 
1980 -1,0 0,2 -0,8 0,9 -0,5 -1 ,8 5,0 -3,3 - 0,1 -6,5 -0,9 
1971-80 2,3 1,9 2,2 6,9 2,9 4,3 3,3 0,0 2,9 1,0 2,4 
1981 -2,9 0,3 -1,4 -0,6 -2,3 1,4 -2,2 -6,8 -1,7 -4,0 -2,2 
1982 -0,2 2,4 -2,8 -4,2 -1,0 0,4 -2,6 - 3,7 -3,4 0,7 -'- 1,6 
(1983) 1,8 3,0 0,5 0,1 -0,8 3,0 -3,2 - '5,1 2,0 2,1 2,0 
Table 10 
Private consumption at current prices 
(as% o/GDP) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 68,5 64,4 62,4 74,8 63,2 84,4 67,8 58,7 60,6 66,7 64,8 
1959 69,5 62,7 61,2 77,0 62,5 80,2 66,6 59,5 60,0 66,8 64,1 
1960 68,7 62,7 59,8 81,2 61,4 80,4 64,4 55,2 59,2 66,0 63,2 
1961 67,4 62,7 59,7 77,9 61,6 78,9 63,4 55,5 60,4 65,0 62,8 
1962 66,3 62,4 59,5 77,7 61,8 78,2 63,6 58,4 61,1 65,8 63,0 
1963 66,7 62,1 59,7 75,7 62,4 77,5 64,7 58,3 62,7 65,8 63,4 
1964 63,7 61,0 58,6 74,6 61,4 76,2 64,1 57,5 60,0 64,3 62,1 
1965 63,8 59,5 59,2 73;9 61,0 75,8 64,0 58,6 59,9 63,7 62,0 
1966 63,4 60,1 59,7 73,8 61,0 75,0 65,2 58,8 59,5 63,4 62,2 
1967 62,4 60,3 60,9 73,6 61,1 73,5 65,3 58,3 58,6 63,1 62,4 
1968 63,3 59,2 60,2 72,8 61,2 74,1 64,2 56,9 57,6 62,9 62,0 
1969 61,8 58,0 59,2 70,3 61,2 72,5 63,7 52,9 57,7 62,5 61,4 
1970 59,4 58,1 58,2 70,3 60,2 71,0 63,9 51,3 57,7 62,1 60,7 
1961-70 63,8 60,3 59,5 74,l 61,3 75,3 64,2 56,6 59,5 63,9 62,2 
1971 59,7 56,6 58,4 69,3 60,6 70,0 63,7 54,9 57,2 62,0 60,7 
1972 59,6 54,3 58,9 67,7 60,5 66,0 63,9 54,0 56,9 63,2 61,0 
1973 59,9 55,2 58,2 65,6 60,1 65,3 63,5 48,8 56,3 62,5 60,5 
1974 59,2 55,2 54,0 69,l 61,2 69,4 63,9 46,2 56,l 63,5 61,3 
1975 60,5 56,2 62,4 69,5 61,9 64,7 65,5 57,5 58,2 61,9 62,4 
1976 60,4 57,1 62,0 68,4 62,l 64,2 64,1 56,5 58,0 60,5 61,8 
1977 61,2 57,3 62,2 68,7 62,2 63,8 63,8 59,8 58,8 60",5 61,9 
1978 60,7 56,5 61,6 68,4 62,3 63,l 63,5 57,9 59,0 60,3 61,7 
1979 61,8 56,5 61,0 66,8 62,5 63,5 63,2 57,7 59,5 60,9 61,7 
1980 62,5 56,4 61,5 68,3 63,6 63,6 63,2 58,5 59,6 60,2 62,0 
1971-80 60,5 56,1 60,5 68,2 61,7 65,4 63,8 55,2 58,0 61,6 61,5 
1981 64,9 56,5 62,1 71,9 65,2 63,6 64,2 60,5 59,4 60,8 62,9 
1982 65,2 56,0 61,6 69,9 65,1 59,6 64,2 61,3 59,4 60,7 62,8 
(1983) 64,1 54,9 61 ,5 70,6 65,0 57,4 64,1 62,0 59,0 61 ,3 62,7 
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Table 11 
Private consumption at 1975 prices 
(annual ,nrcentage change) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 -0,3 4,6 5,0 4,2 1,3 · 2,8 4,0 0,3 2,6 2,8 
1959 1,9 5,5 5,7 2,4 2,5 1,0 5,0 4,4 4,3 4,2 
1960 5,3 4,7 8,0 5,0 4,9 5,4 6,1 6,1 3,9 5,5 
1961 1,7 7,1 5,5 7,2 5,9 3,1 7,5 4,9 5,4 2,2 4,9 
1962 4,1 5,6 5,1 4,5 7,3 3,4 7,1 4,6 6,1 2,0 5,0 
1963 4,3 0,2 3,1 5,4 7,1 4,3 8,9 4,5 7,1 4,2 5,4 
1964 2,7 8,0 5,4 8,2 5,5 4,2 3,3 8,5 5,4 2,9 4,4 
1965 4,2 3,4 6,8 7,8 4,2 0,8 3,7 3,9 7,2 1,5 4,2 
1966 2,7 10,8 3,7 7,4 4,9 1,5 7,3 1,5 2,5 2,0 4,2 
1967 2,8 3,3 1,7 5,8 5,0 3,8 7,0 -0,5 4,8 2,5 3,8 
1968 5,5 1,5 4,9 6,6 3,6 8,9 5,0 4,3 6,1 3,4 4,4 
1969 5,3 6,3 7,3 6,5 6,5 5,4 6,5 5,0 7,0 0,7 5,3 
1970 3,3 3,4 6,8 8,7 4,7 2,0 7,4 5,9 7,9 2,8 5,4 
1961-70 3,6 4,9 5,0 6,8 5,5 3,7 6,4 4,2 5,9 2,4 4,7 
1971 4,7 -0,3 5,1 6,6 6,3 3,1 3,0 5,8 3,4 3,2 4,3 
1972 5,8 1,8 4,9 7,2 6,1 3,9 3,4 4,3 3,5 5,9 5,0 
1973 7,7 5,2 2,3 7,9 5,6 7,0 5,7 5,4 3,9 5,0 4,7 
1974 3,0 -2,3 1,3 -0,7 3,2 1,7 2,7 5,0 2,4 -1,6 1,4 
1975 0,4 3,3 4,2 6,1 3,2 -4,9 -1,3 5,1 3,1 -0,5 1,7 
1976 5,0 8,4 4,0 6,2 5,4 2,4 3,6 3,0 5,2 0,7 3,8 
1977 2,4 1,0 3,3 4,9 3,0 5,8 2,2 2,4 4,1 0,1 2,4 
1978 2,3 0,7 3,7 6,5 4,6 7,6 3,0 3,0 3,9 5,1 4,1 
1979 4,5 1,1 2,9 2,2 3,3 2,0 5,3 3,6 3,2 4,4 3,7 
1980 1,4 -3,5 1,7 0,2 1,6 -0,4 4,3 3,2 -0,3 - 0,8 1,4 
1971-80 3,7 1,5 3,3 4,7 4,2 2,7 3,2 4,1 3,2 2,1 3,2 
1981 -1,4 -0,5 -0,4 0,7 1,9 -0,4 0,2 1,7 -2,1 - 0,1 0,2 
1982 1,1 2,6 -2,2 0,6 3,5 -5,3 0,3 -1,6 - 1,6 1, 1 0,5 
(1983) -3,1 0,9 0,5 0,1 0,3 -3,5 -0,8 - 1,5 - 1,5 3,0 0,4 
Table 12 
Public consumption at current prices 
(as "/. o/GDP) 
B DK D GR . , F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 11,9 14,0 10,5 11,0 13,1 12,6 12,1 11,7 14,3 16,3 13,1 
1959 12,4 13,7 10,6 11,2 13,6 12,4 12,2 10,6 13,4 16,5 13,3 
1960 12,4 13,4 10,6 11 ,7 13,0 12,5 12,8 9,8 12,8 16,6 13,2 
1961 11,9 14,6 11,0 11,3 13,1 12,5 12,7 9,5 13,4 16,7 13,4 
1962 12,3 15,3 11,8 11,6 13,3 12,6 13,1 10,9 13,9 17,1 13,8 
1963 13,0 15,6 12,5 11,3 13,4 12,8 13,9 12,2 14,7 17,0 14,2 
1964 12,5 15,7 11,8 11,6 13,3 13,4 14,3 10,8 14,8 16,5 13,9 
1965 12,8 16,4 12,0 11,7 13,1 13,7 15,1 10,9 14,8 16,9 14,2 
1966 13,1 17,1 12,0 11,8 13,0 13,6 14,9 11,4 15,2 17,2 14,2 
1967 13,5 17,8 12,5 13,0 13,0 13,4 14,4 11,9 15,5 18,0 14,5 
1968 13,6 18,6 11,7 12,9 13,5 13,4 14,5 11,8 15,2 17,7 14,4 
1969 13,6 18,9 11,8 12,7 13,3 13,6 14,2 10,9 15,3 17,2 14,2 
1970 13,4 20,0 11,9 12,6 13,4 14,6 13,8 10,7 15,6 17,7 14,3 
1961-70 13,0 17,0 11,9 12,l 13,3 13,4 14,1 11,1 14,8 17,2 14,1 
1971 14,1 21,3 12,6 12,4 13,4 15,2 15,5 11,7 16,0 18,0 14,9 
1972 14,5 21,3 12,5 12,2 13,2 15,3 16,1 11,9 15,9 18,5 15,0 
1973 14,5 21,3 12,8 11,5 13,2 15,7 15,5 11,3 15,6 18,4 14,9 
1974 14,7 i3,4 13,7 13,8 13,6 17,2 15,1 11,5 16,3 20,l 15,7 
1975 16,4 24,6 14,2 15,2 14,4 19,0 15,4 14,9 17,4 22,0 16,6 
1976 16,4 24, l 13,5 15,1 14,6 18,4 14,8 14,8 17,2 21,5 16,2 
1977 16,9 23,9 13,4 16,0 14,7 18,0 15,3 16,0 17,4 20,4 16,1 
1978 17,5 24,5 13,4 15,9 15,0 18,2 15,9 15,6 17,7 20,0 16,2 
1979 17,7 25,0 13,4 16,3 14,9 19,5 16,2 · 15,8 18,l 19,9 16,3 
1980 18,1 26,8 13,7 16,1 15,2 • 21,5 16,4 16,7 18,0 21,5 16,8 
1971-80 16,1 23,6 13,3 14,5 14,2 17,8 15,6 14,0 17,0 20,0 15,9 
1981 19,0 27,7 14,0 17,8 15,8 22,0 18,1 17,5 17,9 22,3 17,6 
1982 18,5 28,0 13,8 18,0 16,1 22,0 18,3 17,5 17,9 22,2 17,6 
(1983) 18,0 27,5 13,7 18,5 16,0 21,7 18,7 17,8 18,0 22,3 17,7 
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Table 13 
Public consumption at 1975 prices 
(annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 7,6 0,6 8,2 - 0,9 - 4,3 - 0,7 5,5 - 2,9 - 2,2 0,7 
1959 5,3 6,6 9;0 1,7 5,8 2,0 4,4 - 1,3 2,1 4,9 
1960 5,3 3,9 6,0 4,6 3,0 1,7 4,0 5,4 2,2 3,8 
1961 1,9 5,3 6,8 4,4 4,7 2,1 4,4 1,2 3,6 3,5 4,6 
1962 8,6 9,9 10,5 6,7 4,7 3,1 3,9 2,4 4,2 3,1 5,6 
1963 11 ,6 2,9 6,2 4,2 3,4 4,0 4,3 5,8 6,7 1,6 4,1 
1964 4,2 7,3 0,6 9,3 4,1 3,0 4,2 - 0,8 1,7 1,6 2,5 
1965 5,5 3,4 4,0 9,0 3,2 3,7 4,0 2,5 1,5 2,7 3,4 
1966 4,7 5,5 1,0 6,3 2,7 1,0 4,0 5,8 1,7 2,7 2,6 
1967 5,7 7,6 2,9 8,5 4,2 4,5 4,4 4,2 2,4 5,7 4,4 
1968 3,5 4,7 - 1,5 1,3 5,6 5,8 5,2 5,6 2,2 0,4 2,1 
1969 6,3 6,8 4,6 7,7 4,1 6,9 2,8 3,3 4,5 - 1,9 2,5 
1970 2,2 6,9 4,4 5,9 4,1 11 ,3 2,6 4,1 6,0 1,5 3,4 
1961-70 5,4 6,0 3,9 6,3 4,1 4,5 4,0 3,4 3,4 2,1 3,5 
1971 5,5 5,5 3,9 4,9 3,5 8,6 5,7 3,8 3,3 3,0 4,0 
1972 5,9 5,7 2,2 5,7 2,7 7,5 5,3 4,0 1,8 4,1 3,6 
1973 5,2 4,0 3,6 6,8 3,2 6,7 2,4 3,3 0,7 4,7 3,6 
1974 3,4 3,5 2,5 12,1 1,2 7,6 2,8 4,8 2,0 1,5 2,2 
1975 4,8 · 2,0 1,1 11,9 4,7 7,0 3,2 6,6 3,9 5,4 3,9 
1976 3,7 3,9 -0,0 5,1 5,7 2,4 2,2 1,9 4,0 1,0 2,3 
1977 2,9 2,9 l, 1 6,5 1,4 3,6 2,8 3,0 3,2 -1 ,0 1,3 
1978 6,4 6,2 3,8 3,5 4,4 6,8 2,3 2,0 3,9 2,2 3,4 
1979 2,4 5,9 3,8 5,8 1,8 6,9 1,6 4,7 2,7 1,8 2,6 
1980 1,5 4,5 2,4 -0,8 1,3 6,3 2,1 4,6 0,9 1,9 1,9 
1971-80 4,2 4,4 2,4 6,1 3,0 6,3 3,0 3,8 2,6 2,5 2,9 
1981 0,6 3,0 1,7 6,5 2,4 -0,1 1,7 2,1 1,3 0,4 1,5 
1982 -1,6 3,3 -1,1 1,0 1,7 3,3 1,8 0,3 0,7 1,2 0,8 
(1983) -1 ,6 1, 1 -0,1 3,0 -1,1 0,0 1,8 -0,3 1,7 2,4 0,8 
Table 14 
Gross fixed investment at current prices; total economy 
(as % o/GDP) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 17,0 17,3 22,4 19,1 20,3 14,2 20,8 22,9 23,0 15,7 19,6 
1959 17,8 18,8 23,6 21 ,8 20,1 13,9 21,1 22,3 23,8 15,9 20,0 
1960 19,3 21,2 24,3 19,0 20,1 14,4 22,6 21,0 . 24,1 16,4 20,8 
1961 20,7 22,8 25,2 18,2 21,2 16,3 23,2 23,2 24,8 17,3 21,7 
1962 21,3 22,7 25,7 . 20,1 21,4 17,9 23,7 26,1 24,5 16,9 22,0 
1963 20,7 21,6 25,6 19,2 22,1 19,5 24,0 29,9 23,8 16,7 22,0 
1964 22,4 24,1 26,6 21 ,0 22,9 20,5 22,2 33,5 25,5 18,3 22,8 
1965 22,4 23,7 26,1 21;6 23,3 21,4 19,3 28,0 25,1 18,3 22,2 
1966 22,9 24,1 25,4 21,7 23,7 19,8 18,8 26,6 26,2 18,3 22,1 
1967 22,9 24,2 23,1 20,3 23,8 20,1 19,5 23,3 26,3 18,8 21,7 
1968 21,5 23,4 22,4 23,2 23,3 20,9 20,3 21,4 26,9 18,9 21,6 
1969 21,3 24,6 23,3 24,6 23,4 23,3 21,0 21,7 24,6 18,5 21,9 
1970 22,7 24,7 25,5 23,6 23,4 22,7 21,4 23,5 25,8 18,6 22,7 
1961-70 21,9 23,6 24,9 21,4 .. 22,9 20,2 21,3 25,7 25,3 18,1 22,1 
1971 22,1 24,2 26,1 25,7 23,6 23,6 20,4 28,4 25,9 18,4 22,7 
1972 21,3 24,6 25,4 27,7 23,7 23,7 19,8 28,2 23,7 18,3 22,3 
1973 21,4 24,8 23,9 28,0 23,8 25,3 20,8 27,4 23,1 19,5 22,4 
1974 22,7 24,0 21,6 22,2 24,3 24,6 22,4 24,7 21,8 20,3 22,2 
1975 22,5 21,1 20,4 _· 20,8 23,3 22,6 20,6 27,8 20,9 19,5 21,0 
1976 22,1 23,0 20,2 21,2 23,3 24,8 20,0 24,5 19,3 19,0 20,7 
1977 21,7 22,1 20,3 23,0 22,3 25,0 19,6 25,3 21,1 17,9 20,4 
1978 21,6 21,7 20,8 23,9 21,4 27,9 18,7 23,9 21,3 18,0 20,2 
1979 20,6 20,9 21,9 25,6 21,4 31 ,0 18,8 24,6 21,0 17,9 20,5 
1980 21,2 18,3 22,8 23,4 21 ,6 28,9 19,8 26,2 20,8 17,5 20,8 
1971-80 21 ,7 22,5 22,3 24,2 22,9 25,7 20,1 26,1 21,9 18,6 21,3 
1981 17,9 15,7 22,0 20,9 21,2 29,8 20,3 23,3 19,0 15,9 19,9 
1982 17,1 16,0 20,6 19,0 21,1 25,6 19,1 23,4 18,0 15,7 19,1 
(1983) 16,7 16,0 20,8 19,4 20,3 22,5 18,2 22,5 18,0 16,0 18,8 
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Table 15 
Gross fixed investment at 1975 prices ; total economy 
( annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 - 7,2 6,6 4,2 33,4 5,8 -2,5 2,7 - 12,2 0,8 2,1 
1959 9,8 20,4 11 ,8 15,3 3, 1 4,8 8,7 11,6 7,4 8,4 
1960 13,8 9,5 10,1 29,5 7,8 6,8 12,3 11 ,5 9,2 9,8 
1961 12,4 13,9 6,8 8, 1 10,9 16,9 11,6 9,1 6,5 9,8 9,5 
1962 5,9 6,7 4,1 8,4 8,5 14,7 9,8 7,8 4,4 0,2 5,5 
1963 0,1 - 2,4 1,3 5,5 8,8 12,0 8,1 14,2 1,9 1,3 4,1 
1964 14,7 23,5 11 ,2 20,7 10,5 10,9 - 5,8 21,0 18,9 16,8 9,3 
1965 4,1 4,7 4,8 12,8 7,0 10,5 -8,4 - 13,1 5,2 4,8 2,8 
1966 6,8 7,0 1,2 3,2 7,3 -3,0 4,3 - 5,1 8,0 2,5 3,9 
1967 2,9 5,5 - 6,9 -1 ,6 6,0 6,8 11 ,7 - 9,0 8,5 8,5 3,6 
1968 - 1,3 1,8 3,6 21,4 5,5 13,2 10,8 - 4,1 11 ,2 4,6 6,1 
1969 5,3 12,1 10,5 18,6 9,2 20,4 7,8 10,2 -2,2 0,4 6,9 
1970 8,4 2,4 9,9 - 1,4 4,6 - 3,3 3,0 9,2 9,5 2,7 5,5 
1961-70 5,8 7,3 4,5 9,3 7,8 9,7 5,1 3,5 7,0 5,0 5,7 
1971 -1 ,5 1,7 6,2 14,0 7,1 8,9 - 3,2 15,1 3,4 1,5 3,3 
1972 3,3 8,6 2,6 15,4 7,2 7,8 0,9 6,0 -2,8 0,4 3,0 
1973 6,8 4,3 - 0,2 7,7 6,1 16,2 7,7 11,4 4,5 6,9 4,8 
1974 7,0 -9,0 -9,5 - 25,6 0,9 - 11,6 3,3 - 5,2 - 3,8 - 3,0 - 3,1 
1975 -1 ,6 - 12,2 -4,9 0,2 -3,2 - 4,3 - 12,7 - 7,1 - 4,9 - 0,7 -5,2 
1976 3,2 17,1 4,6 6,8 3,5 12,9 2,3 - 5,2 -2,8 I, 1 3,2 
1977 -0,2 -2,0 3,8 7,8 -1,5 3,7 - 0,4 1,8 11 ,7 -2,4 0,8 
1978 2,4 1,4 4,9 6,0 0,4 17,2 - 0,1 0,3 2,7 3,5 2,5 
1979 - 2,6 -0,2 7,2 7,9 2,7 13,0 5,8 7,0 - 1,6 0,9 3,8 
1980 5,3 - 14,8 3,2 -8,7 1,2 - 7,7 9,4 5,9 - 2,5 -2,8 1,7 
. 1971-80 2,1 - 0,9 1,6 2,4 2,4 5,1 1,1 2,8 0,3 0,5 1,4 
1981 -16,2 - 15,7 - 3,9 - 10,1 - 2,3 7,5 - 0,2 - 13,3 - 10,8 - 8,2 -4,7 
1982 -2,6 3,6 - 5,4 - 1,0 1, 1 - 8,4 - 5,3 - 2,2 - 5,0 4,8 - 1,9 
0983) - 1,9 1,7 3,3 - 2,2 - 3,8 - 10,4 - 5,1 - 5,8 0,7 5,1 - 0,2 
Table 16 
Net stockbuilding at current prices 
(as°/.o/GDP) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 0,8 - 0,5 1,5 2,0 3,2 - 1,4 0,8 1,8 0,3 0,5 1,6 
1959 0,2 2,3 1,5 1,3 2,2 4,0 1,0 2,0 0,7 0,7 1,4 
1960 -0,1 4,3 3,0 - 3,4 3,0 2,0 2,1 1,0 2,9 2,2 2,5 
1961 0,5 1,8 2,0 0,8 1,7 1,4 2,3 5,3 2,2 1,0 1,7 
1962 -0,0 2,8 1,6 -0,9 2,3 1,6 1,7 4,0 1,1 - 0,0 1,3 
1963 0,4 0,5 0,7 3,2 1,5 0,9 1,0 - 0,2 0,6 0,6 0,9 
1964 1,5 1,6 1,5 3,6 2,4 1,2 0,5 - 1,9 2,5 2,2 1,7 
1965 0,8 2,1 2,3 5,2 1,6 2,3 0,7 1,1 1,5 1,4 1,6 
1966 1,0 0,8 1,1 1,7 2,0 0,8 0,8 0,6 0,8 0,8 1,2 
1967 0,4 0,0 - 0,1 1,6 1,8 -0,4 1,1 - 1,6 0,5 0,8 0,8 
1968 0,9 0,6 2,1 0,9 1,8 1, 1 0,0 - 0,2 0,3 1, 1 1,2 
1969 1,9 1,3 2,9 2,5 2,6 2,4 0,7 - 0,1 2,1 1,2 2,0 
1970 1,6 1,0 2,1 3,2 2,7 1,7 1,7 2,1 2,2 0,8 1,9 
1961-70 0,9 1,2 1,6 2,2 2,0 1,3 1, 1 0,9 1,4 1,0 1,4 
1971 1,4 0,6 0,6 2,7 1,5 0,3 0,6 2,6 1,1 0,3 0,8 
1972 0,5 0,2 0,6 3,1 1,9 1,4 0,6 1,3 0,6 0,1 0,8 
1973 1,3 _ 1,3 1,4 8,4 2,4 1,6 3,4 0,9 1,7 2,0 2,2 
1974 2,2 1,2 0,5 6,7 2,4 4,4 4,2 - 2,1 2,8 1,5 2,1 
1975 -0,6 - 0,2 -0,6 7,3 - 0,3 - 0,4 - 0,3 - 3,3 - 0,2 - 1,4 - 0,5 
1976 0,1 1,0 1,1 7,2 1,2 0,1 3,6 - 0,0 1,3 0,7 1,6 
1977 0,3 0,8 0,7 4,6 1,1 2,1 1,8 - 3,1 0,6 1,3 1,2 
1978 0,1 - 0,2 0,6 3,1 0,6 0,2 1,3 3,2 0,6 1,0 0,8 
1979 0,6 0,5 1,9 3,5 1,4 2,2 2,4 - 0,1 0,5 1,5 1,7 
1980 0,1 - 0,4 1,2 2,5 1,6 - 0,7 5,3 1,6 0,7 - 1,2 1,5 
1971-80 0,6 0,5 0,8 4,9 1,4 1, I 2,3 0,1 1,0 0,6 1,2 
1981 0,2 - 0,3 - 0,0 1,5 - 0,1 - 1,1 I ,I · 2,4 - 1,1 - 1,7 - 0,3 
1982 0,3 2,1 0,5 7,5 0,7 0,0 1,4 2,3 - 0,2 - 0,7 0,5 
(1983) 0,2 - 0,2 0,7 6,0 0,3 - 0,1 0,9 2,7 - 0,2 0,2 0,5 
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Table 17 
Price deflator of GDP at market prices 
(national currency, annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR F lRL L NL UK EC 
1958 1,5 1,8 3,4 1,6 11 ,8 5,8 2,5 1,8 4,0 4,8 
1959 0,8 3,6 0,8 0,2 5,7 2,7 - 0,7 - 1,8 1,2 1,1 1,7 
1960 0,7 1,8 3,4 3,5 3,5 0,3 0,0 4,1 3,4 1,5 2,7 
1961 1,3 4,3 4,2 1,5 3,4 2,5 2,8 0,4 2,6 3,4 3,3 
1962 1,7 6,6 4,1 4,6 4,7 4,9 5,8 - 1,0 3,2 3,7 4,5 
1963 3,0 5,8 2,7 1,4 6,4 2,7 8,5 5,0 5,0 2,3 4,5 
1964 4,7 4,6 3,0 3,7 4,1 9,7 6,5 5,4 8,4 3,6 4,6 
1965 5,1 7,4 3,6 4,0 2,7 4,4 4,2 3,4 6,1 5,0 4,4 
1966 4,2 3,6 3,5 4,8 2,9 4,4 2,2 3,0 6,0 4,5 3,6 
1967 3, l 6,0 1,2 2,5 3,2 3,3 2,8 1,0 4,2 2,9 2,6 
1968 2,7 7,2 2,0 1,7 4,2 4,2 1,7 5,1 4,2 4,0 3,2 
1969 4,8 6,8 4,2 3,4 6,6 9,1 4,1 5,5 6,4 5,5 5,4 
1970 4,8 8,1 7,5 3,9 5,6 9,7 6,9 11,1 5,6 7,3 6,8 
1961-70 3,5 6,0 3,6 3,1 4,4 5,5 4,5 3,8 5,2 4,2 4,3 
1971 5,4 7,9 7,6 3,8 5,8 10,5 7,2 -0,7 8,5 9,3 7,5 
1972 6,2 9,0 5,4 4,5 6,2 13,4 6,3 5,0 9,4 8,3 6,8 
1973 7,0 10,5 6,6 19,4 7,8 15,3 11,6 10,5 8,4 7,1 8,3 
1974 12,2 12,8 6,6 21,0 11,1 6,1 ' 18,5 11,8 9,3 15,1 12,5 
1975 12,6 12,8 5,9 12,3 13,4 22,3 17,5 -1,1 11,2 26,9 14,8 
1976 7,2 8,7 3,5 15,4 10,1 20,3 18,0 12,7 8,9 14,8 10,5 
1977 7,2 9,0 3,6 13,0 8,9 12,5 19,1 1,7 6,3 14,0 9,7 
1978 4,2 9,5 4,2 12,9 9,9 10,7 13,9 5,3 5,2 10,9 8,5 
1979 4,1 7,4 4,1 18,7 10,4 12,9 15,9 5,8 4,2 15,1 9,4 
1980 4,2 8,8 4,4 17,9 11,6 13,9 20,7 7,8 5,3 19,2 10,8 
1971-80 7,0 9,6 5,2 13,7 9,5 13,7 14,8 6,3 7,7 13,9 9,9 
1981 5,2 10,8 4,0 19,7 11,9 17,7 17,6 7,9 5,6 12,1 9,1 
1982 7,0 9,9 4,8 25,4 12,8 16,8 17,5 7,9 5,7 7,8 9,1 
(1983) 7,1 7,4 3,1 19,7 9,8 10,6 15,1 8,2 1,6 5,0 6,3 
Table 18 
Price deflator of private consumption 
(national currency, annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR F lRL L NL UK EC 
1958 0,1 0,5 2,5 0,0 12,1 3,8 2,3 1,6 2,7 4,3 
1959 -0,3 2,5 1,0 -0,5 5,8 0,4 -0,7 1,2 1,0 1,8 
1960 2,4 2,9 1,0 3,1 3,6 0,9 1,4 2,5 1,1 1,7 
1961 2,7 3,6 3,6 1,1 3,4 2,4 1,8 0,5 2,1 3,0 2,9 
1962 1,0 6,2 3,2 1,3 4,4 3,6 5,3 0,9 2,7 3,9 4,0 
1963 3,7 5,7 3,1 3,2 5,8 2,2 7,1 2,9 3,9 1,9 4,1 
1964 4,1 4,0 2,3 2,2 3,4 7,3 5,0 3,1 6,9 3,6 3,8 
1965 4,6 6,1 3,4 4,6 2,6 5,0 3,6 3,2 4,1 4,9 4,0 
1966 4,1 0,4 3,5 3,5 3,2 2,8 2,9 3,5 5,5 4,0 3,5 
1967 2,5 6,8 1,6 1,9 3,1 3,1 3,1 2,3 3,1 2,6 2,5 
1968 2,9 7,7 1,7 0,8 5,1 4,4 1,4 2,5 2,7 4,5 3,3 
1969 2,9 4,7 2,5 3,0 7,1 7,2 2,9 1,8 6,2 5,6 4,7 
1970 3,6 7,1 4,1 3,2 5,0 8,2 5,0 4,0 4,3 6,0 5,1 
1961-70 3,2 5,2 2,9 2,5 4,3 4,6 3,8 2,5 4,1 4,0 3,8 
1971 5,2 8,0 6,1 2,9 5,5 9,4 5,5 4,7 8,5 8,6 6,6 
1972 5,4 8,2 5,6 3,5 5,9 9,6 6,4 5,2 8,9 6,6 6,4 
1973 6,0 10,9 7,5 15,0 6,8 11,6 12,4 5,0 9,1 8,6 8,7 
1974 12,4 i4,7 7,3 23,6 13,2 15,7 20,8 9,9 10,0 17,4 14,2 
1975 12,5 10,1 5,9 13,0 11,4 22,3 17,6 10,2 10,7 23,5 13,7 
1976 7,6 9,0 4,3 13,6 9,9 18,8 18,l 9,5 8,8 15,5 10,8 
1977 7,0 10,4 3,7 12,0 9,2 12,9 18,2 5,8 5,9 15,2 9,9 
1978 4,1 9,2 2,7 12,6 8,9 7,7 12,9 3,5 4,3 9,0 7,2 
1979 3,8 10,2 4,2 17,5 10,6 14,2 15,0 5,8 4,0 13,2 8,9 
1980 7,0 11,2 5,4 22,2 13,3 17,6 20,3 7,7 6,7 16,4 11,2 
1971-80 7,1 10,2 5,3 13,4 9,4 13,9 14,6 6,7 7,7 13,3 9,7 
1981 8,9 11,8 5,6 24,4 12,9 19,5 19,0 7,7 6,2 11,0 10,1 
1982 7,4 9,8 5,3 21,1 10,9 17,l 16,7 10,0 5,7 8,1 8,7 
(1983) 7,8 6,6 3,0 20,5 9,0 11,0 15,0 8,4 2,8 5,8 6,3 
211 
Table 19 
Price detlator of exports of goods and services 
(national currency, annual ~rcentage change) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 -4,5 -4,6 -1,4 -5,1 7,1 3,0 -9,2 -5,2 - 1,1 -2,0 
1959 -6,3 2,7 0,1 - 5,3 9,1 2,7 -6,2 -0,5 0,4 0,4 
1960 2,4 -0,9 1,9 -2,0 1,8 -1,0 2,6 -0,4 0,4 1,3 
1961 0,9 -1,6 -0,1 0,4 0,1 1,5 -1,9 -3,1 -1,8 1,2 -0,1 
1962 1,0 2,1 0,2 1,5 1,0 1,0 0,3 -1,7 - 0,9 0,8 1,0 
1963 2,1 2,6 0,7 10,2 2,5 2,7 2,7 - 0,0 2,4 1,1 2,1 
1964 4,0 3,4 2,6 0,2 4,4 3,7 3,2 2,3 2,2 2,2 3,0 
1965 1,3 1,7 2,5 -1,7 1,0 1,0 -0,8 1,4 2,2 2,2 1,5 
1966 3,6 2,4 2,3 4,5 1,9 5,7 - 0,0 0,7 0,3 2,9 1,8 
1967 0,3 1,3 0,1 -3,2 - 0,8 1,6 1,3 0,3 - 0,3 2,3 0,5 
1968 0,1 2,2 -0,4 - 1,7 - 0,9 7,3 0,1 1,2 -0,8 8,5 1,8 
1969 4,7 7,5 4,4 0,6 4,6 7,5 2,7 6,7 2,0 2,4 3,8 
1970 5,7 7,0 4,4 2,8 8,0 8,2 6,1 12,8 5,1 8,8 6,7 
1961-70 2,3 2,8 1,7 1,3 2,1 4,0 1,3 2,0 1,0 3,2 2,2 
1971 1,9 3,9 · 4,1 1,0 4,8 7,2 4,1 -2,9 2,9 4,6 4,0 
1972 1,6 6,8 1,8 4,6 0,3 12,3 2,3 1,2 1,0 4,2 2,2 
1973 8,3 12,5 6,4 28,4 7,5 20,5 15,5 15,5 6,9 12,6 10,1 
1974 24,8 19,8 15,7 31,9 23,2 23,6 36,6 23,8 26,5 25,9 24,9 
1975 4,8 7,5 4,2 12,7 4,4 18,6 11 ,0 ~ 1,5 4,9 20,2 9,1 
1976 6,1 6,2 3,4 9,1 8,8 23,3 20,5 7,7 6,5 20,0 11,2 
1977 3,0 6,0 1,7 9,4 9,0 14,9 19,2 -1,2 3,5 15,5 8,9 
1978 0,6 5,0 1,6 6,4 6,2 6,5 7,7 2,0 -1,5 7,0 4,3 
1979 9,1 8,4 4,5 12,6 10,3 9,1 15,8 8,7 8,5 12,4 9,6 
1980 9,2 15,7 6,5 37,5 11,6 10,2 18,0 5,7 12,5 13,8 11,3 
1971-80 6,8 9,1 4,9 14,8 8,5 14,5 14,7 5,6 6,9 13,4 9,4 
1981 9,4 14,5 6,0 6,0 13,5 16,8 20,4 1,3 14,7 9,4 11 ,0 
1982 13,3 9,8 4,2 23,1 15,7 11,6 14,5 12,9 4,2 7,2 9,2 
(1983) 5,2 4,4 1,7 26,l 12,4 8,1 9,9 4,4 0,8 6,9 5,6 
Table 20 
Price detlator of imports of goods and services 
(national currency, annual ~rcentage change) 
B DK D GR F lRL L NL UK EC 
1958 3,1 2,2 1,2 -8,4 8,4 5,3 5,3 4,7 2,3 3,9 
1959 -6,7 -6,9 -7,3 -1,5 6,9 -3,7 -12,2 -5,5 - 5,0 - 4,7 
1960 -1,6 -4,2 -2,0 -0,7 7,6 -2,1 -6,0 -3,0 0,0 -0,3 
1961 2,6 0,1 -2,9 -1,8 0,1 1,4 -2,4 1,1 -2,0 - 0,1 - 0,6 
1962 0,6 -0,5 -0,6 -0,8 2,9 -0,2 0,2 0,7 - 1,4 - 0,4 0,6 
1963 4,1 1,9 2,3 2,6 1,0 1,7 1,7 1,0 1,4 2,6 2,3 
1964 2,9 0,9 1,7 3,1 0,7 1,2 3,5 1,0 2,5 2,5 2,6 
1965 0,0 1,2 2,7 0;4 1,5 2,9 0,5 1,5 0,6 1,4 1,7 
1966 3,0 0,6 1,7 3,3 3,2 -0,3 1,7 1,3 0,7 1,4 1,5 
1967 0,2 1,5 -1,9 -3,0 -1,4 0,3 0,7 -0,9 -0,9 1,0 - 1,0 
1968 0,5 4,8 0,2 0,3 -1,1 8,1 0,5 -0,0 -2,9 11,2 2,8 
1969 3,3 3,4 2,5 0,0 4,9 5,1 1,2 3,0 3,3 2,8 3,2 
1970 5,0 6,4 -0,2 4,1 9,8 5,8 3,5 11,0 6,5 7,1 5,1 
1961-70 2,2 2,0 0,5 0,8 2,1 2,6 1,1 1,9 0,7 2,9 1,8 
1971 3,4 5,6 1,5 3,0 3,7 5,3 5,2 4,9 4,4 3,7 3,7 
1972 0,3 2,3 1,1 7,9 -1,8 5,6 3,7 0,2 -0,8 2,4 1,0 
1973 7,6 15,1 9,5 21,6 6,8 14,1 26,2 9,7 7,5 23,7 14,6 
1974 28,3 33,6 25,0 42,3 42,5 45,8 57,1 21,7 33,8 43,2 39,2 
1975 5,8 4,2 0,8 17,9 -0,3 20,5 6,0 10,5 4,1 13,6 5,3 
1976 7,1 7,2 6,1 11,1 10,5 19,0 24,0 5,6 6,3 21,7 13,l 
1977 2,7 7,4 1,8 5,6 11 ,5 17,0 16,9 2,3 3,0 14,3 8,6 
1978 0,8 2,0 -2,8 9,9 2,0 4,6 4,5 0,7 -2,1 2,8 1,1 
1979 9,1 13,3 8,8 18,2 11 ,2 13,5 17,5 6,6 10,9 8,0 10,6 
1980 13,8 23,5 13,0 35,0 19,9 18,2 22,0 9,0 14,6 10,3 15,3 
1971-80 7,6 11 ,0 6,2 16,6 10,0 15,9 17,4 7,0 7,8 13,8 10,8 
1981 13,9 17,2 10,0 13,0 18,8 18,6 27,8 4,0 15,9 5,1 14,0 
1982 13,3 10,6 2,2 25,4 10,7 8,8 10,7 15,1 1,9 5,3 6,5 
(1983) 4,9 3,4 0,3 23,l 9,0 6,3 8,4 4,7 1,8 10,0 4,7 
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Table 21 
Terms of trade; goods and services 
(1975 = JOO) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 97,8 87,3 81 ,8 112,4 110,0 85,0 103, l 94,4 106,7 99, l 
1959 98,2 96,3 88,3 108, l 112,3 90,6 110, l 99,4 112,8 104,4 
1960 101 ,9 99,6 93,3 106,7 106,2 91 ,6 120,2 111 ,7 102, l 111 ,8 106,2 
1961 100, l 97,9 96,0 109,2 106,l 91 ,7 120,8 107,0 102,3 113,2 106,7 
1962 100,5 100,4 96,8 111 ,7 104,l 92,7 120,9 104,4 102,9 114,5 107,2 
1963 98,6 101 ,l 95,3 120,0 . 105,6 93,7 122, l 103,4 104,0 112,9 106,9 
1964 99,6 103,6 96, l 116,6 109,5 95,9 121,8 104,7 103,6 112,5 107,4 
1965 100,9 104,0 95,8 114,2 109,0 94,l 120,l 104,5 105,3 113,4 107,2 
1966 101 ,5 106,0 96,5 115,4 107,6 99,8 118,0 103,9 104,9 115, l 107,6 
1967 101,5 105,8 98,5 115,2 108,2 101 ,0 118,7 105, l 105,5 116,5 109,2 
1968 101 ,2 103,2 97,9 112,9 108,4 100,3 118,3 106,4 107,9 113,7 108,l 
1969 102,6 107,3 99,6 113,6 108,l 102,6 119,9 110,3 106,4 113,3 108,8 
1970 103,3 107,9 104,2 112,2 106,3 104,9 123,0 112,0 105, l 115,1 110,3 
1971 .101 ,8 106,1 106,8 110,0 107,4 106,8 121 ,7 103,7 103,6 116,1 110,6 
1972 103,1 110,8 107,6 106,7 109,8 113,5 120,1 104,7 105,5 118,0 112,0 
1973 103,8 108,2 104,6 112,7 110,5 119,9 109,9 110,3 104,9 107,4 107,5 
1974 101 ,0 97,0 96,8 104,5 95,6 101,6 95,5 112,2 99,2 94,5 96,5 
1975 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1976 99, l 99,0 97,5 98,1 98,4 103,7 97, l 102,0 100,2 98 ,5 98,3 
1977 99,5 97,7 97,4 101,7 96,2 101 ,8 99,0 98,5 100,7 99,6 98,6 
1978 99,3 100,6 101 ,7 98,4 100,1 103,7 102,1 99,8 101 ,4 103,7 101 ,7 
1979 99,3 96,3 97,6 93,8 99,2 99,6 100,7 101,8 99,1 108,0 100,8 
1980 95,3 90,2 92,0 95,5 92,4 92,8 97,3 98,7 97,3 111 ,5 97,3 
1981 91 ,6 88,0 88,7 89,6 88,2 91 ,4 91 ,7 96,1 96,2 116,0 94,8 
1982 91 ,5 87,4 90,4 87,9 92,2 93,8 94,8 94,2 98,4 118,1 97,1 
(1983) 91 ,8 88,3 91 ,7 90,1 95,l 95,3 96,2 94,0 97,5 114,9 98,0 
Table 22 
Compensation per employee; total economy 
(national currency, annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1961 3,2 12,9 10,2 6,5 10,6 9,5 8,2 2,8 7,4 6,7 8,4 
1962 7,2 11 , l 9,1 6,9 11 ,6 9,3 13,5 4,8 6,8 4,6 8,8 
1963 8,0 4,6 6,1 7,5 11 ,4 6,1 19,7 8,1 9,3 4,9 9,1 
1964 9,7 10,7 8,2 13,1 9,2 14,2 11 ,6 13,3 16,5 7,0 9,4 
1965 9,5 13,8 9,5 12,6 6,5 3,2 8,2 4,2 11,7 6,8 8,4 
1966 8,6 9,6 7,6 12,7 6,0 8,5 8,0 5,0 11 ,1 6,4 7,3 
1967 7,4 10,9 3,3 9,2 6,9 8,0 8,3 2,8 9,3 6,2 6,2 
1968 6,3 9,6 6,7 9,6 11 ,2 10,6 7,6 5,9 8,6 7,8 8,2 
1969 8,4 11 ,4 9,5 10,2 11,l 13,9 7,6 5,6 13,2 7,1 9,4 
1970 9,4 11,0 16,0 9,6 9,8 16,8 13,6 14,8 12,6 13,0 13,2 
1961-70 7,8 10,5 8,6 9,8 9,4 9,9 10,6 6,7 10,6 7,1 8,8 
1971 11 ,7 11 ,7 12,6 9,2 11,5 14,0 13,1 9,3 13,4 11,4 12,2 
1972 14,0 7,9 9,1 12,4 10,3 16,9 11,1 8,8 12,9 13,0 11 ,1 
1973 13,0 13,1 12,1 17,6 12,8 19,8 19,6 12,8 15,1 13,1 14,2 
1974 18,2 i8,4 11,5 18,7 17,6 18,6 22,1 21 ,3 15,8 18,8 17,4 
1975 16,5 14,0 7,2 19,7 18,6 27,0 21,0 11 ,3 13,3 30,9 18,1 
1976 16,1 11 ,7 7,9 23,9 14,7 19,3 20,9 13,2 10,9 14,6 13,7 
1977 8,9 9,7 6,6 22,3 12,6 13,8 21,4 9,4 8,1 10,4 11 ,2 
1978 7,6 9,2 5,6 23,1 12,5 14,8 ·. 16,2 5,6 7,2 13,8 10,8 
1979 5,4 9,4 5,9 21,9 13,1 18,l 17,9 6,0 6,0 16,4 11 ,3 
1980 8,8 9,9 6,8 14,8 14,8 19,5 · 22,2 7,8 5,5 20,2 12,9 
1971-80 12,0 11 ,5 8,5 18,3 13,8 18,1 18,5 10,5 10,8 16,1 13,3 
1981 7,3 10,2 5,3 23,9 14,5 18,5 22,0 7,7 3,3 14,7 11 ,5 
1982 8,0 11 ,1 4,4 26,2 14,5 14,9 17,1 6,9 5,7 8,8 9,6 
(1983) 6,0 7,5 3,8 17,3 9,7 12,2 15,6 7,1 3,2 7,9 7,2 
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Table 23 
Real compensation per employee; total economy 
( annual per~ ntage change) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1961 0,5 8,9 6,4 5,4 7,0 6,9 6,2 2,3 5,2 3,7 5,4 
1962 6,1 4,6 5,7 5,6 6,9 5,4 7,8 3,9 4,0 0,7 4,6 
1963 4,1 - 1,0 2,9 4,1 5,3 3,8 11 ,8 5,0 5,3 2,9 4,8 
1964 5,4 6,4 5,8 10,7 5,6 6,3 6,2 9,9 9,0 3,3 5,4 
1965 4,7 7,3 5,9 7,7 3,8 - 1,8 4,4 0,9 7,3 1,8 4,1 
1966 4,3 9,2 4,0 8,9 2,8 5,5 5,0 1,5 5,3 2,3 3,7 
1967 4,8 3,9 1,7 7,2 3,7 4,7 5,1 0,5 6,0 3,5 3,6 
1968 3,3 1,8 4,9 8,8 5,8 5,9 6,0 3,3 5,7 3,2 4,8 
1969 5,3 6,4 6,9 7,0 3,7 6,3 4,6 3,7 6,6 1,5 4,5 
1970 5,6 3,7 11 ,4 6,2 4,6 8,0 8,2 10,5 8,0 6,6 7,8 
1961-70 4,4 5,1 5,5 7,1 4,9 5,1 6,5 4,1 6,2 2,9 4,9 
1971 6,2 3,4 6,1 6,1 5,7 4,2 7,1 4,4 4,6 2,6 5,2 
1972 8,1 - 0,2 3,3 8,5 4,2 6,6 4,4 3,5 3,7 6,1 4,4 
1973 6,6 2,0 4,3 2,2 5,6 7,4 6,4 7,5 5,4 4,2 5,0 
1974 5,2 3,2 3,9 -4,0 3,8 2,4 1,0 10,3 5,2 1,3 2,8 
1975 3,6 3,5 1,3 6,0 6,5 3,8 2,9 1,0 2,4 6,0 3,9 
1976 7,9 2,4 3,5 9,0 4,4 0,4 2,4 3,4 1,9 - 0,8 2,6 
1977 1,8 -0,7 2,8 9,2 3,1 0,8 2,7 3,4 2, 1 - 4,2 1,2 
1978 3,3 0,0 2,8 9,3 3,3 6,6 3,0 ·2,0 2,7 4,4 3,3 
1979 1,6 - 0,7 1,6 3,7 2,3 3,4 2,6 0,1 1,9 2,8 2,2 
1980 1,6 -1 ,2 1,4 -6,1 1,4 1,6 1,6 0,1 - 1, l 3,2 1,5 
1971 -80 4,6 1,2 3,1 4,3 4,0 3,7 3,4 3,5 2,9 2,5 3,2 
1981 - 1,5 -1 ,5 -0,3 -0,4 1,5 - 0,9 2,5 - 0,0 -2,8 3,3 1,3 
1982 0,5 1,2 -0,8 4,2 3,3 -1 ,9 0,4 -2,8 0,0 0,7 0,9 
(1983) -1 ,7 0,9 0,8 -2,6 0,6 1,1 0,5 - 1,2 0,4 2,0 0,8 
Table 24 
Real product wage; total economy 
(as % o/ GDP at/actor cost) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1960 69,2 72,2 70,5 102,8 72,6 86,5 81,6 66,4 64,2 72,4 74,6 
1961 68,4 73,2 72,1 98,4 73,5 87,0 79,8 65,6 66,5 73,0 75, l 
1962 69,7 73,9 72,5 98,6 73,5 88,1 79,4 68,7 67,3 73,7 75,2 
1963 70,4 74,3 72,6 94,4 74,0 88,0 81 ,5 68,4 68,8 72,8 75,3 
1964 70,0 73,5 71,4 94,3 73,9 89,2 82,8 69,1 69,3 72,6 75,0 
1965 70,2 76,2 71,6 92;5 73,2 86,5 81 ,5 69,3 70,0 73,2 74,8 
1966 71,8 76,6 72,2 93,3 72,2 89,9 79,8 69,7 72,2 73 ,9 74,7 
1967 72,2 77,4 71,5 93,8 71 ,2 87,9 79,9 69,0 71 ,8 73,3 74,2 
1968 71,3 77,9 70,0 94,7 72,1 86,4 78,7 66,4 71,4 72,9 73 ,6 
1969 70,7 77,1 70,5 91,6 71 ,8 86,2 76,7 62,0 71 ,9 74,2 73,5 
1970 68,9 78,1 72,l 88,3 70,8 88,6 78,3 64,1 73,l 76,0 74,3 
1961-70 70,4 75,8 71 ,6 94,0 72,6 87,8 79,8 67,2 70,2 73,6 74,6 
1971 70,9 79,4 73,2 85,2 70,9 88,6 80,8 70,5 74,2 73,4 74,6 
1972 71 ,3 76,0 72,8 84,3 69,9 85,0 80,0 71 ,2 73,4 74,2 74,2 
1973 71 ,5 75,2 73,6 76,7 70,1 84,5 80,6 66,4 73,3 73,8 74,3 
1974 73,3 78,0 75,1 76,8 72,1 90,3 81,1 66,7 74,5 75,9 75,9 
1975 75,9 79,0 75,0 79,2 74,2 90,0 85,0 83,2 76,3 78,2 77,8 
1976 77,4 77,6 73 ,5 80,9 74,4 89,4 83,8 80,1 73,6 75,3 76,5 
1977 77,9 78,0 73,2 84,5 74,6 83,0 85,0 86,6 73,8 73,1 76,1 
1978 78,2 77,9 72,4 87,8 74,6 81 ,3 84,6 83,3 73,9 72,5 75,8 
1979 78,1 78,3 71 ,9 88,7 74,4 85,2 82,3 80,7 74,2 74, l 75,6 
1980 79,2 79,4 72,9 85,0 75,7 90,8 81 ,5 81 ,1 74,1 75,7 76,4 
1971-80 75,4 77,9 73,4 82,9 73,l 86,8 82,5 77,0 74,1 74,6 75,7 
1981 80,6 76,9 73, l 86,5 76,6 91 ,0 84,9 83,1 72,3 75,9 77,2 
1982 79,2 74,6 72, l 87,9 75,8 88,1 84,7 84,1 71 ,3 74,7 76,4 
(1983) 77,5 72,6 70,8 86,8 74,9 87,6 88,0 84,6 70,7 73,9 76,2 
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Table 25 
Relative unit labour costs in a common currency; manufacturing industry 
(1972 = JOO) 
8/L DK D GR F IRL NL UK EC 9 
1960 92,4 91,1 71,6 116,9 119,9 80,2 80,8 75,8 103,8 80,7 
1961 86,4 92,7 76,8 107,9 120,2 79,4 78,5 81,4 107,8 84,8 
1962 86,0 93,1 79,6 108,3 122,0 81,9 80,8 81 ,8 107,8 86,4 
1963 87,8 95,5 79,0 105,8 123,6 83,8 93,6 85,6 104,5 89,5 
1964 90,5 95,5 77,4 109,5 122,7 88,2 97,8 90,7 103,3 90,4 
1965 93,6 98,5 78,0 110,9 120,1 86,5 92,1 94,5 107,5 90,4 
1966 95,3 101 ,9 79,6 115,2 114,4 88,8 86,3 96,9 109,0 90,1 
1967 96,4 101 ,9 77,7 118,2 111 ,3 88,3 87,8 100,7 105,0 88,5 
1968 97,4 98,5 77,5 122,5 116,0 85,5 87, l 101 ,5 91 ,2 84,8 
1969 98,5 103,2 79,3 121,0 110,3 89,6 89,1 98,3 94,2 85,5 
1970 95,0 101 ,3 91 ,0 115,0 100,2 91 , 1 93,8 94,0 98,6 90,9 
1971 96,1 101,2 95,4 107,5 97,4 95,1 98,0 95,8 102,2 95,2 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 98,5 110,9 112,2 99,2 103,9 99,4 97,4 105,4 89,3 105,9 
1974 104,5 113,3 111 ,1 112,4 91 ,6 97,0 91 ,5 108,7 92,5 100,5 
1975 104,7 106,9 100,9 98,8 107,l 99,4 102,0 109,9 97,5 107,4 
1976 106,1 105,9 102,4 101 ,9 105,8 94,5 89,2 107,2 89,7 99,9 
1977 108,8 105,6 107,8 110,0 102,2 93,1 91,2 110,9 87,0 102,5 
1978 106,4 111 ,7 112,1 106,6 103,2 94,4 89,9 109,9 92,4 107,6 
1979 103,1 113,3 113,3 112,8 105,4 95,9 90,2 109,1 106,8 116,3 
1980 100,5 100,1 109,8 110,9 107,9 102,4 89,9 102,9 132,4 122,5 
1981 · 90,9 89,7 101 ,5 114,5 100,5 96,4 87,4 91,4 135,7 105,7 · 
1982 78,2 88,2 102,3 98,7 94,8 97,2 89, l 94,7 126,4 99,3 
(1983) 75,3 89,3 102,2 78,6 94,1 93,1 95,7 92,2 115,4 95,7 
Table 26 
Exports of goods and services at current prices 
(as % o/GDP) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 36,4 31 ,6 17,0 8,7 11,4 24,7 11 ,0 73,2 46,6 20,9 19,0 
1959 35,1 30,9 17,5 7,8 12,9 24,2 11 ,5 74,9 47,8 20,4 19,7 
1960 37,4 30,7 17,5 7,7 13,9 25,5 12,1 85,1 46,1 20,4 19,3 
1961 38,7 28,3 16,7 7,7 13,4 28,2 12,4 81 ,2 43,8 20,0 18,7 
1962 40,4 27,1 16,2 7,9 12,3 26,1 12,3 78,0 42,9 19,6 18,2 
1963 41,5 28,8 16,5 8,0 12,0 27,3 11 ,8 74,9 42,8 19,4 18,1 
1964 42,3 28,2 16,7 7,4 12,2 26,9 12,5 76,8 41 ,7 18,9 18,2 
1965 41 ,7 27,6 16,8 7;2 12,7 27,7 13,9 78,6 41 ,1 18,9 18,5 
1966 43,3 26,3 17,8 9,1 12,7 30,8 14,3 75,3 40,1 18,9 18,8 
1967 42,3 25,0 19,0 8,9 12,6 31 ,6 14,2 75,1 39,1 18,6 18,9 
1968 44,4 25,3 19,9 8,1 12,8 32,8 15,2 76,9 39,6 20,9 19,9 
1969 48,3 25,3 20,3 8,0 13,6 31,9 15,9 81 ,2 41,4 21,7 20,7 
1970 50,6 25,5 19,8 8,1 15,3 32,4 15,9 86,9 43,3 22,6 21 ,3 
1961-70 43,3 26,7 18,0 8,0 12,9 29,6 13,8 78,5 41 ,6 io.o 19,1 
1971 49,4 25,l 19,6 7,5 16,0 31,8 16,3 84,2 43,5 22,5 21 ,4 
1972 49,9 24,5 19,5 8,6 16,2 31,4 16,9 79,5 43,1 21 ,3 21,3 
1973 54,4 26,2 20,8 11,0 17,2 34,9 17,0 85,9 45,3 23,2 22,6 
1974 60,1 29,3 25,2 13,1 20,5 39,1 20,7 99,3 52,0 27,3 26,8 
1975 52,5 27,7 23,5 13,3 18,5 40,3 21 ,0 88,3 48,1 25,2 25,0 
1976 55,9 26,5 24,8 13,3 19,1 44,1 22,9 84,2 49,4 27,4 26,4 
1977 54,5 26,4 24,6 12,4 20,1 47,9 24,0 82,4 46,2 29,0 26,8 
1978 52,7 25,5 24,0 12,5 19,9 49,1 24,3 79,1 43,6 27,5 26,2 
1979 58,2 26,9 24,2 12,2 20,7 49,5 25,3 85,4 47,8 27,3 27,0 
1980 61,9 30,5 25,6 15,4 21 ,0 50,0 22,7 81,4 51,3 26,7 27,3 
1971-80 54,9 26,9 23,2 11,9 18,9 41 ,8 21,1 85,0 47,0 25,7 25, l 
1981 67, l 33,2 28,0 14,4 22,2 50,l 24,7 79,4 56,8 26, l 28,9 
1982 71,6 32,7 29,1 13,4 21 ,6 49,2 24,5 84,2 56,4 25,8 29,1 
(1983) 71,6 32,6 28,3 13,7 22,1 51,4 24,0 80,5 57,5 25,6 28,9 
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Table 27 
Exports of goods and services at 1975 prices 
( annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 0,2 9,1 3,4 1,2 7,4 -1,7 12,6 6,1 -1,6 3,4 
1959 6,6 5,6 12,0 2,0 13,5 1,7 17,7 10,0 2,7 9,1 
1960 10,5 7,9 13,0 9,0 17,5 12,9 19,8 14,0 5,7 8,7 
1961 9,1 4,2 4,3 12,0 5,1 17,2 16,1 3,2 2,1 3,3 5,6 
1962 10,4 5,4 5,0 7,4 1,2 -1,0 11,2 -1,9 6,5 1,9 4,7 
1963 8,1 10,4 7,3 2,3 7,5 9,6 7,3 3,5 5,6 4,5 6,5 
1964 9,7 8,3 8,7 4,3 7,3 8,2 12,4 13,4 12,1 4,0 8,0 
1965 6,0 8,1 7,0 11,6 11,0 8,9 20,3 6,2 7,7 4,9 8,6 
1966 7,7 2,7 10,1 35,2 6,3 10,6 11,2 -0,3 6,0 3,9 7,4 
1967 4,2 3,4 7,9 9,0 8,3 10,3 8,7 2,1 7,3 1,5 5,9 
1968 12,2 10,1 13,9 -0,0 11,2 9,0 15,6 10,7 13,2 12,0 12,8 
1969 15,4 5,5 9,4 12,7 16,1 4,6 12,3 13,8 16,0 8,7 11,5 
1970 10,4 4,4 5,2 9,8 16,3 5,7 6,0 7,8 12,~ 4,6 7,8 
1961-70 9,3 6,2 7,9 10,1 8,9 8,2 12,0 5,7 8,8 4,9 7,9 
1971 4,8 4,5 6,1 2,1 11,2 4,9 7,2 3,4 10,5 7,0 7,4 
1972 11,3 5,3 7,2 24,6 13,4 6,1 11,5 4,0 10,8 0,5 8,0 
1973 14,1 8,7 11,5 28,0 12,5 11,2 3,8 14,5 12,7 11,5 10,9 
1974 3,8 4,7 12,6 4,8 10,8 0,5 9,9 14,1 2,8 6,5 8,3 
1975 -7,9 -1,8 -6,8 7,2 -1,5 8,2 3,7 -16,1 -3,0 -3,3 -3,1 
1976 13,6 4,8 11,5 12,7 9,6 8,9 13,2 1,7 10,6 7,9 10,5 
1977 2,2 4,5 4,2 -0,7 8,6 13,7 6,7 1,4 -1,7 5,5 4,8 
1978 3,2 2,3 3,3 14,6 6,0 12,6 10,1 3,5 3,6 2,2 4,8 
1979 7,8 8,7 4,7 6,4 7,1 7,0 9,1 9,3 7,5 3,0 6,2 
1980 4,6 5,2 5,5 9,8 3,0 7,4 -4,3 -1,1 1,4 0,8 2,0 
1971-80 5,6 4,7 5,8 10,6 8,0 8,0 7,0 3,1 5,4 4,1 5,9 
1981 2,4 5,4 7,7 5,4 4,6 2,0 6,0 2,0 0,8 -1,8 3,8 
1982 2,0 2,1 3,5 -5,7 -3,7 4,0 1,2 0,3 - 0,9 0,6 0,7 
(1983) 1,0 4,6 -1,0 -2,8 -0,1 7,5 1,7 -3,3 2,9 0,3 0,6 
Table 28 
Intra-Community exports of goods at current prices 
(as % o/GDP) 
BLEU DK D GR F IRL NL UK EC 
1958 17,0 15,8 5,9 4,0 2,8 21,4 2,9 21,9 3,2 5,4 
1959 17,5 15,2 6,0 3,2 3,7 19,5 3,3 22,9 3,2 5,8 
1960 20,2 14,8 6,4 2,6 4,4 20,6 4,0 23,3 3,3 6,3 
1961 20,8 13,4 6,7 2,3 4,8 23,0 4,4 23,2 3,6 6,6 
1962 22,6 12,7 6,7 3,0 4,7 20,2 4,7 23,6 4,0 6,8 
1963 25,1 13,4 7,4 2,7 4,8 21,4 4,4 24,5 4,2 7,1 
1964 26,3 12,9 7,5 2,8 4,9 22,0 5,1 25,0 4,2 7,4 
1965 27,3 12,1 7,3 2,7 5,2 20,4 5,9 24,6 4,0 7,5 
1966 27,4 11,3 7,8 2,7 5,4 20,9 6,1 23,5 4,0 7,7 
1967 26,3 10,3 8,4 3,3 5,1 22,8 5,8 22,9 3,8 7,6 
1968 27,8 9,7 8,7 3,2 5,2 22,2 6,1 23,6 4,2 8,0 
1969 32,0 9,3 9,3 3,2 6,1 20,8 6,5 25,4 4,6 8,9 
1970 33,3 9,2 9,0 3,4 7,1 21,7 6,6 27,1 4,8 9.,3 
1961-70 26,9 11,4 7,9 2,9 5,3 21,5 5,6 24,3 4,1 7,7 
1971 31,8 8,7 9,1 3,2 7,3 21,9 7,0 27,9 4,8 9,4 
1972 32,9 8,7 8,7 3,6 7,6 22,6 7,5 27,5 4,7 9,6 
1973 35,1 10,1 9,4 4,9 8,1 . 24,5 7,5 29,1 5,7 10,4 
1974 36,0 10,6 10,7 5,4 9,3 28,3 8,4 33,3 6,8 11,9 
1975 31,9 10,5 9,7 5,5 7,7 30,9 8,5 30,7 6,2 10,8 
1976 35,1 10;1 10,7 5,7 8,2 30,9 9,8 32,3 7,5 12,0 
1977 33,5 9,7 10,5 5,0 8,5 35,3 10,1 27,7 8,5 12,0 
1978 32,8 10,1 10,4 5,4 8,6 35,6 10,6 26,0 8,7 11,9 
1979 36,5 11 ,1 11,2 5,0 9,2 36,6 11 ,3 29,6 9,4 12,8 
1980 38,1 12,9 11,6 6,2 8,9 35,4 9,7 31 ,5 9,3 12,7 
1971-80 34,4 10,2 10,2 5,0 8,3 30,2 9,0 29,6 7,2 11,4 
1981 39,2 13,0 12,0 5,1 8,6 32,6 9,3 34,7 8,7 12,6 
1982 42,6 13,4 12,9 5,2 8,3 32,7 9,7 35,0 8,8 13,0 
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Table 29 
Extra-Community exports of goods at current prices 
(as % of GDP) 
BLEU DK D GR F IRL NL UK EC 
1958 14,5 11 ,3 10,5 4,0 6,9 2,6 5,7 15,9 12,7 9,8 
1959 14,3 11 ,2 10,3 3,4 7,4 3,1 5,5 15,9 12,0 9,8 
1960 13,8 11 ,4 10,2 3,5 7,6 3,2 6,2 14,9 12,0 9,8 
1961 12,9 11 ,2 9,8 3,7 7,0 3,4 6,2 14,3 11 ,4 9,3 
1962 12,1 11 ,0 9,0 3,4 6,1 3,5 5,8 13,2 10,9 8,6 
1963 11 ,1 11 ,9 8,9 3,9 5,8 3,7 5,6 12,2 10,8 8,3 
1964 11 ,0 11 ,8 9,0 3,4 5,6 3,1 5,7 11 ,4 10,6 8,2 
1965 11,9 11 ,9 9,3 3,2 5,7 2,9 6,2 11 ,5 10,8 8,5 
1966 11 ,7 11 ,7 9,8 3,8 5,6 3,9 6,3 11 ,5 10,8 8,6 
1967 11 ,2 11 ,4 10,3 4,0 5,4 5,9 6,5 11 ,3 10,1 8,5 
1968 11 ,4 11 ,5 10,4 3,0 5,3 6,3 6,7 10,5 11 ,0 8,6 
1969 11 ,3 11 ,8 10,2 3,2 5,2 6,6 6,8 10,4 11 ,4 8,7 
1970 11 ,5 12,1 9,9 3,1 5,8 6,4 6,7 10,4 11,3 8,8 
1961-70 11 ,6 11 ,6 9,6 3,5 5,8 4,6 6,3 11 ,7 10,9 8,6 
1971 11 ,1 11,5 9,9 2,8 5,7 6,0 6,6 9,6 11 ,2 8,6 
1972 11 ,1 11,3 9,3 3,3 5,7 5,4 6,8 8,9 10,6 8,3 
1973 12,2 11 ,6 10,0 4,0 6,1 7,3 6,8 10,2 11 ,4 8,9 
1974 14,8 13,6 12,6 5,4 7,9 9,3 9,2 12,4 13,0 11,1 
1975 12,5 12,6 11,9 5,5 7,7 7,5 9,5 11 ,2 12,6 10,5 
1976 11,9 11 ,8 12, l 5,7 7,7 9,2 9,8 11,2 13,1 10,7 
1977 12,8 12,0 12,3 5,5 8,1 10,1 10,7 10,4 14,3 11 ,2 
1978 12,4 10,7 11,7 5,2 7,5 9,7 10,5 9,7 13,9 10,7 
1979 13,0 11 ,3 11 ,3 5,1 7,9 9,9 10,6 10,1 12,7 10,6 
1980 14,6 12,6 11 ,9 6;7 8,2 11 ,3 9,8 11 ,2 12,4 10,8 
1971-80 12,6 11 ,9 11 ,3 4,9 7,3 8,6 9,0 10,5 12,5 10,1 
1981 16,3 14,8 13,5 6,6 9,2 13,5 12,0 12,9 12,4 12,1 
1982 17,1 14,1 13,8 6,0 8,7 13,1 11 ,2 12,5 12,6 11,9 
Table 30 
Imports of goods and services at current prices 
(as % of GDP) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 33,6 29,8 14,2 12,8 11,0 34,5 12,0 70,2 44,7 20,0 17,9 
1959 35,5 31 ,2 14,7 12,5 10,5 34,5 11 ,8 71,1 45,7 20,2 18,4 
1960 37,8 32,3 15,3 16,2 11,3 34,9 13,9 72,1 45,2 21,6 19,0 
1961 39,3 30,2 14,6 15,9 11 ,1 37,4 13,9 74,8 44,5 20,0 18,2 
1962 40,2 30,3 14,8 16,4 11,0 36,3 14,3 77,4 43,5 19,5 18,1 
1963 42,2 28,6 14,9 17,4 11,5 37,9 15,5 7S,2 44,5 19,5 18,6 
1964 42,4 30,5 15,2 18,3 12,1 38,1 13,7 . 76,7 44,5 20,2 18,7 
1965 41,4 29,4 16,4 19;6 11,7 40,9 13,0 77,2 42,4 19,2 18,5 
1966 43,7 28,3 16,0 18,1 12,3 40,1 14,0 72,8 41,8 18,6 18,5 
1967 41,5 27,4 15,3 17,5 12,3 38,2 14,5 66,9 40,1 19,3 18,3 
1968 43,6 27,1 16,3 17,8 12,6 42,3 14,2 66,8 39,5 21 ,5 19,2 
1969 46,9 27,9 17,5 18, l 14,2 43,7 15,6 66,5 41 ,1 21,2 20,2 
1970 47,8 29,2 17,4 17,8 15,0 42,5 16,6 74,5 44,6 21,7 20,9 
1961-70 42,9 28,9 15,8 17,7 12,4 39,7 14,5 72,9 42,6 20,1 · 18,9 
1971 46,6 27,7 17,3 17,7 15,1 41 ,1 16,4 81,8 43,6 21,1 20,6 
1972 45,9 24,8 16,9 19,3 15,3 37,8 17,3 74,9 40,3 21 ,4 20,4 
1973 51 ,4 28,7 17,1 24,5 16,6 42,6 20,2 74,3 42,0 25,7 22,7 
1974 58,8 33,1 20,0 24,9 22,0 54,7 26,2 79,6 49,1 32,7 28,1 
1975 51,4 29,3 19,8 26,1 17,8 46,1 22,2 85,3 44,3 27,2 24,6 
1976 54,9 31,7 21 ,6 25,2 20,3 51,6 25,4 79,9 45,3 29,2 26,8 
1977 54,5 . 30,5 21,2 24,6 20,4 56,8 24,5 80,3 44,0 29,2 26,4 
1978 52,7 28,0 20,4 23,9 19,3 58,4 23,6 79,8 42,3 26,9 25,1 
1979 58,9 29,8 22,4 24,5 20,8 65,6 26,0 83,4 47,0 27,5 27,1 
1980 63,8 31,6 24,8 25,6 23,0 63,3 27,4 84,4 50,3 24,7 28,3 
1971-80 53,9 29,5 20,2 23 ,6 19,1 51 ,8 22,9 80,4 44,8 26,5 25,0 
1981 69,3 32,8 26,0 26,5 24,0 64,4 28,2 84,4 51 ,9 23,4 29,1 
1982 75,8 32,6 25,6 28,1 24,3 56,6 27,2 90,3 51 ,3 23,7 29,0 
(1983) 71 ,3 30,7 24,8 28,6 23,5 53,4 25,6 86,8 52,2 25,3 28,5 
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Table 31 
Imports of goods and services at 1975 prices 
(annual percentage change) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 - 4,3 6,4 10,9 20,0 - 0,8 10,8 3,5 -4,5 1, 1 2,3 
1959 11,2 21,2 15,2 24,2 -2,0 9,1 11 ,5 12,6 6,5 9,0 
1960 12,9 9,5 18,4 27,6 16,9 5,2 37,7 16,6 12,0 16,5 
1961 7,5 3,7 7,1 13, 1 6,5 13,7 13,9 7,4 6,3 -0,8 5,2 
1962 8,8 13,8 11, 1 10,1 7,9 5,3 15,2 3,2 6,7 2,1 7,7 
1963 8,4 -1,6 4,6 15,5 16,6 10,6 21,9 3,6 9,5 3,6 9,0 
1964 9,3 21 ,1 9,7 14,4 15,7 12,9 - 6,6 14,4 14,8 10,6 8,8 
1965 6,4 6,8 14,8 21 ,6 2,0 11 ,0 2,0 4,3 5,8 0,5 5,4 
1966 10,l 5,8 2,1 - 0,3 11,1 3,5 14,3 -2,5 6,6 2,1 6,0 
1967 1,4 4,7 -1,0 7,3 8,8 3,7 13,6 - 4,8 6,1 8,6 6,3 
1968 12,0 5,2 14,7 10,5 13,3 15,7 5,6 9,3 12,6 8,4 10,5 
1969 15,5 13,1 16,7 15,6 22,4 13,4 19,3 11,3 13,9 2,5 13,4 
1970 8,0 8,8 13,1 6,0 7,4 3,6 15,9 14,6 14,8 4,9 10,1 
1961-70 8,7 8,0 9,1 11,2 11 ,0 9,3 11,2 5,9 9,6 4,2 8,2 
1971 3,3 -0,7 8,9 6,9 7,8 5,0 2,4 8,4 6,1 5,2 5,6 
1972 9,6 0,7 6,1 15,0 16,7 5,3 11,4 1,9 5,3 9,4 9,3 
1973 18,4 15,3 2,6 34,0 15,4 19,2 10,5 10,9 11,3 11 ,8 11 ,3 
1974 4,5 -3,6 0,6 - 16,8 6,3 -2,5 2,2 7,4 - 1,2 1,2 1,5 
1975 -8,8 -5,0 2,2 6,0 -7,5 -12,7 -9,6 -9,9 -4,5 -7,6 -5,6 
1976 13,0 17,2 12,3 6,3 18,7 15,2 15,4 2,0 10,2 4,7 11 ,9 
1977 4,5 -0,6 2,9 8,3 1,5 13,2 - 0,2 0,5 2,7 0,9 2,2 
1978 3,0 0,3 6,3 6,5 5,2 15,2 8,1 8,5 6,0 3,1 5,4 
1979 9,3 4,8 9,6 6,5 10,5 14,4 13,8 8,0 6,6 10,8 10,3 
1980 2,2 -7,8 3,8 -7,1 4,6 -4,4 8,3 1,8 - 0,7 - 4,6 1,7 
1971-80 5,7 1,8 5,5 5,8 7,6 6,3 6,0 3,8 4,1 3,3 5,2 
1981 -1,4 -1,5 -0,5 9,0 -1,5 2,1 -5,4 1,8 - 7,3 - 0,9 -2,2 
1982 0,2 2,1 -0,1 5,9 4,8 -4,4 2,1 -0,9 1,1 5,0 2,4 
(1983) -0,9 0,0 0,5 -1,3 - 2,7 -1,5 - 0,8 - 3,0 1,7 4,8 0,5 
Table 32 
Intra-Community imports of goods at current prices 
(as%ofGDP) 
BLEU DK D GR F IRL NL UK EC 
1958 17,9 17,2 4,7 10,4 2,8 27,1 3,2 21,6 3,7 5,5 
1959 18,8 18,2 5,3 9,3 3,2 25,8 3,6 22,7 3,6 5,9 
1960 20,0 17,1 5,6 9,4 3,7 24,0 4,7 23,2 3,9 6,3 
1961 21,3 16,3 5,6 9,5 4,0 26,7 4,9 25,8 3,8 6,5 
1962 22,0 15,9 5,9 10,1 4,3 26,4 5,4 25,4 3,8 6,8 
1963 23,6 14,5 6,0 9,4 4,9 28,1 6,2 26,8 3,9 7,1 
1964 24,5 15,3 6,3 9,7 5,2 27,9 5,3 26,9 4,3 7,4 
1965 24,7 14,5 7,4 10,4 5,1 27,8 4,7 26,0 4,1 7,5 
1966 26,5 13,8 7,2 10,2 5,6 26,2 5,2 25,7 4,3 7,8 
1967 24,5 12,8 6,9 9,6 5,7 25,2 -5,7 24,2 4,6 7,7 
19~8 25,5 12,3 7,4 9,9 6,1 28,3 5,5 23,8 4,9 8,1 
1969 28,2 12,9 8,4 9,5 7,3 29,2 6,3 25,3 4,8 9,0 
1970 28,9 13,4 8,3 10,0 7,5 29,6 7,0 27,1 4,9 9,3 
1961-70 25,0 14,2 6,9 9,9 5,6 27,5 5,6 25,7 4,3 7,7 
1971 30,6 11,7 8,8 9,6 7,4 27,3 6,8 25,3 5,1 9,4 
1972 30,2 10,7 8,5 10,2 7,7 26,1 7,5 23,7 5,6 9,5 
1973 33,1 12,5 8,4 10,6 8,2 30,3 8,9 24,8 7,2 10,4 
1974 35,8 14,3 8,9 10,l 10,0 37,3 10,3 27,0 8,4 11 ,9 
1975 32,3 12,7 9,1 10,9 7,9 31,7 8,8 24,3 7,5 10,7 
1976 34,7 14,1 9,7 10,7 9,2 35,6 10,3 24,5 8,1 11 ,8 
1977 34,1 13,7 9,8 11,1 9,1 38,4 9,7 22,5 9,8 12,0 
1978 34,1 12,8 9,7 10,7 8,9 40,5 9,8 22,2 9,5 11 ,8 
1979 34,5 14,4 10,5 10,9 9,7 46,3 10,7 24,2 10,3 12,6 
1980 37,3 14,5 11 ,0 10,5 9,6 46,2 11,2 24,3 8,8 12,5 
1971-80 33,7 13, 1 9,4 10,5 8,8 36,0 9,4 23,5 8,0 11 ,3 
1981 37,1 14,6 11,5 12,2 10,2 47,2 10,6 24,6 8,4 12,6 
1982 40,6 14,8 11,5 12, 1 10,8 41,0 10,4 ,I 24,7 9,0 12,8 
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Table 33 
Extra-Community imports of goods at current prices 
(as % o/ GDP) 
BLEU DK D GR F IRL NL UK EC 
1958 14,8 12,0 9,0 9,1 7,8 11 ,2 7,7 21,4 14,3 10,7 
1959 14,7 12,5 8,8 9,0 6,9 12,6 6,8 20,1 14,0 10,3 
1960 15,9 14,9 9,2 11 ,7 7,3 12,6 8,7 20,2 14,9 11 , 1 
1961 15,0 14,0 8,6 9,7 6,9 13,0 8,6 19,2 13,4 10,3 
1962 14,9 14,8 8,7 7,8 6,7 12, 1 8,5 18,.1 13,0 10,0 
1963 14,9 14,2 8,6 8,9 6,5 12,3 9,0 18,0 13,1 10,0 
1964 15,3 15,7 8,5 8,3 6,7 12,5 8,0 17,8 14,2 10,2 
1965 14,6 15,1 8,9 9,8 6,2 12,7 7,9 16,6 13,2 9,9 
1966 14,8 14,8 8,6 9,4 6,4 12,5 8,3 16,4 12,5 9,7 
1967 13,9 14,6 8,0 7,9 5,8 12,4 8,3 15,4 12,5 9,3 
1968 14,8 14,1 8,1 8,4 5,4 12,6 7,5 14,7 13,8 9,3 
1969 15,0 14,3 8,4 8,8 5,7 12,6 7,9 14,7 13,5 9,5 
1970 15,2 15,0 8,2 10,l 6,3 11 ,6 8,2 16,2 13,2 9,6 
1961-70 14,8 14,7 8,5 8,9 6,3 12,4 8,2 16,7 13,2 9,8 
1971 13,0 14,0 7,9 9,3 6,0 12,2 7,6 16,0 12,0 9,0 
1972 12,1 12,6 7,1 8,4 6,0 10,8 7,5 14,2 12,0 8,6 
1973 13,6 14,7 7,4 10,6 6,5 11,3 9,1 15,6 14,5 9,6 
1974 18,2 17,0 9,3 13,3 9,9 16,5 13,8 19,9 19,0 12,9 
1975 15,6 14,9 8,9 14,7 8,1 13,5 11 ,3 18,2 15,1 11,2 
1976 16,5 15,7 10,1 16,2 9,2 15,0 13,1 19,6 16,4 12,4 
1977 16,1 14,9 9,8 15,0 9,2 17,l 12,6 18,2 15,2 12,0 
1978 15,1 12,9 9,3 14,1 8,3 16,5 11 ,8 16,3 15,3 11 ,3 
1979 19,0 14,1 10,4 14,1 8,8 17,6 13,2 18,4 14,7 12,2 
1980 21,7 15,0 12,0 15,9 11,0 15,4 14,0 21 ,l 13,9 13,5 
. 1971-80 16,l 14,6 9,2 13,2 8,3 14,6 11 ,4 17,8 14,8 11 ,3 
1981 25,4 15,9 12,4 12,1 10,9 15,6 15,4 22,3 12,9 13,8 
1982 25,9 15,5 12,0 14,0 10,5 14,2 14,4 21 ,1 13,0 13,4 
Table 34 
Current account of balance of payments 
(as % o/GDP) 
BLEU DK D GR F IRL NL UK EC 
1958 3,9 2,9 2,5 -0,4 -1,6 2,0 4,5 1,7 1,7 
1959 0,7 0,4 1,6 1,5 -6,4 2,5 4,8 0,7 1,5 
1960 0,7 -1 ,6 1,6 -2,9 1,5 - 0,1 0,8 3,0 - 1,0 0,7 
1961 0,3 -2,0 1,0 -2,2 1,1 0,2 1,2 1,4 0,(,) 0,7 
1962 0,7 -3,4 - 0,1 -1,6 1,0 -1,8 0,6 1, l 0,4 0,4 
1963 -0,4 0,1 0,2 -2,2 0,3 - 2,8 - 1,4 0,7 0,3 -0,0 
, 1964 0,2 · -2,4 0,2 -4,3 -0,3 - 3,5 1,1 - 1,1 -1 ,3 -0,3 
1965 0,6 -1 ,8 - 1,3 -5,8 0,8 -4,4 3,6 0,1 -0,2 0,2 
1966 - 0,l -1,9 0,3 -2,0 0,1 -1 ,6 3,2 - 1,0 0,1 0,4 
1967 1,2 -2,4 2,2 -2,2 0,0 1,4 2,2 - 0,3 -0,9 0,7 
1968 1,4 -1 ,7 2,3 -3,6 -0,5 -1 ,3 3,3 0,3 - 0,8 0,8 
1969 1,8 - 2,8 1,4 -4,0 -1,1 -4,8 2,7 0,3 0,7 0,6 
1970 3,2 -3,9 0,6 -3,1 0,1 - 4,0 1,2 - 1,5 1,3 0,5 
1961-70 0,9 -2,2 0,7 -3,1 0,2 -2,3 1,8 0,0 - 0,0 0,4 
1971 2,3 -2,4 0,4 - 1,5 0,6 - 3,8 1,8 -0,3 1,8 0,8 
1972 3,9 - 0,4 0,4 - 1,3 0,5 - 2,2 1,6 3,0 0,2 0,8 
1973 2,8 -1,7 1,3 -3,8 -0,2 -3,5 -1 ,8 4,0 -2,0 0,0 
1974 1,7 -3,1 2,7 -3,3 -2,3 -9,9 - 4,7 3,2 -4,6 -1 ,0 
1975 0,7 -1,5 1,0 -4,2 -0,0 -0,5 -0,2 2,5 -2,0 -0,0 
1976 1,0 - 4,9 0,9 - 2,6 -1,5 -3,9 -1 ,5 3,2 - 1,7 - 0,5 
1977 -0,4 - 4,0 0,8 -2,7 -0,7 -3,5 1,2 0,8 - 0,l 0,1 
1978 -0,5 -2,7 1,4 -2,3 0,6 -4,0 2,4 -0,8 0;5 0,8 
1979 - 1,6 - 4,7 - 0,8 -2,9 - 0,0 -11,2 1,7 - 1,2 -0,0 - 0,4 
1980 -3,6 -3,7 -1,9 -0,9 -1,4 -10,0 - 2,5 -1,5 1,6 - 1,3 
1971-80 0,6 - 2,9 0,6 -2,6 -0,4 -5,3 -0,2 1,3 - 0,6 -0,1 
1981 - 4,1 - 3,1 - 1,1 - 2,2 -1,4 -13,8 -2,3 2,4 2,4 - 0,7 
1982 -2,0 -4,2 0,5 -3,8 -2,9 -8,3 - 1,6 2,7 1,5 -0,6 
(1983) -0,9 -2,2 0,9 -5,0 -1,8 -2,6 - 0,4 3,3 0,2 - 0,2 
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Table 35 
Structure of EC exports by country and region, 1958 and 1982 
( as r. of total exports) 
Exports of BLEU DK D GR F IRL NL UK EC 
to 19S8 1982 19S8 1982 19S8 1982 19S8 1982 1958 1982 19S8 1982 19S8 1982 19S8 1982 19S8 1982 19S8 1982 
BLEU 1,2 1,8 6,6 7,3 1,0 1,7 6,3 8,6 0,8 4,S 2,3 2,9 IS,O 14,2 1,9 4,4 4,9 6,4 
DK 1,6 1,0 3,0 2,0 0,2 0,8 0,8 0,7 0,1 0,7 0,8 0,7 2,6 1,7 2,4 1,9 2,0 1,4 
D 11 ,6 20,S 20, l 17,S 20,5 19,0 10,4 14,8 2,2 9,4 14,3 IS,6 19,0 29,S 4,2 9,5 7,4 11 ,7 
GR 0,7 o,s 0,4 0,8 1,4 1,1 0,7 1,0 0,1 0,4 2, 1 1,8 0,9 1,1 0,7 0,S 1,0 1,0 
F 10,6 19,4 3,0 S,6 7,6 14,0 12,9 6,9 0,8 8,7 S,3 15,2 4,9 10,4 2,4 8,0 4,6 10,7 
IRL 0,4 0,4 0,3 o,s 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,2 o,s 0,1 0,3 o,s o.s 3,S S, l 1,1 1,2 
I 2,3 s,o S,3 4,9 s,o 7,3 6,0 8,8 3,4 11 ,3 0,4 2,9 2,7 s,s 2, 1 3,S 3,1 5,9 
NL 20,7 14,2 2,2 3,S 8, 1 8,S 2,0 4,1 2,0 4,6 o,s S,2 2,1 3,1 3, 1 8,1 S,4 6,S 
UK S,1 9,7 2S,9 14,0 4,0 7,6 7,6 4,8 4,9 7,2 78,8 S8,8 6,8 6,3 11 ,9 9,3 s,s 6,9 
Total intra-Community trade S3,S 70,6 S8,3 48,6 3S,9 48,1 so,s 46,4 28,6 48,7 83,6 70,6 33,8 4S,9 S1,S 72,2 20,3 41,0 34,9 SI,7 , 
Other European 
OECD countries 10,4 8,S 17,2 2S,7 23,7 19,0 6,7 6,8 10,S 11 ,8 1,8 S,8 16,6 12,9 12,3 8,3 9,6 13,1 16,4 13,9 
USA 9,4 4,4 9,3 6,1 7,3 6,6 13,6 8,9 S,9 5,1 S,9 7, 1 9,7 7, 1 S,6 3,2 8,8 13,6 7,8 7, 1 
Canada 1,1 0,4 0,7 0,7 1,2 0,6 0,3 0,3 0,8 0,8 0,7 1,2 1,2 0,8 0,8 0,3 S,8 1,5 2,3 0,7 
Japan 0,6 0,6 0,2 1,6 1,0 1,2 1,4 0,6 0,3 1,2 0,1 1,3 0,3 1,1 0,4 O,S 0,6 1,2 0,6 1,0 
Australia 0,6 . 0,2 0,3 0,5 1,0 0,7 0,1 0,5 0,4 o,s 0,1 1,1 1,0 0,7 0,7 0,3 7,1 1,8 2,S 0,8 
Developing countries 18,8 11 ,6 9,7 13,6 22,3 17,0 7,2 28,0 48,4 27,0 1,6 10,0 27,9 25,7 18,1 11 ,1 33,8 23,2 27,9 19,S 
of which : 
OPEC 3,3 4,4 2,3 5,3 4,8 8,9 0,1 IS,6 21,3 11 ,0 1,3 S,2 7,5 14,5 4,S 5,0 7,0 10,4 7,8 9,2 
Other developing countries IS,S 7,2 7,3 8,3 17,5 8,1 7,1 12,4 27,1 16,0 1, 3 4,8 20,4 11 ,2 13,7 6,1 26,8 12,8 20, l 10,3 
Centrally-planned economies 3,8 2,2 3,8 2,6 5,0 4,8 16,3 8,4 3,7 3,6 0,2 1,2 4,7 3,8 2,0 1,7 3,1 1,8 3,9 3,3 
Rest of world and unspecified 1,9 1,5 0,5 0,6 2,6 1,9 4,0 0,2 1,3 0,7 6,2 1,7 5,1 2,0 2,6 2,4 10,8 2,8 3,8 2,0 
World (excl. EC) 46,S 29,4 41,7 Sl ,4 64, l Sl ,9 49,S 53,6 71 ,4 51 ,3 16,4 29,4 66,2 S4, l 42,S 27,8 79,7 S9,0 6S, l 48,3 
World (incl. EC) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 . 100 100 100 
Table 36 
Structure of EC imports by country and region, 1958 and 1982 
(as r. of total Imports) 
Imports of BLEU DK D GR F IRL NL UK EC 
from 19S8 1982 19S8 1982 19S8 1982 19S8 1982 19S8 1982 19S8 1982 1958 1982 1958 1982 1958 1982 1958 1982 
BLEU 3,8 2,8 4,5 7,0 3,3 2,4 S,4 8,6 1,8 2,3 2,0 3,2 17,9 11 ,0 1,6 4,8 4,4 S,9 
DK 0,5 o,s 3,4 1,8 0,7 1,0 0,6 0,8 0,7 0,8 2,2 0,9 0,7 1,0 3,1 2,2 2,0 1,3 
D 17,2 19,9 19,8 20,S 20,3 17,1 11 ,6 17,9 4,0 7,3 12,1 16,1 19,5 22,2 3,6 12,3 8,2 12,7 
GR 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,2 1,7 0,7 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,1 o,s 0,6 0,1 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,4 
F 11 ,6 13,8 3,4 3,9 7,6 11 ,4 S,4 7,1 1,6 4,3 4,9 12,S 2,8 6,S 2,7 7,2 4,2 8,1 
IRL 0,1 0,4 0,0 0,3 0,1 0,5 0,0 0,3 0,1 0,6 0,1 0,3 0,1 0,6 2,9 3,3 0,9 0,9 
I 2,1 3,6 1,7 2,9 5,S 7,6 8,8 9,2 2,4 9,7 0,9 2,2 1,8 3,0 2,0 4,6 2,S S,4 
NL IS,7 17,2 7,3 7,6 8,0 12,8 4,8 S,4 2,S 6,4 2,9 4,6 2,6 4,3 4,2 6,1 6,4 8,0 
UK 7,4 5,S 22,8 10,6 4,4 7,2 9,9 3,7 3,6 6,4 S6,4 S2,2 S,5 4,0 7,4 9,4 s,o 6,2 
Total intra-Community trade 54,7 61 , l S9,0 48,8 3S,2 49, I S3,3 46,2 26,7 50,7 68,4 73,8 29,8 41,8 50,1 54, 0 20,3 40,8 34,0 48,9 
Other European 
OECD countries 8,1 6,8 19,5 25,2 IS,8 14,9 9,5 7,1 8,0 9,3 4,3 5,1 12,0 9,9 7,7 7,7 13,9 14,9 12,0 11 ,7 
USA 9,9 7,2 9,1 7,0 13,6 7,1 13,7 4,2 10,0 7,0 7,0 11 ,3 16,2 6,8 11 ,3 9,4 9,3 14,S 11 ,4 8,S 
Canada 1,4 0,7 0,2 o,s 3,1 0,9 0,8 o,s 1,0 0,6 3,0 1,1 1,4 0,9 1,5 0,7 8,2 2,4 3,7 1,0 
Japan 0,6 1,9 l ,S 2,8 0,6 3,2 2,0 6,3 0,2 2,4 1,1 2,4 0,4 1,3 0,8 2,1 0,9 4,7 0,7 2,8 
Australia 1,7 0,3 0,0 0,1 1,2 0,4 0,3 0,2 2,4 0,5 1,2 0,0 3,0 o,s 0,2 0,3 S,4 0,8 2,7 0,5 
Developing countries 19,7 15,6 6,1 9,8 24,4 17,8 9,6 28,6 46,7 25,0 9,7 4,0 31 ,2 30,2 2S,O 19,8 3S,O 16,6 30,3 20,4 
of which: 
OPEC 5,9 8,5 0,3 3,4 6,7 8,7 1,7 22, I 19,7 IS,9 0,7 1,0 13,9 20,1 11 ,5 10,7 11 ,3 6,S 10,9 11 ,4 
Other developing countries 13,8 7, 1 5,8 6,4 17,7 9,1 7,8 6,S 27,0 9, 1 9,0 3,0 17,3 10, l 13,5 9,1 23,7 10, l 19,4 9,0 
Centrally-planned economies 2,0 3,5 4,6 4,5 S,3 S,6 8,1 5,4 3,3 3,6 1,2 1,5 3,6 6,6 2,6 5,7 3,2 2,6 3,5 4,6 
Rest of world and unspecified 1,9 2,9 0,0 1,3 0,8 1,0 2,9 1,5 1,6 0,9 4,2 0,8 2,3 2,0 0,8 0,3 3,8 2,7 1,5 1,6 
World ( excl. EC) 45,3 38,9 41 ,0 51,2 64,8 50,9 46,7 S3,8 73,3 51 ,3 31,6 26.2 70,2 58,2 49,9 46,0 79,7 59,2 66,0 51,1 
World (incl. EC) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 37 
Money supply (M2/M3) 
( annual ptrcentage change) 
BLEU DK D GR F IRL NL UK EC 
1960 4,0 8,0 11 ,1 20,2 16,7 5,5 19,6 7,0 2,4 10,7 
1961 10,1 9,8 12,9 17,0 . 17,2 7,3 14,9 5,4 3,2 11 ,0 
1962 7,4 8,5 10,4 21 ,5 18,7 9,6 17,0 6,6 4,5 11 ,3 
1963 10,9 12,5 9,9 21 ,4 14,l 5,8 13,5 9,7 7,0 10,8 
1964 7,5 11 , l 9,4 16,0 9,8 9,4 8,8 10,4 5,6 8,6 
1965 8,9 9,7 10,6 12,9 10,9 6,7 15,4 6,2 7,6 10,4 
1966 7,9 12,8 8,3 18,2 10,6 10,6 13,8 5,9 3,4 8,6 
1967 6,8 9,8 12,0 16, l 13, l 12,7 13,3 10,9 9,3 11 ,6 
1968 8,3 14,5 11,8 17,8 11 ,6 16,9 11 ,6 14,8 6,8 10,8 
1969 6,8 10,2 9,1 16,2 6,1 11 ,2 11,4 10,2 2,4 7,6 
1970 9,3 3,3 9,1 19,3 15,4 14,0 13,6 11,0 9,5 11,4 
1961-70 8,4 10,2 10,4 17,6 12,7 10,4 13,3 9,1 5,9 10,2 
1971 13,6 8,5 13,5 22,4 17,8 15,0 17,l 9,0 13,8 14,8 
1972 17,2 15,0 14,4 23,6 18,5 14, l 18,3 11 ,9 24,0 18, l 
1973 14,5 12,6 10, l 14,5 15,0 26, l 23,2 21,9 26,4 17,8 
1974 11 ,0 8,9 8,5 20,9 15,9 20,6 15,5 20,0 10,2 12,7 
1975 17,1 25, l 8,6 26,5 18,2 18,9 23,5 5,7 6,5 13,6 
1976 13,7 10,9 8,4 26,8 12,9 14,4 22,8 22,7 9,5 13,5 
1977 9,7 9,9 11 ,2 22,7 13,9 17, l 23,8 3,6 10,0 13,4 
1978 9,7 8,7 11 ,0 26,0 12,2 28,9 24,2 4,2 15,0 14,2 
1979 6,3 10,8 6,0 18,4 14,4 18,7 23, l 6,9 12,7 12,6 
1980 2,6 8,1 6,2 24,7 9,8 17,7 17,3 4,4 18,6 11 ,5 
1971-80 11 ,4 11 ,7 9,8 22,6 14,8 18,4 20,8 10,8 14,5 14,2 
1981 5,9 9,1 5,0 34,7 11 ,4 17,4 16,0 5,3 13,5 10,8 
1982 5,7 11 ,7 7,1 29, l 10,8 13,0 17,2 7,6 9,3 10,7 
Table 38 
Short-term interest rates 
(%) 
BLEU DK D GR F IRL NL UK EC 
1958 3,6 10,0 6,5 3,9 3,0 
1959 3,2 8,8 4,1 3,6 1,9 
1960 5,1 8,0 4,1 3,6 2, 1 
1961 4,6 6,3 3,6 8,0 3,7 6,2 3,6 I , I 6,2 4,2 
1962 3,4 6,5 3,4 8,0 3,6 5,0 3,6 1,9 5,0 3,9 
1963 3,6 6,1 4,0 7,9 4,0 4,3 3,6 2,0 4,3 4,0 
1964 4,9 6,2 4,1 7,8 4,7 5,5 3,6 3,5 5,5 4,6 
1965 5,0 6,5 5,1 7,8 4,2 6,8 3,6 4,0 6,8 5,0 
1966 5,6 6,5 6,6 8,0 4,8 7,0 3,6 4,9 7,0 5,7 
1967 5,5 6,6 4,3 8,5 4,8 6,3 3,6 4,7 6,3 4,9 
1968 4,5 6,6 3,8 8,3 6,2 7,9 3,6 4,6 7,9 5,3 
1969 7,3 8,2 5,8 8,0 9,3 9,2 3,8 5,7 9,2 7,1 
1970 8,1 9,0 9,4 8,0 8,6 7,0 5,3 6,2 8,1 8,0 
1961-70 5,2 6,8 5,0 8,0 5,3 6,5 3,8 3,8 6,6 5,3 
1971 5,4 7,6 7,2 8,0 6,0 6,6 5,7 4,5 6,2 6,3 
1972 4,2 7,3 5,6 8,0 5,3 7,0 5,2 2,7 6,8 5,6 
1973 6,6 7,6 12,1 9,0 9,3 12,2 7,0 7,5 11,8 9,9 
1974 10,6 10,0 9,9 11 ,8 13,0 14,5 14,9 10,4 13,4 12,2 
1975 7,0 8,0 5,0 11 ,9 7,6 10,9 10,4 5,3 10,6 7,9 
1976 10,1 8,9 4,3 11 ,5 8,7 l 1,6 16,0 7,4 11 ,6 9,4 
1977 7,3 14,5 4,4 12,0 9,1 8,4 14,0 4,8 8,0 8,3 
1978 7,3 15,4 3,7 13,5 7,8 9,8 11 ,5 7,0 9,4 7,8 
1979 10,9 12,5 6,7 16,7 9,7 16,0 12,0 9,6 13,9 10,4 
1980 14,2 16,9 9,5 21 ,0 12,0 16,2 16,9 10,6 16,8 13,4 
1971-80 8,3 10,8 6,8 12,3 8,8 11 ,3 11 ,3 6,9 10,8 9,1 
1981 15,6 14,9 12,4 16,8 15,3 16,7 19,3 11 ,8 14,1 14,8 
1982 14,1 16,4 8,8 18,9 14,6 17,5 19,9 8,2 12,2 13,3 
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Table 39 
Long-term interest rates 
(%) 
BLEU DK D GR F lRL NL UK EC 
1958 6,5 7,6 5,0 6,7 4,3 5,0 
1959 5,8 6,3 4,8 5,7 4,1 4,8 
1960 6,3 5,7 5,4 5,3 4,2 5,4 
1961 5,9 6,6 5,9 5,5 6,2 5,2 3,9 6,3 5,5 
1962 5,2 6,6 5,9 5,4 6,0 5,8 4,2 5,9 5,5 
1963 5,0 6,5 6,1 5,3 5,6 6,1 4,2 5,4 5,5 
1964 5,6 7,1 6,2 5,5 6,0 7,4 4,9 6,0 6,0 
1965 6,4 8,6 7,1 6,2 6,2 6,4 6,9 5,2 6,6 6,5 
1966 6,7 8,7 8,1 7,4 6,6 6,8 6,5 6,2 6,9 6,9 
1967 6,7 9,1 7,0 7,4 6,7 6,7 6,5 6,0 6,8 6,6 
1968 6,6 8,7 6,5 7,3 7,0 6,5 6,6 6,2 7,6 6,7 
1969 7,3 9,7 6,8 7,1 7,9 7,3 6,7 7,0 9,1 7,5 
1970 7,8 11,l 8,3 7,4 8,6 7,8 9,0 7,8 9,3 8,5 
1961-70 6,3 8,3 6,8 7,1 6,5 6,5 6,7 5,6 7,0 6,5 
1971 7,3 11,0 8,0 7,5 8,4 9,2 8,3 7,0 8,9 8,2 
1972 7,0 11,0 7,9 7,8 8,0 9,1 7,5 6,7 9,0 7,9 
1973 7,5 12,6 9,3 10,4 9,0 10,7 7,4 7,3 10,8 9,1 
1974 8,8 15,9 10,4 9,6 11,0 14,6 9,9 10,7 15,0 11 ,5 
1975 8,5 12,7 8,5 9,0 10,3 14,0 11,5 9,1 14,5 10,8 
1976 9,1 14,9 7,8 10,0 10,5 14,6 13,1 9,2 14,6 11 ,0 
1977 8,8 16,2 6,2 9,2 11,0 12,9 14,6 8,5 12,5 10,4 
1978 8,5 16,8 5,7 9,3 10,6 12,8 13,7 8,1 12,6 10,l · 
1979 9,7 16,7 7,4 13,3 10,9 15, 1 14,l 9,2 13,0 10,9 
1980 12,2 18,7 8,5 18,8 13,7 15,4 16,1 10,7 13,9 12,6 
1971-80 8,7 14,6 8,0 10,4 10,3 12,8 11,6 8,6 12,5 10,2 
1981 13,8 19,3 10,4 16,3 17,7 17,3 20,6 12,2 14,8 15,0 . · 
1982 13,5 20,5 9,0 15,4 16,0 17,0 20,9 10,5 12,7 '14,0 
Table 40 
Gross official reserves 
(end ~or. '()()() million ECU) 
BLEU DK D GR F IRL NL UK EC 
1958 1,47 0,22 5,57 0,16 0,99 0,29 2,16 1,48 2,91 15,25 
1959 1,24 0,31 4,54 0,21 1,64 0,31 2,95 1,37 2,65 15,22 
1960 1,43 0,27 6,66 0,23 2,15 0,31 3,08 1,76 3,52 19,41 
1961 1,70 0,26 6,70 0,25 3,15 0,32 3,55 1,83 3,10 20,86 
1962 1,64 0,24 6,So 0,27 3,79 0,34 3,80 1,82 3,09 21,49 
1963 1,84 0,44 7,15 0,27 4,59 0,38 3,38 1,96 2,94 22,95 
1964 2,08 0,60 7,37 0,26 5,35 0,42 3,57 2,19 2,16 24,00 
1965 2,18 0,55 6,95 0,23 5,93 0,38 4;49 2,26 2,81 25,78 
1966 2,20 0,56 7,51 0,26 6,29 0,46 4,59 2,29 2,90 27,06 
1967 2,52 0,52 7,92 0,28 6,80 0,43 5,31 2,55 2,62 28,95 
1968 2,33 0,45 10,28 0,33 4,60 0,54 5,58 2,62 2,55 29,28 
1969 2,53 0,45 7,49 0,33 4,19 0,68 5,31 2,69 2,66 26,33 
1970 2,82 0,48 13,42 0,31 4,95 0,68 5,31 3,22 2,80 33,98 
1971 3,25 0,66 17,17 0,48 7,72 0,90 6,38 3,57 8,04 48,18 
1972 4,30 0,81 23,73 1,00 10,93 1,03 7,03 5,33 5,51 59,65 
1973 6,22 1,20 34,03 1,05 l?,15 0,72 8,96 7,50 5,53 77,37 
1974 8,61 0,92 40,16 1,08 16,50 0,78 12,02 10,91 6,47 97,46 
1975 9,57 0,94 40,49 1,17 21,19 0,95 12,31 11,80 5,63 104,05 
1976 8,34 0,95 43,90 1,09 16,12 0,90 10,81 11,13 4,01 97,25 
1977 8,64 1,53 50,61 1,15 17,07 1,08 13,97 12,18 13,24 119,47 
1978 8,18 2,55 52,84 1,25 21,03 2,00 19,70 11,11 13,90 132,57 
1979 10,41 2,59 57,59 1,47 29,44 1,{i2 26;69 14,52 17,39 161,72 
1980 · 20,54 3,28 76,56 2,49 57,10 2,25 45,94 27,50 23,69 259,34 
1981 18,28 3,01 79,81 2,19 52,52 2,59 45,48 26,26 22,13 252,28 
1982 16,24 2,94 82,14 2,31 46,30 2,84 39,02 26,52 19,71 238,01 
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Table 41 
ECU exchange rates 
(11atio11al units per ECU, annual average) 
DLEU DK D GR F IRL NL UK USA 
1958 54,8350 7,57507 4,60614 32,9010 4,61264 0,391678 685,438 4,16745 0,391678 1,09670 
1959 52,8101 7,29535 4,43605 31,6863 5,21454 0,377215 660,126 4,01357 0,377215 1,05621 
1960 52,8101 7,29535 4,43605 31,6863 5,21454 0,377215 660,126 4,01357 0,377215 1,05621 
1961 53,3667 7,37224 4,30742 32,0202 5,26950 0,381191 667,084 3,89854 0,381191 1,06734 
1962 53,4901 7,38928 4,27921 32,0943 5,28168 0,382073 668,626 3,87268 0,382073 1,06981 
1963 53,4901 7,38928 4,27921 32,0943 5,28168 0,382073 668,626 3,87268 0,382073 1,06981 
1964 53,4901 7,38928 4,27921 32,0943 5,28168 0,382073 668,626 3,87268 0,382073 1,06981 
1965 53,4901 7,38928 4,27921 32,0943 5,28168 0,382073 668,626 3,87268 0,382073 1,06981 
. 1966 53,4901 • 7,38928 4,27921 32,0943 5,28168 0,382073 668,626 3,87268 0,382073 1,06981 
1967 53,2404 7,42293 4,25924 31,9446 5,25703 0,387652 665,506 3,85461 0,387652 1,06482 
1968 51,4442 7,71663 4,11554 30,8667 5,07967 0,428702 643,052 3,72456 0,428702 1,02889 
1969 51,1093 7,66640 4,02622 30,6657 5,29027 0,425912 638,866 3,70032 0,425912 1,02219 
1970 51,1116 7,66675 3,74138 30,6668 5,67767 0,425931 638,895 3,70049 0,425931 1,02223 
1971 50,8663 7,75264 3,64566 31,4328 5,77214 0,428583 647,414 3,65750 0,428583 1,04776 
1972 49,3611 7,78909 3,57681 33,6533 5,65717 0,448941 654,264 3,59991 0,448941 1,12178 
1973 47,8009 7,41598 3,27644 36,9519 5,46775 0,502321 716,460 3,42853 0,502321 1,23173 
1974 46,3994 7,25927 3,08352 35,7810 5,73386 0,509803 775,743 3,20224 0,509803 1,19270 
1975 45,5690 7,12266 3,04939 39,9941 5,31923 0,560026 809,545 3,13490 0,560026 1,24077 
1976 43,1654 6,76176 2,81545 40,8842 5,34486 0,621578 930,150 2,95515 0,621578 1,11805 
1977 40,8826 6,85567 2,64831 42,0353 5,60607 0,653701 1 006,785 2,80010 0,653701 1,14112 
1978 40,0611 . 7,01945 2,55607 46,7829 5,73983 0,663888 1 080,216 2,75409 0,663910 1,27410 
1979 40,1651 7,20911 2,51087 50,7738 5,82945 0,669482 1 138,498 2,74864 0,646392 1,37065 
1980 40,5979 7,82736 2,52421 59,3228 5,86895 0,675997 1 189,205 2,76027 0,598488 1,39233 
1981 41,2946 7,92255 2,51390 61,6241 6,03992 0,691021 1 263,180 2,77510 0,553110 1,11645 
1982 44,6988 8,15186 2,37541 65,3556 6,42534 0,690985 l 321,987 2,61232 0,563644 0,98208 
(1983) 45,2484 8,13446 2,26873 77,6485 6,75035 0,716749 1 348,751 2,53684 0,592504 0,88979 
Table 42 
Central rates against the ECU 
(national currency per ECU) 
Date BLEU DK D GR' F IRL NL UK' 
13. 3.1979 39,4582 7,08592 2,51064 5,79831 0,662638 1 148,15 2,72077 (0,663247) 
24. 9.1979 39,8456 7,36594 2,48557 5,85522 0,669141 1 159,42 2,74748 (0,649821) 
30.11.1979 39,7897 7,72336 2,48208 5,84700 0,668201 1 157,79 2,74362 (0,648910) 
23. 3.1981 40,7985 7,91917 2,54502 5,99526 0,685145 l 262,92 2,81318 (0,542122) 
5.10.1981 40,7572 7,91117 2,40989 6,17443 0,684452 l 300,67 2,66382 (0,601048) 
22. 2.1982 44,6963 8,18382 2,41815 6,19564 0,686799 1 305,13 2,67296 (0,557037) 
14. 6.1982 44,9704 8,2340 2,33379 6,61387 0,691911 1 350,27 2,57971 (0,560453) 
21. 3.1983 44,3662 8,04412 2,21515 6,79271 0,717050 1 386,78 2,49587 (0,629848) 
18. 5.1983 44,9008 8,14104 2,24184 6,87456 0,725690 1 403,49 2,52595 (0,587087) 
I The drachma has not been integrated into the ECU; the pound sterling is represented in the ECU, but does not participate in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. 
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Table 43 
Bilateral central rates since 20 March 1983 
BFR/LFR DKR OM FF IRL LIT HFL UKLI 
(Bruxelles) (Ksbcnhavn) (Frankfurt) (Paris) (Dublin) (Roma) (Amsterdam) (London) 
BFR/LFR 100 ± 2,25 100 18,1312 4,99288 15,3106 1,61621 3 125,76 5,62561 
DKR 100 ± 2,25 551,536 100 27,5375 84,4432 8,91396 17 239,7 31 ,0273 
DMlOO ± 2,25 2 002,85 363,141 100 306,648 32,3703 62 604,3 ll2,673 
FF 100 ± 2,25 653,144 118,423 32,6107 100 10,5562 20 415,7 36,7434 
IRL 1 ± 2,25 61 ,8732 11,2184 3,08925 9,47313 1 934,01 3,48075 
LIT 1 OOO ± 6,00 31,9922 5,80057 1,59733 4,89819 0,517061 1 OOO 1,79976 
HFL 100 ± 2,25 1 777,58 322,297 88,7526 272,158 28,7295 55 563,0 100 
(UKL 1) 
I The pound sterling does not participate in the EMS exchange rate mechanism. 
Table 44 
Effective exchange rates 
(/972 - JOO) 
B/L DK D GR F IRL NL UK EC9 
1960 96,7 106,6 79,3 107,4 l ll ,9 109,4 101,1 92,0 120,3 99,3 
1961 95,5 105,6 82,2 106,8 111,1 109,2 100,4 95,0 119,7 100,6 
1962 95,6 105,6 82,6 106,8 111,1 109,5 100,4 95,7 120,1 101,0 
1963 95,3 105,7 82,9 106,8 111,4 109,4 100,3 95,8 119,9 101,1 
1964 95,6 105,5 83,'2 106,9 111,2 109,3 99,8 95,6 119,5 101,1 
1965 95,9 105,6 82,7 106,9 111,3 109,4 99,8 95,9 119,7 101,1 
1966 95,7 105,7 82,7 107,0 111,9 109,3 9.9,9 95,4 119,6 101,2 
1967 96,0 105, l 83,3 107,3 111 ,2 108,6 100,3 96,2 117,9 101 ,0 
1968 97,0 101,4 84,8 109,3 113,1 102,0 102,5 97,9 103,9 98,8 
1969 97,2 101,0 87,0 109,7 107,5 102,1 102,2 98,1 104,0 98,1 
1970 97,3 100,2 94,4 108,9 99,5 101,8 101,3 97,1 103,6 97,9 
1971 97,2 99,3 97,3 106,7 97,4 102,0 100,5 98,2 103,7 98,7 
1972 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1973 101,4 106,1 110,2 92,9 104,1 93 ,5 90,5 104,2 89,7 101 ,8 
1974 102,8 106,5 116,5 93,4 97,4 91,1 81,5 110,0 86,4 99,1 
1975 104,3 110,2 118,4 84,1 107,1 86,2 78,4 113,0 79,7 101 ,5 
1976 106,8 112,7 125,3 80,1 103,4 77,5 64,8 116,4 68,0 92,9 
1977 112,9 112,2 135,5 78,2 99,0 74,8 59,9 123,3 64,7 93,8 
1978 116,2 112,1 143,5 71 ,4 98,0 75,3 56,2 126,8 65,0 96,5 
1979 117,6 111 ,2 150,4 67,5 98,9 75,5 54,4 129,1 69,0 102,2 
1980 117,0 102,5 151,0 58,4 99,3 73,9 52,4 129,2 75,9 104,4 
1981 110,7 95,5 143,2 52,9 90,7 67,8 46,0 122,8 76,8 88,8 
1982 100,5 91,6 150,4 49,1 83,4 67,1 42,9 129,5 73,2 84,2 
(1983) 98,6 91,7 157,l 40,7 78,3 64,8 41,5 132,7 68,1 80,2 
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Table 45 
Cnrrent receipts of general government (taxation, social security contributions and other) 
(as% of GDP) 
B DK D , GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 25,7 27,7 35,9 19,4 35,8 25,5 28,3 32,6 33,0 32,2 32,9 
1959 26,2 28,0 36,4 19,7 36,6 25,8 29,1 31,2 33,3 32,0 33,2 
1960 27,6 28,1 35,2 20,0 35,5 25,4 29, l 32,3 34,0 31 ,6 32,7 
1961 28,6 27,4 36,3 22,0 36,7 26,3 28,4 33,0 35,0 32,6 33,6 
1962 29,4 28,7 36,6 23,2 36,9 25,7 29,3 33,0 34,5 34,2 34,3 
1963 29,5 30,4 36,9 23,2 . 37,7 26,7 29,8 32,9 35,7 32,8 34,3 
1964 30,2 30,3 36,5 24,0 38,7 27,5 30,8 33,0 35,8 32,7 34,6 
1965 30,9 31 ,7 35,8 23,7 39,1 28,6 30,4 34,6 37,4 34,4 35,0 
1966 32,7 33,9 36,3 25,3 · 39,1 30,6 30,4 35,3 39,3 35,5 35,6 
1967 33,4 34,3 36,8 26,2 39,0 31 ,3 31 ,3 35,1 40,7 37,5 36,4 
1968 34,0 36,8 36,7 27,3 39,5 31,7 31,8 39,0 41 ,9 38,9 37,1 
1969 34,5 37, l 38,7 27,2 40,6 32,3 . 30,9 38,6 42,7 40,9 38,1 
1970 35,4 46,1 37,9 26,8 39,8 36,1 30,6 36,3 43,9 42,0 38,2 
1961-70 31 ,9 33,7 36,9 24,9 38,7 29,7 30,4 35,1 38,7 36,2 35,7 
1971 35,9 48,l 38,8 26,6 39,1 36,7 31 ,3 39,0 46,l 39,6 38,2 
1972 35,8 48,3 39,2 26,6 39,0 35,4 31 , l 39,8 47,2 38,3 38,1 
1973 36,6 48,6 41,7 25,4 39,4 35,1 30,6 39,5 48,9 37,8 39,1 
1974 37,9 50,3 42,0 27,0 40,3 36, l 30,8 41 ,0 49,5 41 ,6 40,2 
1975 40,7 47,5 41 ,3 27,4 41 ,3 36,2 31 ,6 50,2 51,9 42,7 40,8 
1976 40,5 46,9 42,8 29,5 43,7 39,4 33,3 51 ,0 52,2 41 ,8 42,0 
1977 42,0 47,6 44,1 29,9 43,7 38,9 34,3 55,0 I 53,0 41,8 42,7 
1978 43',0 49,7 43,9 30,2 43,3 36,0 36,2 55,9 53,7 38,4 42,4 
1979 44,7 51 ,2 43,3 30,6 44,7 38,7 36,2 53,5 56,1 39,0 42,8 
1980 44,8 52,5 43,5 30,2 46,6 42,0 37,8 55,7 54,2 40,7 43,6 
1971-80 40,2 49,1 42,1 28,3 42,1 37,5 33,3 48, l 51 ,3 40,2 41,0 
1981 45,2 51 ,9 45,5 30, l 47,3 41 ,4 39,5 54,6 53,8 42,4 44,6 
1982 47,0 51,2 46,0 33,5 47,9 43,7 41 ,8 56,9 54,6 43,5 45,7 
(1983) 46,7 52,4 46,1 35,7 48,9 45,7 44,7 58,4 56,8 43,0 46,6 
Table 46 
Expenditure of general government 
(as % of GDP) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 27,9 26,3 34,3 22,0 34,9 27,3 29,7 33,5 34,7 31 ,7 32,5 
1959 29,6 25,7 34,3 23,5 35,4 26,6 30,6 34,6 32,8 31,9 32,7 
1960 30,5 25,5 32,0 23,8 34,6 26,7 29,9 29,3 33,2 32,6 32, l 
1961 29,9 28,1 33,4 24,2 35,7 28,4 29,1 28,5 34,9 33,3 32,9 
1962 30,6 29,1 35,2 25,7 37,0 28,3 30,2 30,8 35,1 34,2 34,2 
1963 31,5 29,1 35,9 24,1 37,8 29,4 30,8 31 ,4 37,1 35,6 35,0 
1964 30,8 29,4 35,7 27,7 38,0 30,7 31 ,5 30,9 37,3 33,8 34,8 
1965 32,2 30,3 36,3 27,5 38,4 31 ,9 34,0 31 ,8 38,2 36,3 36,1 
1966 33,5 32,3 36,5 27,6 38,5 32,4 34,0 34,0 40,2 35,6 36,l 
1967 34,6 34,9 38,2 29,8 39,0 33,5 33,3 35,7 42,0 38,5 37,5 
1968 36,2 36,9 37,6 29,2 40,3 33,9 34,4 41 ,4 42,8 39,7 38,2 
1969 36,1 36,8 37,6 29,5 39,6 35,4 33,8 38,0 43,2 41 ,6 38,3 
1970 36,5 43,1 37,6 29,1 38,9 40,1 33,4 33,4 44,7 39,4 37,9 
1961-70 33,2 33,0 36,4 27,4 38,3 32,4 32,5 33,6 39,6 36,8 36,1 
1971 38,1 44,5 38,9 30,6 38,3 40,5 35,8 36,6 46,6 38,5 38,6 
1972 39,1 43,7 39,7 30,5 38,3 39,0 37,6 37,6 47,2 40, l 39,5 
1973 39,4 42,7 40,5 28,9 38,5 39.,2 36,5 36,0 47,8 41,2 39,8 
1974 39,7 48,5 43,4 31 ,7 39,7 43,7 36,2 36,0 49,6 45,7 42,1 
1975 44,7 49,5 47,1 32,5 43 ,5 47,8 44,9 49,0 54,6 47,7 46,2 
1976 45,3 47,7 46,4 33,0 44,2 47,5 42,3 49,4 54,5 46,8 45,7 
1977 47,0 49,3 46,7 34,0 44,9 46,4 43,3 52,9 54,6 45,3 46,0 
1978 48,4 52,0 46,7 35,3 45,6 46,5 46,7 52,6 55,8 42,4 46,4 
1979 51 ,6 54,3 46,3 35,2 45,5 50,5 45,6 53,4 58,1 42,3 46,4 
1980 53,9 58,6 46,9 29,8 46,2 55,2 45,6 57,0 57,9 44,3 47,1 
1971-80 44,7 49,1 44,3 32,2 42,5 45,6 41 ,5 46,1 52,7 43;4 43.,8 
1981 57,9 58,9 49,3 40,2 49,1 57,2 51 ,2 56,9 59,0 45,3 49,9 
1982 58,9 60,3 49,5 39,9 50,6 59,9 53,7 58,9 61 ,5 45,6 50,9 
(1983) 58,9 61 ,2 49,4 42,0 52,0 59,1 56,6 61 ,3 63,6 45,1 52,0 
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Table 47 
Net lending or net borrowing of general government 
(as % of GDP) 
B DK D GR F IRL L NL UK EC 
1958 -2,2 1,4 1,6 - 2,6 0,9 - 0,8 - 1,3 - 0,9 - 1,6 0,5 0,4 
1959 -3,4 2,3 2,1 -3,8 1,2 -0,7 -1,5 -3,4 0,5 0,1 0,5 
1960 -2,9 2,6 3,1 -3,7 0,9 - 1,3 - 0,8 3,0 0,8 - 1,0 0,6 
1961 -1 ,3 - 0,7 2,9 -2,2 1,0 -2,1 - 0,7 4,5 0,1 - 0,7 0,6 
1962 - 1,2 - 0,4 1,5 -2,5 - 0,1 -2,6 - 0,9 2,2 - 0,6 - 0,0 0,1 
1963 -2,0 1,3 1,0 - 0,8 -0,1 -2,6 -1 ,0 2,5 - 1,3 - 2,8 - 0,7 
1964 - 0,6 0,9 0,7 -3,7 0,7 -3,2 -0,7 2,1 - 1,5 - 1,1 - 0,1 
1965 - 1,4 1,5 - 0,6 -3,8 0,7 -3,3 - 3,6 2,8 - 0,8 - 2,0 - 1,1 
1966 - 0,8 1,6 - 0,2 - 2,4 0,6 -1 ,8 -3,6 1,3 - 0,9 - 0.0 - 0,5 
1967 - 1,2 - 0,6 - 1,4 -3,6 0,0 - 2,2 - 2,0 - 0,7 - 1,3 - 1,0 - 1,1 
1968 -2,2 - 0,1 - 0,8 - 1,9 - 0,8 - 2,3 -2,6 - 2,4 - 0,9 - 0,8 - 1,2 
1969 - 1,6 0,3 1,1 -2,3 0,9 -3,1 -2,9 0,6 - 0,5 - 0,7 - 0,2 
1970 - 1,1 3,0 0,3 - 2,3 0,9 -4,0 -2,8 2,9 - 0,8 2,6 0,3 
1961-70 - 1,3 0,7 0,5 -2,6 0,4 -2,7 -2,3 1,6 - 0,9 - 0,7 - 0,4 
1971 - 2,1 3,6 - 0,2 - 4,0 0,7 -3,8 - 4,6 2,4 - 0,5 1,2 - 0,5 
1972 - 3,3 4,6 - 0,5 - 3,8 0,8 -3,5 - 6,5 2,2 - 0,0 - 1,9 - 1,4 
1973 -2,7 5,9 1,2 - 3,5 0,9 -4,1 -5,8 3,5 1,1 - 3,4 - 0,8 
1974 - 1,8 1,8 - 1,4 -4,7 0,6 - 7,5 - 5,4 5, 1 - 0,1 - 4,1 - 1,9 
1975 - 4,1 -2,0 - 5,8 - 5,1 -2,2 - 11 ,6 - 13,3 1,2 - 2,7 - 5,0 - 5,5 
1976 - 4,8 - 0,8 - 3,6 - 3,6 - 0,5 ·-8, 1 -9,0 1,6 - 2,4 - 5,0 - 3,7 
1977 - 4,9 - 1,7 -2,6 - 4,2 - 1,3 - 7,6 - 9,0 2, 1 - 1,5 - 3,4 - 3,3 
1978 - 5,5 -2,2 -2,8 - 5,1 -2,3 - 10,4 - 10,5 3,3 - 2,1 - 4,0 - 4,0 
1979 - 6,9 - 3,1 - 3,0 - 4,6 - 0,8 - 11 ,9 - 9,4 0,1 -2,0 -3,3 - 3,6 
1980 - 9,4 - 5,9 - 3,5 0,4 0,0 - 12,8 -8,4 - 1,8 -3,4 -3,5 - 3,5 
1971-80 - 4,6 0,0 -2,2 - 3,9 - 0,1 -8, 1 -8,0 2,0 - 1,4 - 3,2 - 2,8 
1981 - 12,6 - 7,0 - 3,9 - 10,1 - 1,8 - 15,8 - 11 ,7 - 2,3 - 5,2 - 2,9 - 5,2 
1982 - 11 ,9 - 9,1 - 3,5 - 6,4 -2,7 - 16,2 - 11 ,9 - 2,0 - 6,9 - 2, 1 - 5,2 
(1983) - 12,2 -8,8 -3,3 - 6,3 -3,1 - 13,4 - 11 ,9 - 2,9 - 6,7 - 2,2 - 5,4 
Table 48 
Budgetary expenditure of the European Communities (a) 
(million ua/EUA /ECU) 
ECSC European Euratom EC general budget Total 
opera· Develop· (b) 
Ilona! rnent EAGGF Social Regional Industry Adrn. Total 
budget Fund (c) Fund Fund Energy and EC 
Research others 
(d) 
1958 21 ,7 7,9 5,9 5,9 35,5 
1959 30,7 51 ,2 39,1 25,2 25,2 146,2 
1960 23,5 63,2 20,0 28,3 28,3 135,0 
1961 26,5 172,0 72,5 8,6 25,4 34,0 305,0 
1962 13,6 162,3 88,6 . 11 ,3 81 ,0 92,3 356,8 
1963 21 ,9 55,5 106,4 4,6 79,5 . 84,1 267,9 
1964 18,7 35,0 124,4 7,2 85,9 93,1 271 ,1 
1965 37,3 248 ,8 120,0 102,7 42,9 55,5 201 ,1 607,2 
1966 28,1 157,8 129,2 310,3 26,2 65,8 402,2 717,3 
1967 10,4 105,8 158,5 562,0 35,6 77,5 675,1 949,8 
1968 21 ,2 121 ,0 73,4 2 250,4 43,0 11 5,3 2 408,6 2 624,2 
1969 40,7 104,8 59,2 3 818,0 50,5 182,7 4 051 ,2 4 255,9 
1970 56,2 10,5 63,4 5 228,3 64,0 156,1 5 448,4 5 578,5 
1971 37,4 236,1 1 883,6 56,5 65,0 284,3 2 289,3 2 562,8 
1972 43,7 212,7 2 477,6 97,5 75,1 424,3 3 074,5 3 330,9 
1973 86,9 210,0 3 768,8 269,2 69,l 533,8 4 641 ,0 4 937,9 
1974 92,0 157,0 3 651 ,3 292, 1 82,8 1 011 ,9 5 038,2 5 287,2 
1975 127,4 . 71 ,0 4 586,6 360,2 150,0 99,0 1 017,8 6 213,6 6 41 2,0 
1976 94,0 320,0 6 033,3 176,7 300,0 11 3,3 1 329,2 7 952,6 8 366,6 
1977 (e) 93,0 800,0 6 667,6 55,3 400,0 167,0 1 303,9 8 483,2 9 376,2 
1978 159,1 394,5 9 552,3 256,5 254,9 266,8 1 430,8 11 884,2 12 190,8 
1979 173,9 480,0 10 765 ,0 527,0 499,0 288,0 2 368,0 14 602,5 15 256,4 
1980 175,7 508,5 11 596,l 502,0 751 ,8 212,8 2 994,9 (f) 16 057 ,5 16 741 ,7 
1981 261 ,0 658,0 11 443 ,0 547,0 547,0 232,0 4 060,0 18 546,0 (g) 19 465,0 
1982 243,0 750,0 12 792,0 910,0 2 766,0 (h) 346,0 4 613,0 21 427 ,0 (i) 22 420,0 
1983 16 611 ,0 1 497,0 2 432,0 1 454,0 3 282,0 25 276,0 (j) 
1984 16 992,0 1 446,0 1 335,0 1 307,0 3 768,0 24 848,0 (k) 
226 
Table 49 
Budgetary receipts of the European Communities (a) 
(million 11a/EUA/ECU) 
ECSC European Euratom EC budget Total 
levies Dev. conlri-
and Fund butions Miscellan. Own resources Total 
o ther contri- (research and EC 
butions only) contri- Miscella- Agri- Import GNP 
butions neous cultural duties cootri-
under levies butioos 
special keys or VAT 
(b) (c) 
1958 44,0 116,0 7,9 0,02 5,9 5,9 173,8 
1959 49,6 116,0 39,1 0,1 25,1 25,2 229,9 
1960 53,3 116,0 20,0 0,2 28,1 28,3 217,6 
1961 53,1 116,0 72,5 2,8 31 ,2 34,0 275,6 
1962 45,3 116,0 88,6 2,1 90,2 92,3 342,2 
1963 47,1 106,4 6,7 77,4 84,1 237,5 
1964 61 ,3 124,4 2,9 90,1 93,1 278,7 
1965 66,1 98,8 3,5 197,6 201 , l 366,0 
1966 71 ,2 116,5 3,9 398,3 402,2 590,0 
1967 40,3 40,0 158,5 4,2 670,9 675,1 913 ,9 
1968 85,4 90,0 82,0 2 408,6 2 666,0 
1969 106,8 110,0 62,7 78,6 3 972,6 4 051 ,2 4 330,7 
1970 100,0 130,0 67,7 121 , 1 5 327,3 5 448,4 5 746, l 
1971 57,9 170,0 69,5 713,8 582,2 923,8 2 289,3 2 517,2 
1972 61 ,1 170,0 80,9 799,6 957,4 1 236,6 3 074,5 3 305,6 
1973 120,3 150,0 511 ,0 478,0 1 564,7 2 087,3 4 641,0 4 911 ,3 
1974 124,6 150,0 65,3 323,6 2 684,4 1 964,8 5 038,2 5 312,8 
1975 189,5 220,0 320,5 590,0 3 151 ,0 2 152,0 6 213,6 6 623,1 
1976 (d) 129,6 311,0 282,8 1 163,7 4 064,6 2 482, 1 7 993 ,1 8 433,7 
1977 123,0 410,0 283,0 1 778,5 3 927,2 2 494,5 8 483,2 9 016,2 
1978 164,9 147,5 217,2 2 283,3 4 407,9 4 975,8 11 .884,2 12 196,6 
1979 168,4 480,0 230,3 2 143,4 5 189,1 7 039,8 14 602,5 15 251,0 
1980 226,2 555,0 1 055,9 (e) 2 002,3 5 905,8 7 093,5 16 057,5 (f) 16 838 ,7 
1981 264,0 658,0 1 219,0 1 747,0 6 392,0 9 188,0 18 546,0 (g) 19 468,0 
1982 243,0 750,0 187,0 2 228,0 6 815,0 12 197,0 21 427,0 22 420,0 
1983 1 294,0 2 461,0 7 574,0 13 947,0 25 276,0 (h) 
1984 222,0 2 950,0 7 623,0 14 053,0 24 848,0 (i) 
Table 50 Table 51 
Borrowing operations of the European Communities and Net outstanding borrowing of the European 
of the European Investment Bank Communities and of the European Investment Bank 
(million ua/EUA/ECU) (million ua/EUA/ECU) (a) 
. ECSC EIB Eoratom EEC(b) EEC-NCI(c) Total ECSC EIB Euratom EEC(b) EEC-NCI(c) Total 
1958 50 50 1958 212 212 
1959 1959 209 209 
1960 35 35 1960 236 236 
1961 23 21 44 1961 248 21 269 
1962 70 32 102 1962 304 54 358 
1963 33 35 5(d) 73 · 1963 322 88 410 
1964 128 67 8(d) 203 1964 436 154 590 
1965 54 65 ll(d) 130 1965 475 217 692 
1966 103 139 14(d) 256 1966 560 355 915 
1967 58 195 3(d) 256 1967 601 548 l 149 
1968 108 213 321 1968 686 737 1 423 
1969 52 146 198 1969 719 883 1 602 
1970 60 169 229 1970 741 1 020 1 761 
1971 102 413 l(d) 516 1971 802 1 423 2 225 
1972 230 462 692 1972 963 l 784 2 747 
1973 263 608 871 1973 1 157 2 287 3 444 
1974 528 826 . I 354 1974 1 615 3 124 4 739 
1975 731 814 l 545 1975 2 391 3 926 6 317 
. 
1976 956 732 1 249 2 937 1976 3 478 4 732 l 161 9 371 
1977 729 1 030 99 571 2 429 1977 3 955 5 421 99 1 500 10 975 
1978 981 l 863 72 2 916 1978 4 416 6 715 172 l 361 12 664 
1979 837 2 437 153 178 3605 1979 4 675 8 541 323 965 178 14 682 
1980 l 004 2 384 181 305 3 874 1980 5 406 10 604 502 l 016 402 18 019 
1981 325 2 243 373 339 3 280 1981 5 884 13 482 902 l 062 894 22 224 
1982 712 3 146 363 773 4 994 1982 6 178 16 570 1 272 591 l 747 26 358 
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Notes on the tables 
Tables 1 and 2: 
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts 1972 (Greece (1958-60) 
OECD National Accounts) and National Accounts ESA 1982 
(Cronos data bank, SEC 1). 
Table 3: 
Source: Eurostat, Cronos data bank (SOEC definition). 
Tables 4 to 8: 
Source : As for Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 8: 
Coverage: Not including construction. 
Source: Eurostat, Cronos data bank. 
Tables 10 to 23: 
Sources: As for Tables l and 2. 
Table 22: 
Source: As for Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 23 
Definition: Compensation per employee deflated by the price 
index of private consumption. 
Source: Commission departments. 
Table 24 
Definition: Compensation of employees adjusted for the share of 
. self-employed in total employment, as per cent of GDP at factor 
cost. 
Table 25 
Source : For a detailed commentary on the method used see 
European Economy No 8, March 1981. 
Tables 28 and 29: 
Source: Eurostat, Foreign Trade (monthly bulletin), special 
number July 1981, and National Accounts as for Tables I and 2. 
Tables 30 and 31: 
Source: As for Tables l and 2. 
Tables 32 and 33: 
Source: As for Tables 28 and 29. 
Table 34: 
Definition: Net lending or borrowing of the nation minus net 
capital transfers to the rest of the world. 
Sourct:: As for Tables 1 and 2. 
Tables 35 and 36: 
Source: As for Tables 28 and 29. 
Table 37: 
Defmitions : B: up to 1964, monetary claims on the main 
monetary institutions; from 1965, M2H. DK: up to 1975, M2; 
from 1976, M2H. D: M3. GR : M3. F : up to 1981, total M2; 
from 1982residents M2. IRL: M3. I : upto 1975, M2; from 1976, 
M3. NL : M2. UK: sterling M3. EC: rate of growth of the 
geometrical average, weighted by GDP at current prices and 
purchasing power parities, of the money stock indices of the 
countries (1975= 100). The weight of Luxembourg has been 
added to the weight of Belgium. 
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Table 38: 
Definitions : DK : Discount rate until 1976, day-to-day rate since 
1977. D: 3-month inter-bank rate. GR : Interest rates on credit 
for working capital to industry until 1980; from 1981 , rate on 
inter-bank sight deposits. F : Day-to-day rate until 1968, !-
month commercial paper rate since 1969. IRL : Up to .1970 : 3-
month inter-bank loans in London ; from 1971: 3-month inter-
bank loans in Dublin. I : 12-month Treasury bill rate until 1970, 
inter-bank rate since 1971. NL: Treasury bill 3-months up to 
1972; inter-bank loans 3-months from 1973. B: Rate on 4-month 
certificates ofFonds des Routes. UK: 3-month Treasury bill rate 
until September 1964, 3-month inter-bank rate since October 
1964. EC: Weighted average with GDP at purchasing power 
parity 1975. 
Table 39: 
Definitions: DK: Yield on first-class mortgage loans. D : 
Average yield on all public sector bonds. GR : Weighted average 
yield of government bonds. F: Yield on public sector bonds. 
IRL: Up to 1970: yield on government securities with maturity 
20 years in London. From 1971 : yield on government securities 
with maturity 15 years in Dublin. I : Yield on Crediop public 
bonds. NL: OECD, yield of government bonds 3,25% up to 
1973. Private loan to public utilities from 1974. B: Yield on 5-
year government bonds. UK : Yield on 20-year government 
securities. EC: Weighted average with GDP at purchasing power 
parity 1975, up to 1964 without Greece. 
Table 40: 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics and Commission 
departments. Gold is valued at market related prices . 
Tables 41 and 44: 
Source : Commission departments ; for 1982 average to Sep-
tember 1982. 
Tables 45 to 47: 
Sources : Member countries' national accounts and OECD 
National Accounts. 
Table 48: 
Source : 1958-81: Management accounts. (a) u.a. until 1977. 
EUA/ECU 1978 onwards. (b) Incorporated in the EC budget 
from 1971. (c) This column includes, for the years to 1970, 
substantial amounts carried forward to following years. (d) 
Including the European Parliament, the Council, the Court of 
Justice, the Court of Auditors and the administrative part of the 
ECSC budget. (e) In 19.77 appropriations for the Social Fund 
carried forward from 1976 and subsequently cancelled amounted 
to 227 716 611 u.a., while total expenditure for 1977 amounted to 
only 172 439 999 u.a. giving the net figure shown here. (f) 
Including surplus of 82,4 million ECU carried forward to 1981 . 
(g) Including 1 173 million ECU carried forward to 1982. (h) 
Including I 819 million ECU UK special measures. (i) Including 
2 211 million ECU carried forward to 1983. (j) Preliminary draft 
supplementary budget No 2/1983. (k) Draft budget established 
by the Council 22 July 1983. 
Table 49: 
Source : 1958-81 : Management accounts. (a) u.a. until 1977, 
EUA/ECU 1978 onwards. (b) GNP until 1978, VAT from 1979 
onward. (c) This column includes for the years to 1970 surplus 
revenue from previous years carried forward to following years. 
(d) As a result of the calculations to establish the relative shares 
of the Member States in the 1976 budget, an excess of revenue 
over expenditure occurred amounting to 40 543 573 u.a. This 
was carried forward to 1977. (c) Including surplus brought 
forward from 1979 and balance of 1979 VAT and financial 
contributions. (f) Including surplus of 82,4 million ECU carried 
for~ar? to 1981. (g) Including surplus of661 million ECU. (h) 
Prehmmary draft supplementary budget No 2/ 1983. (i) Draft 
budget established by the Council 22 July 1983. 
Tables 50 and 51 : 
Source : European Eco11omy No 6; 'Borrowing and lending 
instruments looked at in the context of the Community's 
financial instruments', No 8, 'The Community's borrowing and 
lending operations : recent developments affecting certain 
instruments', and No 13, September 1982, 'The borrowing and 
lending activities of the Community'. (a) ECSC: 1958-74, u.a. ; 
1975-82, EUA/ECU. EIB: 1961-73, u.a. ; 1974-82, EUA/ECU. 
Euratom: 1963-71 u.a. ; 1977-82, EUA/ECU. (b) EEC balance of 
payments financing. (c) EEC New Community Instrument (for 
investment). (d) Drawings under credit lines opened with 
Eximbank (USA). 
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